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ABSTRACT 
This work is about Australian government social security 
policy towards Aborig ines. It begins by outlining the move from 
the legislative exclusion of Aborigines from the social security 
system in the early part of this century to their gradual 
legislative inclusion between 1941 and 1966. The rest of chapter 
1 is devoted to clarifying my conceptual approach to the notion 
of policy and to outlining an approach to the study. In it I 
argue that policy needs to be understood in terms of patterns of 
governmental commitment over time, rather than as something that 
can be comprehended in particular documents, such as legislation, 
or in the words or actions of particular participants, such as 
government ministers. As a consequence, policy needs to be 
studied and analysed as it emerges from the strategic 
interactions of all those involved in a particular shpere of 
governmental activity. This approach to the study of policy 
commits me to examining the established patterns of governmental 
commitment against which recent relations between Aborigines and 
the social security system have emerged. For this reason, the 
rest of part I of the work provides background material on the 
general dynamics of Australian social security administration and 
on general governmental approaches to Aborigines. 
Parts II and III of the work provide a detailed empirical 
account of recent relations between the social security system 
and Aborigines. Building on a distinction between patronal and 
legal bureaucratic access structures for the poor, part II 
analyses the changing roles and resources of participants 
involved in this area of g o v e r n m e n t activity. Chapter 4 
identifies the way in which social security payments to 
Aborigines were, until the 1960s, largely incorporated into the 
existing highly patronal special purpose state-level Aboriginal 
welfare systems. Chapter 5 traces the transformation of this 
pattern of servicing through a growing DSS awareness of and 
commitment to it new Aboriginal clientele, while chapter 6 
identifies the effects on Aboriginal access to social security 
payments of changes in the non-government Aboriginal welfare 
sector. 
Part III of the work inquires more closely into the 
processes through which this general policy change has occurred. 
It examines a number of specific debates in recent years over the 
application of particular aspects of the social security system's 
rules to Aborigines. Chapter 7 examines instances of the 
breakdown of standard DSS procedures when applied to Aborigines. 
Chapter 8 recounts debates over the application of the social 
security system's family income units to Aborigines. Chapters 9 
and 10 are concerned with various aspects of recent debates over 
Aboriginal eligibility for unemployment benefit. 
Part IV of the work returns to the overall concern with 
policy maintenance and transformation. Drawing on the details of 
parts II and III, it attempts first to identify the general 
nature of the transformation of Aboriginal access to social 
security payments and of the DSS's commitment to Aborigines and 
second to identify some general characteristics of the processes 
through which this policy change has emerged. 
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PART ^ 
IMRODUCTION 
Chapter ]_ 
Aborigines apd the Australian Social Security System: 
An Approach to the Case 
This work is about changes in Australian government social 
security policy towards Aborigines. In the decade 1905-15, when 
the new Commonwealth government introduced age and invalid 
pensions and maternity allowances, the legislation specifically 
excluded Aborigines from eligibility for these income security 
payments. In the early 1940s, when the Commonwealth government's 
involvement in income security was expanded through the 
introduction of family allowances, widows' and wives' pensions 
and unemployment, sickness and special benefits, the exclusion of 
Aborigines became slightly less comprehensive (1). Family 
allowances could be paid in respect of Aboriginal children unless 
they were 'nomadic' or 'wholly or mainly dependent' upon 
Commonwealth or State governments for their support (Act No 8 of 
1941). Age, invalid, wives' and widows' pensions became payable 
to Aborigines exempt from State or Commonwealth Territory laws 
'relating to the control of Aboriginal natives' and, where the 
relevant State or Territory laws did not provide for such 
exemption, to those individual Aborigines whose 'character, 
standard of intelligence and social development' made it 
reasonable in the judgement of the Director General of the DSS 
to do so (Acts Nos 3 and 19 of 1942). Ivith the introduction of 
unemployment, sickness and special benefits legislation in 1944, 
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these payments too became available to Aborigines who the 
Director General of Social Security judged to be of appropriate 
'character, standard of intelligence and social development' (Act 
10 of 1944). 
In 1959, further legislative amendments overturned this 
complex of exclusionary provisions and replaced them with ones 
which included all Aborigines except the 'nomadic and primitive'. 
Announcing these changes, the Minister for Social Services, 
Kobertson, commented: 
I come now to the provisions relating to the aboriginal 
natives of Australia, and no provisions in this bill could 
give me greater personal satisfaction. 
Ihis is an occasion of great historic importance both 
nationally and internationally. For more than 50 years 
successive Commonwealth governments have been called upon to 
defend - or to remove - the traditional discrimination 
levelled against the aboriginal natives of our country who, 
for a variety of reasons associated with the native welfare 
laws of the States, were unable to qualify for social service 
benefits in the normal way.... the effect of the legislation 
I now bring to the House is to sweep away the provisions that 
place restrictions on aboriginal natives in qualifying for 
social service benefits, except where they are nomadic or 
primitive... 
There have been considerable difficulties to overcome and a 
great amount of preliminary investigation and exploratory 
negotiations with state authorities and other interested 
persons was necessary before v;e were in a position to 
formulate a new policy which would adequately meet the 
various problems involved (CPD House of Representatives, 
3/9/1959: 930) (2). 
In 1966, the remaining references to 'nomadic and primitive' 
Aborigines were also removed from the legislation. These 
amendments, unlike the 1959 ones, did not occasion grandiloquent 
ministerial comment. They were, in the words of the then Minister 
for Social Services, Sinclair, a 'machinery item' amending 
provisions which had been 'in no sense discriminatory in their 
application', but which were now to be deleted 'to remove any 
doubt' (CPD house of Representatives 15/9/1966: 934). 
In legislative terms, the history of Commonwealth government 
social security policy towards Aborigines is one of a gradual 
move from exclusion to inclusion. On the basis of this brief 
account and my declared intention to focus on changes in social 
security policy towards Aborigines, one might well anticipate 
that this work would focus on the period of the 1950s. The 1959 
legislative amendments have been clearly identified by both the 
Ministers quoted as the point of major change. Robertson 
indicated that the process of 'formulating' the 'new policy' 
embodied in the legislative changes had involved 'considerable 
difficulties'. Sinclair, on the other hand, implied that by 1966, 
all that remained to be done was minor technical adjustment; mere 
tidying up of the implementation of the new policy. However, this 
work is not primarily about changes in the 1950s. It is about 
changes which have their roots in the 1940s and 1950s, but which 
are still occurring to this day. It is not only about changing 
social security policy towards Aborigines, but also about the 
implementation of that policy change. 
Policy Processes: Models and Methods 
Mention of the words 'policy' and 'implementation' leads me 
to a number of more conceptual issues about what it is that 
governments and their administrations do as they reproduce and 
develop the form and substance of the modern welfare state. The 
conventional view of the relationship between politics and 
administration is, as Self notes, of one between ends and means. 
Vvhereas politics is concerned with the uses of state power and 
disputes about the allocation of public resources, administration 
is concerned with 'translating into practice political decisions 
which are derived from other sources' (Self 1977: 149). The 
politics/administration distinction in terms of ends and means is 
also usually paralleled by a similar ends/means distinction 
between policy and administration, or policy and implementation. 
Politics is concerned with the general ends of government, with 
matters of policy. Administration, on the other hand, is 
only c o n c e r n e d with the technical details of their 
implementation. The distinctions are also conventionally seen as 
ones between the concerns of elected politicians and those of 
appointed government officials (Self 1977: 150). Ihey are then as 
much distinctions between the roles of different types of 
participants in government as between different ends/means 
aspects of governmental decision making. 
Within this conventional view, policy takes the form of a 
particular type of decision which emerges at the conclusion of a 
political process of debate and negotiation over the ends to 
v/hich state power and resources should be put; who will get what 
when and how. Central to this political process of policy 
formulation are elected politicians, and particularly government 
ministers. Administrators may advise and outside interests may 
bring pressure to bear, but ultimately it is the elected 
politicians, and particularly ministers, who must invoke the 
authority of the state and make a decision. With this decision 
taking step politics, in the sense of disagreement and struggle 
over the allocation of important public resources, is supposed to 
end. Ivhat follows are stages of implementation; the province of 
administration to which politics and politicians are seldom 
legitimately admitted. All that remains to be done is for the 
administrators to bring the agreed policy to reality as 
efficiently and effectively as possible, and in accordance with 
the other norms of administration; obedience to hierarchical 
authority, equality of treatment for all under the rules, etc. 
Legislative changes are, in this conventional view, the 
archetypal policy decisions; though far from the only ones. The 
Minister for Social Security appeared to be using the term 
policy in this conventional sense when he referred to the events 
leading up to the 1959 amendements to the social security 
legislation as the formulation of a 'new policy'. It was also 
this conventional understanding of the term which led me, having 
declared my interest in social security policy towards 
Aborigines, to recount the history of social security legislative 
provisions relating to Aborigines. 
Ihis conventional view owes much to normative ideals of 
responsible government, and it is partly on account of this that 
it occurs so frequently in commonsense notions of governmental 
processes. In academic terms it received its fullest endorsement 
at the hands of the American scientific administration school 
during the early years of this century (Self 1977: Chi, Dunsire 
1978: Chi). However, as an adequate analytic schema with which to 
approach the study of governmental processes, it has come under 
substantial criticism ever since. As Self notes of the ends/means 
distinction between politics and administration: 
so simplified a distinction has never at any time or in any 
society been very realistic (Self 1977: lAy). 
The question then arises as to how we might improve or replace 
the distinction. In this context it is important to trace some of 
the more critical analytic attempts to conceptualise governmental 
processes in other ways in recent years. 
In his early and now much cited work on 'muddling through', 
'incrementalism' and 'partisan mutual adjustment', Lindblom 
emphasised that policy making tends to proceed through repeated 
remedial steps which build gradually on what already exists, 
rather than through single authoritative decisions (Lindblom 
1959, 1965, 1968). Participants successively scan a limited range 
of possible courses of action and characteristically employ 
strategies not very different from those with which they are 
already familiar. Lindblom also emphasised that the outcomes of 
the process need not be the result of decisions made by 
particular participants, but can rather be the net result of 
adjustments between partisan actors who continue to disagree on 
important aspects of the allocation of public resources. 
In the Australian context in 1960, Parker argued that the 
ends/means distinction between policy and administration had been 
built on a false analogy between the governmental process and a 
machine. Public purposes could not be so easily specified or 
transmitted as the analogy suggested: 
'purposes' of a community as embodied in legislation cannot 
possibly be expressed in definitive, unmodifiab1e, 
inextensible 'instructions' comparable to those involved in 
tapping out these words on the typewriter keys. What we have 
in legislation are statements of greater or less generality, 
which become meaningful only in application to particular 
cases... As a matter of convenience, only a small proportion 
of the applications can be carried out by responsible 
representatives; the rest must be shared with officials. The 
imprecision of the original statements of purpose inevitably 
leaves a margin of discretion to ministers and officials - a 
margin which may permeate to very low levels of the 
administrative hierarchy. Anyone who has discretion helps to 
determine policy (Parker 1960: 117). 
If there was a distinction to be maintained betweeen different 
types of governmental activity, Parker argued that it was not so 
much a dichotomy between policy making and its implementation but 
a continuum of difference ranging from 'broader statements of 
purpose' to 'increasingly specific decisions and actions' (Parker 
1960: 117). This, of course, was no longer a recipe for 
distinguishing between categorically different types of 
governmental decision making or between the different roles of 
politicians and administrators. Part of the point was that 
politicians often do, in fact, take an interest in the details of 
particular cases, while on other matters, more general decisions 
about public purposes fall to administrators. 
In 1965, in their introduction to a collection of case 
studies in Australian governmental processes entitled Decisions, 
Schaffer and Corbett directed attention to the way in which 
decisions 'emerge' from the existing 'setting' against 'differing 
patterns of contest': 
The deliberations of the decision will see a selection, of 
tactics and values about how the decision is to be conducted 
and towards what ends, and of what evidence will be 
considered (Schaffer and Corbett eds 1965: Introduction). 
But the outcome of such deliberations, they argued, is seldom 
best conceived as a decisive end point: 
Decisions lead to fresh commitments which become part of a 
new setting provoking further decisions (Schaffer and Corbett 
eds 1965: Introduction). 
So the cases in Schaffer and Corbett's collection are not about 
single isolated decisions. Each necessarily covers a 'good deal 
of ground' in the particular area of government activity being 
examined. Schaffer and Corbett note the 'continual movement' 
between 'closed' and 'open' spheres of decision making within and 
outside the formal hierarchies of government administration and 
the inadequacy of the notion of 'simply executing policy'! 
Ihere does not seem to emerge a confident sense of policy as 
a thing exsiting on a somewhat airless plateau, quite other 
than a jumble of activities among the lower foothills. What 
we see, rather, is policy as, in one sense, a sort of 
commitment, often unwilling and delayed, of important and 
expensive resources: an obligation for some, a structural 
factor for other participants (Schaffer and Corbett eds 
1965: Introduction). 
Some years later, Schaffer described the public policy process, 
somewhat more epigramatically, as: 
a multi person drama going on in several arenas, some of them 
likely to be complex large-scale organisational situations. 
Decisions are the outcome of the drama, not a voluntary 
willed, individual, interstitial action. 'Drama is 
continuous. Decisions are convenient labels given post hoc to 
the mythical precedents of the apparent outcomes of uncertain 
conflicts.' (Schaffer 1977: 148) 
In 1972 in the 'garbage can' model of public policy making 
that he and others had developed, Olsen noted that; 
What is being decided will itself be determined through the 
course of deciding it (Olsen 1972: 49, See also March and 
Olsen 1976). 
Olsen argued that because all participants face competing claims 
on their time and because all choice opportunities are 'ambiguous 
stimuli', it is important to attend to the 'activation' of 
participants and the 'definition' of choice opportunities. He saw 
public policy making as a garbage can in which participants, 
choice opportunities, problems and solutions circulated 
haphazardly as 'streams', rather than in any set configuration of 
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roles and ordered processes. Participants find problems and 
solutions find choice opportunities as much as vice versa. 
Policy, he argued, is an 'outcome' or an 'interpretation of the 
four streams' (Olsen 1972: 53). 
By 1972, these sorts of critiques of the conventional view 
had become common enough for Heclo to argue in his review article 
on policy analysis that there was considerable agreement in 
'academic circles' that policy, understood analytically, had to 
be something 'bigger than individual decisions', something 
'broader than the tangible pieces of legislation and regulations 
which at any one moment are being administered by government 
departments'(Heclo 1972: 84-85). Heclo argued that at the core 
of recent academic usage there was a common notion of policy as a 
course of action or inaction intended to accomplish some end. He 
noted, nevertheless, that there was also some disagreement in 
academic circles between those who thought of policy as only an 
intended course of action or inaction and those who wished also 
to include the 'actual behaviour implementing the intention'. 
Heclo sided with the latter, arguing that: 
for serious political study, it seems useful to recognize 
that, while policy is purposive, a statement of purpose does 
not itself constitute the sum of policy. The alternative is 
to tie policy studies to the view that an intention produces 
a policy regardless of whatever actually occurs (Heclo 1972: 
85). 
Arising from this view, Heclo noted that the phenomena at issue 
in policy studies are 'moving events, routines, strategies and 
adaptations'. The challenge, he argued: 
is not to decompose process or content but to find the 
relationships which link the two, not to reify collectivities 
into individual deciders but to understand the networks of 
interaction by which policies result (Heclo 1972: 106). 
Heclo's o w n a p p r o a c h , d e v e l o p e d m o r e f u l l y in his 1974 w o r k on 
social policy in Britain and Sweden, was to view policy processes 
in terms of 'collective puzzlement' and 'political learning'. The 
appropriate image, he argued, was that of: 
a m a z e w h e r e the o u t l e t is s h i f t i n g and the w a l l s are b e i n g 
constantly repatterned; where the suject is not an individual 
but a g r o u p b o u n d t o g e t h e r ; w h e r e this g r o u p d i s a g r e e s not 
only on how to get out but on whether getting out constitutes 
a satisfactory solution; where, finally, there is not one but 
a l a r g e n u m b e r of s u c h g r o u p s w h i c h k e e p g e t t i n g in each 
other's w a y (Heclo 1974:308). 
Yet H e c l o e m p h a s i s e d t h a t t h e r e is l e a r n i n g , s o m e t i m e s 
'nonlearning', and not just random bumping. 
P e r h a p s the m o s t s t r i k i n g a s p e c t of these r e c e n t m o r e 
c r i t i c a l a n a l y t i c a t t e m p t s to c o n c e p t u a l i s e g o v e r n m e n t a l 
processes is the consistent way in which the various authors have 
chosen to reject the conventional sequential language of policy 
formulation, decision making and implementation in favour of some 
other metaphor altogether. This has been no mere literary device. 
For the l a n g u a g e and the c o n v e n t i o n a l v i e w of g o v e r n m e n t a l 
processes are closely intertwined. 
C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , the w a y in w h i c h P r e s s m a n and 
W i l d a v s k y i n t r o d u c e d t h e f i r s t e d i t i o n of t h e i r w o r k 
Implementation in 1973: 
Implementation, to us, means just what Webster and Roget say 
it d o e s : to c a r r y o u t , a c c o m p l i s h , f u l f i l l , p r o d u c e , 
complete. But what is it that is being implemented? A policy, 
n a t u r a l l y . T h e r e m u s t be s o m e t h i n g out there prior to 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ; o t h e r w i s e there w o u l d be n o t h i n g to m o v e 
t o w a r d in the p r o c e s s of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . A v e r b like 
'implement' must have an object like 'policy' (Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1984: xxi). 
I r o n i c a l l y e n o u g h , t h o u g h t r a p p e d by t h e i r l a n g u a g e into an 
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essentially conventional view, much of what Pressman and 
Wildavsky had to say about implementation was itself a 
significant contribution to the critique of that view. Their 
account of the vjay in which the multiplicity of participants with 
different perspectives engaged in an apparently never ending 
process of negotiation over the details of the 'implementation' 
of the Economic Development Administration's new program in 
Oakland was a perfect example of Schaffer's continuous drama, 
March and Olsen's organised anarchy in the garbage can, or 
heclo's collective puzzlement in the shifting maze. Their 
analysis suggested the inadequacy of viewing implementation as a 
matter of subsequent 'technical details', since it was precisely 
on these details that the program foundered. Pressman and 
Wildavsky were, however, still inclined to retain the sequential 
language of policy formulation and implementation and to argue, 
in their more prescriptive moments, that the two should be more 
closely related: 
implementation should not be divorced from policy. There is 
no point in having good ideas if they cannot be carried out.. 
The great problem, as we understand it, is to make the 
difficulties of implementation a part of the initial 
formulation of policy. Implementation must not be conceived 
as a process that takes place after, and independent of, the 
design of policy. Means and ends can be brought into somewhat 
closer correspondence only by making each partially dependent 
on the other (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984: 143). 
In the later editions of Implementation, Wildavsky and his new 
collaborators more explicitly rejected the language of sequential 
stages. Instead, implementation came to be viewed as 
'interaction' and 'evolution'; the inevitably unpredictable 
working out of general policy 'dispositions', which itself shapes 
the further development of those dispositions (2nd edition. 
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1979). Later still, the metaphor was of 'exploration', 'mutual 
adaptation' and 'learning' (3rd edition 1984). 
All this suggests the importance of the language employed in 
models of governmental process. Critics of the conventional 
policy formulation, decision taking and implementation view have 
usually found it necessary to abandon or at least clarify this 
language in order to develop their own more adequate analytic 
frameworks. Schaffer, for his part, has come to criticise 
strongly both the language of decision and of implementation. 
V^ ihile he has no wish to deny that there are opportunities for 
choice in matters of public policy, and hence that many decisions 
are to be made, he objects to the 'decisionality' of conventional 
language; the notion that a policy decision is 'single, isolated 
and discrete, and is taken as elective and intended' (Schaffer 
1984: 148). Similarly Schaffer rejects the language of 
'implementation' and regards the listing of 'obstacles' to 
implementation as if they were inanimate objects which need to be 
removed as a 'seauctive' but 'pernicious' form of analysis: 
Will-less de-personal inanimate impedimenta would no doubt be 
removed. Actual opposition, objection and resistance by some 
persons to others is quite a different matter. Any 
participant at all in administration... is an interest likely 
to see a proposal from another as highly objectionable; he 
will oppose and resist it. 
All administrative or other change proposals in that sense 
meet obstacles: it is a matter of course; the list is likely 
to be very long. (Schaffer 1980: 195, see also Schaffer 1984: 
156-63). 
The term 'policy' on the other hand, has proved too central 
to any understanding of governmental processes to be so easily 
discarded. Schaffer, like Heclo, seeks to clarify it for analytic 
purposes rather than discard it as too tainted by some inadequate 
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conventional view. Building on his 1965 suggestion quoted 
earlier, in 1977 Schaffer invited us to 'look at policy as a 
committed structure of important resources' (Schaffer 1977: 148). 
Ihis particular formulation of the idea of policy has been taken 
up by a number of others in Australia as a crucial conceptual 
element in redirecting the analytic study of governmental 
activity; a redirection with which this work is in general accord 
(Hawker, Smith and Weller 1979: 21, Colebatch 1979: 14, Loveday 
1982: 200). 
One of the implications of Schaffer's and Heclo's 
formulations is that policy is not to be identified solely by 
reference to a particular document or statement; such as, in the 
present case, the legislative changes and ministerial speeches 
relating to Aboriginal inclusion in the social security system 
with which I began. Such documents and statements may, as 
Loveday makes clear, provide 'evidence' of a policy, 'a forward 
commitment to a particular course of action', but they are not 
themselves to be analytically equated with policy (Loveday 1982: 
199). It is the ongoing commitment, not the momentary 
pronouncement which is analytically important. As Heclo noted: 
There is no unambiguous datum constituting policy and waiting 
to be discovered in the world. A policy may usefully be 
considered as a course of action or inaction rather than 
specific decisions or actions, and as such a course has to be 
perceived and identified by the analyst in question (Heclo 
1972: 85). 
This does not imply that the study of policy necessarily lapses 
into the subjectivism of individual analysts arbitrarily 
identifying what, for them, constitute important courses of 
action and inaction independent of what participants themselves 
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identify as policy. It does, however, imply that policy is not to 
be appreciated in a moment; and certainly not in the words or the 
actions of any particular actor, not even a government minister. 
C o m m i t m e n t s and c o u r s e s of a c t i o n , u n l i k e p o l i t i c i a n ' s 
statements and pieces of legislation, need to be established and 
maintained. So policy is, in part at least, institutional; a 
m a t t e r of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s for ongoing resource 
allocation, of staffing and budgeting arrangments from one year 
to the next. This directs attention to the processes of 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n at all levels of the governmental apparatus and 
not just the activities of elected politicians. Policy must be 
studied and identified over time as commitments are maintained 
and developed in the processes of interaction b e t w e e n all 
participants, whether elected or appointed and whether within or 
outside the formal apparatus of the state. 
Another i m p l i c a t i o n of these f o r m u l a t i o n s is that the 
d e v e l o p m e n t of policy needs to be studied against the existing 
structure of governmental commitments and in the broader context 
of the socio-economic circumstances of those whom policy changes 
p u r p o r t to be a f f e c t i n g . N e w c o m m i t m e n t s , a g a i n u n l i k e 
ministerial pronouncements and pieces of l e g i s l a t i o n , can only 
build on existing c o m m i t m e n t s and the existing s o c i o - e c o n o m i c 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of those they affect. Policy change is, in that 
sense, a necessarily incremental process. 
The model of governmental processes emerging from these more 
analytic c r i t i c i s m s of the conventional v i e w is not one of 
sequential stages of policy f o r m u l a t i o n , decision m a k i n g and 
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implementation, but of continuous interaction and renegotiation 
both within and outside the formal apparatus of the state. There 
are not so much l a r g e , s i n g l e , e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e policy 
decisionsas a myriad of ambiguous and only partially determined 
choice opportunities at all levels of the governmental apparatus, 
the importance of which can only be understood over time as the 
results of this cacophony of d e l i b e r a t i o n and dec is ion making 
emerges. Policy i s never f i n a l l y made. It i s always s t i l l 
emerging. As the notion of sequential stages is broken down, so 
too is the notion that administrators do have, or ever could 
h a v e , an e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t a p o l i t i c a l r o l e to p l a y . The 
commitment of important public resources is always and everywhere 
open to be contested. When it is contested, as it inevitably will 
be, administrators usually have a central role to play in i ts 
maintenance or renegotiation. 
An Approach to the Case 
The legislative changes and ministerial statements referred 
to in the opening section of this chapter presented some basic 
evidence of the direction in which the social security system's 
p o l i c i e s towards Aborigines appear to be developing . Given the 
conceptual approach sketched above, however, to say anything of 
analytic value about those pol ic ies w i l l require more deta i led 
investigation of the commitment of social security resources and 
of the processes of interaction between DSS administrators, the 
potential Aboriginal clientele and other interested parties. But 
the number of i n t e r a c t i o n s of potential relevance is v a s t ; 
particularly as I delve into the administrative apparatus to the 
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d e t a i l s of budget ing , s t a f f i n g and actual service del ivery 
processes. To paraphrase Heclo on the general problem, case 
studies of the dynamic interactions of policy processes run the 
danger of lapsing into a confused real ism in search of an 
a n a l y t i c framework (Heclo 1972) . The challenge is to achieve 
a n a l y t i c r e a l i s m ; to d i s c e r n the s t r u c t u r e of r e l e v a n t 
commitments and their maintenance and transformation over time, 
not just to provide an account of endless interact ion . But to 
meet that challenge, we need more than a metaphorical comparison 
of policy processes with garbaging cans or shifting mazes. 
F i f teen years ago, as Schaffer attempted to develop an 
alternative analytic framework within which to investigate policy 
and administration, he turned his attention to those aspects of 
governmental a c t i v i t y which were 'most dominant', but to which 
the p o l i t i c a l science d i s c i p l i n e had paid least a ttent ion ; the 
routine encounters between c l i e n t s and rank and file officials 
occurring at the bottom of the h ierarch ies of government 
administrat ion . The point in doing so, was not to eschew the 
d i s c i p l i n e ' s concern for p o l i t i c s and policy , but rather to 
discover the 'ground roots ' of these in a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d a i l y 
l i f e . The d i s c i p l i n e ' s 'view from the top f loor ' had generally 
ignored this level of admin istrat ive a c t i v i t y , regarding it as 
e s s e n t i a l l y a p o l i t i c a l and instrumental ( Schaf fer ( ed ) 1975: 
e d i t o r i a l ) . But for Schaffer it was better conceived as 'a 
p a r t i c u l a r level of p o l i t i c s ' ( Schaf fer 1973 : Chl6) . It i s , he 
a r g u e d , 'a range of e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s , i n d e e d 
constitutes, the outcome of the policy, the institution and the 
programme', the analys is of which demands a more c r i t i c a l 
16 
'comparative m e t h o d o l o g y ' (Schaffer (ed) 1975: editorial). To 
provide such a methodology, Schaffer and his colleagues developed 
the 'language of access' (See also Schaffer and L a m b 1974, 
Schaffer and O'Keeffe 1978, Schaffer 1981, Painter 1980, Loveday 
1 9 8 2 b ) . T h e i r c o n c e r n h a s b e e n to a n a l y s e the n a t u r e of 
encounters between rank and file officials and their clients in 
political terms, and to relate these to the larger more overtly 
political m o m e n t s of public life. The w o r k coincided to some 
extent w i t h A m e r i c a n w o r k on the 'theory of street-level 
bureaucracy' (Lipsky 1976, 1980, Prottas 1979), and on changing 
approaches to the study of implementation (Herman 1978, Nakamura 
and S m a l l w o o d 1980, W i l l i a m s et al 1982). M y debts in what 
follows will be evident to those familar with the writings of 
Schaffer and others in a rather small and diverse literature, 
however, the particular formulation is largely my own. 
In bureaucratic administrative access situations, resources 
take the form of packages or i t e m s of service which are available 
to applicants, or clients, who can d e m o n s t r a t e that they fall 
within certain pre-defined, universalistic categories. Allocative 
decisions are made by rank and file (street level) administrators 
who occupy bureaucratic offices of specific jurisdictional range. 
So the allocation of public resources is c o m p a r t m e n t a l i s e d into a 
series of orderly queues in w h i c h people b e c o m e applicants for 
different types of services. In each queue, applicants are 
required to voice their claim for eligibility for the particular 
service. They find themselves treated as individualised cases, to 
be investigated and assessed in accordance with an existing body 
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of rules. There will be rules about the ordering of applicants 
and about what precisely needs to occur in an encounter between 
applicant and rank and file official before a decision about 
eligibility for the service can be made; the information to be 
ascertained about the circumstances of clients, the checks to be 
made and the procedures to be followed. 
Queueing structures are intended to limit the discretion of 
both applicants and rank and file officials. They treat 
applicants as isolated individuals who simply either do or do not 
have an objective need for the service offered. Rank and file 
officials, on the other hand, are treated as loyal and obedient 
appliers of the established body of rules. Fairness for all is 
ensured by equal treatment under the rules. So queues are 
important symbols of justice, the characteristic legal-
bureaucratic solution to the allocation of scarce resources 
(Schaffer 1 973: Chl6). 
All this may, of course, sound routine; a restatement of the 
Weberian ideal of rational/legal authority exercised by a 
bureaucratic administrative staff (Weber 1947: 329-41). The 
welfare state appears as a series of perfectly ordered queues, 
each justly servicing some objective client need within the 
limits of available resources. But there are important systemic 
and behavioural reasons why the ideal is never achieved, why 
bureaucratic administrative allocation is never entirely routine. 
The first systemic factor is that queuing structures manage 
scarcity, but do not eliminate it. Queues provide structures for 
individualised competition for available resources between those 
who know about the services offered and are able and willing to 
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meet the conditions imposed. They do not necessarily guarantee 
enough resources to satisfy everyone's daily needs and wants. The 
second systemic factor it that rules have to accommodate large 
numbers of individual applicants whose circumstances often differ 
markedly. It is difficult, if not impossible, for established 
bodies of rules to anticipate every nuance of every possible 
case. Even if rules are elaborated as fully as possible, they 
must still remain to some extent subjective and indeterminate. 
There are limits to bureaucratic categorisation (Hood 1976: Ch4). 
So rank and file officers will inevitably be required to make 
interpretative judgements about the application of rules to cases 
(Zimmerman 1973). Furthermore, the more rules are elaborated the 
more they will come up against a third systemic factor; the 
limited time and investigative resources of the rank and file 
officials. While the complexity of individual applicant's 
circumstances and the elaboration of rules will push rank and 
file officers towards greater case investigation, limited time 
and resources will call for rapid assessment and decision making. 
Street level bureaucrats will inevitably have to make significant 
judgements not only about how to apply the rules to particular 
cases but also about how best to employ their time and decision 
making resources. A fourth systemic factor has to do with the 
view from the client side of the counter. The central problem for 
clients is to know about the range of services offered by various 
organisations and to be able to link this knowledge to their own 
needs and wants by making judgement about which queues to join. 
The task is, in fact, far from simple. Services are highly 
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compartmentalised, rules are complex and clients, like rank and 
file officials, have limited time and investigative resources. So 
it is not always obvious to clients for which service categories 
they will be eligible or which will suit their needs or wants. 
The behavioural reasons why bureaucratic administrative 
allocation is never entirely routine arise from these systemic 
factors and from the artificiality of the roles assigned to 
participants in the queue. Clients are most assuredly not 
isolated individuals who simply either do or do not stand in need 
of the services offered. They can and do react to the queueing 
structures of welfare administration, both individually and as 
collectivities (Collman 1981). They find room for strategic 
manoeuvre. From the client perspective, the queueing structures 
of the welfare state offer not so much an array of functionally-
specific parallel services as a loose structure of partly 
substitutable and more or less preferable resource opportunities, 
each of which imposes different but always considerable 'costs' 
on them by way of conditions that must be satisfied to be granted 
eligibility (Prottas 1979:Ch8, 1981). Some clients are better at 
access encounters than others. They may have better information 
about what is available and from whom. They may know more about 
the rules under which they are being assessed, and be able to 
present their circumstances in ways which they know will maximise 
the likelihood of eligibility. 
On the other side of the counter, rank and file officials 
also have room for manouevre. In the process of making judgements 
about the application of rules to cases and about the allocation 
of their time and resources, some street level bureaucrats will 
20 
be activist facilitators of client access, while others will not. 
Itie j u d g e m e n t s they m a k e will reflect the v i e w of the world of 
service encounters they have come to acquire (Young 1981). Those 
sympathetic to client needs may push clients towards the service 
category which seems to them to offer the best chance of success. 
Ihey may inform clients of the significance of questions, of the 
i n f o r m a t i o n sought and a n s w e r s supplied and of the basis of 
decisions. They m a y even inform applicants of weak points in 
adverse decisions and encourage them to appeal. On the other 
hand, m a n y rank and file officers w i l l inhibit client access 
through m i n i m a l i s t passive behaviour. To some extent, this 
inevitably occurs simply because of the pressure on rank and file 
officials to process cases quickly within the l i m i t e d time 
available to them. But some officials go further. They m a y be 
brief, unhelpful and u n s y m p a t h e t i c to borderline cases or 
procedural transgressors, and they m a y not bother to inform 
clients of alternative service possibilities. They may be 
suspicious of the facts supplied by clients and devote the 
greater part of their energies to checking these in an attempt to 
catch clients out. Clearly when clients and officials who span 
these ranges of behaviour encounter each other in the processes 
of service allocation, there is considerable potential for these 
e n c o u n t e r s to v a r y . E v e n g r e a t e r v a r i a t i o n is l i k e l y if 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s b e c o m e i n v o l v e d ; as p o l i t i c i a n s , w e l f a r e 
professionals and others often do. A c o m p l e x dyadic exchange 
immediately becomes an even more complex triadic one. 
W h a t e m e r g e s then is the scope for both i n d e t e r m i n a c y and 
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contention in the encounters of bureaucratic service allocation. 
The image of welfare administration as an array of perfectly 
ordered parallel queues servicing a similar array of objectively-
defined client needs becomes compromised. Even at the lowest 
levels of administration, commitments of public resources are 
still being determined through processes of strategic 
interaction. Policy is still being fashioned, and street-level 
bureaucrats are contributors to that fashioning through their 
central role in the processes of service allocation (Lipsky 1980: 
Ch2). The politics of service allocation occurs through strategic 
manoeuvre in queues and at counters, between applicants/clients, 
intermediaries and rank and file officials, and within and 
between the rules governing existing service categories. As a 
'level of polities', it is highly structured, but far from 
insubstantial. 
Queueing structures can, of course, break down. If potential 
applicants do not know of a service's existence, the queue does 
not so much break down as never form. But even when people know 
of and are applying for services, they may still be dissatisfied. 
The rules may be seen as unjust, the variation in encounters 
between clients and rank and file officials may be perceived as 
unacceptably great. The supposed fairness of the queues will then 
be called into question. Individual applicants (or non-
applicants) may even seek to become organised; to exercise 
'political' voice about queueing structures as groups, not just 
'administrative' voice as individuals within them (Schaffer and 
Lamb 1974). This suggests both the empirical and analytic 
continuity between the encounters of bureaucratic service 
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allocation and the larger moments of public life which have been 
the more usual focus in studies of policy. If the view from the 
'top floor' has been partial and uncritical about activity at the 
bottom of government administration, a view entirely from the 
bottom floor is similarly incomplete. 
It is necessary, therefore, in any study of policy to also 
pay attention to the opportunities for public choice occurring 
higher up the hierarchies of government administration; but with 
a more critical 'bottom up' perspective. This perspective grounds 
the 'extradordinary' in the 'ordinary', and inquires how the 
commonplace routines of access encounters at times provide 
possibilities for 'critical' or even 'crucial institutional 
challenges'(Schaffer 1981). Politics at this higher level of 
governmental activity is more a matter of strategic manoeuvre 
about queues than within them. Over time queues can be modified, 
even new ones introduced. Rules can be reinterpreted and amended 
and resources can be redeployed. So this level of politics has 
different forms and a different time scale than at the level of 
service allocation, but the levels are essentially and 
continually connected. 
The central participants at this higher level of political 
life are senior administrators, 'institutional maintenance men' 
as Schaffer has characterised them: 
The institutional profession is crisis management: playing 
with, adapting, programmes; maintaining themselves; avoiding 
crucial challenges to institutional positions (Schaffer 
1984: 153). 
Challenges to established institutional patterns of commitment 
can come from a number of quarters. As suggested above, 
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d i s s a t i s f i e d c l i e n t s may seek to become organised as groups in an 
a t t e m p t t o c h a n g e e x i s t i n g q u e u e i n g s t r u c t u r e s . The 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s of s e r v i c e a l l o c a t i o n may again be important as 
group o r g a n i s e r s , a d v o c a t e s , l e a d e r s or r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I f 
s u c c e s s f u l , c l i e n t s and i n t e r m e d i a r i e s can e v e n b e c o m e 
' c o n s t i t u e n t s ' , w i t h some i n f l u e n c e o v e r t h e a l l o c a t i n g 
b u r e a u c r a c y , r a t h e r than mere o b j e c t s o f s e r v i c e a l l o c a t i o n 
( L e w i s 1977, P a i n t e r 1980) . E l e c t e d p o l i t i c i a n s and p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s a l s o have i d e a s about the i n a d e q u a c i e s o f e x i s t i n g 
s e r v i c e a l l o c a t i o n and the way i n which queue ing s t r u c t u r e s 
shou ld be r e f o r m e d . M i n i s t e r s , in p a r t i c u l a r , are i n a s t r o n g 
p o s i t i o n to i ssue i n s t i t u t i o n a l cha l lenges and d i r e c t reform. But 
i t i s the senior bureaucrats who are at the centre of t h i s l e v e l 
of p o l i t i c s , f o r i t i s they who must respond to and manage the 
p le thora of cha l l enges to e s tab l i shed i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements 
which w i l l i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e over time. 
The way i n w h i c h p o l i t i c s a t t h i s h i g h e r l e v e l o f 
g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i v i t y p r o c e e d s was s u g g e s t e d by S c h a f f e r and 
O 'Keefe when a n a l y s i n g the r e a c t i o n s o f s e n i o r d e p a r t m e n t a l 
o f f i c e r s t o t h e i r s u r v e y on a c c e s s e x p e r i e n c e s o f a number o f 
A u s t r a l i a n g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e s . They a r g u e d t h a t s e n i o r 
bureaucrats acknowledge that c l i e n t s do o f t e n exper ience problems 
o f a c c e s s , but t h a t t h e y t y p i c a l l y t r a n s l a t e t h e s e i n t o terms 
which make them c r i t i c a l , but not c r u c i a l , c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e i r 
d e p a r t m e n t s . The p r o b l e m s , as the s e n i o r b u r e a u c r a t s see them, 
are p r i m a r i l y the f a u l t o f o t h e r s and c o u l d , g i v e n a d e q u a t e 
resources and coopera t i on , be overcome. The s o r t s of things that 
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senior o f f i c i a l s identified in Schaffer and O'Keeffe's survey 
w e r e i n a d e q u a t e b u d g e t s and r e s o u r c e s , u n d e r - t r a i n e d or 
inappropriate counter officers, obtuse clients and interfering 
politicians. Schaffer and O'Keeffe argue that: 
The way in which bureaucrats make these problems manageable 
and able to be dealt w i t h can be termed the 'official 
ideology'. 
The function is the avoidance of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the 
maintenance of the institution: a sort of depoliticisation, 
then. Its broad norms are grounded in acceptable themes like 
deficits, information and human error. The particular agenda 
will vary but its language will a l w a y s be surprisingly 
potent. 
The i d e o l o g y e m e r g e s as the e x p l a n a t i o n of continued 
dislocation between policies, p r o g r a m m e s and o u t c o m e s , and 
m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f in the a t t e m p t to r e c o n c i l e the 
irreconcilable perceptions held by an agency's officials and 
its applicants about why the agency exists, for whose benefit 
it exists, and what it is allocating (Schaffer and O'Keefe 
1978: 12). 
Schaffer refers to the language employed by senior bureaucrats as 
'official ideology' precisely because it obscures the politics of 
the situation. Rather than acknowledging that there is a struggle 
over the use and allocation of public resources still going on, 
in which there are inevitably irreconcilable points of view and 
w i l l inevitably be w i n n e r s and losers, the talk is all of 
reasonableness and rationality, of appropriate solutions to 
identifiable problems. The senior bureaucrat's language is a 
version of c o n v e n t i o n a l discourse about 'implementation' which 
excludes struggle over i m p o r t a n t public resources from the 
province of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Instead it identifies and lists 
obstacles and problems which are to be rationally removed. But, 
as noted previously, there is more to administration than that. 
Obstacles and problems are not all i n a n i m a t e . Identifying them 
all would include analysing the ongoing concerns and reactions of 
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all interested participants both within and outside the formal 
administrative apparatus of the state; and this is better done in 
more political language which allows for interests, bias and 
struggle as central concerns. The senior bureacratic language is 
an important depoliticising part of a higher level politics of 
policy choices. It is an important element in the strategies and 
manoeuvres engaged in by senior bureaucrats and other 
participants at this level of governmental processes. 
In outlining this approach to the case, I have identified 
both the politics of service allocation and the higher level 
politics of policy choices. I have grounded the latter in the 
former and hinted at the complexity of the interaction between 
the levels, with participants at one level often being involved 
in another role at the other. Without in any way lapsing into a 
conventional sequential view of the processes of government, I 
have provided the rudiments of an analytic framework within which 
to understand the complex realities of policy processes from the 
'bottom up'; of politics in an administrative setting as I will 
from time to time refer to it. In utilising this framework in the 
context of Aborigines and the social security system, the 
challenge will continue to be to achieve that analytic realism 
which Heclo identified as the mark of more adequate policy 
analysis; neither lapsing into the confusion of unanalysed 
realism nor the unrealism of an over rigid analytic framework, 
but able through the examination of strategic interactions 
between participants to discern the maintenance and 
transformation of structures of governmental commitment over 
time. 
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The Organisation of the Study 
The study is organised into four parts. The remainder of 
Part 1 provides more detailed background material on the context 
of the subject. Chapter 2 focuses specifically on the service 
categories and operations of the Australian social security 
system. It also places the social security system in the broader 
context of Australian social welfare administration. There are 
many other Commonwealth and State government departments which 
allocate resources to both family units and incorporated 
community welfare groups under a large array of welfare programs. 
Chapter 3 turns more specifically to the socio-economic position 
of Aborigines in Australian society and the changing government 
approaches to Aboriginal policy. It identifies the welfare 
authority approach, which excluded Aborigines from the mainstream 
institutions of the Australian welfare state. Ihis approach was 
still firmly in place at the time of the 1959 changes to the 
social security legislation but began to be gradually broken down 
during the 1960s. Aboriginal inclusion in other mainstream areas 
of government activity, as well as social security, also began to 
occur. Chapter 3 also discusses the emergence of new 
administrative arrangements and policy terms in Aboriginal 
affairs during the 1970s. All this is essential if we are to 
understand the changing structure of commitments between the DSS 
and Aborigines in proper perspective. 
Parts II and III are the substantive body of the study. Part 
II is a broad scale sketch of the changing configuration of 
participants and their roles and resources. In conceptualising 
these changes, it utilises a distinction between different types 
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of access structures faced by the poor. The distinction between 
welfare by patronage and by legal bureaucratic administration is 
developed in the introduction to part II and informs the 
discussion of the following three chapters. That discussion 
outlines the pattern of commitments, roles and resources which 
existed between Aborigines and the DSS up to the 1960s and early 
1970s and then goes on to discuss the nature of the significant 
changes of recent years. 
Part III, entitled Playing by the Rules, delves further into 
the details of disputes in recent years over the precise way in 
which the rules of the social security system should be applied 
to Aborigines. 1 examine a number of specific issues and see how 
they have been addressed by various participants over time. The 
issues covered range from the operation of standard procedures 
and how they have at times broken down when applied to 
Aborigines, to a series of complications arising out of the 
social security system's arbitrary grouping of individuals into 
conjugal family units, to a host of more publically contentious 
issues surrounding Aboriginal eligibility for unemployment 
benefit. 
Part IV of the study comprises a single concluding chapter. 
In it I draw together themes from the preceeding chapters and 
attempt to identify the broad transformation in the structure of 
social security commitments to Aborigines as it has developed 
since the 1950s. I also return to consider the character of the 
processes through which this transformation has occurred and to 
relate these back to the conceptual approach to policy processes 
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Chapter _2 
The Political Dynamics of Australian Welfare Administration 
The Social Security Income Service Categories 
The income service categories of Australia's national social 
security system are of different historical origins and reflect 
complex slowly changing social judgements about the extent of 
government responsibility for providing income support to people 
of different ages in various domestic and economic circumstances. 
Since the introduction of age and invalid pensions and maternity 
allowance in the decade 1905-15, the legislative base of the 
Australian social security system has undergone considerable 
expansion. In the 1940s family allowances, widows' and wives' 
pensions and unemployment, sickness and special benefits were all 
introduced. In the 1970s, maternity allowance was abolished but 
supporting parent's benefit, double orphan's pension and 
handicapped child's allowance were added. So far in the 19b0s, 
the family income supplement has also been added. The addition of 
new income service categories has not been the only cause of 
expansion. More minor legislative amendements have also tended 
over time to broaden eligibility for existing social security 
categories (DSS 1983, Kewley 1973, Grimes 1983). As a 
consequence, the extent of Commonwealth government support for 
income maintenance at the present day is greater than at any time 
in the past. 
The current legislative rules of the social security system 
categorise the DSS's potential clientele somewhat arbitrarily 
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into conjugal family units and life-cycle stages. People from 0 
to 16 years (and extending to 24 years for some purposes for 
those still in full time education), are treated as dependent 
children ineligible for social security payments in their own 
right. They are instead the basis on which parents and guardians 
can claim a number of income supplementation allowances to assist 
with their maintenance. Family allowance is available on a 
universal (non-income tested) basis to all permanently residing 
in Australia who have 'care custody and control' of dependent 
children (sec 95). (Twelve months residence is required for those 
not born in Australia). Parents and guardians can also receive 
income-tested support in the form of additional pension and 
guardian's allowance for pensioners, additional benefit for 
beneficiaries, family income support for low wage earners or 
handicapped child's allowance or double orphan's pension for 
those caring for handicapped or orphaned children. 
Having passed this stage of the social security life-cycle, 
individuals are able to apply for income payments in their own 
right; with the subsequent generations of dependent children 
being in turn attached to them as guardians. An important further 
qualification to the individual basis of eligibility in the later 
stages of the social security life-cycle is that, where 
applicants are married (either de facto or de jure), although it 
is the individual who applies for and may be eligible for 
payment, assessment always involves consideration of the 
circumstances of the spouse. So the eligibility unit for social 
security payments becomes a complex conjunction of the individual 
applicant and, where applicable, surrounding conjugal family 
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members (Edwards 1983). 
In these later life-cycle stages, the social security system 
operates more to provide minimum income support and less as one 
providing income supplementation. All service categories are 
subject to means tests and all provide a payment which is 
supposed to be sufficient to meet an eligible client's basic 
needs. The income support categories of these later life-cycle 
stages can be conveniently divided into the longer term pensions 
and shorter term benefits. 
Among the pensions, age pensions are the simplest, the most 
longstanding and, in terms of overall expenditure, the most 
expensive. Eligibility depends only on age (60 for women, 65 for 
men), ten years residence in Australia, residence at the time of 
application and an income and assets test (sec 21). Age pensions 
constitute the third life-cycle stage of the social security 
categories. Reflecting the assumption of greater government 
responsibility for income support in old age, age pensions 
account for almost half of all social security expenditure. 
In the middle life-cycle stage of the social security 
system, the extent of government responsibility for income 
support is far more restricted. Whenever possible, people in this 
age range are encouraged to derive their income elsewhere. For 
those who are unable to do so, however, there is the possibility 
of voicing a claim to a number of pension and benefit categories, 
all of which are subject to comparatively stringent eligibility 
conditions. Invalid pensions are available to those who are 
'permanently incapacitated for work' to a degree 'not less than 
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85%' and who are resident in Australia at the time of application 
(sees 23, 24). An additional qualification of 10 years residence 
applies to those whose incapacity occurred while not residents of 
Australia. Wives' pensions are available to wives of aged and 
invalid pensioners who are not themselves eligible for a pension 
in their own right (sec 31). Single women who are widows, 
divorcees, deserted wives or wives of prisoners and who are over 
50 (or over 45 in the case of those who have just ceased to have 
dependent children), all qualify for widows' pensions (sec 60). 
Younger single women in similar circumstances may also receive a 
widow's pension if they have dependent children. This last 
payment, the (class A) widow's pension, merges with the more 
recently introduced supporting parent's benefit, which is 
available to all single parents with dependent children subject 
only to an income test (sec 83AAC). Although referred to as a 
benefit, the payment to supporting parents is administered more 
or less on pension conditions; as long term income support 
subject to fairly infrequent reviews of eligibility. 
Benefits, in contrast to pensions, offer those in the middle 
life-cycle stage more restricted opportunities for less secure 
and less generous short term income support subject to more 
frequent review. Residence requirements for benefits are, 
however, less than for pensions; twelve months residence 
immediately prior to making the claim or the intention to reside 
permanently in Australia. Sickness benefit is available to those 
who are temporarily 'incapacitated for work by reason of sickness 
or accident' and who have thereby suffered a loss of income (sec 
108). Unemployment benefit is available to those who are 
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unemployed, but are 'capable' and 'willing' to undertake 
'suitable' paid work and have taken 'reasonable steps to obtain 
such work' during the relevant period, with certain broader 
exclusions applying to those unemployed because of industrial 
action (sec 107). There is also a catch-all special benefit 
category under which the DSS is empowered to make discretionary 
payments to anyone who is 'unable to earn a sufficient 
livelihood' for themselves and their dependents (sec 124). 
The Structure and Operation of the DSS 
Before launching into a general description of the structure 
and operation of the DSS, a couple of general points about social 
security budgetary arrangements need to be made. The social 
security system is non-contributory, with all funding coming from 
the consolidated revenue of the Commonwealth government. The 
queueing structures through which the DSS allocates the various 
types of payment are also, formally at least, non-competitive. 
Though estimates of possible social security spending are made in 
advance, budgeting is in the final analysis open-ended. 
Individual eligibility and total spending are not determined by 
prior budgeting. Each client receives the payment for which they 
are judged to be eligible irrespective of considerations either 
about the total payout or about the extent of eligibility granted 
to others. On the other hand however, the resources to be 
allocated by the DSS are far from unlimited. Social security is 
the single most significant item of Commonwealth government 
spending and has been continuing to increase in significance in 
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recent years. Over the last 20 years spending under the Social 
Security Act has grown from 14 to 23.5 per cent of total 
Commonwealth government outlays and from 3.7 to 7.2 per cent of 
gross domestic product (see Table 1). As such the social security 
system in recent years has been under constant budgetary 
pressure. Its critics often portray it as out of control, while 
its defenders are frequently required to justify the level of 
spending which has developed (see eg Grimes 1983). 
Table 1 
Expenditure Under the Social Security Act Compared with Total 
Connnonwealth Government Expenditure and Gross Domestic Product 
Year 
ending 
June 
30th 
1964 
1974 
1984 
Expenditure 
under the 
Social 
Security 
Act (A) $M 
641 
1, 944 
13,305 
Total % 
C'wealth A/B 
Government 
Expenditure 
(B) $M 
4,572 14 
12,229 16 
56,570 23.5 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
(C) $M 
17,464 
51,447 
185,235 
% 
A/C 
3.7 
3.8 
7.2 
Sources: DSS Ten Year Statistical Summary 1974 to 1984 and 
Commonwealth government budget papers 1964/65. 
The financial open-endedness of the social security queueing 
structures gives rise to bureaucratic allocation procedures which 
attempt to maintain close control over expenditure through the 
day to day operations of the Department. The DSS, deprived of the 
certain control of prior budgeting, is more concerned than most 
government departments to maintain a constant check on its 
expenditure. The Department expends a considerable part of its 
resources investigating and double checking the facts supplied to 
it by clients, in an attempt to weed out the ineligible 
applicants as well as servicing the eligible ones. The result is 
35 
an organisation constantly racked by a fundamental tension 
between, on the one hand, satisfying the income needs of 
applicants and, on the other, controlling the expenditure of 
public money. Appreciating this tension is central to any 
understanding of the dynamics of social security administration 
and needs to be born in mind as we proceed. 
The job of the DSS is, quite simply, to apply the 
legislative rules governing each of the income support categories 
to the cases of applicants at hand. This it does through a 
network of regional offices overseen by a hierarchy of area 
offices, a state headquarters in each of the state capital cities 
and a central office in Canberra. The Department's network of 
regional offices has expanded rapidly in recent years from less 
than 50 in 1970 to over 200 at present. This has led to a 
progressive decentralisation of much of the day to day processing 
of income service applications within the Department. Those most 
centrally involved in these processes are the assessing and 
determining officers now working in the DSS regional offices, of 
whom the Department's 1980/81 Annual Report had the following to 
say: 
The Assessing Officers and Determining Officers perform, as 
far as our clients are concerned, perhaps the most important 
role within the Department. The Assessing Officers, on facts 
presented to them on application forms and, in some cases, 
from follow up enquiries and correspondence, recommend 
acceptance of applications (including the rates at which 
pensions, benefits and allowances are to be paid) or 
disallowance of the claims. Their recommendations are 
reviewed by Determining Officers, who confirm query or reject 
the recommendation. 
The great majority of these officers are young people and in 
the Public Service classification system they are in the 
comparatively junior ranks of the Third Division. 
There are about 3100 regional office staff involved directly 
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in assessing claims and determining entitlements. Each on 
average was responsible for more than 1000 current recipients 
and for the expenditure of more than $2 million in the year. 
(DSS Annual Report 1980/81:2) 
To aid assessing and determining officers in their task, the DSS 
has over the years built up a large body of 'administrative 
guidelines' which elaborate on the legislative rules governing 
income service allocation. These are contained in manuals of 
instructions which are constantly being updated and clarified 
through the issueing of additional circular instructions. Unlike 
the legislative rules, these guidelines and instructions do not 
enjoy formal legal status. However, for most intents and purposes 
they take on a similar role to the legislative rules in directing 
the activity of service allocation undertaken by rank and file 
assessing and determining officers. In fact, it is the manuals 
and to a lesser extent the circular instructions to which these 
officers turn first when they are unsure about any aspect of the 
rules governing the processing of cases. The Act is usually only 
referred to if it is necessary to justify decisions in a formal 
legal sense. 
DSS regional offices also employ a number of other staff 
to assist in the task of allocating income services. The jobs of 
some, such as filing clerks, typists and the data entry officers 
who record the results of case determination in the Department's 
computer system, are fairly self-explanatory and routine, and 
need not concern us unduly. But others' tasks are less routine 
and do require some explanation. 
First, there are the field officers who act as a mobile 
extension of the regional office in both the client servicing and 
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expenditure control aspects of day to day administration. The DSS 
recently described the field officer role as that of 'friend 
counsellor, communicator and, sometimes, investigator'; as both 
provider and seeker of information ensuring that people entitled 
to p a y m e n t s receive them as well as that 'false claims do not 
succeed' (DSS Annual Report 19&0/81:8). In practice it is often 
's. 
the investigative role that l o o m s largest in the w o r k of field 
officers, as they are required to check on the circumstances of 
clients suspected of m i s r e p r e s e n t i n g the facts. Ihis of course 
jeopardises their image as friend, counsellor or communicator. 
A second and rather less controversial category of officers 
are the counter oficers, who act as the first point of client 
contact at the regional office counter. These officers carry out 
a range of ancillary tasks such as collecting u n e m p l o y m e n t 
benefit review forms and medical certificates, sighting documents 
such as birth certifiates or checking payment status for clients 
experiencing difficulties. Only where more substantial action is 
required do clients join a subsequent queue for the attention of 
assessing officers. 
More peripheral to the m a i n s t r e a m processes of income 
service allocation are a third type of officer; the regional 
office social workers. Their primary task, as the DSS describes 
it, is to provide broader range assistance to a small number of 
clients 'experiencing personal difficulties'. This involves them 
only occasionally in income service cases, but their domain does 
legitimately extend, in the official view, to: 
advising clerical staff of special features which should be 
taken into account in the determination and review of client 
eligibility where social or psychological factors are 
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relevant (DSS Annual Report 1980/81:8). 
Of particular interest to this study are a fourth category 
of regional office employees; the Aboriginal public contact staff 
who have been appointed to many DSS regional officers in recent 
years. The roles of these Aboriginal welfare officers (AWOs), 
liaison officers (ALOs) and counter officers (ACOs) span the 
range of the previous three types of officers; though typically 
they are more concerned with client servicing and less concerned 
with client investigation than are field officers, more outgoing 
in their public contact work than mainstream counter officers and 
more directly involved in income security case administration 
than social workers. I will have more to say of this group of DSS 
officers as I proceed. Finally, of course, supervising all this 
activity in the DSS regional office is the regional manager, who 
also acts as the primary link to higher levels of the Department. 
The scope for indeterminacy and contention in the process 
of service allocation occurring at the regional office level of 
the DSS is considerable. First among the reasons for this is the 
sheer volume of service allocation work and the limited time and 
resources within which it must be achieved. At present the income 
service categories accommodate over 2 million pension cases, 1.5 
million family allowance cases and .5 million benefit cases. The 
second reason that must be added is the complexity of the 
circumstances of the clients in many of these cases; particularly 
those in changing multi-member conjugal family units. Third is 
the contestability of social security rules as applied to 
individual cases. What precisely, for example, does it mean to be 
'permanently incapacitated for work' to a degree 'not less than 
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85%', or to be capable and willing to undertake suitable paid 
work or to be living in a de facto relationship as husband and 
wife 'on a bona fide domestic basis'. All these phrases are 
crucial elements of the eligibility rules governing social 
security payments. But each can only be understood against a 
background of contestable and changing social and economic 
expectations. There is, of course, the body of established 
departmental guidelines and procedures to direct rank and file 
judgements on such matters; elaborations of the rules, standard 
procedures requiring particular types of documentary evidence and 
standard appplication forms requiring answers to a series of 
standardised questions. But the rules will always remain to some 
extent indeterminate and rank and file officers will inevitably 
take differing views of the appropriate application of the rules 
to particular complex cases. The range of judgements and the 
extent of disputation that arises between staff and clients at 
the regional office level of the DSS is inevitable given the 
fundamental tension within the social security system discussed 
earlier between servicing income needs and controlling the 
expenditure of public money. 
The best way to appreciate the scope for contention and 
indeterminacy at the level of service allocation within the DSS 
is through actual cases. I pause at this point in the general 
account of the DSS's structure and operations to provide one 
example. It is of direct relevance to our study as it involves an 
Aboriginal unemployment beneficiary living on a pastoral station 
in the north of Australia in the early 1980s. 
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Service Allocation Politics at the Regional Office Level of the 
DSS — An Example 
Being i l l i t e r a t e , this particular Aboriginal client relied 
heavily on the pastoral station m a n a g e r to assist him in 
negotiating the r e q u i r e m e n t s for access to UB. In the course of 
c o m p l e t i n g the regular return form for the continuation of 
benefit, the station manager informed the local DSS office that 
the beneficiary was absent from the property while one of his 
children attended hospital in the city. On receiving this form, 
the assessing officer in the DSS regional office decided to 
terminate the payment, judging that, while away, the beneficiary 
was unavailable for w o r k and hence ineligible for benefit. A 
letter was sent to the pastoral station informing the beneficiary 
of the termination. 
A couple of weeks later, an Aboriginal Liaison Officer (ALO) 
from the same DSS regional office called at the pastoral station. 
The beneficiary was still away, but the manager informed the ALO 
of the termination. The ALO was enraged and returned to the 
office to dispute the j u d g e m e n t of the assessing officer, 
claiming that the beneficiary was available and willing to work, 
that the absence was only likely to be short term and that if 
work had become available on the station, the beneficiary would 
have returned i m m e d i a t e l y to take it up. The ALO believed the 
assessing officer to be one of those 'missionary types' who 
thought that Aborigines in remote areas should not be paid UB. He 
suggested to the officer concerned that personal judgements may 
be interfering in the assessment process. In return the assessing 
officer suggested that the ALO was interpreting the eligibility 
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rules for UB too liberally in order to maximise the flow of money 
to his people. 
This dipute was not, however, simply the result of different 
personal values leading to different judgements about the case. 
At its root were the systemic causes of indeterminacy in DSS 
queueing structures. The facts of the case were complex. It 
appeared that, in return for attending to the garden and doing 
odd jobs around the homestead, the beneficiary was provided with 
provisions for his family. With a wife and nine dependent 
children, these informal exchanges were of considerable value; as 
too was the UB. There was some doubt then, whether the 
relationship between pastoralist and beneficiary ought more 
properly to involve employment. The beneficiary's circumstances 
fell somewhere close to the margin between employment and 
unemployment. Investigation of these facts was equally 
problematic. The station was over two hundred kilometres from the 
regional office and could be visited only infrequently with the 
existing level of departmental resources. To complicate matters 
further, the station manager who was acting as intermediary in 
the case, clearly had distinct interests of his own in the 
arrangement. Was he illegitimately exploiting both the social 
security system and his de facto Aboriginal 'employee', or was he 
privately carrying the burden of inadequate public service 
delivery arrangements? Making judgement on these matters would be 
particularly difficult without constant and thorough 
investigation of the case. But judgments and decisions did, of 
course, have to be made. The assessing officer took the view that 
the case had always been of dubious legitimacy and so felt 
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justified in using the trip away as a means of terminating it. 
But the ALO insisted that if the Aboriginal beneficiary had been 
eligible before, he was still eligible now. He was still 
unemployed and capable and available to undertake suitable paid 
work. 
Even accepting that the case had been assessed correctly, 
there were still a number of issues that could be taken up. If 
the beneficiary was not eligible for UB while away, could the 
case be transferred to the regional office in the city rather 
than terminated? Or could the applicant be eligible for another 
income security category? The assessing officer had not explored 
these possibilities, seeking only to deal with the application as 
presented in the facts on the UB review form. But the ALO felt 
that possible eligibility for other payments ought to be 
explored. Ke knew that there was an established practice of 
paying special benefit to those unable to work because they had 
to care for sick dependents. Might this be applicable? The ALO 
thought this worth exploring. But it would be difficult now to 
arrange an application from the client. In the event the episode 
was not resolved until the beneficiary returned to the pastoral 
station. Quite by chance, the assessing officer concerned had by 
then been transferred to another DSS regional office. A new 
application for UB was received and the ALO was able to convince 
the officer now assessing the case of the applicant's 
eligibility. The beneficiary had been without income for a couple 
of months, but the pastoral station manager had helped him out 
where necessary. 
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The Structure and Operation of the DSS (cont) 
The regional offices of the DSS account for only about half 
of the 16,000 staff employed by the Department. So though 
activity at this level is an important part of any understanding 
of the operation of Australian social security administration, it 
is far from the whole story. What of the remainder of the DSS 
officials v/orking in the overarching hierarchy of area, state and 
central offices? 
At the central office level, the Department is divided into 
divisions and branches each with distinct but interrelated 
responsibilities. Grouped under the title of the Field Operations 
Service are a number of divisions with concerns relating fairly 
directly to day to day allocation of services in the regional 
offices. The Benefits Division is perhaps the most centrally 
involved. It comprises three major branches; benefits 
administration and entitlements which determines difficult cases 
referred from the regions, benefits policy which issues general 
directives clarifying procedures and practices of relevance to 
larger numbers of cases in which some area of indeterminacy has 
become apparent, and benefits control which analyses payment and 
assessment data in an attempt to detect and pursue illegitimate 
claims. The newer Performance Monitoring Branch, by contrast, has 
a rather more selective involvement and perspective. It attempts 
to identify key problem areas as they develop in the processes of 
service allocati on at the regional office level and to undertake 
major nationwide reviews of etablished practices. The Resource 
Management and the Operations Support Divisions provide an array 
of supporting functions covering matters from personnel 
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administration and planning of staffing needs to the provision 
and maintenance of computers, the supply of departmental forms 
and the provision of office space. There are also branches with 
responsibility for staff training and development and for equal 
opportunity in both employment and service provision. 
Outside the Field Operat ions Service are a number of other 
central office divisions and branches with less direct interests 
and involvement in regional level administration. The Legislation 
and Review Division oversees all appeals against departmental 
decisions and is involved in the development of proposals for 
legislative change. The Development Division undertakes the 
compilation of statistics and the production of research reports 
directed to long term policy review and development. The Systems 
Division develops information processing systems to support the 
Department's operations. 
This description of departmental divisions and branches 
could be elaborated significantly. At the state head quarters 
level, for e x a m p l e , the field o p e r a t i o n s types of 
responsibilities reappear in an array of organisational units 
with concerns corresponding closely to those of their central 
office counterparts. At the newer area office level, a more 
restricted range of regional office oversight also takes place. 
The overall image of the DSS should rightly be one of 
organisation on a massive, geographically dispersed and 
hierarchically sophisticated scale, the details of which are 
perhaps not as important at this point in the discussion as the 
overall impression. 
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The work of senior DSS bureaucrats is quite clearly 
different from that of the rank and file officers working in the 
regional offices. Conceptually the two are linked because much 
senior bureaucratic work is concerned, in one way or another, 
with the present structuring or future restructuring of the 
Department's practices and procedures for service allocation; 
whether it be through organising personnel and equipment, 
clarifying and developing rules and procedures or investigating 
ideas for future changes. This, of course, is not to suggest that 
each organisational unit within the DSS makes uncontested 
contributions within a particular area of specified 
responsibility. In fact, the potential for differences of opinion 
and contention between senior DSS officers is, for a number of 
reasons, far greater than at the street level of the Department. 
First, since the division of administrative labour at senior 
levels is greater than at the regional office level, so too is 
the potential for officers to develop loyalty to particular 
concerns. Senior benefits control section officers can, for 
example, be expected to focus their attention more consistently 
and unerringly on concerns of fraud and misrepresentation than 
even the most vigilant inspectorial regional field officer. 
Against this may be posed an equally unerring commitment to a 
sympathetic pro-client stance among senior officers holding some 
brief for the social work profession within the Department. A 
second reason that the potential for contention is greater at the 
senior levels of the Department is because there is more to be 
won and lost at this level. The matter at hand is not so likely 
to be how to apply a rule or utilise departmental resources in 
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relation to a particular case, as in the example of service 
allocation politics given above, but rather how to interpret a 
rule or deploy resources in relation to whole groups of cases. 
Over time, rules can be re-interpreted, procedures and practices 
can be changed and resources can be extensively redeployed. This 
may have considerably greater effect on the patterns of service 
allocation, on policy as it works out at the street level, than 
any of the debates over individual cases going on between the 
rank and file. The example of service delivery politics given 
above is, in fact, one small episode in a series of larger 
debates about how much of the DSS's resources should be used to 
service Aborigines in remote areas and whether or not Aborigines 
in these areas ought to be eligible for UB. The different strands 
of this larger policy debate are recounted historically in some 
of the later chapters. 
Social Welfare Administration: llie Larger Context 
Although spending on income support by the DSS is clearly a 
central aspect of Australian social welfare administration, these 
are by no means the only types of service opportunites open to 
the poor, hany other Commonwealth government departments provide 
other services under other programs. The Department of Employment 
and Industrial Relations provides training and wage subsidies 
which, with the assistance of a willing employer, may provide an 
alternative source of income for the potentially unemployed. The 
Department of Education also provides a range of educational 
allowances which can, in certain circumstances, be another useful 
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source of i nconie. The Department of Veterans Affairs provides a 
range of service and income opportunities for war veterans. The 
Department of Community Services, which was until 1984 largely 
subsumed within the DSS, provides funding for non-government 
welfare groups to undertake the provision of facilities and 
services ranging from accomodation for the aged, disabled and 
homeless to child care, family support services and neighbourhood 
centres. The Department of Aboriginal Affairs and the Aboriginal 
Development Commission, which are of particular importance in the 
context of this study, also provide funds to Aboriginal 
organisations for the provision of services ranging from housing 
and health to legal aid and for the encouragement of Aboriginal 
enterprises. To this array of Commonwealth government departments 
and programs must then be added a similar array of State 
government departments of health, housing, community welfare and 
others, all of which provide further service opportunities for 
both individual clients and incorporated non-government welfare 
groups through their various programs. 
Estimates of numbers of programs, departments, and non-
government organisations involved in the field of welfare 
administration and the amounts of money spent depend, to a large 
extent, on the definition of the field one adopts. But the 
precise details of any classification are perhaps less important 
than the general point that the arena of welfare administration 
is inhabited by a wide range of both government and non-
government interests all with differing stakes in the diverse 
array of established programs and service allocation commitments. 
The potential for strategic manoeuvre and contention between the 
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participants is considerable, as they debate issues such as who 
and what comes within the auspices of which program and 
department and why. A political dynamic, in the sense of an 
ongoing struggle over the allocation of important public 
resources, is endemic. For that reason, it is necessary to 
understand developing relations between the DSS and its new 
Aboriginal clientele in the larger context of relations between 
Aborigines and other social welfare service providers. Equally 
however, it should be emphasised that DSS spending is still at 
the heart of welfare administration. The Commonwealth 
government's own budgetary figures put expenditure under the 
Social Security Act at around 80 per cent of its total welfare 
outlay (see Table 2). So who gets what when and how from the 
social security system is certainly a central concern of those 
with an interest in welfare administration. It is, in short, 
worth struggling for. 
Table 2 
Expenditure Under the Social Security Act Comparedwith Total 
Commonwealth Government Outlays on Welfare 
Year ended 
30 June 
1974 
1984 
Expenditure under 
Social Security 
Act $M (A) 
1,944 
13,305 
Total C'wealth 
Outlays on 
Welfare $m (B) 
2,487 
16,438 
% A/B 
78 
81 
Source: DSS Ten Year Statistical Summary 1974 to 1984 
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Chapter _3 
A b o r i g i n e s i n A u s t r a l i a n S o c i e t y and A b o r i g i n a l P o l i c y 
Approaches: A Background to the Clientele 
The conceptual approach to understanding policy processes 
outlined in Chapter 1 commits me to investigating the position of 
the DSS's Aboriginal clientele in Australian society as well as 
the dynamics of Australian social w e l f a r e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Only 
after we have gained some general appreciat ion of these two 
aspects of the subject and brought them to bear in a more 
s p e c i f i c account of the contemporary interaction of Aborigines 
and the social security system can we claim to have f u l l y 
understood and analysed the development of social security policy 
towards Aborigines . So in this chapter , I turn to consider the 
p o s i t i o n of A b o r i g i n e s i n A u s t r a l i a n s o c i e t y and to the 
development of general policy approaches towards Aborigines. 
Early Settlement and the Protection Approach 
The history of white settlement in A u s t r a l i a is also a 
h i s t o r y of the d e s t r u c t i o n of A b o r i g i n a l s o c i e t y as an 
independent entity (Rowley 1970). Though this is not the place to 
recount that history in detail (see for other accounts Loos 1982, 
Reece 1974, Reynolds 1972 and 1981), it is important to gain some 
general apprec iat ion of the h i s t o r i c a l development of the 
position of Aborigines in Australian society. 
As the f r o n t i e r s of white occupation moved across the 
Australian continent, Aborigines W'ere dispossessed of their land 
and with it l a r g e l y of the independence of their pre-contact 
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ways. Relations between Aborigines and settlers were often tense 
and at times degenerated into violence. The early white settlers 
saw l i t t l e role for the Aborigines in their society . Generally 
the Aborig ines were regarded as a nuisance and a problem; as an 
inferior race which many settlers assumed would eventually die 
out. The s e t t l e r s ' a t t i t u d e s served, at t imes , to bring this 
p r o p h e s y c l o s e r to r e a l i t y by j u s t i f y i n g even o u t r i g h t 
a n n i h i l a t i o n of Aborig ines . Alternatively, and more charitably, 
the 'Aboriginal problem' was to be solved by gathering together 
remaining Aborig inal groups to 'protect ' them from the harsher 
consequences of white settlement. Missionaries were the first to 
pursue this more char itable protectionist approach, but it was 
not long before the colonial predecessors of Austral ian State 
governments also began to play a role. In the latter half of the 
19th century, acts were passed which excluded 'Aboriginal 
natives ' from the general provisions of Austral ian law and 
assigned them to a distinct legal status of their own. These acts 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y provided for the appointment of o f f i c i a l 
'protectors ' of 'A.boriginal nat ives ' . The Colonial , and later 
State, governments gradually established administrative agencies 
charged with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for Aboriginal protection . The 
Commonwealth government adopted a similar approach after 1911, 
when i t assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for Aborigines in the Northern 
Territory from the SA State government. 
The major policy instrument of the Aboriginal protection 
authorities was the 'reserve'; an area of land set aside for the 
the management and control of Aborigines segregated from the 
l a r g e r w h i t e s o c i e t y . As t i m e went on the a u t h o r i t i e s 
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established and ran a number of institutions on these 'reserves'. 
In other instances the task of managing Aborigines continued to 
be delegated to various missions or to users of Aboriginal 
labour, particularly pastoralists and others in the more outlying 
areas of white settlement. 
The white settlers' protectionist approach to their 
Aboriginal problem, although often couched in charitable terms, 
served primarily as a means of controlling Aborigines and 
clearing the way for the geographic expansion of white Australian 
society. One hundred and fifty years after the first white 
settlement, only a few Aborigines remained unaffected by the 
advance of the invading society, but equally few had been 
admitted to that society even as members of its labouring 
classes. The white settlers' approach to Aborigines had served, 
intentionally or not, to relegate them to a peculiarly 
disadvantaged, marginalised and encapsulated position in the 
developing society. Through dispossession, they had been largely 
robbed of the autonomy of their precontact ways. Through the 
development of new post-contact needs and expectations, they were 
gradually becoming increasingly dependent on white society. Yet 
the Aborigines enjoyed none of the legal and political rights or 
the economic resources of others in Australian society. Rather 
they became dependent on a system of publicly sanctioned white 
patronage. 
The protectionist approach effectively restricted Aboriginal 
access to the resources of the larger society to one single 
channel. For all those needs which they could not satisfy from 
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their own truncated traditional resources, Aborigines had no 
alternative but to look to their protectors - the missionaries, 
their employers and the officers of the Aboriginal protection 
authorities. These people became the Aborigines' patrons; the 
principal source of resources and opportunities for Aborigines, 
but consequently also agents for their domination and control. As 
monopolisers of access these 'bosses', as they were often called 
in the Aboriginal vernacular, were able to set the terms of their 
exchanges with their Aboriginal clients. Rewards were generally 
meagre, but once dependence on them was established, the white 
patrons could extend the element of control inherent in their 
position by making the rewards contingent upon Aborigines 
embracing, or at least showing signs of embracing, values of 
patronal choosing; honesty, humility, christian faith, diligence 
or whatever. Dependence, then, led to domination. 
The fullest development of this system of white patronage 
was the 'total institution' of the Aboriginal reserve settlement 
(Rowley 197 la:190,271-8, 1971b:Ptl, 1978:Ch6, Long 1970:Ch6, 
Eggleston 1976:Ch8). Like prisons or mental asylums these were 
places of residence and work for groups of people who had been 
excluded from the larger society. Life on the inside was 
administered in its totality (Goffman 1961). Here the 
relationship between the Aborigines and their white 'protectors' 
was that between inmate and superintendent. Authority rested 
almost monarchically with the latter, who had wide discretion to 
reward and punish as they saw fit. The Aboriginal inmates, by 
contrast, were almost entirely bereft of resources to bring to 
bear in their exchanges. Although Aboriginal labour was often 
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required to run the institutions, this W3S seldoni recognised 3S 
such. For the Aborigines, possible personal strategies were few. 
They could cooperate with their superintendent as diligent 
disciples, or even informers, and reap the rewards of approval. 
Alternatively they could seek to reassert some degree of personal 
autonomy by limiting their demands for resources from the larger 
society and isolating themselves from the superintendent as much 
as possible. More assertively they could secretly subvert the 
superintendent's authority. But that way, of course, led to 
punishment; particularly if there were others in the group 
willing to take on the role of disciple or informer. Rewards were 
meagre; better living quarters, more freedom from supervision, a 
more desirable work task. Punishments, on the other hand, were 
pervasive since many crimes on the inside were not crimes at all 
on the outside (Eggleston 1976). Having the authority to allocate 
resources which in the larger society were freely available as 
rights and necessities enabled superintendents and others 'in 
charge' of Aborigines to maintain strong control. 
For many Aborigines, the patronal relationships in which 
they found themselves never quite reached this state of formal 
total institutionalisation and dependency. The resources 
committed to Aboriginal protection were never sufficient to 
effectively incarcerate all Aborigines. Some lived in only partly 
supervised circumstances on the fringes of towns or on less than 
fully administered reserves. Some retained a vestige of pre-
contact autonomy, which rendered their dependence on a patron a 
little less than complete. Some had bargaining power, however 
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slight, because of the labour they provided. But all were 
excluded from the normal opportunities, resources and 
institutions of the larger society and all came to rely to some 
degree on the patronage of the 'protection' system. 
FrcHH Protection to Assimilation: How Much Change? 
Beginning in the late 1930s, white Australians began to admit 
that the Aborigines, and more particularly at first the growing 
population of part-Aborigines, seemed destined to survive as 
members of Australian society. As a consequence, the settlers' 
approach to their Aboriginal problem needed to provide some more 
plausible conception of the future role of these Aborigines, 
rather than simply relying on the idea that they would eventually 
die out. This was achieved through the idea of 'assimilation'. 
Initially the term tended to refer to absorption of the part-
Aborigines into the general population through miscegenation 
(Gammage and Markus eds 1982:96, Biskup 19 7 3:187-93). However 
during the 1950s, and particularly under the influence of Paul 
Hasluck, who as Minister for Territories from 1951 to 1963 was 
responsible for Commonwealth administration of Aborigines in the 
NT, the term came to replace 'protection' as the cornerstone of 
all Aboriginal policy. In 1951, the conference of Commonwealth 
and State ministers and officials responsible for Aboriginal 
welfare explained that the policy of 'assimilation' meant that 
all Aborigines and part-Aborigines: 
shall attain the same manner of living as other Australians, 
enjoying the same rights and privileges, accepting the same 
responsibilities, observing the same customs and being 
influenced by the same beliefs, hopes and loyalities (quoted 
in Lippman 1981: 38). 
55 
Just how much of a change this movement from protection to 
assimilation meant for many Aborigines is open to question. 
Aboriginal 'protection' laws were being rewritten as 'welfare' 
laws and the protection authorities were being renamed as 
Aboriginal 'welfare' authorities. Provisions were also being 
introduced for exemption from these laws for Aborigines who were 
judged by these authorities to be ready for life beyond the 
supervision and segregation of the Aboriginal welfare system. 
This granting of exemptions to individual Aborigines was to be 
the basic mechanism through which 'assimilation' would gradually 
be achieved. 
Formally these were major changes. However Rowley, for one, 
saw the possibility of continuity: 
As a particular branch of government does not easily change 
its methods, or its philosophy, a good deal of the policy and 
practice which had been relevant in the days of protection by 
segregation, and then in relation to the absorption of the 
part-Aboriginal, could be carried over into the post-war 
period, when whatever a particular government was accustomed 
to do could be described as promoting assimilation (1971a: 
383). 
Despite the fact that it paraded officially as assimilation 
rather than protection. Aboriginal policy in the 1950s and 1960s 
continued to have a strongly patronal aspect. The white patrons 
of the Aboriginal welfare authorities and their various mission 
and employer delegates were still the major channel of access 
which Aborigines had to the resources of the larger society. Only 
slowly were the Aborigines being released from the reserves and 
from the controls of the Aboriginal welfare acts. The system of 
exemptions for individual Aborigines lent itself to incorporation 
into the established patronal system of highly discretionary 
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rewards and punishments for 'good' and 'bad' Aborigines; 
particularly since the Aboriginal welfare authorities could 
revoke as well as grant exemptions. Even those 'assimilated' 
Aborigines who moved away from the reserves into the larger towns 
and cities did not necessarily escape entirely from the 
established system of welfare patronage. Their attempts to gain 
access to the resources of the larger society - a job, a place to 
live, etc - were often unsucessful. Most of the Aboriginal 
welfare authorities established a city presence, and sympathetic 
whites established new non-government welfare organisations to 
minister to Aboriginal city dwellers needs (Barwick 1963: 343-
356, Rowley 1971a: 17, Gale 1972: ChlO, Howard 1981). For many 
'assimilated' Aborigines the white people associated with these 
organisations continued to act as their major channel of access 
to the resources of the larger society. So the established 
pattern of Aboriginal marginalisation and consequent dependence 
on the specialised system of welfare patronage was to some extent 
perpetuated even in the cities. The congregation of Aborigines in 
areas of cities such as Redfern in Sydney, South Brisbane and 
East Perth during the 1950s and 1960s was indicative of this. For 
many Aborigines then, the difference between 'protection' and 
'assimilation' may not, at first, have been so great. 
Nevertheless there were some potentially significant 
developments occurring under the auspices of 'assimilation'. 
Discriminatory provisions which excluded Aborigines from many 
mainstream institutions of Australian society were being removed. 
The gradual legal inclusion of Aborigines in the social security 
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s y s t e m was one early e x a m p l e . During the early 1960s, voting 
rights in Commonwealth and State elections were extended to all 
Aborigines; though e n r o l m e n t was not c o m p u l s o r y as for other 
eligible electors. Previously in a n u m b e r of states, voting 
rights had been restricted to those Aborigines exempt from the 
special Aboriginal welfare laws (Rowley 1971a: 392-4,403-5). In 
the latter half of the 60s, a number of discriminatory provisions 
in industrial a w a r d s , of particular relevance to Aborigines 
employed in the pastoral industry, were successfully challenged 
in the industrial arbitration tribunals and subsequently removed 
(Stevens 1974 & 1981:Ch3, Rowley 1971b:PartIII). In 1967, in the 
most highly supported referendum for constitutional amendement 
yet held in Australia, two specific references to Aborigines were 
removed from the Constitution. The first, in section 127 of the 
Constitution, had p r e v e n t e d A b o r i g i n e s b e i n g c o u n t e d in 
'reckoning the number of people of the Commonwealth'. The second, 
in section 51 (26) had provided the Commonwealth with the power 
to make laws with respect to 'the people of any race, other than 
the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary 
to make special laws'. Though as hanks ( 1984) explains, this 
latter section was originally intended p r i m a r i l y to strengthen 
the C o m m o n w e a l t h government's ability to deal with u n w a n t e d 
aliens and immigrants, by the 1960s it was seen by many to be an 
impediment to a more active Commonwealth involvement in policies 
concerning Aborigines. Its a m e n d e m e n t , along with section 127, 
was therefore seen as a major breakthrough by those who believed 
that reform in approaches to Aboriginal affairs would only follow 
from a greater Commonwealth government involvement in this area 
58 
of policy, which had until then been primarily a State government 
preserve. There was also a trend during the 1960s for the 
existing Aboriginal welfare authorities to liberalise their laws 
and controls over Aborigines. In NSW and South Australia, the 
State government Aboriginal welfare authorities even disappeared 
as separate bureaucratic entities. In both these instances they 
were incorporated within general State governmnent departments of 
community welfare. 
Cumulatively these developments of the 1960s changed the 
legal status of Aborigines quite dramatically. From being a race 
apart, 'not slaves, not citizens' as Biskup (1973) had described 
their previous legal status. Aborigines gradually became 
incorporated into the general legal structure. Nevertheless, the 
legal liberation of the 1960s was not complete, and there were 
also an increasing number of people willing to argue that mere 
legal liberation of Aborigines from the restrictions of the 
welfare laws was not enough. The Federal Council for the 
Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and others 
were increasingly active in pushing for land rights and for a 
generally more active Commonwealth involvement in Aboriginal 
affairs. The term 'assimilation' was itself coming under attack 
by those who preferred to talk of 'integration' (eg Schapper 
1970), or sometimes even 'self-determination' (eg Downing 1969) 
as the appropriate policy approach. So although significant 
developments had occurred under the auspices of assimilation 
during the 1960s, by the end of that decade much more extensive 
reform was being demanded. 
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The Challenge of the 1960s and the Development of Academic 
Interest 
The 1960s was, far from coincidentally, also a period of 
increasing academic interest in Aborigines. Alongside the 
existing anthropological interest in analysing Aboriginal society 
in itself, there developed a parallel academic interest in 
analysing the position of Aborigines in the larger Australian 
society. In 1963, the Academy of the Social Sciences initiated a 
major project on 'Aborigines in Australian Society' and by the 
early 1970s, books on the contemporary position of Aborigines 
were proliferating rapidly. 
Broom and Jones undertook analysis of census data relating 
to Aborigines in order to measure their basic socio-economic 
status and to compare it with that of other Australians (Jones 
1970, Broom and Jones 1973). Even though the census collection 
was often inadequate and incomplete with respect to Aborigines, 
the comparison demonstrated massive disadvantage irrespective of 
the particular measure used. Others undertook their own localised 
survey work in an attempt to assess the socio-economic 
circumstances of Aborigines living in particlar localities. Long 
investigated a number of remote institutional communities in 
eastern Australia, while Beasley (1970), Smith and Biddle (1975) 
and Gale (1972) surveyed Aborigines in Sydney, Brisbane and 
Adelaide respectively. Others focussed their attention on 
particular aspects of the Aborigines' position, such as 
employment, wages and training (Sharp and Tatz 1966, Stevens 
1968), involvement in the cattle industry (Stevens 1974), health 
(Moodie 1973), and involvement in criminal law (Eggleston 1976). 
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All found massive and consistent Aboriginal disadvantage, which 
w a s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g g i v e n the history of black-white contact 
and p a s t w h i t e a p p r o a c h e s to the ' A b o r i g i n a l p r o b l e m ' . O t h e r s 
p r o v i d e d m o r e q u a l i t a t i v e h i s t o r i c a l accounts of approaches to 
Aboriginal administration in particular states (Biskup 1973), or 
critiques of the 'assimilation' approach as it had worked out in 
v a r i o u s s t a t e s and l o c a l i t i e s (Reay ed 1964, B e r n d t ed 1969). 
A n o t h e r g r o u p of w o r k s p r e s e n t e d g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s of 
A u s t r a l i a n race r e l a t i o n s and r a c i a l a t t i t u d e s (Taft 1970, 
Lippman 1973, Stevens ed 1971, Stone ed 1974, McQueen 1974, Gale 
and B r o o k m a n 1975). M e a n w h i l e , the c l a s s i c a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 
a c c o u n t s of A b o r i g i n a l s o c i e t y w e r e b e g i n i n g to i n c l u d e f i n a l 
c h a p t e r s s u c h a s 'The A b o r i g i n e s on t h e M a r c h ' a n d 'The 
A b o r i g i n e s T o d a y ' (Elkin 1964: C h l 4 , B e r n d t and B e r n d t 1968: 
Chl4). 
M u c h of this a c a d e m i c w o r k w a s h i g h l y e n g a g e d , in that it 
sided o v e r t l y , and at t i m e s p o l e m i c a l l y , w i t h the c h a l l e n g e to 
official policy approaches that was developing during the 1960s. 
For example, the analysis of Aboriginal settlements in terms of 
Gtoffman's analysis of 'total institutions' allowed Rowley and the 
others who used this comparison to argue that much contemporary 
Aboriginal behaviour was a product of the way in which Aborigines 
had been i n c a r c e r a t e d in i n s t i t u t i o n s on r e s e r v e s , r a t h e r than 
deriving peculiarly from Aboriginal traits and inadequacies. The 
political implications of the analysis were only too clear; the 
system of legal and institutional segregation of Aborigines had 
to be e n d e d . T h e r e w e r e a l s o m o r e p o s i t i v e c a l l s f r o m the 
a c a d e m i c s for land r i g h t s (eg R o w l e y 1971b: p a r t II), o r , as 
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Broom and Jones termed it, Aboriginal 'repatriation' to both land 
and citizenship (Broom and Jones 1973). There were constant 
criticisms of 'assimilation' and calls for increased government 
spending in an attempt to lessen Aboriginal disadvantage. There 
were also calls for increased Aboriginal participation in both 
high level policy processes and in day to day service delivery, 
and for increased encouragement of Aboriginal community 
organisation. On this last, for example, Rowley noted that by the 
late 1960s, the 'Aboriginal voice' had become 'continuous' and 
that this was indicative of 'growing confidence' and potential 
for leadership. But he added: 
As yet these voices are not backed by effective Aboriginal 
pressure groups and organisations (1971a: 385 emphasis in 
original). 
Rowley believed that, if more meaningful political development 
was to occur among the Aborigines, it would require the 
encouragement of Aboriginal leaders and the incorporation of 
Aborigines into strong independent companies or associations. He 
saw these organisations as providing opportunities for 'political 
and administrative innovation' that could capitalise on the 
'initiative of the Aborigines themselves' and provide some 
greater degree of Aboriginal autonomy (Rowley 1971a:chl9). 
Because of the highly engaged nature of these academic 
writings of the late 60s and early 70s, they often now appear 
somewhat dated. 'Assimilation' has long since been discarded as 
the central term in Aboriginal policy, so criticisms of it have 
lost the pertinence they once had. Many of the other things 
called for in this academic literature, such as land rights, the 
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encouragement of Aboriginal o r g a n i s a t i o n and 'self-
determination', have also now become accepted in the official 
language of Aboriginal affairs, even if many of them are only 
partly realised. But despite or perhaps because of its political 
engagement, the literature of the 60s and early 70s opened up a 
number of more enduring analytic issues about the position of 
Aborigines in Australian society. It set an agenda of research 
and debate which continues to this day. A number of the issues 
were raised very starkly in Rowley's massive three volume 
contribution on Aboriginal Policy and Practice (1970, 1971a, 
1971b). 
In the first volume, Rowley provided an historical account 
of the destruction of Aboriginal society and of the development 
of colonial approaches to the Aboriginal problem up to the turn 
of the century. In the second and third volumes, he divided the 
Australian continent into 'settled' and 'colonial' areas and 
investigated the contemporary position of Aborigines in each area 
in relation to issues such as wages, urbanisation and approaches 
to policy and administration. He also distinguished within these 
areas between a number of different community situations in which 
Aborigines lived: as small enclaves or dispersed households in 
metropolitan cities and large towns, in or on the fringes of 
smaller predominantly white country towns, in proximity to new or 
well established remote area mining communities and in isolated 
reserve settlements. 
In developing his analysis, Rowley confronted a number of 
important analytic issues. The first and most crucial was - who 
is an Aborigine? Rowley discussed the issue at some length in an 
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appendix to the first volume, which began after preliminaries as 
follows: 
If special laws are to apply to special persons, such persons 
have to be legally defined. Therefore, from the begining of 
legislation restricting and protecting Aborigines, it has 
been necessary to include definitions indicating who is an 
Aboriginal person (1970: 341). 
Rowley then provided an account of the variety of definitions 
used by the different Aboriginal protection and welfare 
authorities and also the Australian Bureau of Census and 
Statistics up to 1 967. All were based in one way or another on 
the idea of race as physical characteristics traced through 
genealogical descent. They attempted at times even to sub-divide 
Aborigines by degrees of descent into full, half-castes and even 
quarter-castes. The assumptions in such divisions, when made by 
the welfare authorities, had usually been that those of lesser 
degree should be subject to less stringent control and 
supervision and given greater opportunities to 'assimilate' into 
the larger society. They were the first to be considered for 
exemptions from the Aboriginal welfare laws. However, the welfare 
authorities categorisations were not just based on degrees of 
descent. Even in the latter days of the welfare authority 
approach when part-Aborigines were being treated more leniently, 
there were also usually provisions under which those of lesser 
degrees of descent could in some circumstances, such as when 
living on a reserve, be classified as full Aborigines and subject 
to the greater controls which that status entailed. Though 
couched in terms of descent, the welfare authority 
classifications were primarily about exclusion from the larger 
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society and maintaining control over those excluded. 
Rowley was highly critical of these definitions by 
genealogical descent which in practice, he argued, lapsed into 
capricious and racist categorisations on the basis of skin 
colour, physical appearance or administrative whim: 
they classify persons in terms of things which are irrelevant 
to their potential and their achievements. But they are more 
deeply wounding and insulting because they have been (and 
are) so often used as a means of classifying a rejected caste 
group by those who have done the rejecting and who have 
proclaimed their own inherent superiority (1970: 343). 
Rowley did not, however, argue that government administration 
should be totally blind to Aboriginal status. Aborigines had in 
the past been 'administratively and legally restrained ... as no 
other group', and were consequently massively disadvantaged. 
Rowley continued: 
It would be unreal not to allow for the need for compensatory 
assistance. But this raises the same question: who is to be 
an Aboriginal? 
The end aimed at, I think, should be definition in terms of 
the group with which a person identifies (1970: 364). 
Group self-identification was, in fact, the direction in which 
official approaches to the definition of Aborigines would soon 
move. The census question on race was changed in 1971 to one of 
self-identification in terms of 'social origin'; a development 
all the more notable since the 1966 question had represented the 
greatest excursion into genealogical fractionation ever attempted 
by the census. In 1971, respondents were asked to choose between 
origins specified as European, Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander 
or other, and in the case of those of 'mixed origin' to indicate 
the one to which they considered themselves to belong. Soon after 
that census, the principle of Aboriginal self-identification was 
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adopted by the Commonwealth government for all administrative 
purposes and the official definition of an Aborigine or Torres 
Strait Islander became: 
a person of Aboriginal or Islander descent who identifies as 
an Aboriginal or Islander and is accepted as such by the 
community with which he is associated (Official Yearbook of 
Australia 1973: 971). 
Rowley's criticism of official definitions of Aborigines 
was his first enduring contribution to the analysis of the 
position of Aborigines in contemporary Australian society. It 
opened up a debate about Aboriginal identification and identity 
which continues to this day (for example see Langton 1981, 
Jordan 1985). However, his rejection of the genealogical 
definitions which had prevailed up to the 1960s, placed him in a 
difficult position in relation to the official statistics about 
Aborigines that were then available. The statistics had been 
compiled under a definition of Aborigine with which Rowley was 
clearly at odds, yet they were often a major source of 
information. For example, in his discussion of the size and 
characteristics of the Aboriginal population, the census data 
were all Rowley had to work on (1970: Appendix B). In using the 
census data, Rowley slipped back into the terminology of 
Aborigines and part-Aborigines which the genealogical definitions 
had encouraged. He even used the distinction between these 
categories to define his 'colonial' and 'settled' regions; the 
former being where Aborigines predominated over part-Aborigines 
and the latter being where the reverse was true. In fact, the 
predominance of each category over the other in the two areas was 
so great that volume II of Rowley's work on the settled areas 
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dealt almost exclusively with 'part-Aborigines', while volume III 
on the colonial areas dealt equally exclusively with 
'Aborigines', or remote Aborigines as Rowley referred to them 
(see Table 3 and Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Rowley's Division of the Australian Continent into 'Colonial' and 
'Settled' Areas on the Basis of Full- and Part-Aboriginal 
Population Distribution in the 1961 Census 
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Table 3 
Dlstibution of Aboriginal Population in Rowley's 'Colonial' and 
'Settled' Areas of Australia on the Basis of the 1961 Census 
Area Full-Aborigines Part-Aborigines Total 
Colonial 23,148 5,954 34,102 
Settled 7,989 33,218 41,207 
Source: Rowley 1970:376. 
The point being made is not that people may not freely 
identify as part-Aborigines - indeed there is some evidence in 
more recent years that suggests that a number still do (Loveday 
and Jaensch 1982, 1984 1985) - but rather that the statistics 
which Rowley used were the product of a genealogical definition 
which had tended to identify people in particular racial 
categories irrespective of their own choice of group identity. As 
well as Rowley's criticisms, there was also growing Aboriginal 
reaction to the official imposition of genealogical 
fractionation. This Rowley recognised when he noted that in the 
census collection: 
some disliked the term 'half-caste' and described themselves 
as Aboriginal. ...For instance, in the map ... which shows 
the relative distribution of Aborigines and part-Aborigines 
for Australia as a whole, on the basis of the 1961 census 
figures, it will be noted that the proportion of Aboriginal 
to part-Aboriginal in capital cities is higher than in many 
of the more remote census divisions of the States concerned: 
we know that this was not so, and it is relevant as 
indicating an unwillingness to identify as 'half-caste'. Many 
part-Aborigines must also have described themselves as 
'European', probably many more than opted for 'Aboriginal'. 
Some used a category of their own - 'Australian'. (1970: 365) 
The growing strength of this sort of Aboriginal reaction was in 
part responsible for the re-assessment of official approaches to 
the definition of Aborigines which took place in the early 1970s 
(Weaver 1984). 
68 
There is a clear inconsistency in Rowley's work in on the 
one hand rejecting the definition of Aborigine on which the 
census statistics were based and on the other using those 
statistics as a central element in the construction of his 
analysis. This is not to say, however, that Rowley's distinction 
between 'colonial' and 'settled' areas of Australia is of no 
analytic value. In fact, I regard Rowley's distinction between 
the areas as most helpful and as one that can quite easily be 
redefined in terms more acceptable to the present group self-
identification approach to defining Aborigines. 
Rowley suggested the way out of his own dilemma when he 
noted that in the colonial areas, outside the towns, part- and 
full-Aborigines together outnumbered whites. Comparing numbers of 
all Aborigines as a percentage of the overall population of 
census districts could have generated an equally useful 
distinction as Rowley's between the remote and settled area. 
This, in fact, is what two later researcher have done. Drakakis-
Smith and Hirst used 1976 census data to distinguish between 
areas where the concentration of Aborigines was less than the 
national average of 1.2 per cent of the whole population, and 
'Aboriginal Australia' consisting of areas where the percentage 
of Aborigines in the population was more than one standard 
deviation above the national average; ie greater than 18.6 per 
cent (Drakakis-Smith 1981, Drakakis-Smith and Hirst 1981). 
Together with the intermediate zone, this presented a 
trichotomous distinction between areas which both paralleled and 
refined the one made by Rowley ten years earlier (See Figures 2). 
69 
Figure 2 
Drakakis-Smith and Hirst's Delineation of 'Aboriginal Australia' 
on the Basis of Aboriginal Population Concentrations More Than 
One Standard Deviat ion Above the National Average of 1.2 Per 
Cent, as Measured in the 1976 Census 
t t t a t n r I 
Q A b o . , ^ T A S M A N I A ® / 
Drakakis-Smith and Hirst's Delineation of Areas Where Aborigines 
Constitute Less Than the Average 1.2 Per Cent of the Population 
as Measured in the 1976 Census 
ff^n 1 2 N 01 p o o o u l o " 
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R o w l e y ' s d e f i n i t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t y a s i d e , his d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the position of Aborigines in colonial and settled areas 
was his second enduring a n a l y t i c c o n t r i b u t i o n . The d i s t i n c t i o n 
was not i n t e n d e d to d e n o t e a d i s c o n t i n u i t y , since R o w l e y w a s 
h i m s e l f c o n v i n c e d of the 'basic u n i f o r m i t y ' of the 'social 
relations' in which Aborigines found themselves because of the 
c o m m o n 'history of s e t t l e m e n t and d e v e l o p m e n t ' . R a t h e r w h a t 
Rowley was suggesting was a gradient of difference: 
The differences between the social facts, broadly considered, 
c o r r e s p o n d w i t h h i s t o r i c p h a s e s , so that one s e e m s , as it 
w e r e , to go b a c k as one a p p r o a c h e s and p a s s e s our d i v i d i n g 
l i n e , f r o m our 'settled' to our 'colonial' r e g i o n s , into an 
earlier pattern of race relations. (1971a: viii) 
The historical analogy ought not be pushed too far, since clearly 
race relations in the less settled areas do not slavishly follow 
those of an e a r l i e r period in the m o r e s e t t l e d a r e a s . But there 
is a distinction to be made in the contemporary context between 
areas in w h i c h A b o r i g i n e s are a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of the 
p o p u l a t i o n and a s i g n i f i c a n t part of a region's s o c i a l and 
e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s , as a g a i n s t the s i t u a t i o n w h e r e they are a 
t i n y m i n o r i t y u n e n c o u n t e r e d by the v a s t m a j o r i t y of people in 
their daily lives and of little economic or social significance. 
The point is not to s u g g e s t that the A b o r i g i n e s in these areas 
are t h e m s e l v e s f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t , as the f u l l / p a r t 
distinction of the genealogical definitions often apeared to do. 
Rather it is to s u g g e s t that in the t w o a r e a s A b o r i g i n e s o c c u p y 
different places in the larger social structure. 
At the l e v e l of o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s m e a s u r i n g A b o r i g i n a l 
socio-economic status, these attempts to distinguish between the 
circumstances of Aborigines in different areas have now become 
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institutionalised as a typology of Aboriginal communities. The 
DAA regularly distinguishes between four types of Aboriginal 
communities defined as follows: 
A.1 Aboriginal townships on Aboriginal land/Reserves 
Aboriginal townships (i.e. the population is mainly 
Aboriginal) in relatively remote areas, whe re the community 
is likely to be responsible for its own water and power 
supplies, and including missions in such places, communities 
on Aboriginal-owned pastoral leases, but not housing estates 
on restives near non-Aboriginal towns in southern states. 
A. 2 Outstations and other small groups 
These communities are always linked to a resource centre, 
whether it is in a reserve community or a town like Katherine 
or Alice Springs. 
B.1 Cities 
Communities in state capital cities and major urban areas. A 
major urban centre is defined as one with a total population 
of 20,000 or more. 
B.2 Towns 
Communities whose members are residents of the town proper 
(i.e. Aboriginals living in a town whose population is mainly 
non-Aboriginal), of fringe camps or of nearby reserves. 
Specificaly, this classification includes all the 'town 
camps' in Alice Springs. (DAA 1981:7) 
That this sort of distinction overlaps with Rowley's earlier one 
between colonial and settled areas can be appreciated from the 
fact that in 1981 the DAA identified only three outstation (A.2) 
communities in NSW and Victoria, the focus of Rowley's settled 
area, but over 250 in the NT, the centre of his colonial area. On 
the other hand, it identified only one city (B.l) community in 
the NT as against 24 in NSW and Victoria. 
From Integration to Self-Determination: Policy Developments in 
the 1970s and 1980s 
After the 1967 referendum, the Commonwealth government did 
begin to play a more active role in policy relating to 
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Aborigines. It established an Office of Aboriginal Affairs in 
Canberra and an advisory council of three high ranking whites 
sympathetic to the growing calls for reform. The Office was 
allocated a small budget which it spent, with the approval of the 
exisitng state-level Aboriginal welfare authorities, on 
Aboriginal health, education, welfare and economic enterprise 
projects. 
However, it was in 1972, when the Whitlam Labor government 
came to office, that Commonwealth government initiatives in 
Aboriginal affairs became more overtly positive. A separate 
ministry and department of Aboriginal Affairs was established. 
The new DAA took over the MT's Aboriginal welfare authority, the 
Welfare Branch, and negotiated for the handing over of the 
Aboriginal welfare authorities from the states (Hanks 1984: 24-
25). Negotiations were successful in all states except 
Queensland, where the Commonwealth DAA was established 
independently of the State government and its Department of 
Aboriginal and Islander Advancement (DAIA). Commonwealth 
government spending on Aboriginal affairs increased dramatically 
and a new central policy term - 'self-determination' - was 
introduced. The new policy term enabled the Whitlam government to 
distinguish its Aboriginal affairs policy from the 'assimilation' 
and 'integration' approaches of past State and Commonwealth 
governments, and from the approach of the contemporary State 
government in Queensland. Self-determination came to encompass 
most of the Whitlam government's initiatives in Aboriginal 
affairs: legislation enabling groups of Aborigines to incorporate 
organisations for the conduct of their own affairs and the 
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delivery of their own services; increased spending on health, 
education, housing, welfare and economic enterprise programs; the 
establishment of an elected ministerial advisory body of 
Aborigines, the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee; and 
the establishment of inquiries into how best to go about 
recognising Aboriginal land rights in the NT, as a first step 
towards nationwide recognition of land rights. These initiatives 
established new patterns of Commonwealth government involvement 
in Aboriginal affairs which continue to this day; though not 
without some significant changes along the way. 
Non-government Aboriginal organisations, dependent to a 
large degree on DAA funding, have grown rapidly and consistently 
since 1^/2. Specialised Aboriginal service organisations, such as 
legal services, health services, childrens services and housing 
associations, have come into being in many of the larger urban 
centres. In more recent times, they have formed themselves into 
loose federatons such as the National Aboriginal and Islander 
Health Organisation (NAIHO) and the National Aboriginal and 
Islander Legal Services (NAILS). In the smaller more remote 
communities these specialised Aboriginal service organisations 
are complemented by ones providing a range of more general 
services to Aborigines in particular local areas. In the mission 
and reserve settlements of earlier eras. Aboriginal community 
councils have been incorporated for the conduct of community 
affairs. In areas where decentralised outstation communites have 
developed, organisations referred to as 'resource centres' have 
been formed. A few of these Aboriginal community organisations 
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have come and gone, particularly if they have lost the DAA's 
support as a funding agency. But generally they have survived and 
proliferated, so that the overall picture is one of continual 
growth and increasing organisational sophistication. 
Within the Commonwealth government's own Aboriginal affairs 
apparatus at the national level, developments have also been 
considerable but generally in the direction first charted by the 
Whitlam government. Under the Fraser Liberal/National coalition 
government from 1975 to 1983, the new policy approach was 
referred to as 'se1f-management', rather than 'self-
determination', and it had a rather less generous and more 
managerial emphasis (Sanders 1982a). Nevertheless, it was the 
Fraser government which in 1976 enacted the legislation arising 
out of the Whitlam government's inquiries into the recognition of 
Aboriginal land rights in the NT. By 1976-77, on the other hand, 
the NACC had become rather too independent and outspoken an 
advisory body for the pleasure of its new Liberal party Minister 
and the DAA. It was as a consequence reviewed and restructured 
into the National Aboriginal Conference (Weaver 1983). In 1980, 
the DAA was itself split in two with the creation of the 
Aboriginal Development Commis sion. Since 1983 and the re—election 
of a Labor Commonwealth government, the NAC has been reviewed 
once agajr and finally abolished and, despite some initial 
enthusi asm on the part of the new Labor Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs, progress towards nationwide Commonwealth land rights 
legislation has not been achieved. 
These frequent changes in the Commonwealth government's 
administrative and advisory structures in Aboriginal affairs are 
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one indication that arrangements for the conduct of policy 
processes in Aboriginal affairs are still relatively unstable and 
open to change. Aboriginal affairs has, however, been established 
as an ongoing field of Commonwealth government activity and that 
basic development is unlikely now to be reversed. 
The mobilisation of Aboriginal resources since 1972 has also 
been reflected in the activities of other sectors of Commonwealth 
government administration and in new developments at the State 
level of Australian government. In recent times, many mainstream 
functional departments of State and Commonwealth government have 
developed structures and programs addressing the needs of the 
Aboriginal segment of their clientele. The DAA has encouraged 
this at the State level by directing some of its expenditure to 
State departments of education, health, housing, etc as special 
purpose grants for Aboriginal programs. But recent State and 
Territory government commitments go further than particular 
departments just taking up DAA money. There are a number of 
purely State government funded Aboriginal programs operating in 
these functional departments also. These are most obvious in the 
NT, where over one quarter of the population is Aboriginal and 
almost every department of the new NT government (since Territory 
self-government in 1978) has an Aboriginal program or section. 
But similar programs and structures have been developed in other 
States too. The NT and Victoria also now have Aboriginal affairs 
units located in their first minister's departments and since 
1981, NSW has had a new ministry and department of Aboriginal 
affairs. 
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At the Commonwealth level Aboriginal service substructures 
now exist within the Departments of Health, Education and Youth 
Affairs, Employment and Industrial Relations and Social Security. 
These are evidence not only of inclusion of Aborigines among the 
general clientele of mainstream departments involved in social 
policy, but also of attempts by these departments to meet 
particular Aboriginal needs. In time, these departments are 
becoming as important as the DAA in providing services and 
resources for Aborigines, both as individuals and as incorporated 
non-government welfare organisations. The social security system 
in particular is now a major contributor to Aboriginal economic 
resources; which is one important reason for focussing on it in 
this study. 
This brief account of developments in policy approaches to 
Aboriginal affairs during the 1970s and 1980s raises numerous 
questions of how much the position of Aborigines in Australian 
society has changed in recent years and to what extent these 
policy developments have contributed to such change? In 
particular it raises the question of whether the mode of 
Aboriginal incorporation into the larger society has been 
transformed significantly from the structure of welfare patronage 
which I have suggested characterised the Aboriginal position of 
the 1960s and before. My assessment, in brief, is that it has and 
that the policy developments have been crucial to this change. 
There is now a diverse array of government organisations offering 
a variety of different services to Aborigines and in ways which 
appear considerably more responsive to Aboriginal needs. There is 
also a much greater diversity of non-government organisations and 
77 
individuals who can act as both alternative sources of resources 
and as intermediaries for individual Aborigines. These points 
about the increasing number of channels of access to the 
resources of the larger society available to Aborigines are 
crucial to my overall argument and will be developed further as I 
proceed. 
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Aborigines and the Social Security System in the 1980s: Some 
Quantitative Data 
The more specific issue of relevance to this study is the 
extent to which the provision of social security payments has had 
a significant role to play in this changing mode of Aboriginal 
incorporation into the larger society. Again my judgement, in 
short, is that it has. The precise dimensions of that 
contribution will become evident through the remainder of this 
work. However, 1 will begin the task here by giving some fairly 
crude quantitative measures of the importance of social security 
payments in relation to the general level of Aboriginal economic 
resources. In doing so, I rely heavily on Fisk's recent survey of 
the Aboriginal economy (Fisk 1985). 
Following the DAA's typology of Aboriginal communities, Fisk 
divided the Aboriginal population into four (and at times five) 
categories of residence: outstations. Aboriginal towns, small 
non-Aboriginal towns, large towns and metropolitan cities. His 
estimates of the numbers of Aborigines in each of these 
residential categories, using a combination of 1981 census and 
DAA community profiles data, are presented in Table 4. For the 
Aborigines in each locational category, Fisk estimated both 
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personal monetary income and income from social security for the 
year 1981. The results are presented in per capita form in Table 
5. At an aggregate l e v e l , he est imated an Aborig inal social 
security income of $216M out of a total Abor ig inal personal 
monetary income of $400M, or $1395 out of $2583 per capita. 
Table h 
Aboriginal Population by Category of Residence, July 1981 
Category Per cent Approximate Population 
Outstations 4 . 9 7 ,600 
Aboriginal Tovms 19. 6 30 ,300 
Small Non-Aboriginal Towns 34 .3 53,100 
Cities and Large Towns 41 .3 63 ,900 
Total 100 154,900 
Source: Fisk 1985 
Table 5 
A v e r a g e A b o r i g i n a l M o n e t a r y I n c o m e and S o c i a l S e c u r i t y 
Income by Category of Residence, 1981 
Category Monetary Income Monetary Income Social Security 
per person 15 per capita Income per 
years and over capita 
Outstations $3 ,926 $2 ,142 
$ 862 
Aboriginal $ 3 , 4 96 / 3 , 5 56 $ 1 , 9 51 / 1 , 9 76 
Towns 
Small Non- $4 ,326 $2 ,425 $1 ,099 
Aboriginal Towns 
Large Towns $4 ,929 $2 ,678 
Metropolitan $5 ,338 $3 ,085 
Cities 
$1 ,957 
Source: Fisk 1985. Discrepancy for Aboriginal Towns in original . 
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The methods by which these figures were calculated differed 
markedly from category to category and make the drawing of fine 
distinctions a hazardous business. However some general trends 
are clear. 
In the total monetary income figures, the trend is clearly 
from highest incomes in the capital cities with continual decline 
as one moves through the large towns, small non-Aboriginal towns 
to the Aboriginal towns in remote areas. The exception to the 
trend appears to be Aborigines living in outstations, who in 
Fisk's calculations have a slightly higher monetary income than 
their counterparts in the nearby Aboriginal towns. Whether this 
is, in fact, the case is open to considerable debate which need 
not be entered into here. However, what should be noted is that 
Fisk's method for calculating average monetary income differed 
markedly between the outstations and the other residential 
categories. For the other categories the figures were calculated 
from 1981 census data. For the outstations, however, because the 
census data could not be provided for such small communities, the 
data were extrapolated from a single case study of one 
outstation. 
Social security income also followed a similar trend, being 
highest in the capital cities and large towns and least in the 
remote area Aboriginal towns and outstations. However, not too 
much weight should be placed on this trend since the methods of 
calculation again differed across the categories. The most 
reliable figure in this instance was the combined one for 
outstations and Aboriginal towns. It was extrapolated to all such 
communities from a list of payment details by place name supplied 
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by the NT branch of the DSS; an extrapolation from about a 50 per 
cent sample. The figures for small non-Aboriginal towns and 
cities and large towns were, however, once again extrapolated 
from single or small numbers of field work case studies. 
The more important feature of the figures for social 
security income is that, in all the locational categories, in 
1981 social security provided between 40 and 60 per cent of all 
personal monetary income. This is clearly a considerable change 
since the time when Aborigines were excluded from the social 
security system. It also suggests that influence over the flow of 
social security payments into Aboriginal communities has been a 
prize worth fighting for in recent years. The dimensions of these 
struggles to influence the allocation of this important public 
resource are not self-evident from the raw quantitative data. 
Hopefully however they will become so as I proceed further. 
PART II 
PARTICIPANTS, ROLES AND RESOURCES 
Introduction 
So far in this work, I have outlined my conceptual approach to 
policy and provided background material both on the structure and 
operation of the Australian social security system and on general 
governmental approaches to Aborigines. In part II, I wish to 
focus more specifically on the events of recent years of 
relevance to the changing way in which Aborigines have been 
incorporated into the social security system. This part of the 
work provides a fairly broad scale sketch of the roles and 
resources of various participants in this area of governmental 
activity, both inside and outside the DSS. It begins in Chapter 4 
with the structure of roles and resources which existed between 
Aborigines and the DSS up to the 1960s and early 1970s. Chapters 
5 and 6 concentrate on changes which have occurred during the 
1970s and 1980s. Chapter 5 focuses on changes occurring within 
the DSS, and particularly on a growing departmental awareness of 
its Aboriginal clientele and an expanding departmental commitment 
to the servicing of that clientele. Chapter 6 focuses on recent 
changes in the non-government Aboriginal welfare sector and the 
way in which social security payments have been implicated in 
these changes. 
Poor People's Access Structures: Welfare by Patronage or Legal 
Bureaucratic Administration 
In order to help conceptualise the nature of these recent 
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changes in the configuration of participants, roles and resources 
surrounding the incorporation of Aborigines into the social 
security system, I want to devote the remainder of this 
introduction to Part II to the construction of an ideal type 
distinction between different 'access structures' encountered by 
the poor. 
Weber saw the construction of ideal types in the social 
sciences as a process of induction from observed events to 
logically coherent mental constructs which, although they would 
not capture the full complexity and diversity of specific 
empirical situations, could be used to comprehend and interpret 
classes of empirical situation and to explain their causation: 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one 
or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many 
diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally 
absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged 
according to those one-sided emphasised viewpoints into a 
unified a n a l y t i c a l construct ( G e d a n k e n b i 1 d). In its 
conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) 
cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a 
Utopia. (Weber 1949: 90). 
Elsewhere Weber notes that the function of ideal types in 
historical investigation of actual empirical circumstances is: 
the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish 
its divergence or similarities, to describe them with the 
most imambiguously intelligible concepts, and to understand 
and explain them causally. (Weber 1949: 43) 
As concepts in the social sciences, ideal types exist at a fairly 
low level of abstraction and are themselves dependent on prior 
empirical observation. It is largely for this reason that I have 
left the construction of my ideal-type distinction to this stage 
of the study. The distinction is itself partly built on some of 
the general observations about the social security system. 
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approaches to Aboriginal policy and the position of Aborigines in 
Australian society made in part I. 
To construct the distinction between different types of 
poor people's access structures, I pose one simple question: How 
do the poor in our society gain access to the things they need 
and value in their everday lives? 
In the context of the modern welfare state, this question is 
increasingly likely to be answered by pointing to a series of 
compartmentalised, impersonal, isolated and rule governed service 
allocation encounters with street level bureaucrats working in 
different specialised government departments. In the ideal case, 
this type of access structure for the poor corresponds from a 
slightly different perspective to Weber's own ideal construction 
of rational-legal authority exercised by a bureaucratic 
administrative staff. The perspective is different because my 
starting point is a concern with types of access structures faced 
by the poor rather than types of legiti mate authority in society. 
In the ideal legal bureaucratic access structure, pre-defined 
services are allocated by bureaucratic administrative staff 
occupying offices of specific pre-determined jurisdictional range 
working in perfectly ordered and functionally specialised 
hierarchical organisations. Poor people's access to the services 
offered is determined entirely by the existing bodies of rules 
applied impersonally to individual cases. Access is by right, not 
discretion, and the conditions of access as well as the services 
offered are determined by the pre-existing rules. 
To appreciate the reality of poor people's access structures 
in our society, it is necessary to construct another ideal-type 
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description of an access structure which displays the opposite 
characteristics to those prevailing in the legal bureaucratic 
ideal. In this contrasting ideal, poor people's access to the 
things they need and value in their everday lives is achieved 
through unitary, personalised, time-extended and non rule-bound 
exchange relationships with a single providor. In this type of 
access structure, the resources available to the poor and the 
conditions on which they are available are determined by the 
personal preferences and priorities of the individual providor, 
rather than by any body of rules. Access, rather than being a 
legally pre-determined right, is a highly discretionary personal 
privilege. This type of access structure can be identified as a 
system of patronage; a concept which has enjoyed something of a 
resurgence as an explanatory tool of the social sciences in 
recent years (Payne ed 1971, Gellner and \vaterbury eds 1977, 
Schmidt et al eds 1977, Eisenstadt and Lemarchand eds 1981). As 
VJaterbury argues, patronage networks can be seen as: 
stategies for the maintenance or aggrandisement of power on 
the part of the patrons, and of coping and survival on the 
part of the clients. (Gellner and Waterbury eds 1977: 332) 
In its ideal form, access by patronage implies a perfect monopoly 
over the valued resources of the larger society on the part of 
the patron and a corresponding total lack of independent access 
to such resources on the part of the clientele. 
Another important difference between the legal bureaucratic 
and the patronal ideal types of poor people's access structures 
relates to the way in which they develop and are reformed over 
time. In the legal bureaucratic ideal, reform is achieved through 
a process which is totally distinct from the processes of service 
a l l o c a t i o n . T h e e n d / m e a n s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n policy and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is perfectly m a i n t a i n e d and the two b e c o m e 
logically separate. The objective and o u t c o m e of any political 
reform process is a r e w r i t i n g of the rules. Although any such 
rewriting m a y l e g i t i m a t e l y be i n f o r m e d by the experiences of 
previous administrative service allocation, the process of reform 
is necessarily distinct; the one operating within the rules, the 
other being about the rules. In a patronal access structure, on 
the other hand, the relationships b e t w e e n the individuals 
involved are not significantly bound by formal rules of law and 
only themselves become defined over an extended period of time. 
So the maintenance and reform of access structures over time is 
itself part of the ongoing process of gaining and granting 
personally privileged access to valued resources. Rather than a 
logical separation of existing access a r r a n g e m e n t s and their 
r e f o r m , of politics and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , as in the legal 
bureaucratic ideal, in the patronal ideal there is a logical 
unity. 
If we envisage these ideal type descriptions of patronal and 
legal bureaucratic access structures as the end points of a 
continuum, rather than as simply a contrasting dichotomy, they 
provide us with an axis of stipulative characteristics against 
w h i c h the actual access structures of particular poor people, 
such as Aborigines, can be compared both at particular points in 
time and as they develop over time. But before we e m b a r k on any 
empirical comparisons, there is one other question which needs to 
be addressed in relation to the definition of the ideal types. 
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Vjhy do the characteristics listed for each type logically cohere 
in the way specified? The answer to this lies in understanding 
poor people's access structures as a reflection of underlying 
social and economic contexts, and not just incidental collections 
of stipulative characteristics. It is the underlying social and 
economic context which explains the characteristics of access 
structures, not the other way round. So patronal and legal 
bureaucratic tendencies in actual poor people's access structures 
need to be related to an underlying socio-economic context. 
Patronal tendencies in access structures depend for their 
existence on the poor they serve suffering from an acute scarcity 
of valued resources and an acute lack of independent penetration 
to the centres of valued resources in the larger society. Only 
where scarcity is acute and penetration is weak can patrons 
establish or maintain a high degree of monopoly control over the 
resources valued by the poor. Only where patrons enjoy a degree 
of long term monopoly control over access to valued resources can 
they foster and maintain the personalised dependence of the 
clientele. And only in such circumstances of established 
personalised dependence can patrons impose conditions of their 
own personal choosing on their exchanges with clients. The 
underlying context of a structure of patronage, as Waterbury 
argues, is 'vulnerability': 
resort to patronage mechanisms will be the more pronounced 
where the weak are disproportionately weak, the strong 
disproportionately strong, and formal, alternative mechanisms 
for protecting citizens - laws, court systems, police, 
procedural rules of the game, etc - remain embryonic, 
manipulable or perhaps imbued with little or no legitimacy 
(Gellner and Waterbury eds 1977: 336) 
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Where the s c a r c i t y of valued resources experienced by the poor i s 
l e s s acute and p e n e t r a t i o n between the poor and the c e n t r e s of 
resources in the larger soc i e ty stronger, channels of access are 
a l so l i k e l y to be more numerous. In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the 
a b i l i t y of any one individual to maintain monopoly contro l over 
poor p e o p l e ' s a c c e s s to r e s o u r c e s and to impose c o n d i t i o n s of 
their own making on exchanges of resources between the poor and 
the larger soc ie ty w i l l l o g i c a l l y be lessened. So highly patronal 
tendencies in access structures w i l l be unl ikely to emerge or, i f 
they already exiSt , to be maintained. 
Legal bureaucratic tendencies in access structures, on the 
other hand, are dependent on a r e l a t i v e l y a f f l u e n t , s t rong and 
organisat ional ly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s t a t e apparatus which has both 
the authority and the a b i l i t y to a l l o ca te valued resources to the 
poor in p r e - d e t e r m i n e d r u l e - g o v e r n e d ways. L e g a l - b u r e a u c r a t i c 
tendencies also depend on a l i t e r a t e and r e l a t i v e l y experienced 
poor c l i e n t e l e who have the complementary a b i l i t y and knowledge 
to be a b l e t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f the v a r i e t y o f s e r v i c e 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s a v a i l a b l e . Only i f both these e lements are in 
existence can mult iple channels of organisat ional ly spec ia l i sed 
and r u l e governed s e r v i c e a l l o c a t i o n be e s t a b l i s h e d and 
m a i n t a i n e d . I f the d e g r e e o f p e n e t r a t i o n o f the v a r i o u s 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l Dtr ts of the w e l f a r e s t a t e to the poor i s not so 
great, the a b i l i t y of the part ies to maintain rule governed and 
impersonal serv ice exchanges w i l l also l o g i c a l l y be lessened. 
The roots of this idea l - type d i s t i n c t i o n in the observations 
o f p a r t I s h o u l d be c l e a r l y e v i d e n t . A u s t r a l i a n w e l f a r e 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , as d e s c r i b e d in chapter 2, has many l e g a l 
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bureaucrat ic a s p e c t s ; though my emphasis on the scope for 
indeterminacy and struggle even at the level of service delivery 
i n d i c a t e s c l e a r l y that it f a l l s wel l short of the ideal . 
S imi lar ly , my d e s c r i p t i o n of the protection and later wel fare 
a u t h o r i t y a p p r o a c h to the ' A b o r i g i n a l p r o b l e m ' , w h i c h 
predominated until the 1960s, indicated many patronal aspects of 
that segregated special purpose access structure for Aborigines; 
such as the acute scarcity of valued resources flowing from the 
larger society to Aborigines and the monopoly control over access 
to those resources enjoyed by those placed 'in charge' of groups 
of Aborigines in particular localities. So in terms of my ideal 
type distinction, the expansion of the social security system and 
other elements of the mainstream Austral ian wel fare state 
in recent years to include Abor ig ines , can be interpreted as 
p r o v i d i n g the c i r c u m s t a n c e s for i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n an 
established highly patronal access structure for Aborigines and 
an expanding mainstream more legal bureaucratic element. Policy 
change, in the sense identified in chapter 1 of a transformation 
in the committed structure of important public resources, would 
seem the likely i f not inevitable result of such an interaction. 
Two such divergent access structures are not likely to be brought 
together without some significant changes in the commitment of 
important public r e s o u r c e s , nor for that m a t t e r w i t h o u t 
considerable scope for ongoing politics. 
How much transformation of Aboriginal access structures has 
taken place in recent years, and how the social security system 
has contributed to change in the patterns of commitment of public 
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resources cannot be simply read off from the ideal types or from 
the basic facts of change as outl ined thusfar . We are deal ing 
with degrees of change conceptualised in terms of a subtle shift 
a long our i d e a l - t y p e c o n t i n u u m , not w i t h the w h o l e s a l e 
replacement of one type of access structure by another. In the 
middle of our continuum are a complex v a r i e t y of access 
structures in which those who occupy the crucial intermediary 
posit ions between the poor and the larger society do not enjoy 
monopoly control over the flow of valued resources, but equally 
are not without some capacity to exercise personal influence over 
that f low. Though they may not be patrons free to impose their 
own priorities on poor people's access, the may be 'brokers' able 
to mix some of their own p r i o r i t i e s with those embodied in the 
r u l e s of s e r v i c e a l l o c a t i o n l a i d down u n d e r the l e g a l 
bureaucrat ic author i ty of the modern wel fare state (Payne ed 
1 9 7 1 ) . I t i s in t h i s m i d d l e range that the p o l i t i c s of 
renegotiating Aboriginal access structures has been occurring in 
recent years , and considerably more empirical investigation is 
needed before we can adequately analyse these changes and the 
contribution to them made by the social security system in these 
terms. 
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Chapter ^ 
Social Security Payments and the Structure of Welfare Patronage 
for Aborigines: The 1960s and Before 
The 1940s and 1950s 
Ihe legislative moves away from total Aboriginal exclusion 
from the social security system during the early 1940s left much 
still to be d e t e r m i n e d . The i n c l u s i o n of A b o r i g i n a l c h i l d r e n , 
except the nomadic and those wholly dependant on Commonwealth or 
State government support, in the family allowance legislation of 
1941 provided the first such opportunity for indeterminacy. The 
new l e g i s l a t i o n p r o v i d e d for the p a y m e n t of f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e s 
either to a child's individual parent/custodian or, where a child 
was m a i n t a i n e d by an i n s t i t u t i o n , to that i n s t i t u t i o n . In the 
case of A b o r i g i n a l c h i l d r e n l i v i n g in m i s s i o n s . State and 
T e r r i t o r y w e l f a r e s e t t l e m e n t s or under the s u p e r v i s i o n of 
e m p l o y e r s such as p a s t o r a l i s t s , this i m m e d i a t e l y raised the 
question of whether the mission or other authority was to be paid 
the a l l o w a n c e , or w h e t h e r it w o u l d be paid to the i n d i v i d u a l 
A b o r i g i n a l p a r e n t s w h o also lived under the s u p e r v i s i o n of the 
relevant authority. In 1942, the matter was clarified in favour 
of the A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e a u t h o r i t i e s by an a m e n d m e n t to the 
family allowance legislation which provided that: 
Where any children of an aboriginal native of Australia are, 
for not less than six months in any calendar year, or for any 
continuous period of not less than six months, supervised and 
assisted by, although not mainly maintained by, an aboriginal 
m i s s i o n w h i c h is an i n s t i t u t i o n , the C o m m i s s i o n e r (ie 
DSS W S ) may grant endowment to the institution at the rate of 
five shillings per week based upon the average number of such 
children so supervised and assisted (Act No 5 of 1942). 
This a m e n d e m e n t set the p a t t e r n for the rest of the 1940s and 
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1950s whereby the limited inclusion of Aborigines in the social 
security system would, in effect, mainly lead to social security 
money flowing to the established welfare authorities on 
behalf of Aborigines, rather than to Aborigines themselves. 
The pensions legislation of 1942 did not provide quite the 
same degree of opportunity for the Aboriginal welfare authorities 
to tap into social security resources as had the family allowance 
legislation of the previous year. The pensions legislation 
provided only for payment to Aborigines exempt from the special 
State or Territory laws controlling their race or, where 
provisions for exemption did not exist, to those judged by the 
DSS to be of sufficient 'character, standard of intelligence and 
social development'. The DSS's 'rule of thumb' for interpreting 
this last phrase quickly became that Aborigines living on 
reserves under welfare authority management were not generally to 
be considered eligible. This restricted the welfare authorities 
in their ability to gain pensions on behalf of those in their 
care. However, when they were successful, and I will return 
briefly to the sorts of manoeuvres which were later engaged in, 
the pensions legislation also provided that where the DSS judged 
it desirable to do so: 
payment of the pension of an aboriginal native of Australia 
shall be made to an authority of a State or Territory 
controlling the affairs of aboriginal natives, or to some 
other authority or person... suitable for the purpose (Acts 
J^ os 3 and 19 of 19^2). 
In contrast to the pensions legislation, the benefits 
legislation of 1944 neither stipulated that Aborigines had to be 
exempt from the special State or Teritory laws in order to be 
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eligible nor provided specifically for the payment of Aborigines' 
benefits to others. It merely provided that in order to be 
eligible for benefits, Aborigines had to be considered by the DSS 
to be of sufficient 'character, standard of intelligence and 
social development'. At first sight, these provisions may appear 
to allow for greater Inclusion of Aborigines. In fact, however, 
they reflected the prevailing judgement that both unemployment 
and sickness benefits were even less applicable to Aborigines 
than pensions or family allowances. The general eligibility 
criteria, which in the case of UB required that applicants had to 
be capable and willing to undertake suitable paid work and in the 
case of sickness benefits had to be temporarily incapicitated for 
work and thereby have suffered a loss of income, were regarded as 
ruling out eligibility for all Aborigines except those very few 
who were 'assimilated' into the larger society totally outside 
the supervision of the welfare authorities. So, unlike for 
pensions, there was no apparent need to specify that only those 
exempt from the laws controlling Aborigines would be eligible. 
This was taken to be self evident from the general eligibility 
criteria. Similarly, there was no apparent need to provide 
specifically for the payment of Aborigines' benefits to others, 
since if the Aborigines concerned were not regarded as able to 
handle their own money there would be no possibility of them 
qualifying for benefit. 
The relative importance of the three different types of 
social security payments for the Aboriginal welfare authorities 
during the 1940s can be gauged from the estimates of social 
security payments to Aborigines given by the Director General of 
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Social Security to the 1948 conference of Commonwealth and State 
Aboriginal welfare authorities (quoted in Rowley 1971a: 390). Of 
the $800,000 per annum then being paid out on behalf of 
Aborigines, more than half was in the form of family allowances, 
while less than one per cent was in the form of benefits, and the 
remainder was pensions, t^ince a single pension at the time was 
$4.25 per week and the rate of allowance for each child 
(excluding the first) only 30c per week, by number family 
allowances were by far and away the most significant type of 
social security payments being made on behalf of Aborigines. 
They, more than the other types of social security payments, were 
effectively being fed into the existing Aboriginal welfare 
structure. 
The overall importance of social security payments as a 
source of income for the Aboriginal welfare authorities by the 
late 1940s is somewhat harder to gauge in quantitative terms. By 
the standards of the 1980s, the level of social security payments 
was extremely limited. $800,000 per annum represented the 
equivalent of only about 3,600 standard rate pensions in 1948, 
whereas Pisk's 1981 figure for social security payments to 
Aborigines of $216M represented the equivalent of about 59,600 
standard rate pensions. Nevertheless, in 1948 almost all of this 
social security money was flowing direct to the Aboriginal 
welfare authorities rather than to individual Aborigines. So from 
the viewpoint of these authorities social security payments were 
probably of considerable importance as a new source of resources. 
The interest which the welfare authorities had developed in 
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the receipt of social security payments by the late 1940s can be 
gauged more qualitatively from the stand they took in the debate 
at the time over the issue of further reform of the provisions 
for Aboriginal eligibility. In 1947, a former Commissioner for 
Native Affairs for Western Australia offered the following 
comment on the pattern of social security payment to Aborigines, 
as it had by then developed: 
it is only to be expected that some relief has been enjoyed 
by the native people in the extension to them of these social 
services of the Commonwealth, but some of this money is being 
unwisely spent - Child Endowment for instance - so much so 
that its distribution has unfortunately to be directed 
through Official State channels. The relief afforded the 
States in saving rationing costs, no doubt enables the 
expenditure of money in other beneficial directions (Neville 
1947:224). 
Neville, for one, was well pleased to see the welfare authorities 
receiving Commonwealth government funds through the social 
security system to assist in the running of the Aboriginal 
welfare system. He also believed they should get more. He went on 
in his discussion to give the example of an Aboriginal pensioner 
whom he took into an institution 'because she was too feeble to 
care for herself and there was none of her own people to look 
after her' (Neville 1947: 225). Her pension ceased when she 
entered the institution, despite Neville's protestations. On the 
basis of this example, Neville commented that he viewed with 
some concern the prospect that 'all Aborigines' might decide 'to 
give up living as such in order to secure these benefits' 
(Neville 1947: 225); by which I take it he meant that Aborigines 
might move outside the welfare institutions in order to obtain a 
pension. The alternative was to bring pensions into the welfare 
institutions; which is precisely what the welfare authorities 
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set about achieving. 
At the 1948 Conference of Aboriginal welfare authorities a 
unanimous resolution was passed that all Aborigines, except those 
living under primitive or nomadic conditions, should be eligible 
for social security payments. Rowley later commented that 'such a 
recommendation would ha\e been beyond all hope ten years earlier' 
and that 'there was a kind of logic here for which one looks in 
vain in the records of the 1937 Conference' (Rowley 1971a: 390). 
A new logic there may have been. But, conciously or not, it was a 
logic that entailed a degree of self interest on the part of the 
welfare authorities. Having been able to procure some financial 
resources from the social security system to aid them in the task 
of managing their Aboriginal wards, the welfare authorities may 
well have sensed that there was considerable further potential to 
be exploited here. 
Although these moves to legislatively extend eligibility for 
social security payments to all Aborigines other than the 
'nomadic or primitive' did not come to fruition until 1959, in 
the interim much the same objective could be pursued through 
administrative means. Biskup recounts how, in 1954, senior 
officials of the Department of Native Affairs in Western 
Australia manoeuvred into a position where they could grant 
exemptions to invalid, aged and widowed Aborigines for the 
purpose of qualifying ror pensions, while at the same time 
maintaining the Department's jurisdiction over these Aborigines 
under the Native Administration Act (Biskup 1973: 249). These 
pensioners were not the 'assimilated' Aborigines who had 
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ostensibly been the target of the provisions for limited 
Aboriginal inclusion in the pensions legislation back in the 
early 1940s. Rather they were among those who were still tied 
into the WA Department of Native Affairs' highly patronal special 
purpose system of segregated welfare support and control. So when 
eligibility was granted, the provision for the payment of 
Aborigines pensions to others on their behalf was immediately 
invoked and the money flowed to the WA Department and its 
mission and employer delegates, rather than to the exempt 
Aborigines themselves. 
Administrative manoeuvres such as the above could extend the 
welfare authorities' access to social security resources to some 
limited degree. However the biggest prize, as the authorities 
perceived it, was still to be had from legislative change. So 
ironically enough, it was the welfare authorities, the 
established institutional interests in Aboriginal affairs, who 
were amongst those pushing hardest for an expanded legislative 
inclusion of Aborigines in the social security system. When this 
did eventuate in 1959, in terms which the welfare authorities had 
first suggested back in 1948, the welfare authorities were well 
pleased. They could reasonably anticipate an expansion in the 
level of social security resources flowing to them in the next 
few years. 
One of the potential 'losses' of the 1959 reforms, from the 
point of view of the welfare authorities, lay in the deletion of 
the legislative clauses providing explicitly for the payment of 
pensions and family allowances to others on behalf of Aborigines. 
This did not concern the welfare authorities unduly, since there 
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were general provisions in the social security legislation for 
the payment of family allowances to institutions and also for the 
payment of pensions and benefits to others on behalf of 
applicants where the DSS judged it desirable (Social Security Act 
1947 sees 43, 95 and 123). The Aboriginal welfare authorities 
justifiably believed that the DSS would continue to direct 
Aboriginal payments to the authorities under these general 
provisions, rather than to individual Aborigines. They were, of 
course, correct. Had this not been so predictably the case, the 
welfare authorities might not have been so enthusiastic about 
reform of the social security legislation. If paid direct and in 
full to individual Aboriginal applicants, social security 
payments could have undermined the system of welfare patronage 
which the authorities and their delegates had worked long and 
hard to build. Payment would have been a prize out of all 
proportion with the other rewards offered within the Aboriginal 
welfare system. However, as long as the payments were made to the 
authorities rather than direct to the individual Aboriginal 
applicants, they would be a useful addition to the resources over 
which these established local white patrons of Aboriginal welfare 
could exercise their personal control. In short, social security 
payments could conveniently be added to and enhance the existing 
structure of welfare patronage for Aborigines. 
Not long after the legislative changes of 1959, the DSS 
presented the following account of the administrative 
'principles' being used for the payment of pensions to 
Aborigines : 
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(1) Where an aborigine has demonstrated his ability to handle 
money wisely and to manage his own affairs, the payments will 
be made direct to him. 
(2) Where an aborigine cannot handle the whole of the pension 
but perhaps some of it, the pension will be paid in two parts 
- one part to the aborigine as pocket money and the other 
part to some other authority to be used on his behalf. This 
is the principle which will generally be applied to 
aborigines on Government settlements. Church missions and 
pastoral prcperties. 
(3) Only where a native, although not actually nomadic or 
primitive, is unable to handle any money at all will the 
whole of the pension be paid to some person or authority on 
his behalf. 
It was anticipated at the outset that, because of the 
differing policies pursued by the various States and 
differing standards of development and customs of the 
aborigines themselves, it would not be possible to bring 
about immediately uniformity of treatment throughout the 
Commonwealth. This proved to be the case and subject to such 
adjustments as may be necessary in the light of experience 
the following procedures have been adopted. 
Payment will be made direct to the Aborigine in New South 
Wales and Victoria. Where the pensioner requests, or the 
Director of Social Services considers it desirable, the whole 
or part of the pension may be paid to some other person or 
authority on behalf of the pensioner. The same principles 
will apply to the payment of maternity allowances. 
Where aborigines are living in a controlled community such as 
a Church mission. Government settlement or pastoral property, 
pensions will be paid on the institutional basis, i.e. a 
portion will be paid to the aborigine for his own personal 
use and the balance will be paid to the authority controlling 
the community for the maintenance of the aborigine. 
Because of the various stages of advancement of the 
aborigines, the personal or pocket money component will not 
be uniform in all cases but will vary from 10/- ($1) a week 
in the more remote areas to 33/- ($3.30) a week in the 
Government settlements in Queensland and on certain of the 
Church missions where the aborigines are sufficiently 
advanced to handle that amount of money themselves (DSS 
1960:3). 
The pension rate at the time was $9.50 per week. These 
administrative principles clearly identified the way in which, 
particularly in the remote areas, social security was continuing 
to flow to the welfare authorities on behalf of Aborigines, 
rather than direct to the Aborigines. However, they also pointed 
to the need to distinguish by that time between the practices in 
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these more remote areas and those then developing in more settled 
areas. For this reason, discussion of the 1960s needs to be 
divided more clearly on an area basis. 
Payment Patterns in the Settled Areas in the 1950s and 1960s: 
The Seeds of Change 
Following Rowley's historical analogy concerning the 
different patterns of contemporary race relations in the colonial 
and settled areas of Australia, it would not seem unreasonable to 
expect that any change in the way in which social security 
payments were fed into the established structure of Aboriginal 
welfare patronage would emerge first in the more settled areas. 
In terms of my own typology of poor people's access structures, 
such an expectation reflects the fact that Aboriginal 
segregation from the larger society was at that time less acute 
in the more settled areas and harder for the welfare authorities 
to maintain. The resources of the larger society were closer at 
hand and the Aborigines themselves slightly more experienced in 
the white society's ways. So the opportunities for Aborigines in 
the settled areas to gain access to these resources independent 
of established white welfare patrons could reasonably be 
anticipated to be greater than in the remote areas. This 
expectation would seem particularly plausible since approaches to 
'part Aboriginal' policy had been more lenient than for 'full 
Aborigines' in recent years and, as Rowley indicated for the 
1960s, this distinction paralleled the settled/remote one. It is 
not surprising then to find the DSS by 1961 distinguishing 
between its individualised payment practices in MSW and Victoria 
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and payment to welfare authorities on behalf of Aborigines in the 
remote areas. 
From about the late 1940s on, l i fe outside the reserves was 
becoming a p o s s i b i l i t y for Abor ig ines in the sett led areas in 
ways previously denied them. Studies of Aborigines in Australian 
c a p i t a l c i t i e s have a l l i d e n t i f i e d the period during and a f ter 
world war I I as a time of major in-migration of Aborigines from 
the settled rural hinterland (Barwick 1963: 32-43, Beasley 1970: 
150-5, Gale 1972 :Ch5 , Howard 1981 : 22-30, Rowley 1971a : P t I I I , 
Smith and Biddle 1975:Ch3). As noted in chapter 3, this movement 
of Abor ig ines from the h interland of the sett led areas to the 
metropolitan cities did not automatically lead to the demise of 
the established structure of welfare patronage. These Aboriginal 
city dwellers often still had great difficulty gaining access to 
the resources they wanted and needed in their everyday l i v e s . 
The welfare authorities, which usual ly e s t a b l i s h e d or expanded 
their own presence in the cities at the time often remained the 
Abor ig ines ' major channel of access to the resources of the 
larger society. 
Social security payments were, on the other hand, gradually 
becoming more readily available and were, as the DSS guidelines 
indicate, being paid direct to the new city dwelling Aborigines 
when they did q u a l i f y . These social security payments did 
themselves contribute in some significant way to the expansion of 
metropolitan opportunities for Aborigines in the settled areas. 
However, access to soc ia l secur ity payments for c i ty d w e l l i n g 
Aborigines still had its problems, as accounts of the time make 
clear. In 1964 for example, Andrews suggested that: 
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A b o r i g i n e s are being severely penalised because they have 
been deliberately excluded from official records such as ... 
registers of births, marriages, deaths, etc...the Department 
of Social Services now expects Aborigines to be able to prove 
f a c t s s u c h as a g e w i t h o u t t h e a s s i s t a n c e of s u c h 
records...Destitute e l d e r l y Aborigines are kept waiting for 
pensions until they can find s o m e o n e acceptable to the 
Department who can corroborate their age. This can be quite 
i m p o s s i b l e for A b o r i g i n e s who have m o v e d to n e w districts 
(Andrews 1964). 
Other accounts m a d e it e q u a l l y clear that A b o r i g i n e s in the 
m e t r o p o l i t a n cities w e r e e x p e r i e n c i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s in gaining 
access to social security payments. In their survey of Aborigines 
in Brisbane in 1965, Smith and Biddle estimated that only forty 
per cent of the A b o r i g i n e s who they judged to be entitled to a 
pension were in fact receiving one (Smith and Biddle 1975: 103). 
The situation in relation to benefits appeared s i m i l a r . Of the 
working-age men in Smith and Biddle's sample, 7.5 per cent were 
unemployed but 'hardly any' were receiving unemployment benefits 
(Smith and Biddle 1975: 100). A n d r e w s provided another e x a m p l e 
from Perth: 
Proofs required to establish eligibility for benefits can be 
quite e l a b o r a t e , and m a n y Aborigines are unable to produce 
the d o c u m e n t a t i o n required. An e x a m p l e is provided by the 
case of the two Aboriginal friends who applied together for 
u n e m p l o y m e n t benefits in Perth. One had been w o r k i n g in a 
city f a c t o r y , and his application was granted i m m e d i a t e l y . 
His friend had been working on cattle stations for years, and 
had come to Perth only because he couldn't get any w o r k in 
the country. He couldn't produce d o c u m e n t a r y proof of his 
e m p l o y m e n t and so was refused the u n e m p l o y m e n t benefit. 
Aboriginal station w o r k e r s are usually e m p l o y e d on a very 
casual basis, and the difficulties of providing documentary 
proof can become insuperable in such cases (Andrews 1964). 
The h i s t o r y of A b o r i g i n a l segregation and m a r g i n a l i s a t i o n w a s 
clearly still hindering the 'assimilated' A b o r i g i n e s in their 
attempts to gain access to the prizes of white society, including 
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y p a y m e n t s . The b u r d e n of i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
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o r g a n i s a t i o n a l rules and A b o r i g i n e s ' o w n lack of experience in 
dealing with legal bureaucratic queueing structures made access 
to the services of the m a i n s t r e a m w e l f a r e state for them m u c h 
more problematical than for many other Australians. It is hardly 
surprising then t h a t the S t a t e - l e v e l A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e 
a u t h o r i t i e s did e s t a b l i s h a c i t y p r e s e n c e to a s s i s t the 
' a s s i m i l a t e d ' A b o r i g i n e s and t h a t t h e y did r e m a i n to a 
significant degree these Aborigines' major channel of access to 
the resources of the larger society. It is also not surprising 
that many 'assimilated' Aborigines did, from time to time, return 
in sheer frustration to the m o r e f a m i l i a r surroundings of the 
reserve settlements in which they had grown up. 
This m o v e m e n t of Aborigines back and forth b e t w e e n the 
metropolitan cities, country towns and the Aboriginal reserves in 
the settled areas created a whole new series of problems for the 
DSS in its dealings with its Aboriginal clientele. The reserves 
in these areas were no longer closed places of living for people 
totally excluded from the larger society. So the d i s t i n c t i o n 
b e t w e e n 'assimilated' and 'reserve' A b o r i g i n e s , on w h i c h the 
DSS's past practices had been built, no longer worked so neatly. 
In NSW, for example, during the mid 1950s a number of cases arose 
in which pensioners and beneficiaries who were exempt from the 
the c o n t r o l of the NSW A b o r i g i n a l W e l f a r e Board, returned to 
reserves to live while maintaining their exemptions. Previously 
the DSS w o u l d have regarded these people as ineligible for 
benefits, since living on a reserve was taken by the Department 
as indicating insufficient 'character, standard of intelligence 
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and s o c i a l development ' to warrant e l i g i b i l i t y . Pensions, on the 
o t h e r hand, would have been p a y a b l e as l o n g as an a p p l i c a n t ' s 
e x e m p t i o n f o r S t a t e A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e l a w s was m a i n t a i n e d ; 
though p r e v i o u s l y t h e y would have been pa id t o someone e l s e on 
the a p p l i c a n t ' s b e h a l f w h i l e t h e y were on a r e s e r v e . However , 
b e c a u s e t h e s e A b o r i g i n e s had worked and l i v e d o f f the r e s e r v e s 
f o r extended per i ods of t ime , and could do so again at any t ime, 
t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e on the DSS to m a i n t a i n b o t h 
e l i g i b i l i t y f o r b e n e f i t s and d i r e c t payment of both pensions and 
b e n e f i t . Not a l l t h e p r e s s u r e came f r o m t h e A b o r i g i n e s 
themselves . The NSW Abor ig ina l Wel fare Board was a l s o keen at the 
time f o r the reserves to become more open and l e s s f u l l y managed, 
and f o r the A b o r i g i n e s who l i v e d on them t o work and d e r i v e 
income o u t s i d e , rather than r e l y i n g e n t i r e l y on the resources of 
t h e B o a r d . The DSS b e c a m e e n t a n g l e d i n a p r o c e s s o f 
r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t s own previous p r a c t i c e s . I t now began to 
d i s t i n g u i s h open, unmanaged reserves from c l o s e d , managed ones. 
Abor ig ines l i v i n g on the l a t t e r continued to be regarded by the 
D e p a r t m e n t a s o f i n s u f f i c i e n t ' c h a r a c t e r , s t a n d a r d o f 
i n t e l l i g e n c e and s o c i a l development' to warrant e l i g i b i l i t y f o r 
b e n e f i t o r , i f e l i g i b l e f o r p e n s i o n b e c a u s e o f t h e i r e x e m p t i o n 
from Abor ig ina l w e l f a r e laws , among those whose pension was to be 
d i r e c t e d to o thers . Those l i v i n g on open r e s e r v e s , however, would 
now r e c e i v e both types of payment d i r e c t l y . 
This process o f r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ru les in r e l a t i o n to 
the r e s e r v e s o f the s e t t l e d a r e a s d i d not mean t h a t the o l d 
s t r u c t u r e of Aborignal w e l f a r e patronage d i s a p p e a r e d a l t o g t h e r . 
Some of the s u b t l e t i e s invo lved may be gleaned from an account o f 
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the s i t u a t i o n at Lake Tyers reserve in eastern V i c t o r i a . By the 
early 1960s, the Victorian Aboriginal Welfare Board was pursuing 
a stated pol icy of c l o s i n g down A b o r i g i n a l r e s e r v e s and 
e n c o u r a g i n g the A b o r i g i n e s s t i l l l i v i n g on them to move 
elsewhere. Lake Tyers was one of the last Victorian reserves to 
remain and it too was marked for closure in the not too d i s t a n t 
future . By 1964 Lake Tyers had become less than a f u l l y managed 
i n s t i t u t i o n , though it did s t i l l have a white Wel fare Board 
manager. Pension payments at Lake Tyers were at that time being 
paid d irect to i n d i v i d u a l Aborigines at the local post o f f i c e . 
However, two thirds of each pension was immediately handed over 
to the white manager of the reserve who also received al l the 
f a m i l y a l lowance payments in bulk. The manager then used the 
social secur ity money to buy goods 'at the request ' of those 
concerned (Andrews 1964) . C learly this part icular welfare 
authority manager was able to maintain a significant degree of 
monopoly control over the Lake Tyers Aborigines' access to the 
resources of the larger society, even though the official policy 
developments of the time were moving away from such close 
personalised control. 
In summary then, individualised social security payments in 
the sett led areas during the 1950s and 1960s were beginning to 
undermine the soc ia l pre-conditions for a structure of welfare 
patronage, but were not as yet part of any coherent challenge to 
the highly patronal Aboriginal welfare structure that continued 
to ex ist . There were s t i l l major pract ical problems for 
Aborigines in gaining access to social security payments, so the 
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social security system's contribution to any changes in 
Aboriginal access structures more generally was an emerging 
potential as much as a realised effect. The seeds of change were 
apparent, but were not as yet fully germinated. 
The Remote areas in the 1960s: Black Money for White Bosses 
In the remote areas in the 1960s, social security payments 
to Aborigines began to slowly expand as a result of the 1959 
legislative changes. However, in almost every instance they 
continued to be paid direct to the established white patrons of 
Aboriginal welfare. Because of the growing academic interest in 
Aborigines at the time, the situations to which this gave rise 
are in fact quite well documented. 
In his study of the administration of Aboriginal welfare in 
the Northern Territory, Tatz identified the economic importance 
of social security payments to NT Welfare Branch's settlements 
and to the missions and pastoralists in charge of groups of 
Aborigines(Tatz 1964: Ch5). By 1964, social security payments 
were contributing from 20-40 per cent of the income of the 
various missions. This meant that social security payments were 
almost as significant a source of income for the missions as the 
subsidies they received from the Welfare Branch itself. In the 
case of the pastoral properties, social security income received 
on behalf of resident Aborigines was, by then, far outstripping 
contributions from the NT Welfare Branch (see also Stevens 
1974:83). So in aggregate terms social security payments were 
clearly becoming a major source of funding. 
As regards the actual method of payment in the three types 
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of communities, Tatz noted that the NT Welfare Branch settlements 
d i v i d e d the p e n s i o n p a y m e n t s i n t o t h r e e p a r t s : the 
'institutional' portion of about 65 per cent, which went into the 
Branch's account for the m a i n t e n a n c e of its w a r d s ; a housing 
portion of about 25 per cent, which was placed in a trust account 
for the construction of pensioner housing; and the pocket money 
portion of $1 per w e e k , w h i c h was given to the individual 
pensioner. Tatz noted further that the institutional portion of 
the pension appeared not to be s p e c i f i c a l l y spent on those 
entitled to a p e n s i o n , but rather b e c a m e part of the general 
revenue used for the m a i n t e n a n c e of all the Aborigines on a 
settlement. The situation on the missions and pastoral properties 
was little different, except that few missions or pastoralists 
seemed to distinguish the institutional and other portions of the 
pensions so clearly and few could account as precisely for the 
use made of the m o n e y . Of the housing expenditure on pastoral 
properties Tatz commented: 
by July 1963 a total of 150 houses had been built by 
pastoralists to regulation standards. There is no evidence 
that any of these houses have been built s p e c i f i c a l l y for 
pensioners (Tatz 1964: 110). 
Of the missions, he concluded: 
From the evidence available it seems that all social service 
m o n e y is added to other subsidies and m i s s i o n contributed 
funds, and the total used for the m a i n t e n a n c e of all 
Aborigines (Tatz 1964:108). 
Tatz and others were highly critical of the situation they 
found in the r e m o t e areas in the 60s. Tatz argued strongly that 
payments should be m a d e direct to the individual p e n s i o n e r s . 
Stevens even w e n t so far as to question the propriety and 
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legality of the DSS's practice of treating Aboriginal pensioners 
on pastoral properties as if they were residents of benevolent 
insti tutions. Of the NT pastoral properties, he commented: 
Pensioners' funds were paid into the general account of the 
station, allowing the manager to administer the sums involved 
in accord with his own priorities. This meant that there was 
considerable variation from station to station as to what 
individual pensioners received in form of cash. 
The question of the propriety of the Department's decision in 
this regard is raised because of the failure of the stations 
to provide any form of reasonable accommodation for the money 
received. If pensioners lived under similar institutional 
circumstances in southern Australia the establishment would 
have been de-registered either as a health, or fire, risk -
or both (Stevens 1974: 157). 
Stevens went on to comment that most of the pensioners felt that 
the deductions from their pensions were unwarranted, and that 
some openly complained of the practice whereby: 
the station was permitted to build pensioner housing out of 
the pension receipts, and illegally gain property rights in 
the buildings so erected (Stevens 1974: 158). 
The situations in most managed Aboriginal settlements in 
remote areas were probably similar in essence if not in detail to 
those described by Tatz and Stevens. Tonkinson described the 
situation at Jigalong, in Western Australia, as follows: 
In 1960 legislation was passed making all Australian 
Aborigines eligible for Old Age and Invalid Pensions. At 
Jigalong this stabilized the residence of most older adults, 
because if they moved about they would lose income until 
their pension checks caught up with them. The missionaries 
who administered the welfare payments used this authority to 
impress upon the pensioners that if they left the mission 
they would forego their welfare income. 
The mission was particularly concerned to keep the old people 
and schoolchildren at the settlement because of the nature of 
its financial support. Its combined income from church 
sources, stock raising, and the store was insufficient to run 
the settlement, so the mission relied heavily on state and 
federal government funding. Apart from grants-in-aid for 
specific projects, most of this money was allocated on a per 
capita basis, so the more children and pensioners present, 
the more government money received. The mission allotted the 
pensioners two dollars... a week pocket money and withheld 
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the rest in exchange for the food, clothing, and other items 
that it issued them. Some of this money went into a building 
fund, and in 1962 the mission undertook the first 
construction work in the Camp. Iron huts, latrines, and a 
water tap were installed, but the buildings were not popular 
with the Aborigines, most of whom preferred their simpler and 
more mobile camps (Tonkinson 1974: 35-6). 
Later in his study, Tonkinson comments on the conflict between 
the Aborigines and the mission at Jigalong over pension payments 
and other money: 
Aborigines are convinced that the bulk of the pension 
payments withheld by the missionaries are used by the mission 
for its own purposes, which include the purchase of vehicles. 
Thus the Aborigines become very angry when the missionaries 
at times deny them rides in these vehicles. The meager wages 
paid by the mission cause much adverse comment among the 
Aboriginal employees. They are not told how much they are 
earning per week and never see any money unless they leave to 
go elsewhere - so they are sure they are being cheated 
(Tonkinson 1974: 132). 
In his survey of settlements in the remote areas of north 
Queensland, Long informed us of the number of pensions being 
received in each, but commented only briefly on the method of 
payment. At the communities around Bamaga, at the tip of Cape 
York, he claimed that payments were being made in full to the 
pensioners (Long 1970:169). At Weipa, he claimed, only a small 
proportion of the child endowment was retained by the mission 
(Long 1970: 161). If Long's claims were correct and not just a 
reflection of the 'official line' of the white patrons in these 
communities, such practices were exceptional. Of Aurukun, Long 
commented more characteristically for the time: 
Like other remote mission communities in the north Aurukun 
remained extraordinarily isolated from the life of the rest 
of the country. Its superintendent had wide powers and, 
though there was an appointed 'council' of Aborigines, he, 
and the Board of Missions, made the important decisions 
affecting the community. Cash was seldom if ever seen (Long 
1970: 148). 
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Thiele provides one other useful example. The mission at 
Ngukurr on the Roper River claimed, he notes, to have 'pioneered 
a new experiment' there in 1965 by paying social security and NT 
Welfare Branch allowances direct to the Aborigines. The mission 
also claimed that the experiment had placed severe f inanc ia l 
strain on it , leading to a decision to withdraw in 1968. Although 
this o f f i c i a l account makes clear the mission 's dependence on 
social security income, Thiele prefers to see the 'experiment' as 
a symptom of the mission's developing intention to withdraw from 
the settlement , rather than as an innovation which only later 
caused the mission financial problems. Thiele argues that a new-
found Aboriginal 'vociferouness and activism', particularly among 
the young, was giving rise to a situation in which the Aborigines 
were 'increasingly unwilling' to give the mission the 'authority 
it needed to run Ngukurr' (Thiele 1982:12). Thiele's implication 
was that the Aborigines were demanding their social security 
payments rather than that the mission was 'experimenting' of its 
own volition. This was a portent of things to come in the remote 
area settlements and of the way in which social security payments 
would be implicated in change. 
The Lack of DSS Commitment to Servicing its Aboriginal Clientele 
These a c c o u n t s of s i t u a t i o n s in the 6 0 s , however 
fragmentary, make it clear that the DSS was committing few, i f 
any, significant additional resources to the servicing of its new 
Aboriginal c l i e n t e l e . Penetration between the Department and 
Aborigines was, as a consequence, extremely restricted. 
In the settled areas , i n d i v i d u a l i s e d payment was slowly 
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being established, but there were a range of practical problems 
which still made access for Aborigines difficult. They joined the 
same queues and did battle with the same procedures as the rest 
of the DSS clientele, despite the fact that their past exclusion 
from and consequent inexperience of the legal bureaucratic 
aspects of Australian welfare administration caused them 
considerable disadvantage. 
In the remote areas of Australia, where the proportional 
addition to the DSS clientele which the Aborigines represented 
was greater, departmental administration proceeded by 'remote 
control'. These areas were serviced from DSS offices in distant 
cities; from Perth for VIA, Adelaide for SA and the NT, and Cairns 
and Townsville for north Qld. A Darwin office was established to 
service the NT in 1965, but even this was still a long way from 
most of its Aboriginal clientele. 
This form of administration in remote areas was only 
possible because of extensive reliance on mission and welfare 
authority personnel and other established Aboriginal welfare 
patrons as intermediaries between the Department and its new 
Aboriginal clientele. There was little if any direct contact 
between the Aborigines in these areas and officers of the DSS. 
Not only were these intermediaries the actual recipients of 
payments, they also carried out the information collection and 
verification processes that are an integral part of administering 
social security payments. Few, if any of these intermediaries 
appear to have adopted the position of a simple honest broker 
between the DSS and the Aborigines. Nor did the DSS expect them 
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to. Rather, the DSS placed considerable power in their hands to 
influence, if not exactly d e t e r m i n e , both the eligibility of 
individual Aborigines for social security payments and the method 
of p a y m e n t . Effectively the DSS allowed these white authority 
figures to incorporate the new social security payments into 
their own well established systems of localised patronage. 
Initially at least, most Aborigines in these areas probably had 
little idea where exactly the new money was coming from or what 
rights to individualised legal-bureaucratic access they might 
potentially assert. One pamphlet which attempted to inform 
Aborigines of those rights captured the essence of the situation: 
Many Aborigines have had trouble in getting the benefits due 
to them....because they've been told to apply to 'protectors' 
or Aboriginal Welfare Departments for these benefits. 
If you wish to apply for benefits, you are advised to write 
direct to the nearest office of the Department of Social 
Services. If your application is made direct, in this way, it 
should be dealt with in the usual manner and you should not 
suffer any discrimination. 
The best way is to write to the nearest office of the 
Department of Social Services, saying which benefit you wish 
to claim. Then they will send you application f o r m s . These 
forms have to be filled in... If you have any trouble filling 
in the forms, go to someone who will help you. This is better 
than having a try and getting it w r o n g . (Andrews and Hall 
1963) 
But to w h o m other than their white welfare bosses might the 
Aborigines in the remote areas turn? Rights to social security 
payments they now had, but resources and experience they did not. 
The rumblings of Aboriginal dissatisfaction which Tonkinson, 
Thiele and Stevens reported were perhaps indicative of attempts 
by the Aborigines in these areas to use knowledgeable whites who 
were passing through their s e t t l e m e n t s , such as a c a d e m i c 
researchers, to explore their legal welfare rights and the 
possibilities of challenging patronal domination. These transient 
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whites were a new resource for the Aborigines and, consequently, 
also a potential threat to the s t a b i l i t y of the establ ished 
structure of wel fare patronage. In time, i f v i s i t s became 
frequent or long term, they might begin to offer Aborigines 
a lternative channels of access to the resources of the outside 
world. The white welfare authority patrons had little cause then 
to complain of the DSS's preferred method of administrat ion by 
remote control. 
It i s , of course, partly inaccurate to refer to these 
arrangements as administrat ion by 'remote control ' . Remote it 
was, but control , by the DSS at l e a s t , was as a consequence 
largely lacking . Stevens provides a useful example. Having 
already cast doubt on both the l e g a l i t y and the degree of 
Aboriginal compliance with the way in which social security 
payments were being directed to pastoral ists on behalf of 
Aborigines ' , he went on to cite a case in which some Aboriginal 
pastoral station employees were a l legedly being paid by the 
station manager out of pension money received on their behalf 
(Stevens 1974:158). Such practices did no doubt exist. Given the 
direct f i n a n c i a l Interest of these intermediar ies in social 
security payments and the degree of autonomy allowed them by the 
DSS, these practices were surely to be expected. But with the 
existing commitment of resources, the DSS was in no position to 
set them right . On the few occassions on which DSS o f f i c e r s did 
venture into the remote areas of Australia during the 60s, they 
expressed their general approval with the way in which their 
unofficial delegates were administering social security payments 
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(Tatz 1964:110-11, DSS 1961). To have found otherwise would have 
been tantamount to committing the DSS to a considerable expansion 
of the resources devoted to the servicing of its Aboriginal 
clientele in remote areas; and that was not to occur for some 
years to come. In the meantime, in the remote areas at least, 
social security payments, rather than offering a new and 
independent economic resource for Aborigines, served primarily to 
reinforce the system of welfare authority patronage which had 
long been institutionalised through earlier white approaches to 
the Aboriginal problem. To capture the weakness of the DSS's 
presence, I can perhaps do no better than quote again from 
Andrews, whose pamphlets of the time expressed acute 
dissatisfaction with the DSS's lack of independent commitment and 
pushed relentlessly for change: 
Department of Social Services has been weak in yielding to 
pressure from State Aboriginal Authorities 
Comparison of the social services provided for Aborigines 
with those available to the rest of the Australian community 
demonstrates that the Department of Social Services has been 
unduly influenced by the State Aboriginal departments. 
Apparently, these State bodies fear the extension of the 
Department of Social Services into work among Aborigines, and 
have, therefore, pushed themselves into this social service 
field. At the same time they have introduced their own 
outmoded attitude of paternalism into a department which has 
been fairly free of this sort of approach.... 
In general, the Department of Social Services has a good name 
with other pensioners and their organisations. It is a great 
pity that this Department was not left to deal with the 
extension of benefits to Aborigines without the interference 
of the State Aboriginal departments. (Andrews 1964) 
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Chapter ^ 
Opportunities for C h a n g e : E x p a n d i n g DSS Commitment to I t s 
Aboriginal Clientele 
If there is one lesson to be drawn from the experience of 
the 1960s and before , it is that changes in the legal status of 
Aborigines within the social security system would of themselves 
have l i t t l e e f fect on the establ ished structures of segregated 
welfare patronage without other new commitments of DSS resources. 
Indeed, the flow of social security money to Aborigines via 
established white patrons during the 1960s and before may, in 
many instances , have served to bolster ex ist ing structures of 
localised welfare patronage at a time when resources from other 
sources were becoming increasingly uncertain. The experience of 
the 1970s and early 1980s was to be quite different. 
In 1968, the Minister for Social Security, Mr Wentworth, who 
happened also to be the minister in charge of the Commonwealth 
government's new O f f ice of Aboriginal A f f a i r s , directed that 
progress towards the direct payment of social security benefits 
to Aborigines be speeded up. Though this m i n i s t e r i a l d irect ive 
indicated the way in which policy on this point was generally 
moving, its e f fects on practices of the time were l imited . The 
real turning point came in December 1972 with the election of the 
Whitlam government. This marked the begining of an extensive 
restructuring and expansion of public commitments of relevance to 
Aborigines which would in time provide significant opportunities 
for change. Part of that restructuring encouraged the mainstream 
departments of welfare state administration, such as the DSS, to 
take a greater interest in and responsibiity for the Aboriginal 
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portion of their potential clientele. A second aspect attempted 
to r e s t r u c t u r e the existing A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e sector by 
encouraging Aboriginal community organisation and participation 
to replace direct white oversight and management. The first apect 
of this r e s t r u c t u r i n g , as it has w o r k e d out in relation to the 
DSS, is the subject of this chapter. The second will be taken up 
in chapter 6. Together these d e v e l o p m e n t s have opened up 
considerable room for change in the way in which social security 
p a y m e n t s have contributed to the access structures of poor 
Aborigines. 
The Whltlam Government and the Beginings of New DSS Commitments 
W i t h i n three m o n t h s of the W h i t l a m g o v e r n m e n t coming to 
p o w e r , the new M i n i s t e r for A b o r i g i n a l A f f a i r s , Gordon Bryant, 
had w r i t t e n to his colleague the M i n i s t e r for Social Security 
outlining problems Aborigines were having gaining access to the 
income support services of the DSS. He suggested the appointment 
of specialist public contact officers within the DSS to deal with 
Aborigines. As the new M i n i s t e r for Aboriginal Affairs and the 
new DAA saw it, the problem of inadequate social security 
servicing for Aborigines was a nationwide one to be addressed by 
the DSS on a n a t i o n w i d e basis. H o w e v e r , for a n u m b e r of reasons 
the problem was m o s t acutely identified in the NT. So it was 
there that m u c h of the ensuing battle over the a p p o i n t m e n t of 
Aboriginal field staff within the DSS was focussed. 
The e x t r a o r d i n a r y gravity of the problem in the NT was 
largely the result of the greater changes taking place in 
A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e a r r a n g e m e n t s t h e r e . B e c a u s e of the 
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C o m m o n w e a l t h government's direct control of the NT at that time, 
the W h i t l a m government's new approach to Aboriginal policy was 
h a v i n g a m o r e s w i f t and d i r e c t e f f e c t t h e r e than in a n y of the 
states. The new DAA had i m m e d i a t e l y taken over the old MT Welfare 
Branch and acted quickly to disband m a n y of its existing programs 
and a r r a n g e m e n t s . This led to a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e in the 
a p p l i c a t i o n s for s o c i a l s e c u r i t y p a y m e n t s b e i n g r e c e i v e d f r o m 
A b o r i g i n e s in the NT, and c o n s e q u e n t l y a l s o to a s i g n i f i c a n t 
additional volume of work for the DAA (formerly Welfare Branch) 
field s t a f f , m i s s i o n a r i e s and o t h e r s w h o w e r e a c t i n g as s o c i a l 
security intermediaries. This Increased intermediary work for DAA 
field staff w a s d i f f i c u l t to r e c o n c i l e w i t h the DAA's stated 
intention that, under the new policy of self-determination, these 
staff s h o u l d take on a l e s s p r o m i n e n t role in c o m m u n i t i e s and 
should in time be progressively withdrawn in order to encourage 
Aboriginal community organisations to run their own affairs. The 
DSS's lack of independent penetration to its Aboriginal clientele 
in the NT b e c a m e one m a j o r o b s t a c l e to the n e w DAA's i n t e n d e d 
course of action, and hence, as DAA saw it, a problem. While the 
DSS c o n t i n u e d to r e l y so h e a v i l y on D A A f i e l d staff as s e r v i c e 
intermediaries, the withdrawal of those staff would be difficult 
to carry through; or if carried through would probably only have 
left the intermediary position open to be taken up by some other 
a s p i r i n g w e l f a r e p a t r o n , such as a m i s s i o n a r y or m i s s i o n 
organisation. The solution which DAA foresaw was for the DSS to 
expand its f i e l d p r e s e n c e and to take o v e r the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
r e l a t e d t a s k s that D A A f i e l d o f f i c e r s and o t h e r s w e r e then 
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undertaking. 
The DSS's response to the DAA's pressure for special purpose 
public contact staff to deal with Aborigines was to argue that 
the teething problems of recent policy change would soon be 
resolved and that there was no need for specialised commitments 
of DSS manpower to the servicing of Aborigines. However, in the 
NT at least, the issue was not to be disposed of so simply. It 
was not long before the Darwin office of the DAA was pressing 
Darwin DSS to become more directly involved in servicing its 
growing Aboriginal clientele, regardle ss of the resistance of DSS 
central office to the appointment of specialist Aboriginal field 
staff within the Department. In mid 1973, DAA Darwin suggested 
that it organise monthly charter flights to remote Aboriginal 
communities in the NT on which DSS and Commonwealth Employment 
Service officers could accompany DAA officers to deal with 
enquiries. The charters never got off the ground and, at the end 
of that year, the Director of the DAA in Darwin wrote more 
formally to his counterpart in DSS saying: 
In the past we have relied on the work of officers of our 
department and mission authorities to provide an agency 
service for your department. In pastoral property areas we 
tend to rely on the good graces of pastoralists and 
occasional visits from departmental officers to see that 
Aborigines receive their entitlements. I do not believe that 
this is good enough. I understand that at one time you were 
contemplating the development of extension officers which 
would include Aboriginals to work in the field to ensure that 
Aboriginals become aware of the basis on which they could 
submit claims. Could you tell me how far this has developed 
and whether you intend to launch such a scheme nationally. I 
wonder if there are additional special measures which might 
be taken into account in respect of Aboriginal communities. 
Special leaflets in Aboriginal languages, the use of film 
strips and other educative media may be worth considering 
(3). 
The DSS Regional Manager in Darwin replied that the proposed 
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e x t e n s i o n officer service w a s 'singularly out of pattern' with 
the DSS's 'normal o r g a n i s a t i o n a l set-up' and that the provision 
of information in Aboriginal languages was 'outside the scope' of 
his Department's responsibilities. He did, however, add that in 
the case of an i n f o r m a t i o n program the DSS would be happy to 
cooperate with any initiative taken by others. 
In m i d 1974, the DAA in D a r w i n decided to take up with 
Canberra the issue of DSS's inadequate i n v o l v e m e n t in the 
servicing of its Aboriginal clientele. DSS central office was 
approached on the m a t t e r , both via DAA central office and via a 
First Assistant Secretary of the Department of the NT who, in the 
early days of the W h i t l a m g o v e r n m e n t , had been the Director of 
DAA in D a r w i n . The DSS central office argued in reply that the 
DSS was only responsible for the general application of social 
welfare policies and that: 
w h e r e a p r o b l e m a r i s e s s o l e l y d u e to the c l i e n t or 
beneficiary being an Aborigine the m a t t e r is one for 
consideration by DAA. 
This reply was conveyed to the Director of DAA in D a r w i n who 
commented: 
It seems to me that this approach is not in line w i t h the 
intention that there be a transfer of functions carried out 
by this Department to those departments which have special 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and expertise to handle their particular 
areas of w o r k with DAA eventually being left with a policy 
making and co-ordinating role. 
Although DAA, and earlier Welfare Branch, undertook to assist 
the DSS with handling of benefits in remote areas and even in 
u r b a n a r e a s , t h i s w a s s e e n m o r e as a s e r v i c e to the 
recipients than to the DSS. There w a s , and still is in some 
places, difficulties of identification of beneficiaries and 
the cashing of cheques w h i c h was likely to leave the 
beneficiary at a disadvantage unless assistance was given by 
the Department to ensure that the beneficiaries eventually 
received legal tender as benefit p a y m e n t . H o w e v e r , the DSS 
has insisted on moving over the years from a situation where 
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they paid benefits to other than the beneficiaries (eg. 
pastoralist, Welfare Branch) to a position where there is the 
same direct relationship between the Department and the 
Aboriginal beneficiary as there is with beneficiaries in the 
wider community. It seems now, however, that they are 
reluctant to take the final step to eliminate the 'go-
between' . 
I think it is an important step in the development of 
confidence in Aborigines that they should be encouraged to 
negotiate directly with government departments and other 
organisations on matters which affect them and they should 
not feel that all dealings must be through the DAA. Part of 
this encouragement is for those departments to be accessible 
to Aborigines and themselves to carry out the functions which 
are their responsibility. 
The practical situation in remote areas is that the DAA is 
forced to be responsible for the clients or beneficiaries of 
the DSS to avoid disadvantages to those beneficiaries. 
The Darwin director of the DAA went on to list the social 
security related activities that DAA field officers still 
typically undertook. These included distributing cheques, 
providing cash advances for the purpose of cashing cheques, 
identifying beneficiaries and answering correspondence. 
By 1975, if only because of DAA's persistence on the point, 
the DSS was slowly becoming more receptive to the suggestion that 
it be more directly involved in the servicing of its Aboriginal 
clientele. Other developments within the Department also meant 
that such involvement was now more feasible for the DSS. Since 
the Whitlam government had come to power late in 1972, the DSS 
had embarked on a major program of departmental regionalisation. 
It had expanded its regional office operations from sixty 
locations around Australia to over one hundred. This expansion 
included the opening of a second regional office in the NT at 
Alice Springs, one at Broome in northern WA and also one at Mt 
Isa in north west Queensland. These regional offices placed the 
DSS in a considerably better position to service its Aboriginal 
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c l i e n t e l e in r e m o t e areas than had p r e v i o u s l y been the case. In 
the MX, w h e r e the DAA's push for a greater DSS c o m m i t m e n t had 
been strongest, regionalisation was also accompanied by a number 
of other i n i t i a t i v e s . In 1975, two DSS d i s t r i c t o f f i c e r s were 
stationed in the NT t o w n s of Katherine and Tennant Creek. These 
officers were to be permanent mobile outposts of the Darwin and 
Alice Springs offices respectively, and were responsible for the 
servicing of all DSS clientele in the surrounding a r e a s , 
including the s i g n i f i c a n t n u m b e r s of A b o r i g i n e s . One of these 
district officer w a s in fact h i m s e l f A b o r i g i n a l . Also in 1975, 
two A b o r i g i n a l Liaison Officers w e r e a p p o i n t e d in the DSS's 
D a r w i n and A l i c e S p r i n g s r e g i o n a l o f f i c e s w i t h specific 
responsibility for servicing Aborigines in the surrounding areas. 
Again, one of the officers was himself Aboriginal. 
T h e s e i n i t i a t i v e s w i t h i n the NT b r a n c h of the D S S 
represented a m a j o r b r e a k t h r o u g h . For the first t i m e since the 
inclusion of Aborigines under the social s e c u r i t y l e g i s l a t i o n , 
the DSS appeared to be a c k n o w l e d g i n g that it did have s o m e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for ensuring that A b o r i g i n e s enjoyed m o r e than 
a purely formal legal right to payment. Aborigines also needed to 
be adequately serviced, and these latest initiatives seemed to be 
an a d m i s s i o n t h a t t o t a l r e l i a n c e on e x t r a - d e p a r t m e n t a l 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s was i n s u f f i c i e n t to fulfill that d e p a r t m e n t a l 
responsibility. For the first time also, the DSS appeared to be 
acknowledging that Aborigines w e r e experiencing e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
difficulties in gaining access to its services and that a special 
purpose commitment of departmental m a n p o w e r to servicing them 
could as a c o n s e q u e n c e be j u s t i f i e d . At the end of the W h i t l a m 
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years, this positive special purpose commitment within the DSS 
was restricted to the NT. But the events in the NT during the 
W h i t l a m years had e s t a b l i s h e d the precedent and m o r e would in 
time follow. 
Expansion and Consolidation of the new DSS Commitment: 
the late 1970s and early 1980s 
R e s i s t a n c e w i t h i n the DSS during the W h i t l a m years to the 
demand for a special purpose commitment of departmental manpower 
to the servicing of the Aboriginal clientele reflected in part a 
c o m p l a c e n t acceptance of the status quo in relation to service 
delivery a r r a n g e m e n t s for A b o r i g i n e s . H o w e v e r , it also partly 
reflected a more fundamental departmental resistance on the basis 
of legal-bureaucratic norms of universality (equal treatment for 
all under the rules) and specificity (only those aspects of an 
individual's circumstances of specific relevance to the matter at 
hand should enter into account). For an o r g a n i s a t i o n as steeped 
in the virtues of these n o r m s as the DSS, special purpose 
commitments of departmental resources to groups identified along 
e t h n i c or r a c i a l l i n e s c a n , u n d e r s t a n d a b l y , a p p e a r as 
p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c p e r v e r s i o n s of the l e g a l - b u r e a u c r a t i c ideal. 
P u t t i n g the m o s t c h a r i t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on the DSS's 
resistance, we might argue that having only ten years previously 
escaped the particularism of legislative exclusion of Aborigines, 
the D e p a r t m e n t w a s not n o w keen to b e c o m e involved in the 
p a r t i c u l a r i s m of a special purpose c o m m i t m e n t . H o w e v e r , if 
a p p r o a c h e d d i f f e r e n t l y , past exclusion could be seen as one 
justification for such a special purpose commitment precisely on 
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the grounds that past inexperience of the social security system 
disadvantaged the p o t e n t i a l present A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t e l e in 
making use of i t . As I have argued more g e n e r a l l y e lsewhere , 
claims of disadvantage in making use of government services on 
the part of both Aborigines and migrants in Australia have been 
accommodated in recent years by mainstream legal-bureaucratic 
welfare state administration through the definition of a problem 
of ' access ' (Sanders 1984) . The formula , roughly s t a t e d , is for 
government departments and other a d m i n i s t r a t i v e organs to 
acknowledge and articulate the sorts of disadvantage that these 
groups experience in gaining access to their services and then to 
use this to j u s t i f y small special purpose commitments of 
departmental resources to overcoming that d isadvantage . The 
commitment to universal treatment of clients is then reinstated 
at a higher l e v e l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . Complete f o r m a l i s t i c 
equality of treatment gives way to a slightly less procedural and 
more substant ive concept of e q u a l i t y of opportunity under the 
rules . The l i m i t a t i o n s placed on c la ims of r a c i a l or ethnic 
disadvantage are st i l l considerable, but the formula has allowed 
government departments like the DSS to develop and justify some 
small special purpose programs addressing Aboriginal and migrant 
needs in recent years. 
In the case of Aborig ines and the DSS, the process of 
identifying Aboriginal ' access ' d i sadvantages and a r t i c u l a t i n g 
the need for a s p e c i a l purpose commitment had been begun in 
rudimentary form during the Whitlam years. By the mid 1970s, it 
was gathering some momentum. The two new DSS ALOs, for example. 
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identified four sources of Aboriginal disadvantage in an article 
in the DSS 's j o u r n a l in 1976 ; c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s , language 
d i f f icult ies , distance and physical movement (Harris and Turner 
1976). Their article was, in fact, fairly conservative, in that, 
rather than using the identification of disadvantage to call for 
major commitments to A b o r i g i n a l serv ic ing by the DSS, they 
remained ambivalent about the appropriateness of the application 
of social security payments to Aborigines. In a more progressive 
vein, an article in reply by another DSS officer warned against 
any move away from legal equal i ty for Abor ig ines (Beruldsen 
1976) . This o f f i c e r did use the r e c o g n i t i o n of d isadvantage to 
actively advocate that the Department expand its special purpose 
commitment to Aborig ines . He suggested that the DSS expand i t s 
new W e l f a r e Rights O f f i c e r s program to inc lude A b o r i g i n a l 
communities and also that the Deparment examine possibilities of 
providing greater assistance to Aborigines in ways similar to the 
special purpose provision made for migrants; through mechanisms 
such as i n t e r p r e t e r services and support for ethnic community 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . Here was the ' a c c e s s f o r m u l a ' i n i t s 
characteristic form. 
Late in 1977 , the DSS took i t s next major step in making a 
spec ia l purpose commitment to the serv ic ing of A b o r i g i n e s ; an 
Aboriginal Unit was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n DSS central o f f i c e . In 
a ministerial anouncement to this effect, the 'role, particular 
responsibilities and functions' of the new Unit were set down as 
follows: 
( i ) Assess, evaluate and advise on welfare projects for which 
Government funds are sought through the DAA. Undertake field 
trips for the screening of proposed projects and continually 
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o v e r s i g h t the p r o g r e s s a n d e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a p p r o v e d 
projects. 
(ii) Monitor trends in Aboriginal welfare services and advise 
the D A A on t h e i r p o l i c y on s u p p o r t of w e l f a r e p r o g r a m s 
r e l a t i v e to the c h a n g i n g n e e d s and a s p i r a t i o n s of the 
Aboriginal people. 
(iii) Provide advice and assistance to the DAA on training of 
A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e p e r s o n n e l e m p l o y e d b y that D e p a r t m e n t , 
welfare agencies and Aboriginal organisations. 
(iv) Establish and maintain liaison with States, Territories, 
local government councils and voluntary agencies engaged in 
A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e s e r v i c e s and p r o v i d e a c o n s u l t a t i v e 
service to them. 
(v) P r o v i d e a c o n s u l t a t i v e s e r v i c e to o t h e r D i v i s i o n s and 
State Offices of the Department on all matters concerned with 
Aboriginal welfare. 
(vi) Administer a scheme of Aboriginal Liaison (or Welfare) 
O f f i c e r s to be a t t a c h e d to all S t a t e o f f i c e s and s e l e c t e d 
Regional/District Offices of the Department. The assumption 
is t h a t the D e p a r t m e n t w i l l e m p l o y A b o r i g i n a l s t a f f for 
b e t t e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h A b o r i g i n a l p e o p l e w h o c o m e in 
contact with the Department, particularly in areas with large 
A b o r i g i n a l population. 
(vii) P a r t i c i p a t e in I n t e r - D e p a r t m e n t a l C o m m i t t e e s and 
W o r k i n g P a r t i e s at the F e d e r a l l e v e l and F e d e r a l / S t a t e 
consultations on Aboriginal welfare m a t t e r s . 
( v i i i ) E s t a b l i s h and m a i n t a i n a c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e g i s t e r of 
information on all aspects of Aboriginal welfare, including 
trends in similar fields overseas. Collate and analyse such 
information and disseminate to all interested Departments and 
agencies throughout A u s t r a l i a and o v e r s e a s ( C P D , S e n a t e 27 
October 1977: 1855). 
The f i r s t t h r e e h e a d s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y m a d e it c l e a r that the 
DSS still saw its o w n role in the provision of welfare services 
for Aborigines as minor and secondary to that of the DAA. It was 
the DAA's m o n e y w h i c h w o u l d be s p e n t on A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e 
projects and it was the DAA which would be advised and assisted 
by the n e w U n i t . H e a d s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (v) and (vi) d i d , 
however, hold out some prospect of the new Unit becoming involved 
in c h a n g e s w i t h i n the DSS. H e a d (vi), in p a r t i c u l a r , i d e n t i f i e d 
an i m m e d i a t e and c l e a r i n t r a - d e p a r t m e n t a l o b j e c t i v e ; the 
a p p o i n t m e n t of A b o r i g i n a l o f f i c e r s at the State and R e g i o n a l 
office levels of the Department. 
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In the event, the new DSS unit did little to advise the DAA, 
w h i c h regarded its o w n e x p e r t i s e as quite s u f f i c i e n t for the 
administration of its own programs. So the major focus of the new 
unit's a c t v i t i e s w a s , in fact, intra-departmental. Encouraging 
the a p p o i n t e m e n t of A b o r i g i n a l public contact staff in the 
regional offices and Aboriginal co-ordinators in the DSS's state 
offices q u i c k l y b e c a m e the p r i m a r y , but by no m e a n s s i m p l e , 
task. The idea m e t c o n s i d e r a b l e r e s i s t a n c e w i t h i n the DSS and 
the early development of the A b o r i g i n a l staffing s c h e m e varied 
c o n s i d e r a b l y b e t w e e n the states. By the begining of 1980 there 
were still only five third division Aboriginal Liaison Officers 
( A L O s ) ; the t w o p o s i t i o n s in the NT w h i c h p r e - d a t e d the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the central office unit, two in M e l b o u r n e and 
one in Perth^ A p p o i n t m e n t to the m o r e j u n i o r fourth d i v i s i o n 
position of Aboriginal Welfare Officer (AWO) had been preferred 
in other states. There w e r e by 1980, eight A W O s in Q u e e n s l a n d , 
one in NSW and one in South Australia. This latter practice 
placed the new A b o r i g i n a l public contact staff in a c l e a r l y 
subordinate position in relation to the mainstream third division 
assessing and determining staff. 
As the departmental promoters of special purpose Aboriginal 
a p p o i n t m e n t s perceived it, the A b o r i g i n a l liaison s c h e m e w a s 
being g r e a t l y frustrated by the resistance of those w i t h i n the 
DSS u n s y m p a t h e t i c to the special needs and d i s a d v a n t a g e s of 
Aboriginal clients. Following a nationwide review of the scheme 
in early 1980, the First A s s i s t a n t D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l in DSS 
central office overseeing the activities of the Aboriginal Unit 
felt cause to comment as follows: 
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I am d r a w n to the c o n c l u s i o n that there are e l e m e n t s of 
prejudice i n h e r e n t in a t t i t u d e s to the A b o r i g i n a l Liaison 
Scheme. One evidence of this is the reluctance of some States 
with a large A b o r i g i n a l p o p u l a t i o n to appoint A L O s , except 
when pressed or specifically directed to by central office; 
and even then just to appoint AWOs... 
This experience has been repeated so often in the time since 
the Aboriginal Liaison Scheme was announced late in 1977 that 
the m o s t s y m p a t h e t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the action is that 
it reveals a l a c k of k n o w l e d g e of the severe poverty from 
which Aboriginal people suffer. 
In the wake of this review, special purpose Aboriginal staffing 
w a s given n e w i m p e t u s w i t h i n the DSS. By the end of 1982 there 
was an Aboriginal Coordinator in each of the Department's state 
offices and just over 50 A b o r i g i n a l public contact staff 
scattered through thirty of the Department's r e g i o n a l o f f i c e s . 
Thirty of these w e r e third d i v i s i o n ALOs and the rest fourth 
division AVJ Os or Aboriginal Counter Officers. By the end of 1984, 
the number of Aboriginal public contact staff in the regions had 
risen to 76, 55 of w h o m were third division A L O s , and the 
A b o r i g i n a l C o o r d i n a t o r positions in the state o f f i c e s had been 
upgraded to Manager Aboriginal Services positions. The Aboriginal 
Unit in central office had also been upgraded to the status of 
A b o r i g i n a l Services Section. By the mid 1980s then, the DSS's 
special purpose c o m m i t m e n t to A b o r i g i n a l staffing had been 
consolidated and expanded to a level rarely envisaged even just 
a few years before. 
The d e v e l o p m e n t of this n e t w o r k of A b o r i g i n a l o f f i c e r s at 
regional, state and central office levels within the DSS remains 
to this day the m o s t enduring and s i g n i f i c a n t change of 
commitments within the DSS of relevance to Aborigines, and I will 
return later in the chapter to consider the role of these 
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o f f i c e r s at the r e g i o n a l o f f i c e l e v e l in m o r e d e t a i l . H o w e v e r , 
before doing so it is important to be aware of other developments 
w i t h i n the D S S d u r i n g the l a t e 70s and e a r l y 1980s of r e l e v a n c e 
to the e x p a n s i o n and c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the n e w d e p a r t m e n t a l 
c o m m i t m e n t to servicing Aborigines. First is the ongoing process 
of r e g i o n a l i s a t i o n . By the m i d 1 9 8 0 s , D S S had e x p a n d e d its 
regional office n e t w o r k to over 200 locations. This in itself has 
b r o u g h t the D S S c o n s i d e r a b l y c l o s e r a g a i n to its A b o r i g i n a l 
c l i e n t e l e t h r o u g h the o p e n i n g of o f f i c e r s in p l a c e s s u c h as 
suburban Redfern in Sydney (1976), Kununurra in far northern W A 
(1978) and Katherine in the NT (1979). 
The second intra-departmental development of importance was 
the establishment in 1979 of an NT level of administration within 
the DSS. Prior to 1979, the regional offices of the DSS in the NT 
had b e e n part of the D e p a r t m e n t ' s S o u t h A u s t r a l i a n s t a t e 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . But w i t h the g r a n t i n g b y the C o m m o n w e a l t h of 
N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r y s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 7 8 , and the i m p l i c i t 
r e c o g n i t i o n t h e r e i n of a p o s i t i o n of p a r i t y b e t w e e n the N T and 
the S t a t e s , the DSS a l s o m o v e d to e s t a b l i s h an i n t e r n a l s t a t e -
like administrative structure for the conduct of its operations 
in the NT. A review of DSS operations in the NT undertaken in the 
l a t t e r half of 1 9 7 8 f o r m e d the b a s i s for this d e p a r t m e n t a l 
r e s t r u c t u r i n g . The r e v i e w team's r e p o r t m a d e a b u n d a n t l y c l e a r 
w h a t the p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n s and p r e - o c c u p a t i o n s of the n e w N T 
level of administration within the DSS would be. The report was 
concerned throughout with the p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m s of s e r v i c i n g 
Aboriginal clients in the NT; almost in fact to the exclusion of 
all e l s e (DSS 1978). In m a n y w a y s this w a s to be e x p e c t e d . I 
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have already noted the importance of the NT as the location of 
the most persistent DAA demands for a greater DSS commitment to 
the servicing of its Aboriginal clientele during the Whitlam 
years. But there are quite simple demographic reasons why we 
might reasonably expect that the NT branch of any Commonwealth 
government department would at any time be both more aware of and 
more affected by the problems of servicing Aborigines than any 
other state branch. After all, Aborigines account for one quarter 
of the total population in the NT. It should come as no surprise 
then, to learn that since its establishment the NT branch of the 
DSS has used its direct access to the Department's central office 
in Canberra to give Aboriginal issues a higher intra-departmental 
profile. Some examples will be evident in the chapters that 
follow. 
The DSS's New Aboriginal Presence: Program Initiatives 
The extent of change within the DSS of relevance to 
Aborigines in recent years can perhaps be most succintly captured 
by quoting from the current statement of 'responsibilities and 
functions' of the central office Aboriginal Service Section. The 
first two heads of responsibility now read: 
(i) Develop policy, assess, evaluate and advise the Minister 
and senior management on all matters relating to the 
Department concerning Aboriginals including programs 
administered and/or funded by the DSS covering programs 
specifically designed for Aboriginals as well as the access 
of Aboriginals to all programs. 
(ii) Establish formal channels of communication and 
consultation with the DAA and organisations representing the 
Aboriginal community, DSS Divisions and State offices to 
ensure that DSS services are meeting the needs of Aboriginal 
clients. Monitor trends in Aboriginal communities and advise 
on matters relative to the changing needs and aspirations of 
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Aboriginal people. 
W h e n c o m p a r e d to t h e s t a t e m e n t of t h e A b o r i g i n a l Unit's 
responsibilities back in 1977, the expansion of DSS c o m m i t m e n t is 
readily apparent. The earlier statement's emphasis on DAA and its 
programs has disappeared. The Section's focus is now clearly on 
DSS's o w n i n v o l v e m e n t in w e l f a r e p r o g r a m s and s p e n d i n g for 
A b o r i g i n e s . As a r e s u l t of t h i s , t h e r e h a v e b e e n a n u m b e r of 
recent program initiatives within the DSS directed specifically 
to Aborigines . 
In 1981 the Department's central office Information Section 
and N T b r a n c h C o m m u n i t y L i a i s o n S e c t i o n p i l o t e d a p u b l i c 
i n f o r m a t i o n p r o g r a m d i r e c t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y to A b o r i g i n e s . The 
p i l o t i n c l u d e d the p r o d u c t i o n of w r i t t e n and a u d i o v i s u a l 
m a t e r i a l in a n u m b e r of A b o r i g i n a l l a n g u a g e s ; a m e a s u r e w h i c h 
back in 1974 had been rejected by the DSS as beyond the scope of 
its r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s (see F i g u r e 3 at end of c h a p t e r ) . The 
program also included an implicit departmental recognition of the 
important role of intermediaries in servicing Aborigines, in that 
some of the publicity material produced was intended to assist 
' c o m m u n i t y c o n t a c t p e o p l e ' as m u c h as i n d i v i d u a l A b o r i g i n e s 
directly. The principles of the NT pilot information program have 
s i n c e b e e n i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e D S S ' s g e n e r a l p u b l i c 
information program as a National Aboriginal Information Program 
(DSS Annual Report 1982-83: 64). 
A n o t h e r DSS p r o g r a m i n i t i a t i v e of s p e c i f i c r e l e v a n c e to 
A b o r i g i n e s , w h i c h b e g a n i n 1 9 8 2 , w a s t h e A b o r i g i n a l 
Identification and Data Project. The aim was to get Aborigines to 
voluntarily identify t h e m s e l v e s on s o c i a l s e c u r i t y a p p l i c a t i o n 
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forms (DSS Annual Report 1982-83 : 65) . The o b j e c t i v e was to 
develop a capacity for the DSS to generate its own statistics on 
Aboriginal 'utilisation' of social security services. The project 
was proposed and encouraged by o f f i c e r s of the Department 's 
central office Aboriginal Services Section who believed that the 
data generated could be of considerable use to them in making the 
case for st i l l greater departmental attention to the particular 
problems of the Aboriginal clientele. As yet the data generated 
and use made of them has been minimal, but the project remains a 
potentially important program initiative which reflects the new 
Aboriginal presence within the DSS. 
A th ird , but as yet somewhat less successful program 
initiative has been the suggestion that DSS recruit paid agents 
in remote Aboriginal communities. The first attempt to introduce 
such a scheme dates back to the 1978 review of DSS operations in 
the NT. The scheme proposed in that review was for Abor ig ina l 
community organisations to be funded by the DSS to employ social 
security workers for a s p e c i f i e d number of hours per week (DSS 
1978) . The scheme was not immediately taken up at more senior 
levels w i t h i n the DSS, however , one of the DSS's A b o r i g i n a l 
L i a i s o n O f f i c e r s in the NT did arrange for the recruitment of 
trainee agents in a number of communities. In the first instance 
the positions were funded from the Aboriginal training allowance 
p r o g r a m s of the D e p a r t m e n t of Employment and I n d u s t r i a l 
Relat ions . The ALO's hope was that by gett ing the agents 
operating as trainees in these communities, when the DEIR money 
ran out the DSS would be obl iged to take over funding . Such was 
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not to be the case, and paid social security agents in Aboriginal 
communities remains to this day an unfulfilled idea. 
The problem with agency proposals even today is that the DSS 
r e m a i n s h i g h l y a m b i v a l e n t about any p r o g r a m s w h i c h f o r m a l i s e 
relations with extra-departmental intermediaries. Since the mid 
1970s, the DSS has experimented with a number of general programs 
of this s o r t , such as the W e l f a r e R i g h t s O f f i c e r s P r o g r a m , the 
Honorary Information Officers Program and more recently the Paid 
Agents Scheme. With each program, its application to Aboriginal 
c o m m u n i t i e s has been seen as one p o s s i b l e way of f o r m a l i s i n g 
relations with intermediaries in these communities. But in each 
instance, the programs themselves have not survived long enough 
or b e e n d e v e l o p e d e x t e n s i v e l y e n o u g h for their a p p l i c a t i o n to 
A b o r i g i n a l c o m m u n i t i e s to be a s e r i o u s p o s s i b i l i t y . The DSS 
generally remains highly ambivalent about agency arrangements. If 
the D e p a r t m e n t is g o i n g to r e l y on i n t e r m e d i a r i e s , it w o u l d 
p r e f e r in m a n y w a y s to do so i n f o r m a l l y . At l e a s t then the 
Department can, if it wishes, distance itself from intermediaries 
who it judges to be unjustifiably projecting their own values and 
priorites onto the service exchanges they mediate. 
The DSS's N e w A b o r i g i n a l P r e s e n c e : The R e v i e w of A b o r i g i n a l 
Access 
A n o t h e r i n i t i a t i v e r e f l e c t i n g the g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n to 
Aboriginal issues within the DSS in recent years was the review 
of ' A b o r i g i n a l A c c e s s ' u n d e r t a k e n b y the c e n t r a l o f f i c e 
Performance Monitoring Branch b e g i n i n g in 1983. Three o f f i c e r s 
were seconded from elsewhere in the Department and one from the 
D A A to u n d e r t a k e t h e r e v i e w . T h e t e a m ' s r e p o r t r e f l e c t s 
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extensively on the developments of recent years within the DSS of 
relevance to Aborigines and makes a number recommendations for 
further d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t m e n t s (DSS 1985). In m a n y w a y s it 
represents the c u t t i n g e d g e of s y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e s to 
A b o r i g i n a l access p r o b l e m s w i t h i n the senior ranks of the DSS, 
and for this reason it is worthy of a little further attention. 
The first point to note from the r e v i e w team's report is 
that any lingering ambivalence within the DSS about the general 
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of the a p p l i c a t i o n of social security payments 
to A b o r i g i n e s appears n o w to have b e c o m e s u b o r d i n a t e d to an 
unreserved c o m m i t m e n t to inclusion. The access r e v i e w argued 
that : 
Effective and appropriate access to income security programs 
is important to Aboriginals for at least two reasons: 
-on the basis of accepted indications (eg, r e l a t i v e i n c o m e 
levels, unemplojnnent levels, dependency rates), Aboriginals 
compromise the most disadvanteged needs group in Australia 
-direct cash transfers in the form of benefits, pensions and 
allowances give Aboriginals control over money and budgetting 
(c.f. in kind a s s i s t a n c e ) w h i c h is vital for A b o r i g i n a l 
d e v e l o p m e n t and s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e and is consistent w i t h 
Government policies concerning self-determination and self-
management (DSS 1985: 12). 
The second point to note from the r e v i e w is that the DSS's 
articulation of the A b o r i g i n a l 'access' problem has b e c o m e 
c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d . The review identified three 
a p s e c t s , and w i t h i n these a n u m b e r of c o n t r i b u t i n g e l e m e n t s , 
w h i c h go t o w a r d s m a k i n g up a client's ability to gain access to 
the social security system. They were as follows: 
awareness of programs and procedures, implying 
-access to i n f o r m a t i o n about p r o g r a m s , and procedures 
(eligibility, rights, obligations, status in the system) 
-access to materials (forms, other printed matter) 
-access to staff (Aboriginals or n o n - A b o r i g i n a l s ) in the 
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office or in the field 
-access to the regional office as a facility 
entry into the system 
-making application 
-having entitlement determined 
maintenance within the system 
-having proper account taken of changes to circumstances 
-having access to appeal mechanisms (DSS 1985: 2-3). 
The review also identified three different types of responses to 
Aboriginal access problems that had already occurred within the 
DSS; the Aboriginal public information programs discussed above, 
the a d a p t a t i o n and m o d i f i c a t i o n of c l e r i c a l p r o c e s s i n g 
a r r a n g e m e n t s some of w h i c h I w i l l discuss in chapter 7, and of 
course the appointment of special purpose Aboriginal staff. The 
review argued that A b o r i g i n e s s t i l l s u f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t 
d i s a d v a n t a g e s in gaining access to DSS services despite these 
recent initiatives. It commented as follows: 
It is also apparent that, while the Department has introduced 
some significant administrative e n h a n c e m e n t s to processing 
arrangements, it has only been in recent times and largely as 
a direct result of Aboriginal staff of the D e p a r t m e n t 
facilitating an awareness of and sensitivity to the issues, 
that the necessary c l i m a t e for change has developed (DSS 
1985: 11). 
On this basis, the review argued for the adoption of a three year 
National A b o r i g i n a l Strategic Plan w i t h i n the DSS to help 
overcome remaining Aboriginal disadvantages. 
As part of the A b o r i g i n a l access r e v i e w , the team of 
officers also conducted a survey of 69 DSS r e g i o n a l office 
m a n a g e r s who w e r e asked, in consultation w i t h their staff, to 
answer a number of questions relating to Aboriginal access. Using 
1981 census data organised by DSS regions, the offices surveyed 
included all regions where Aborigines constituted more than 2 per 
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cent of the total population. There were 9 regions, all in more 
remote areas, where Aborigines constituted more than 10 per cent 
of the population (see Table 6). Another 13 regions, mainly in 
the rural hinterland of the more settled areas, had Aboriginal 
populations of between 2 and 10 per cent, in the range of 1,000 
to 5,000 individuals. The remaining 47 offices surveyed were a 
sample of regions of lesser Aboriginal population, in one 
instance going as low as a concentration of only .04 per cent, or 
some 50 Aborigines in the region. 
Table 6 
DSS Regions with Aboriginal Population Greater than 10 Per Cent 
of Total Population as Measured by 1981 Census 
DSS Region Aboriginal Population % of Total Population 
by 1981 Census by 1981 Census 
Katherine 4,785 45.92 
Broome 4,739 41.22 
Kununurra 3,195 40.96 
Alice Springs 9,868 31.38 
Darwin 12,018 25.59 
Mt Isa 5, 738 15. 68 
Port Augusta 3,611 11.87 
Cairns 15,668 10.73 
Geraldton 5,075 10.32 
(Source DSS 1985) 
Fifty four of the regional offices surveyed indicated that 
they presently employed a total of 207 Aboriginal staff, which 
included over a hundred Aborigines who were not occupying 
designated special purpose Aboriginal service positions. When 
asked whether they saw a need to employ additional Aboriginal 
staff in the next two years, 43 offices said they did. Between 
them they sought an additional 121 Aboriginal staff. The 26 
offices which said that they did not need additional Aboriginal 
staff gave reasons such as that the existing Aboriginal staff was 
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sufficient or that the Aboriginal population in their region was 
insufficient to j u s t i f y any appointment. When the offices were 
asked to identify the number of Aboriginal community agencies in 
their r e g i o n , the D a r w i n office i d e n t i f i e d 74, w h i l e Cairns 
identified 48 and Rockhampton 33. Another 8 offices identified 10 
or more such organisations, while most identified between 3 and 
7. Only 10 offices could not identify any. 
W h e n asked to list t i m e c o n s u m i n g tasks w h i c h occur in 
servicing Aborigines, 58 offices provided 190 responses. Sixty of 
these related to obtaining information from Aboriginal clients, 
the t w o m o s t f r e q u e n t l y m e n t i o n e d t i m e c o n s u m i n g i t e m s being 
proof of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and child custody arrangements. Thirty 
five of the responses related to the t i m e c o n s u m i n g nature of 
providing information to Aborigines, such as explaining rights, 
e n t i t l e m e n t s and d e p a r t m e n t a l procedures and decisions. Other 
time consuming tasks mentioned related to payment tasks, such as 
follow up work on lost cheques and issuing manual cheques, work 
on f o r m s , i n t e r v i e w s , c o r r e s p o n d e n c e and travel. Of the 11 
offices which did not provide any positive responses, 5 indicated 
that Aboriginal clients were no more time consuming than others. 
Twenty five of the offices surveyed indicated that they had 
used and d i s p l a y e d v a r i o u s d e p a r t m e n t a l posters directed 
specifically to Aborigines which had been produced as a result of 
DSS's Aboriginal information program. Of those which did not use 
the posters, 12 said they had not received them, 11 did not know 
of their existence, while others indicated reasons such as that 
the posters w e r e not n e c e s s a r y because of good relations that 
already existed between the office and Aborigines, or that they 
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were subject to damage. When asked to identify means, other than 
the D S S - p r o d u c e d p a m p h l e t s a n d p o s t e r s , used to p r o v i d e 
information to Aborigines, 55 offices provided 176 responses. The 
m o s t c o m m o n l y m e n t i o n e d m e a n s V7as l i a i s o n w i t h A b o r i g i n a l 
community organisations and representatives, mentioned 37 times, 
followed by DSS presentations at meetings, talks, conferences and 
seminars, mentioned 25 times, and visiting services, mentioned 17 
times. 
In reply to a question asking what training had taken place 
in the r e g i o n a l o f f i c e to f a c i l i t a t e A b o r i g i n a l a c c e s s , 44 
o f f i c e s p r o v i d e d 83 p o s i t i v e r e s p o n s e s . The m o s t f r e q u e n t l y 
mentioned topic of training sessions was Aboriginal culture, with 
the DSS's o w n A b o r i g i n a l s e r v i c i n g arrangements and Aboriginal 
l i a i s o n s c h e m e b e i n g the n e x t m o s t i m p o r t a n t . M o s t of these 
training activities had been presented by the Aboriginal staff. 
Twenty five of the offices indicated when asked that additional 
training was required on servicing Aboriginal clients. 
P e r h a p s the m o s t t e l l i n g q u e s t i o n s in the s u r v e y w e r e t w o 
w h i c h asked the r e g i o n a l o f f i c e m a n a g e r s to i d e n t i f y p r o b l e m s 
experienced by Aboriginal clients at the point of initial contact 
with the DSS and then d u r i n g the c o n t i n u a t i o n of p a y m e n t . The 
q u e s t i o n on p r o b l e m s of i n i t i a l c o n t a c t y i e l d e d 418 r e s p o n s e s . 
P r o b l e m s r e l a t i n g to A b o r i g i n e s n o t b e i n g able to p r o v e 
identification were given 50 times by 35 offices, while problems 
e x p e r i e n c e d by A b o r i g i n e s in u n d e r s t a n d i n g and c o m p l y i n g w i t h 
departmental procedures and requirements were mentioned 58 times 
by 28 o f f i c e s . Other p r o b l e m s f r e q u e n t l y i d e n t i f i e d r e l a t e d to 
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literacy, personal anxieties and difficulties with communication. 
The question on problems experienced by Aborigines during 
continuation of payments yielded an even larger number of 
responses, since it invited the regional managers to specify 
problems in relation to particular types of payment. Seven 
hundred and twenty five responses were recorded in all. Forty per 
cent of these were categorised by the survey team as identifying 
'system features' which caused problems for Aboriginal clients; 
such as problems with understanding, answering and lodging 
complicated forms, problems with notification of change of 
circumstances, or again problems with proof of identification. 
Another 20 per cent of responses identified characteristics of 
Aboriginal culture which DSS payments were not designed to cope 
with; such as kinship obligations, mobility, lack of budgeting, 
sharing of financial resources and the oral nature of traditional 
communication. Another 17 per cent of responses related to lack 
of Aboriginal knowledge of the social security system, while an 
equally large fourth group related to problems specific to 
particular types of payment; such as loss of pensioner health 
care cards, problems with renewal of medical certificates for 
sickness benefit and problems with Aboriginal applicants for 
invalid pension not turning up for interviews with Commonwealth 
Medical Officers. 
Regional Managers were also asked to suggest possible 
solutions to the problems they identified. The solutions 
suggested in response to both the initial contact and continuing 
payment questions related predominantly to improving 
communications between the regional office and Aborigines, 
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m e n t i o n e d 314 t i m e ( m e a s u r e s i n c l u d e d b e t t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l 
publicity and information dissemination, better client education 
and better liaison with k e y p e o p l e in A b o r i g i n a l c o m m u n i t i e s ) , 
and improving staffing arrangments, mentioned 205 times (measures 
i n c l u d e d i n c r e a s i n g A b o r i g i n a l s t a f f i n g , i n c r e a s i n g t h e 
involvement of present Aboriginal staff in departmental processes 
a n d , m o r e o c a s s i o n a l l y , a p p o i n t m e n t of d e p a r t m e n t a l a g e n t s ) . 
C h a n g e s to the D e p a r t m e n t ' s p r o c e d u r e s and p r a c t i c e s , s u c h as 
s i m p l i f y i n g a p p l i c a t i o n f o r m s , s p l i t t i n g p a y m e n t s b e t w e e n 
h u s b a n d s a n d w i v e s , c h a n g i n g p r o o f of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
r e q u i r e m e n t s , i m p r o v i n g v i s i t i n g s e r v i c e s and i n f o r m a t i o n 
collection procedures, were also mentioned as possible solutions 
144 times. Staff training was mentioned 56 times. 
All this m a y appear at first to give the impression that DSS 
regional offices are now both enormously aware of and sensitive 
to the m a n y d i m e n s i o n s of A b o r i g i n a l d i s a d v a n t a g e in g a i n i n g 
a c c e s s to d e p a r t m e n t a l s e r v i c e s , and that t h e y are m o r e than 
willing to countenance considerable departmental accomodation to 
the A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t e l e . B u t i n m a n y w a y s t h i s o v e r a l l 
impression is the product of the survey design. In articulating 
the Aboriginal access problem, the survey team was emphasising a 
v i e w s y m p a t h e t i c to this c l i e n t g r o u p . For e x a m p l e the t w o 
q u e s t i o n s on p r o b l e m s and s o l u t i o n s w e r e p h r a s e d in t e r m s of 
p r o b l e m s ' e x p e r i e n c e d by A b o r i g i n e s ' in o b t a i n i n g a c c e s s to 
departmental services. However, on closer inspection some of the 
r e s p o n s e s i n d i c a t e d that the r e g i o n a l m a n a g e r s c o n c e r n s w o u l d 
s o m e t i m e s be m o r e accurately described as problems experienced by 
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the DSS in gaining access to Aborigines. For example within the 
solutions category of 'improving communications', suggestions 
were as often a prescription for educating and hence changing the 
behaviour of Aboriginal clients and intermediaries as for 
improving departmental liaison and information dessimination 
capacity. Similarly some of the problems identified indicate 
concern for DSS's inadequate control over payments to Aborigines, 
as much as any concern with facilitating Aboriginal access. The 
problem of lack of notification of circumstances, mentioned 92 
times, is one example. A number of the responses of this type 
related to current recipients of all payments failing to notify 
the DSS when children passed out of their care, or of recipients 
of widow's pension or supporting parents benefit failing to 
notify entry into a de facto marital relationship, and hence 
causing overpayment. Overpayment was itself explicitly mentioned 
as a problem 15 times. Aboriginal clients' lack of recognition of 
their 'obligations' under the social security rules as the other 
half of their rights was another closely related and clearly 
control-oriented problem mentioned 6 times. 
The concern for Aboriginal disadvantages in gaining access 
to departmental services, which has developed within the DSS in 
recent years, exists alongside a concern that Aboriginal clients 
may be abusing the system. Though the latter is less often 
explicitly acknowledged by the DSS, it does without a doubt make 
its presence powerfully felt within the Department. This is no 
more and no less than we should expect to occur in a department 
as riven by the tension between controlling the expenditure of 
public money and servicing applicants income needs as I earlier 
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argued that the DSS is. The DSS may well have identified and 
defined an Aboriginal access problem and, as a consequence, 
committed considerable resources to more adequate servicing of 
Aborigines. However, in penetrating more directly to the 
Aboriginal clientele, the Department has brought with it its 
expenditure control concerns as well as its client servicing 
ones. 
The DSS's New Aboriginal Presence: The Role of Aboriginal Public 
Contact Staff in the Regional Offices 
This discussion of the survey of regional office managers 
brings me back to more closely consider the role of Aboriginal 
public contact staff in the DSS regional offices. Like all 
members of the DSS staff, these officers are subject to the 
fundamental tension in the social security system between 
sympathetically servicing client needs and controlling public 
expenditure. However, most Aboriginal public contact staff, like 
the Department's social workers, tend towards client sympathy. 
Whereas these tendencies among social workers apply to all 
clients and reflect a common professional outlook, client 
sympathies among the Aboriginal public contact staff are 
concentrated on the Aboriginal clientele and derive from other 
sources. Although being Aboriginal is not itself a requirement 
of appointment, all the DSS's current Aboriginal public contact 
staff are in fact themselves Aboriginal. Most have strong 
Aboriginal loyalties and hold firmly to the view that Aborigines 
have in the past suffered, and still are suffering, severe 
disadvantage in gaining access to social security payments. They 
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t h e r e f o r e o f t e n see t h e i r o w n r o l e as m u c h in t e r m s of b e i n g an 
A b o r i g i n a l a d v o c a t e w i t h i n the D e p a r t m e n t as a d e p a r t m e n t a l 
officer working among the Aboriginal clientele. 
The a d o p t i o n of a p o s i t i o n of c l i e n t a d v o c a c y b y the 
A b o r i g i n a l p u b l i c c o n t a c t s t a f f is h e l p e d , as w i t h s o c i a l 
w o r k e r s , b y the fact that t h e y are not t h e m s e l v e s d i r e c t l y 
r e s p o n s i b l e for c a s e a s s e s s m e n t and d e t e r m i n a t i o n . B e c a u s e of 
t h i s , t h e y o f t e n f e e l free to put the client's c a s e to the 
m a i n s t r e a m a s s e s s i n g and d e t e r m i n i n g s t a f f as s t r o n g l y as 
p o s s i b l e ; l e a v i n g the m o r e c o n t r o l o r i e n t e d c o n c e r n s of c a s e 
administration to others. Role conflict can, however, arise for 
the Aboriginal public contact staff if they come under pressure 
from regional office managers or others in the Department to take 
on more investigative control oriented tasks, such as checking on 
the domestic circumstances of recipients of supporting parents' 
benefits or w i d o w s ' pensions or on the availability for work of 
t h o s e r e c e i v i n g or a p p l y i n g for UB. S o m e A b o r i g i n a l p u b l i c 
c o n t a c t staff h a v e b e e n r e l u c t a n t to u n d e r t a k e these s o r t s of 
tasks arguing that they cannot be both trusted by the Aboriginal 
clientele as service facilitators and at the same time adopt an 
inquisitorial p o s t u r e . 
A l l this is n o t to say that s o m e A b o r i g i n a l p u b l i c c o n t a c t 
staff have not w a r m e d to the control oriented potential of their 
p o s i t i o n . For e x a m p l e , the m a j o r c o n c e r n of one A b o r i g i n a l 
L i a i s o n O f f i c e r to w h o m I s p o k e w a s that the A b o r i g i n e s in his 
area i n v o l v e d in the g r o w i n g A b o r i g i n a l art t r a d e m a y not be 
d e c l a r i n g t h e i r i n c o m e f r o m t h i s s o u r c e on s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
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a p p l i c a t i o n f o r m s . In his a t t e m p t to crack d o w n on this he had 
asked the local A b o r i g i n a l art o r g a n i s a t i o n for access to its 
records of payment. But the art organisation was unwilling to be 
drawn into the ALO's control-oriented concerns. Though this is an 
e x c e p t i o n a l e x a m p l e w h i c h does not override the m o r e general 
o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t A b o r i g i n a l p u b l i c c o n t a c t s t a f f a r e 
predominantly sympathetic to the needs and access disadvantages 
of the A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t e l e , it does r e m i n d us of the w a y in 
w h i c h increasing DSS p e n e t r a t i o n to the A b o r i g i n a l clientele 
n e c e s s a r i l y brings w i t h it both greater capacity for client 
servicing and a greater capacity for client monitoring. It also 
alerts us to the continuing i m p o r t a n c e of i n t e r m e d i a r i e s in 
social security service allocation p r o c e s s e s , and to the 
complexity of the relationships between DSS's Aboriginal public 
contact staff, extra-departmental intermediaries and individual 
Aboriginal clients. 
In the m o r e r e m o t e a r e a s , A b o r i g i n a l public contact staff 
still only v i s i t m o s t A b o r i g i n a l c o m m u n i t i e s at frequencies 
ranging from once every two w e e k s , to once every six m o n t h s . In 
such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , illiterate Aborigines at least are still 
forced to rely fairly heavily on extra-deparmental assistance in 
order to m a i n t a i n the flow of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e paper w o r k that 
receiving a social security p a y m e n t requires. There are also 
other reasons besides simple necessity why Aboriginal clients may 
still want to turn towards intermediaries. Like all DSS clients, 
they may see it as a strategic advantage to depend on some third 
party who knows the social security system better than they, even 
t h o u g h t h e y c o u l d p r o b a b l y h a n d l e it b y t h e m s e l v e s . The 
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i n t e r m e d i a r y m a y be a b l e to s h i e l d t h e m f r o m t h e m o r e 
inquisitorial aspects of DSS administration and to make sure that 
their cases are put forward in ways that are consistent and will 
m a x i m i s e the p o s s i b i l i t y of e l i g i b i l i t y under the rules. Hence 
the fact that the A b o r i g i n a l legal service in Alice Springs, or 
the Aboriginal medical service in suburban Redfern in Sydney, or 
a host of other t o w n and city based n o n - g o v e r n m e n t A b o r i g i n a l 
service organisations all still deal with large numbers of social 
security related m a t t e r s , even though the DSS offices in their 
regions are nearby. Thus there is still a role for the extra-
departmental intermediaries, and there are still o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
for these i n t e r m e d i a r i e s to project their o w n v a l u e s and 
priorities onto the service exchange; though clearly their 
ability to do so is no longer so unfettered as it once w a s . If 
i n d i v i d u a l A b o r i g i n a l clients feel that they are not getting a 
fair deal through an i n t e r m e d i a r y , they w i l l n o w have some 
greater o p p o r t u n i t y to turn d i r e c t l y to the DSS itself. The 
Aboriginal public contact staff, in the g r o w i n g n u m b e r of DSS 
regional offices that have t h e m , w i l l in m o s t instances give 
sympathetic c o n s i d e r a t i o n to their a p p l i c a t i o n s , if not quite 
adopt a position of outright client advocacy. 
The basic point to be m a d e in this context is t h a t , in 
expanding its commitment to Aboriginal servicing at the regional 
office level, the DSS has m a d e a significant c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
undermining the social pre-conditions for the persistence of a 
highly patronal A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e structure. DSS is n o w in a 
much stronger position to ensure that social security p a y m e n t s 
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are allocated in ways consistent with the body of rules within 
which it operates. The distance between individual Aborigines and 
the DSS is no longer so great that individual intermediaries can 
easily monopolise and control Aboriginal access to social 
security payments in the way they once could. The DSS has also, 
more incidentally, offered a more limited number of Aborigines 
the opportunity to move beyond the status of the welfare 
dependent poor by themselves becoming involved in permanent 
public service employment. 
If we add to the DSS's role, the fact that many other 
mainstream departments of both state and Commonwealth government 
in Australia have also increased their commitment to Aboriginal 
servicing in recent years, and hence also their employment of 
Aborigines, the structure of Aboriginal access to the resources 
of the larger society would indeed appear to have been undergoing 
significant change. Discussion on this point cannot, however, be 
completed until we also appreciate more clearly the changes that 
have been taking place in the non-government Aboriginal welfare 
sector in recent years. As the major supplier of intermediaries 
between individual Aboriginal poor and the DSS, and for that 
matter between individual Aboriginal poor and the many other 
organisational arms of the welfare state which now pay some 
attention to servicing Aborigines, this sector and the changes 
occuring within it must necessarily affect the analysis. It is to 
these changes that I turn in the next chapter. 
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Figure 3 
Posters P r o d u c e d by the NT B r a n c h of the DSS in the Pilot 
Aboriginal Information Program 
N G I N Y I P A M E Y A L K G U N - J A R A N G A J E M B E R R N G G U L A 6 0 . 
R R A P A MSNYPA W U R R A G U N - J A R A N G A J E M B E R R N G G U L A 6 5 . 
N G I N Y I P A W A Y G A J A R R U P I Y A M U - Y U R R A N G G U L A A G E P E N S I O N , 
M I N Y P A J E i y i B E R R G U N - J A R A N G A G U - N i N G G U L A . 
• D * M r t m « i t •< S*c ls l S w w i t y 
KU-YIMflYAPA RftUHYA NY41A BARRA 
• NyHM bafTt ny-yofWya 2 WMk gu-fil b t r r i 9u-«ortdya. 
• AburMmrwga nglnylp* mk4a )ege ny4w4s buiTwe. * ln|a 
mipty i wara ny-iM bwra. Rraps 0ali 
buTTwa, fTupJyi wun rry-ma b f r ^ Wnipa twinia 
mur^gsta iwn-fWTWfls m#p*ye ity-meiiffge ny-yortdyt, 
w w a Ag» Pwt^on nynm b f f ny yortdy*. 
Gu-94Vlma barn ^mbcrr 70 9u-ni b«rr« nggula, B u mipfya 
wMiA ciyHtts bMTS ny-^fortdys, n w ^ c n •wiiwwmoga nynns 
ny^fortdyiL 
• Gun-ngtny1p« Coff r Ofnc« Kim ai-bakiia nu-yu 
i.b«iTan . ^ m k u n ^ bwTwa 
D.p«w««Bl oJ Soctol S«cur«y, wufT» ngtnylp. r ^ u f n i M 
l luh. W i m mki j i g<JMil f .9«^ " " " n * ™ ""P*** 
y bwra ffsta n y M b«T« 
htwTwm ( 0 rrmr* w n w n « KTbiarwa (S. 
p « n s ^ nuU mu-ytfvntyapa rrupty* ny-mt barra. UafTitt 
inun-9«ta nyi-na bam. 
NY-YtNUIYA BARRA 
• Uln|a nglnylpa nr^borrwuta, Ihnama >*fnb«rr gufHaranfa 
ngguia, b a m Aga PanakNi ny-ma, Bca nr-yangga nufa 
an-nginyipa Abortgtnai Ualaon Omcr , afw>alan99a barrw. 
a-yum, bam nipi a^ngga fa ngguia. 
• W u m tnln^ nglnyipa ny-borrwufa, )l**wna mun-gata m j p ^ 
ny^mang^a iTy'yo<1dya imin-rwranoa, Wca nyYangga nuta 
an-ogkrytpa Abortglnal Ualaon Omcac. 
• Utn^ Aga PansJon ny^mangga ny^yorldya, gun-guna borrwa: 
wo4«woU an-fVnylpa Aboriginal Ualaon Offlcar 
a Mki |agMa>rangafra«ny4 
ny^jartdya, wangga bumta Social Sacurtty, bam 
lM«M>giny(pam*>ly«sa<»ml>H«nnani 
J|I«!UI»ABR8«»AMUH4«KA PENSION 
Mh^a»MigfcnH'a»>^a»an<i>(iammnanggaa^»oi1dYa Aaa 
fanalon . u m ngfciytpa gala ny^na ny-yortJya, martta an-gau 
aimglriytpa Aboriginal Ualaon Omcoiranggana bam bltUpa 
iroplylbubHnL 
aygala atn>glnyH>a Aboriginal Ualaon 
ny-)ungga)a b a m njguU panaion nula. 
wttrinyHunaabliitayyilangga abKrtnyyuira: 
i<ol Social Sacorlty 
Abor igM Ualaon Unit 
P.O. Bo< i r u 
DafwtMlT.STM 
Taiaphona: 101211 
A0£ P£KS*JH - SURAHRA TRANSLATIOH 
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NGINYIPA NGARDAPA BURR-GAKJA N-DIGIRRNGA 
GU-NGARDA YERRCHA. NGINYIPA WAYGAJA RRUPIYA MU-YURRA 
NGGULA SUPPORTING PARENT'S BENEFIT. 
• iTT ip . anara ( a m a mi l l . o » i g » a •burr-wor l t l ra 
tupOOTtini P a r a o f a Bat tam iKlttv, l u n ^ a U s 
• r rapa 
^ffafda 
MO-TWMrrAPA RRUPIYA NY-MA BARRA 
• Supporting Paranr iBanamnyHna b a m nr-)ro>Uyali>aak 
gu-ni bana giMroildya. 
• Rn^riya lairaata. 
OiHiganlararrchailiun^ytnailtrapalagaiir. . 
aglnT<pa bana ia<a nvpiya wana n y a H barn nnVnL 
• Mn^ng4ny1paH rranganvpt 
a nglOTtpa lama iiY->i 
. . . n j g a i i r r K i t t y a 
Hyyoridya.awrTamw-gata 
SupfxxVnQ ParK i fa Banam m v l r > 
• Unfa n3liTr%Mrn4>hrany-HirTiiMr>jaiirrorUYa b a t e a u 
ngkiftpa ailnta iruptya wana ny-ma bana nr^fartdya. 
a Connnunity omea (una K^ialciia m u ^ 
S<jpp<xt)ng ParanCt BanafH nuta aorytna^yipa mJftfM 
ny-ma bafra. Uatriia awn-gata nyfH^a bam. 
• Ngkiy^talnyf-nlmiptyaniuna-boybarringgutachaqua 
aiu-guy«nda, waygala H n y M bant aA^fumna batra 
nggu(a aburr-anrtdya. 
NY-TIKWYA BARRA 
• Nginylpa mJnta ngardapa burr-ganja it-flglrmga Ih 
an-daUpa rrapa nglnylpa ny-bomnjnga awn-gata 
Supporting Paraofa 
-kiya ngardapa. 
rrwplya mln ja l u - n g a n U 
ya r r cha Jaga ay^anaja k u r r a a ny-ywl i l ya ngardapa, 
" W p a an-gtanarrMpa gala iMlkna r rapa minypa mll lyal i 
•yi-f i i . 
vnglnytpa Aborlgkial Uataon Omcar, an-n 
a-yvra , bana nlpa a-yunggaja nggula. 
> Wurra mlnta ngloylpa ny^wTwula, Ihiwna I 
nynnangga ny-yorUya mun-r>arranga, Mia n 
an-og(ny(pa Aboriginal Ualaon omear. 
yangganula 
^gabarrwa 
amjptya 
^nu4a 
a Mkifa Supporting Paranf iBanafttn r-yorldym. 
guvguna bomra: WolawoU aiwigtnylpa Aboriginal Uataon 
OWcarM »anggai«cha a-woriJya. barra naHurra a^a^ifcurrja 
bumni Dapartmam o< Social Sacurtty. wurta nglnyipa 
yagurraM nu*a. Wurra ailn^a gun-nyagara, m m n a rrijptya 
gala barratt Bwna-boy nggUa. 
• Rrapa gun-guna bomra; mlnta nglnyipa an-gianant)ipa 
barrwa barra n-dlma. warrfita ny-yangga barra nula 
aivnglnytpa Aboriginal Ualaon Offloar. Jmam (anapa m j p l y a 
ngta bwfyolkal ln. 
• Rni>a a * ^ gu-*arTwiga irawa ny-boy b«T i gau nyt-nl 
baira nryortdya, waogga botrwa Social Saojrfly. barra 
aaavnglnyV* T^ply* g * " mbt-tarnnaml ngguU. 
• MM" ' • l y bH>aamna. WMtra »<ln)a an-nairanga Jatapa |aga 
ny janaja nula, y«>lrTlch ny-yaogga burrwa Social Sacurlty, 
barra >acNna«ra rrvplya ny-ma barra. 
Jtn-nglny<pa rrapa waygaja an^iginyipa Aboriginal Ualaon 
omcar blRlnf^M ablrriny-)uoggaM baira nggula panalon nula , 
arurra bkT<n(lpa awkTtny-)una ablirtny-yalanggi ablrrmy-yurra: 
DapartmaM o< Sodal Saoirtty 
Abortgkial Ualaon Unit 
P.O. B o l t 7»3 
Danrtn, N.T. 5T94 
T a l a p h o n « : M m i 6SS 
s u p p o m w a p a r e k t s b e n e f i t — b a r a h r a 
•mANSLATKm 
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lb E T _ 
H 
SOCIAkt'^hen you get m Invalid Pension you mustlIIt 
^SECURITYTOMENORWOMENWHOAREBUNOORi^^ill out AlCfomis that are sent t6 
WHO CANNOT WORK BECAUSE^ T^HE/ HAVEWI the doctor when you are asked 
liPERMANENT SICKNESS ^ you do not your money will stop 
HOW MUCH SHOULD YOU GET? uytHe 
Security pay Invalid Pension tell Social Security straight away 
^fipeople once every ^ weeks. . ^ «o your cheques can get sent there ipe
fe^The-amount of your cheque wW dtpendW^qipKMp^- pcmccit - — T 
:Mthe number of peopje-you-looV after, BENEFIT - . 
amount of^ cegulir-mojiey^ coming tdjS^^^l^'' ¥<•*< to leavelyeUrtjob beeause'youm i^ 
r.flhe family.. AND you .will be going,back 
^•^Ta find out you may be able to get a Sickness'!^^ 
•^^you should recelve,tlo£irforthe chart ^ ^ V p ' B w e f i t rather than an Invalid Pension, 
produced by Social Security >You sltoulii1iSiX?I^ 'fl<e rates of the two benefits are the 
^lind one of these/ai».thejiotice>board I n ^ ^ l i ' ^^^ vour Abongmaf Liaison OHicerJor^^^K 
;i^your community. more details of this benefit A 
« n WIPES PENSION . ' ' 
m 
.^-^hould be getting art'lnvalid Pension.-
Tllien you should comacttone of the Abbri9hlial^ 9fP»'«"e^^^ Social ^ e^rity 
.'Liaison OHicers shown belovv who will give ybtF^Aboriginal Uatson Unit^^^ 
smote details or send you a claim form 
'Ityou think ,vou are getting the wrong 
YA? NGINYIPA BUR^-GUYA NY-YORRPURDA, 
GALA NY-NYlNMiYA JAMA NY-JI? 
NGINYiPA WAYGAJA RRUPIYA MU-YURRA NGGULA 
AN-GURD^RDA MUN-NiKA MINYPA INVALID 
PENSION RRAPA SICKNESS BENEFIT. 
•< toeUI S*cur<tr bwrbo-micha 
UU-YWUrrAPA RRUPIYA NY^ IA BABRA 
• Rnjplyan^ Mnibafnwsygajawanaimyvcfainun-dcUpa. 
Qt^ garda yvncha iiiln^  nginylpa )aga bumra, 
nyWiytpa bwn nii^ yi wana ny-nia barrL 
iaf4a nglnytpo mun-narranga rruptyi ny-fl . . r>o»aii«rortdya, 
wufTa mun^fata hvaM Panaion mjplya RMjn.dotapa ny^fna 
barra. 
• Q<in-ngliiy1paCoaMmjnltyOfflca)uffaB*-bakhainu^  
panalon mila ira^ylnnWyapa rrup^ ny-fna barra. MwTlta 
inuf>-gata nyt^na barra. 
NY-YINMrr A BARRA 
' InvaJhj panalon ny-ma ba/ra ny-yoriilya 2 WMk gu-nl barra 
Bu-woridya. 
• WtSan9lny1pabufT-guyany-yorTpurdarTa4ia0aianY-ylnmtya 
)aina ny.^  barrwa, mara mun-gata n^ lnylpa ny^bomvula 
invalid Panalon ny-fna barra ny4.nl, vrurra wangga nuta 
an-nglnyfpa Abof^glnal Ualaon Officaf Mvnalangga bacrwa 
a-yucra, bana nlpa a^ uojgala nggula. 
• Mln^  nglnylpa annarranga ny-bomruta afvg<iniorda, rrapa 
mlnypa annnugapala, barra mun-gata nlpa InvaM Panaion 
muHiM a^nlnya, wtMTa annglnyipa Abof^glnaJ Lialaon Omcar 
wangganula. 
• WunaiiynJanglnvHMny.borTwuKP*namainun-g«tamjptYa 
ny-mangga ny-ytxUya awn-narranga. Wta nyyangga nula 
an^ tglnytfia Aboriginal Ualaon Offlcar. 
• U4n4a Invalid Panaion ny^mangga ny-yorldya, gunguna 
bomn: Wotawola annglnytpa Abcrlglnal Ualaon Offlcaf 
bl wangganacba a^worUya. barra imHurra a-wukurrfa bunwa 
Dapartmacrt of Social Sacurtty, wurra nginylpa yagurrma 
nuta. Wurra mtn|a guivnyagara. iHmnxra mjpiya gala barrwa 
muraHboy ngguta. 
• Rniparaln)ag<Mii«rTangairawany.boybamga<aiiy|.ni 
barra ny-yotidya, ataogga burraa Social SacutHy, ban* 
mun-nglnylpa mjplya gala »T^>t^a^Tmau>a nggula. 
AfMSUROEROA MUtMUKA. SICKMES3 BOIBTr 
Uinta nglnylpaglpanybewunalamaiTapainlotaiiyifonpurdj, 
wurra mlnla barrwa ny4al<a barra K<na. mJplya waygata 
im^ yurra ngguU Stciinaaa Banam, wvrra auMHgala kivaM 
PanakKi ngfca. Mun-gata Sidcnaaa Bana« murnnaywapa 
rriiplya mlnypa Invalid Panaloo. Wanggana anoglnytpa 
Aboriginal Ualaon Omcar barra nl(>« »^ ungga|a nggula. 
JtN-GUUARRBlPA UUHMKA. WIFE'S PENSION 
ulnia anwiglnylpa an-gumarrttpa imMnangga a^amUya Invi 
P^ ialon waygaja Aga Panalon, wurra ngkiylpa ny-wa ban* 
|ln.]uinarTbl(ia mun-nlka panalon. Wanggana an^ tginylpa 
Aboriginal Ualaon Offlcar barra nlpa a-gungga|a nggula. 
Jln^ >glnylpa rrapa waygala 1 rylpaA 
Offlcar birrinfpa ablrrtny-)ungga|a barra ngguta panalon nula. 
wurra blrrlnflpa awhitny )unaablrrlnyyalangga abliiliiy yulia: 
Dapartmant o( Sodal Saajrlty 
Aboriginal Ualaon Unit 
P.O. Bo«lT«5 
Oarwln, M.T. 57« 
TalaphonaiSOml 
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JAL NYI-NIRRA JAMA NY-Ji WUHRA 
GALA ANA-NGA GU-RRIMA NQGULA. nGlNYiPA WAYGAJA 
RRUPIYA MU-YURRA NGGULA UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT. 
•mU-4 
U m 
•>TP« m — M l n y p . 
n « « i t y l b w T - w e r k h r e w a y g a j a 
r t t y l 
r a » a w a r v a l a U J L O u 
M f l t M r r i p a D a p a r t m . 
• I — 
tnMrm 
a h i r r a n 
MU-YINUIYAPA RRUPIYA NY-MA B A B H A 
• U . B . n Y H n a b a i T a n i f - i f O r t i l y a 2 w « « > g u M i l b « i T l B U » o r t d y « . 
• R n i p l y > n Y - n i b a m < n y s a i « w a n a < n y i ^ a a l u f H ( M a ( > l . 
Uinta ngtnytpa lambaiT 11 g a l a g i M i k T v n a nggula b u n l a k , 
R r a p * minfa gala ^ n - g u m a n b l p a n-dkna rrapa wayga|a 
a f v ^ u n w r W p a i v ^ f n a , w u m i m j f i l y a inun-cWapa n y - M 
batrm. 
R n p a m l n ^ aburr^^rlnnyyapa ) a g a ny-janata burrwa, w w r a 
m j f k y a Nrana ny-ffla barra. 
R n p a mln|a m u n - f w r a f ^ n u p l y a mu-ylninlyapa n y - i n a n 
ny -yor ldya , wufTa wayga la m u n - d a t a p a n r ^ b a n O B . 
• Gun-ngkry lpaComiTiunl^Of f lGalurra in- faa lchaRHf-yu 
p a n a k x i tMjIa. U ^ intFylnmlyapa mjptya ny-ata b a m u 
U a r r l u i m j t v g a U n y M u barra. 
NY-YWMIYA BARRA 
• Uin|anglnTV>a|alnyl -ni fTa|anuiTa(>ait i lntagaUana-n9a 
gu-rr lma t ^ u i a . rrapa nglnyHM m l i ^ n y ^ o n v u f a n y l - f l ^ 
barra mlnia ny-flia U.B^ Bka n y - y a n g g a mjta an-nglnytpa 
Abor ig ina l U a l a o n Otficar, a n - n a l a n g g a l u n l a d i a f u n a . 
barra nlpa a-gungga^a nggu la . 
• W u r r a m l n t a n g l n y l p a n y ' b o m i n j K l l n ^ 
Pai>ai<iiai« o« S o c i a l Saourt ly , wutra ngl i i>lya yagwtiaia 
nula . Wutra giMWiyagaca, n u w u m i i r o p l y a gaU b a r t w a 
n u n a ^ o y n g ^ ^ 
t R r a p « g u i - g u n a b a f T w v : w u i T a ) « f n a f T - d b n a b a r r a , w a f r H c a 
n y y a n g g a barra nula a n ^ i g t o y l p a A b o r i g i n a l U a l v m O m c * r , 
Jtoiam J a m p a tn jp lya nula buiT-yoll ia|la 
I n r ^ B r i n f a g u - w a r r a n g a r r a w a n y - b o y barra gatanylHil 
b a n a ny-yor idya, w a n g g a but rwa S o c i a l Sacurity , barra 
• u t w t g l n y l p a m ^ i t y a g a l a m b l - t a r n a n g g u l a . 
i M h ^ a r r u p t y a g 
a U r w n p t 
a r a n g g u l a , wunra gala ny-y1(wntya 
^ a n a m , wurra wayga4a m i ^ 
a n g g u l a . W a n g g a n a marrlca 
a Aboriginal U a i a o n O t d c * barra a^)tingga|a 
^<ylpa Abor ig inal U a K o n 
a r r u p l y a 
• r t R a r r u p i y a U ^ 
n y - m a n g g a ny -yorUya inurvn«rrar>ga, Hka ny -yangga nula 
an -ng lny lpa AJxxIglnal U a i a o n Otf lcar . 
• Mln^a U.B. ny-fnar>gga n y - y o r U y a , gurv-guna borrwa: 
W o i a m U an-nglnylpa A b o r i g i n a l U a i a o n Omoar 
M - w a n g g a n a c h a a-worWya, barra mu-turra a-wMkurrta burrwa 
J k v n n k i y l p a rrapa wayga|i 
O m c a r bltrtnjH>a a6lrrlny-)ungga|« barra n g g u l a panalon nula . 
a u r a Dirrlnppa a«lrr1ny-)una ab l r r iny -ya langga ablniny-yurra . 
Dapar lmant o ( S o c i a l Sacur i ty 
A b o r i g m a i U a i a o n I M t 
P.O. B o i l T»S 
O a r « W l . H . T . I T » » 
T a l a p h a n a : M > 2 1 l 
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A-JAY MEYALK, NGINYIPA AN-GUMARRBIPA BI-BAWyNA. 
f^GlNYlPA WAYGAJA RRUPiYA MU-YURRA NGGOLA JiN-R^lLIYAK 
MUN-NIKA WIDOWS PENSIOM. 
mgywfeJhi awy<nd« aw t u m f r b ^ j h ^ ^ w n a , 
e l M i « H i i « i w |hMr*1dy» W W e V i r«Ml<i« , blrripe 
• w w r - s J i t a D » p « i t w < i l mt S a e i a l <^c<ifttyiitow-wwch« 
•bWT-worUya . 
lytpj Atortgliwl U«l ion OWmc. 
bwra nip* a-gungaata nggub-
n y - m - w nr-yortdyi i>iu>M>«™n9«, KM >«<ta 
•n-nglnylpa Aboclglnal UaUon omcrn . 
MU-YWaOYAPA RflUPIYA NY-UA BARRA 
SUivf luM boaw . : Wol^rota BMiBtnTtP* 
HnWyike i>nny-in.b«T»n»-r<x«y.2wMk Ot f l c * ••I* 
gu-nl b«T« gu-«tortdy«. 
> Rniphranr^vMbafTawayyafamnawvyvataRwn-Mafta. 
Ou-nearda y«nt:ha ngtnyip* taga ny-tan«ta bonwi , 
nyliiytpa bafra nup^ra wana iiy uia bana. 
Utn|a ngkryip* mun-narranga iruptya ny-mang^a ny-vorUya 
mun-gaU nglnylpa |atM ny^lrTa ny-yiMtiya, wufTa RHifl-sala 
WMow'a Panakm maplya mutwWafM ny-ma barra. 
> OunHfghiylpa Community OfflcaJtHTain-bak^aitH^^ 
penakw nula mu-ykwiiyepe mipiya t t y « barra. 
Uarrka mun-gata ny*-na barra. 
» Hglnylpa |a< n y i ^ mjplya muna-boy barra nggula chaqua 
mu-(riyWtda, wayga|a nyt-n) bank mb^-gurrma ba/ra 
ngguta aburr-worldya. 
burrwa Dapartmart (X Soda l S « » « y . wuna ngtoytpa 
yagumtia nula. Wuira mlnla gufwiyagaca. nu»WTa nvplya 
gala baiTwa n u n t ^ a y nggula. 
Rfapa mMa g«-*a»Taoga rrawa ny-boy barra gata a y ^ 
bana t>y-y<*«ya. * » w a buftwa Social Saeurtty, barta 
n«j<wiglny((>a miplya gata mbHamnaina ngg<«a. 
Jl iwiglnylpa trapa waygala aiw.gtnylpa Aboriginal Uaiaon 
Otflcaf Wrrtnllpa abWfiy-lunggala baira nggula p.oalon HMla, 
wurni blrrfcillpa awlfilnyHuna ablrrinylfalaogga ablirtnyyurta: 
WY-YINWYA BARBA 
• Mlfl}a nginylpa ny-mlHyal( rrapa mln^ afvgumarrbtpa 
W-bawuna rrapa mln|a nlpa a-bona, pflaon a^jaxTngumurra. 
mun-nglnylpa mjplya wayga^a mu-yurra nggula, wnjrra 
Oepartmant of Social Sacurtty 
AbortjHwl Ualaon Unit 
P . O . B o i l T t S 
Darwin. N.T. S7M 
Talaptiooa:»0»211 
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YA? AN-NGINYBPA AN-GUMARRBIPA MU-MANGGA A-WORKIYA AGE 
PENSSON, MINYPA JEMBERR GUN-JARANGA NULA, WURRA WAYGAJA 
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Chapter 6 
The Plurallsation and Aboriginalisation of the Non-GovernmeDt 
Aboriginal Welfare Sector 
As well as encouraging mainstream government departments 
like the DSS to accept greater responsibility for the Aboriginal 
portion of their clientele, the Whitlam government also embarked 
on a process of reform intended to encourage the development of 
Aboriginal organisations governed by elected Aboriginal 
representatives. These organisations were to run Aboriginal 
community affairs and so replace the direct white management and 
control of Aborigines of the past. As noted in chapter 3, this 
process of reform led to the incorporation of the state-level 
Aboriginal welfare authorities that into the new DAA, except in 
Qld. It also led to a proliferation of non-government Aboriginal 
organisations funded primarily by the DAA to provided a range of 
services and undertake enterprises. Here, I want to examine the 
contribution of this rapid development of the non-government 
Aboriginal welfare sector in changing Aboriginal access 
structures, and in particular in changing patterns of Aboriginal 
access to social security payments. 
These new Aboriginal organisations must of necessity play 
many of the same roles and face many of the same problems as 
other more established non-government welfare organisations; 
including for that matter the non-government Aboriginal welfare 
organisations of the 60s and before. Like all non-government 
welfare organisations, they are themselves group clients of the 
welfare state. They are also providers of alternative and 
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additional services for i n d i v i d u a l poor people , i n t e r m e d i a r i e s 
between individual clients and state welfare bureaucracies, and 
foci for political mobilisation around particular welfare issues. 
The new A b o r i g i n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s , l ike other non-government 
welfare organisations, needed both to e s t a b l i s h and mainta in a 
c l i e n t e l e of their own and to acquire , however they could , the 
resources to susta in their own operations . In pursuing these 
organisat ional needs , the leaders and employees of the new 
Abor ig inal organisat ions have often undermined the e f f e c t i v e 
monopoly control over Aboriginal access to the resources of the 
larger society formerly held by the established white patrons of 
Aboriginal w e l f a r e . From being l a r g e l y stable and s e t t l e d , the 
non-government Aboriginal welfare sector has, since 1972, become 
increasingly volatile, pluralistic and competitive. 
As a major source of Aborig inal resources and a major 
dependent on non-government intermediation between itself and its 
Aboriginal clientele, the DSS has been ineradicably entangled in 
these changes in the non-government Aboriginal welfare sector. 
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the nature and complexity of 
such involvement is by recounting a number of examples. 
The Involvement of S o c i a l Secur ity Payments in Changes i n the 
Non-Government Aboriginal Welfare Sector: Some Examples 
In f luence over the flow of social security payments has 
often been an important resource in the attempts of newly 
emerging Aboriginal organisations and their leaders to establish 
their own pos it ion in the structure of Aborig inal w e l f a r e . 
Gilbert's account of the establishment of the Aboriginal Housing 
1 5 4 
Company in Redfern back in 1973 provides an early example: 
The original concept of the Aboriginal Housing Project was of 
a place where the c i t y ' s d e s t i t u t e , homeless blacks could 
come for shelter. It was not to be a handout centre. Each and 
every person, i n c l u d i n g the goomies , were to pay some rent 
(out of the social services or pensions that Bob Bellear was 
trying to get for them) so that there could be a gradual 
return to pride in s e l f , a return to self-value as a human 
being. Everybody was to share in some responsibility around 
the place so that a feeling of belonging would be generated. 
Late in March, after hearing so much about this wonderful new 
hope being held out to blacks in Redfern , I t r a v e l l e d to 
Sydney to i n t e r v i e w some of the people then camping in the 
old houses in Caroline St. There I met the goomees. (Several 
of them turned out to be r e l a t i v e s of mine - uncles and 
aunts . ) A l l were bubbling over with the knowledge that for 
the f i r s t time in their l i v e s they belonged somewhere and, 
guided by Bob B e l l e a r , they could help bu i ld something of 
their own. (Gilbert 1973: 166). 
B e l l e a r , one of A u s t r a l i a ' s f i r s t A b o r i g i n a l l a w y e r , played a 
central role in initiating the project. The new DAA was willing 
to put up the capital for the group to establish the project, but 
could not be r e l i e d upon to meet al l the recurrent costs of 
maintaining the houses in the future. For this, social security 
payments among the clientele would be a useful supplement. Social 
security money could contr ibute , v ia rent c o l l e c t i o n , to the 
f i n a n c i a l v i a b i l i t y of the group p r o j e c t , which would in turn 
help build Bob B e l l e a r ' s pos it ion as an A b o r i g i n a l community 
leader and the promoter of a successful A b o r i g i n a l - i n i t i a t e d 
project . An i n t r i n s i c and crucial part of B e l l e a r ' s l e a d e r s h i p 
role was then to help the homeless deal w ith the DSS. Th is , of 
course, was well before the days of DSS Aboriginal public contact 
staff in Redfern. 
In other cases the dependence of emerging A b o r i g i n a l 
organisations and their leaders on the social security payments 
of others has been far more e x p l i c i t and s u b s t a n t i a l . For 
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example, Bennelong's Haven, an Aboriginal alcohol rehabilitation 
centre e s t a b l i s h e d in the Sydney suburb of M a r r i c k v i l l e in the 
mid 1970s, has since its inception depended heavily on the social 
security p a y m e n t s of those u n d e r t a k i n g its c o u r s e s . Sickness 
Benefit is the preferred social security payment at the centre. 
In p a r t t h i s r e f l e c t s the c e n t r e ' s f o c u s on A b o r i g i n a l 
a l c o h o l i c s . But s o m e w h o u n d e r t a k e the c o u r s e s r e m a i n at the 
centre for some considerable time after initial rehabilitation, 
and would often be more appropriately placed on some other social 
security payment, such as UB. However, the Aboriginal management 
of Bennelong's Haven prefers its residents to obtain sickness 
benefit whenever possible. This avoids the necessity of clients 
having to negotiate the more demanding aspects of access to UB, 
such as two w e e k l y r e v i e w s and d e m o n s t r a t i n g a v a i l a b i l i t y and 
capability for work. But it also facilitates managerial control 
of the c e n t r e , since the DSS is m o r e w i l l i n g to pay sickness 
benefits direct to the Aboriginal manager of the centre, rather 
than to the individual A b o r i g i n e s , than it is w i t h UB. The 
manager also has an understanding with the local DSS office that 
he attends all DSS interviews with 'his' clients. This arrangment 
has at t i m e s been challenged by m o r e control oriented rank and 
file b u r e a u c r a t s in the local DSS office who have seen the 
manager's presence at interviews as inhibiting their ability to 
detect the illegitimate case through close cross questioning of 
the client. The effects of the arrangement are probably, as these 
control oriented regional office bureaucrats seem to suspect, to 
f a c i l i t a t e client access to sickness b e n e f i t by a l l o w i n g the 
m a n a g e r to bring his g r e a t e r k n o w l e d g e of the social s e c u r i t y 
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s y s t e m to bear in i n t e r v i e w s . The a r r a n g e m e n t also has another 
benefit from the manager's point of view; it helps maintain his 
c o n t r o l over the f l o w of the social s e c u r i t y p a y m e n t s into the 
alcohol r e h a b i l i t a t i o n centre. T h a t , as far as the m a n a g e r is 
concerned, may be an equally important consideration since it is 
social security payments which sustain the organisation. 
The remote areas of northern and central Australia have also 
p r o v i d e d e x a m p l e s of n e w A b o r i g i n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s built 
specifically and explicitly on social security payments. In some, 
the element of competition for influence over the flow of social 
security payments between the n e w l y e m e r g i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n s and 
t h e i r l e a d e r s and the m o r e e s t a b l i s h e d white patrons of 
Aboriginal welfare has been quite explicit. 
Since the advent of award wages in the pastoral industry in 
these remote areas in the late 60s, relations between Aborigines 
and p a s t o r a l i s t s have changed c o n s i d e r a b l y . M a n y groups h a v e , 
from time to time, had fallings out with their pastoral patrons 
of the past, leading to strikes, w a l k - o f f s or e x p u l s i o n s . The 
points at issue in such d i s p u t e s have often included concerns 
about social s e c u r i t y p a y m e n t s , as w e l l as m o r e o v e r t l y 
i n d u s t r i a l concerns relating to stockmen's w a g e s and housing 
(Doolan 1977, Bell 1978). Despite such episodes, many Aborigines 
have continued to live on the pastoral properties with which they 
had long been a s s o c i a t e d . In the absence of a l t e r n a t i v e s , they 
have also continued to rely on p a s t o r a l i s t s for basic service 
needs, including needs relating to social security payments. 
In t h e K a t h e r i n e r e g i o n of the N T , t h e s e s o r t s of 
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d e v e l o p m e n t s led in 1976 to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the Yulngu 
A s s o c i a t i o n . L a r g e l y the idea of the DAA area o f f i c e r , Yulgnu 
aimed to provide Aborigines living on pastoral properties in the 
region with an alternative to dependence on white pastoralists 
for t h e i r e v e r y d a y s e r v i c e n e e d s . T h e A s s o c i a t i o n w a s 
constituted as an A b o r i g i n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n d r a w i n g A b o r i g i n a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the pastoral c o m m u n i t i e s it aimed to 
service. The Yulgnu Association's s t r a t e g y was to take over the 
social security and store provision functions for Aborigines on 
the pastoral properties and, thereby, cut the pastoralists out of 
the service intermediation game. Yulngu established a community 
trust account system based on social security payments. Ten per 
cent of the amount of social security cheques would be deducted 
to finance the running of the o r g a n i s a t i o n and the r e m a i n i n g 
ninety per cent would be split three ways. Thirty per cent would 
be paid direct to the eligible i n d i v i d u a l s on the two w e e k l y 
Yulgnu 'liaison' trips to the communities. These trips were also 
to be a time for attending to the administrative requirements of 
social security servicing; i n d i v i d u a l s w o u l d sign a schedule 
authorising Yulgnu's a c t i o n s , social s e c u r i t y f o r m s w o u l d be 
c o m p l e t e d , c o r r e s p o n d e n c e a n s w e r e d and changes in e l i g i b i l i t y 
attended to. In short, the Yulngu liaison section workers would 
carry out the usual tasks of c o m m u n i t y i n t e r m e d i a r i e s who do 
social s e c u r i t y related w o r k in b e t w e e n the o c c a s i o n a l , but by 
then increasingly frequent, visits to these c o m m u n i t i e s by the 
DSS's own newly appointed Aboriginal public contact staff. Under 
the Yulgnu a r r a n g e m e n t , the other sixty per cent of social 
security payments would be paid into the community trust account 
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to be drawn on to meet connnunity expenses. About half of this was 
designated for a c o m m u n i t y food supply d e l i v e r e d by Yulgnu's 
trucking service. The other half was to be used to m e e t other 
recurrent community expenses such as fixing vehicles, buying in 
food in advance for the wet season or community members going to 
town for meetings. 
Yulgnu met with considerable success in its early years, not 
the least reason for which being that it received the support of 
DSS's A b o r i g i n a l District Officer and later Senior A b o r i g i n a l 
Liaison Officer in Katherine. From the begining, he supported the 
idea and encouraged the pastoral communities he visited to become 
involved. Once a community had joined the Yulgnu system, one of 
the m a i n p r o b l e m s of m a i n t a i n i n g the a r r a n g e m e n t was for 
c o m m u n i t i e s to ensure that everyone continued to direct their 
social security cheques to the Yulgnu A s s o c i a t i o n a d d r e s s . If 
this was not maintained those who received their cheques by some 
other means, perhaps the white pastoralist, might be tempted to 
free ride on the c o l l e c t i v e trust account benefits. At t i m e s in 
some Yulgnu c o m m u n i t i e s the free rider p r o b l e m has b e c o m e so 
g r e a t as to t h r e a t e n the v i a b i l i t y of the t r u s t a c c o u n t 
a r r a n g e m e n t , and in a n u m b e r of i n s t a n c e s the a r r a n g e m e n t has 
collapsed a l t o g e t h e r for a period. Here again the local DSS 
Aboriginal officer had an important role to play. While he could 
not tell people in trust account communities where to send their 
cheques when they applied to him for social security payments, he 
could suggest that Yulgnu was the appropriate place. This often 
helped communities which had the system working well to resist 
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the development of a free-rider problem. However in other 
instances where communities were divided on the merits of the 
system, not even the DSS officer's influence could save some 
trust account arrangements from temporary collapse. This often 
provided white pastoralists with an opportunity to get back into 
the Aboriginal servicing game. But Yulgnu would in time usually 
come back for another attempt. 
After 1978, the Yulngu Association had even more to be 
thankful for to the Katherine DSS District Officer. In that year, 
allegations were made that one of Yulgnu's white employees was 
abusing his position in the organisation by directing Yulngu 
expenditure to a company in which he had some interest. The DSS 
in Darwin undertook a review of Yulgnu in order to assess whether 
its own tacit support for the organisation should continue. The 
Katherine District Officer defended Yulngu staunchly before his 
non-Aboriginal departmental colleagues. It was largely due to his 
efforts that the organisation survived this episode with its flow 
of social security funds intact. This has not been the only time 
that Yulngu has come under scrutiny from the DSS. But so far it 
continues to enjoy the tacit support of the Department and it 
local Aboriginal staff in its arrangements for pooling social 
security funds in the Katherine region. 
In more recent years, Yulngu's trust account arrangement and 
other service activities have also been taken up by break away 
outstation groups from the old mission and Welfare Branch 
settlements in the region, as well as by pastoral property 
communities. The establishment of Aboriginal outstation or 
homeland communities more generally in the remote areas in recent 
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y e a r s h a s b e e n a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t in w h i c h s o c i a l 
security payments have been constantly implicated. DAA policy has 
b e e n to p r o v i d e s u p p o r t for A b o r i g i n a l o u t s t a t i o n r e s o u r c e 
organisations only after the new decentralised c o m m u n i t i e s have 
d e m o n s t r a t e d s o m e v i a b i l i t y and s t a b i l i t y . So i n i t i a l l y , at 
l e a s t , s o c i a l s e c u r i t y p a y m e n t s a r e o f t e n the o n l y s o u r c e of 
financial support. Even if DAA funds are later forthcoming, this 
s u p p o r t is u s u a l l y m a i n l y of a c a p i t a l n a t u r e , and s o c i a l 
security payments remain the major source of recurrent outstation 
income. 
For e x a m p l e , a 1976 report on the operation of the Bawinanga 
A b o r i g i n a l C o r p o r a t i o n , the o u t s t a t i o n r e s o u r c e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
s e r v i c i n g c o m m u n i t e s out f r o m the old NT W e l f a r e B r a n c h 
settlement at Maningrida in Arnhemland, calculated the income of 
the s e v e n t e e n o u t s t a t i o n s it then s e r v i c e d as $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 o v e r a 
n i n e m o n t h p e r i o d . $ 1 7 0 , 0 0 0 of t h i s w a s f r o m s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
p a y m e n t s , w i t h the rest b e i n g f a i r l y e q u a l l y d i v i d e d b e t w e e n 
i n c o m e f r o m a r t s and c r a f t w o r k and the w a g e s of t e a c h i n g 
assistants, health assistants and other government employees in 
the communities. The report described social security services as 
among the general c o m m u n i t y services provided by Bawinanga for 
the outstations. Others included a mechanical service, an art and 
craft c o l l e c t i o n and m a r k e t i n g s e r v i c e and a m o b i l e s t o r e 
s e r v i c e . The s t o r e s e r v i c e , in p a r t i c u l a r , w a s tied in w i t h 
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e s , for the o b v i o u s r e a s o n that p e o p l e 
w o u l d n e e d c a s h to b u y s t o r e s . T y p i c a l s o c i a l s e c u r i t y r e l a t e d 
tasks included collection, recording and distribution of cheques, 
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preparation of application forms, pursuit of inquiries regarding 
late or lost c h e q u e s and, m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l l y of all, cashing 
cheques. 
Bawinanga provides another illustration of the crucial role 
played in such arrangments by the DSS, It, like Yulngu, also ran 
a community trust account system whereby some portion of social 
security payments was put aside in a community account designated 
for c o m m u n i t y p r o j e c t s and e x p e n s e s . In 1 9 7 9 , the DSS's 
A b o r i g i n a l Liaison Officer s e r v i c i n g the area from D a r w i n 
expressed misgivings about the voluntariness of this arrangement 
as it w a s then being a d m i n i s t e r e d by one of Bawinanga's w h i t e 
e m p l o y e e s . The n e w NT D i r e c t o r of the DSS v i s i t e d the area w i t h 
the ALO and, after assessing the situation, instructed Bawinanga 
to desist. He too was not satisfied that the arrangement had the 
full support of those individuals who were having deductions made 
from their social security payments. 
Another instructive example comes from the Fitzroy Crossing 
region of W A . The s i t u a t i o n that has d e v e l o p e d there in recent 
years has had certain similarities with the development of the 
Yulgnu A s s o c i a t i o n in the K a t h e r i n e region. M a n y A b o r i g i n a l 
g r o u p s p r e v i o u s l y d e p e n d e n t on w h i t e p a s t o r a l i s t s in the area, 
had fallen out with their pastoralist patrons in the wake of the 
introduction of award wages. In this instance most had moved into 
the tiny town of Fitzroy Crossing, either of their own volition 
or because the extent of their falling out with the pastoralists 
had led to their e x p u l s i o n. In the m i d 70s, a n u m b e r of g r o u p s 
settled down in areas around the town without either much service 
support or m u c h f o r m a l group o r g a n i s a t i o n . T w o e s t a b l i s h e d 
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missions operated in the town; one providing housing and general 
c o m m u n i t y s e r v i c e s in a p a r t i c u l a r area of the t o w n , the other 
running a hospital. The United Aboriginal Mission providing the 
general c o m m u n i t y s e r v i c e s s h o w e d little interest in the 
additional clientele. However, in 1976, these groups were taken 
on by a husband and w i f e t e a m of w h i t e c o m m u n i t y d e v e l o p m e n t 
employees of the W A State government's Department of Community 
VJelfare (DCW), Stan Davey and Jan Richardson. The central part of 
their plan was to use pooled social security money as a resource 
for ' c o m m u n i t y d e v e l o p m e n t ' , and in the longer t e r m , w h e r e 
p o s s i b l e , to n e g o t i a t e o u t of t o w n l i v i n g a r e a s for the 
communities that had come in from the pastoral properties. A DAA 
profile on the area in 1977 captures well the situation that had 
by then developed: 
The United A b o r i g i n a l M i s s i o n and the A b o r i g i n a l Inland 
M i s s i o n are preoccupied w i t h 'their' p e o p l e , and m i x i n g of 
their people with the general Aboriginal community was not 
encouraged. 
A l t h o u g h belonging to the s a m e tribal group the m i s s i o n 
group are not encouraged to mix with the non-mission people. 
This has not created any sense of c o m m u n i t y at F i t z r o y 
Crossing. The DCW appears to have a good day-to-day working 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with 'their' A b o r i g i n a l g r o u p s . The DAA in the 
area tends to act m a i n l y as a funding body and play a m i n o r 
role in co-ordinating the groups in Fitzroy Crossing. 
Go Go Station camp, three miles out, is an excision from Go 
Go Station where approximately 60 people live. Mr Davey and 
his wife are involved with this community as well as others 
in the F i t z r o y Crossing area. They are the m o t i v a t i n g force 
that helped the Aboriginal people build their own shelter as 
well as encouraged the women with their homemaker program. 
The State Housing C o m m i s s i o n has c o n s t r u c t e d a n u m b e r of 
houses in the area but it appears that only M i s s i o n people 
w i l l be a l l o c a t e d the houses 
At the state school A b o r i g i n a l w o m e n from the H o m e m a k e r s 
Group supply the midday meal to all the children except those 
coming from the Mission. They raise the money themselves to 
buy the food, w h i c h is cooked in the c a m p s and taken to the 
school. The Homemakers are very industrious and are concerned 
about the welfare of their children. The women said that the 
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Aboriginal children from the Mission were not encouraged to 
mix, to attend meetings or even to eat with the children from 
the camps, even though they belong to the same t r i b e . The 
Homemakers group should be further supported and encouraged. 
Some camps in the F i t z r o y River area include Yungngora, 
Windmill Reserve and Kadjina camp. The DCW has a good day-to-
day working r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h these camps and also l i a i s e 
with Mission groups as well as the Melbourne based Aboriginal 
Inland Mission group which runs the hospital. (DAA 1978: X I I ) 
All seemed to be going along fairly smoothly in Fitzroy Crossing 
u n t i l the DCW workers ' l i a i s i n g ' w i t h the m i s s i o n A b o r i g i n e s 
began to threaten the position of the United Aboriginal Mission. 
Whereas the m i s s i o n appeared to be pursuing a strategy of 
patronal coexistence through c l i e n t e l e s e p a r a t i o n , the DCW 
officers were adopting a more competitive approach. Within a year 
of the above report , competit ion between these two groups of 
whites had become intense. The mission brought pressure to bear 
in the more senior levels of the WA state government and the DCW 
community development officers were removed from their jobs for 
creating trouble in the community. 
During this period of increasing competition for the service 
i n t e r m e d i a t i o n role in F i t zroy Crossing , the idea of a new 
Aboriginal service organisation for the area had been gathering 
momentum. In 1979 the Marra Worra Worra Association, was formed. 
By 1982 the A s s o c i a t i o n comprised eight separate incorporated 
A b o r i g i n a l c o m m u n i t i e s ; one i n F i t z r o y C r o s s i n g , two on 
surrounding A b o r i g i n a l owned pastoral propert ies purchased in 
recent years w i t h a s s i s t a n c e from DAA, two on recognised 
e x c i s i o n s from white run pastoral properties and three newly 
e s t a b l i s h e d communities squatt ing on pastoral propert ies . The 
community in F i t z r o y Crossing was the old m i s s i o n community 
there. It was s t i l l on m i s s i o n land and s t i l l the subject of 
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competitive influence from the United Aboriginal Mission. The 
other communities were, by contrast, securely within the fold of 
the new Aboriginal organisation. At that stage Marra Worra Worra 
comprised a council of Aboriginal representatives from the 
constituent communities, two centrally located white employees 
and a number of Aboriginal employees drawn from each of the eight 
communities. In its structure, the organisation was rather 
similar to, though still much smaller than, the Yulgnu 
Association in Katherine. In a similar fashion to Yulgnu and to 
the DCW officers' arrangements which had proceeded it, Marra 
Worra Worra's life blood and much of the routine daily work for 
its employees related to social security payments. Payments 
contributed crucially to the viability of each of the 
communities, so it was important to attend to the administrative 
work that kept them flowing in. Although there was no set formula 
as in Yulgnu, each community had some 'chuck-in' arrangement 
whereby some portion of the social security money was pooled to 
cover community expenses. 
In other Aboriginal communities in the remote areas of 
northern WA, social security payments have continued until very 
recently to be the basis for the perpetuation of old-style 
Aboriginal welfare regimes under the firm control of white 
missionaries. As late as 1981, for example, an official review of 
three Catholic mission communities at Balgo, La Grange and 
Lombadina in the Kimberley region of WA was, in a manner 
reminiscent of Tatz's work of the 60s, able to identify social 
security payments in the statements of mission income. In each of 
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the three c o m m u n i t i e s , social security payments by then accounted 
for m o r e t h a n 50 per c e n t of t o t a l i n c o m e r e c e i v e d in m i s s i o n 
a c c o u n t s ( h a c F a r l a n e and F o l e y 1981). The head of e a c h m i s s i o n 
r e c e i v e d a b u l k UB c h e q u e f r o m the D S S c o v e r i n g a s p e c i f i e d 
n u m b e r of A b o r i g i n e s . T h i s b e c a m e the b a s i s for an u n d e r a w a r d 
w a g e system for these people. W a g e rates were in fact so low that 
not even all the u n e m p l o y m e n t benefit was used for wages. At La 
G r a n g e , for e x a m p l e , the o n l y c o m m u n i t y for w h i c h a p r e c i s e 
b r e a k d o w n of m i s s i o n i n c o m e and e x p e n d i t u r e f i g u r e s w e r e 
a v a i l a b l e to the r e v i e w , UB a c c o u n t e d for $ 2 3 0 , 0 0 0 of m i s s i o n 
i n c o m e in 1 9 7 9 / 8 0 , b u t A b o r i g i n a l w a g e s o n l y a c c o u n t e d for 
$198,000 of expenditure. Pensions in these three communities were 
by then paid d i r e c t to i n d i v i d u a l s , but c h e q u e s w e r e s t i l l 
d i r e c t e d v i a the m i s s i o n a r i e s as ' w a r r a n t o r s ' . In t w o of the 
communities 20 per cent of pension payments was retained by the 
m i s s i o n , while in the third the mission retained 35 per cent. 
The local DSS office in Broome was, through its complacency 
a b o u t t h e s e a r r a n g e m e n t s , an e f f e c t i v e s u p p o r t e r of t h e s e o l d -
s t y l e m i s s i o n r e g i m e s . D A A , on the o t h e r h a n d , had s i n c e its 
i n c e p t i o n s h u n n e d d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h C a t h o l i c m i s s i o n 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in the K i m b e r l e y and d i r e c t e d f u n d s and o t h e r 
s u p p o r t to the i n c o r p o r a t e d A b o r i g i n a l c o u n c i l s w h i c h it had 
encouraged in these c o m m u n i t i e s . By 1980, the councils in these 
three c o m m u n i t i e s had one white employee, referred to as project 
o f f i c e r or c o m m u n i t y a d v i s o r , and w e r e f u n d e d b y D A A for a 
v a r i e t y of s e r v i c e and e m p l o y m e n t e n t e r p r i s e s . At La G r a n g e in 
1 9 7 9 / 8 0 , D A A f u n d i n g to the B i d y a d a n g a C o m m u n i t y C o u n c i l w a s 
$367,000, giving it an income s o m e w h a t less than half the mission 
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income of $862,000. 
The 1 9 8 1 r e v i e w of the K i m b e r l e y C a t h o l i c m i s s i o n 
communities presented diagrammatic representations of ' d e c i s i o n 
making ' s tructures in each of the communities rev iewed . The 
f i g u r e r e l a t i n g to La Grange is reproduced below ( F i g u r e 4) . It 
clearly shows the division in the community between the mission 
administrator and the Bidyadanga Council's project officer. Each 
has some claim to the key position between the community and the 
larger society . 
Figure 4 
Kimberley Missions Review Team's D iagrammatic Representat ionof 
Decision Making Structures at La Grange, 1981 
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The diagram is suggestive of the way in which the positions the 
missions administrator and the project officer in the community 
h a d b e e n b u i l t on a n d w e r e s u s t a i n e d b y a l l e g i a n c e , as 
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s , w i t h different state and f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t 
departments and different members of the Aboriginal community. In 
1981, the mission administrator clearly maintained a monopoly on 
health, education and social security matters in the community. 
H o w e v e r , in other areas of a c t i v i t y , there was c o m p e t i t i o n for 
the support of the A b o r i g i n a l clientele. There w e r e c o m m u n i t y 
t r a d e s m e n and w o r k e r s as well as m i s s i o n ones and there w a s a 
community pastoral station, aquired with the assistance of the 
DAA, as w e l l as a m i s s i o n one. The r e v i e w , s y m p a t h e t i c to the 
m i s s i o n v i e w of the m a t t e r , r e f l e c t e d on t h i s r e c e n t 
pluralisation as follows: 
To summarise, for reasons which probably have their roots in 
mistrust and suspicion, mission m a n a g e m e n t structures have 
been side stepped and their functions duplicated by the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of a b u r e a u c r a t i c a d m i n i s t r a t i v e structure, 
w h i c h in t u r n h a s r e m o v e d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g f r o m the 
s e t t l e m e n t s , causing greater d e p e n d e n c y by Aboriginal 
c o m m u n i t i e s on E u r o p e a n s who can deliver p r o g r a m s through 
European institutional structures. 
It then went on to recommend: 
That the DAA recognise the Church's management structures in 
the M i s s i o n s by w o r k i n g w i t h them and through them for the 
delivery of g o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m m e s and policy to M i s s i o n 
c o m m u n i t i e s . This recognition should be both f i n a n c i a l and 
functional. (MacFarlane and Foley 1981: 13) 
A l t h o u g h the m i s s i o n clearly would have liked to reverse the 
competition for service intermediation which had crept into the 
c o m m u n i t y in recent years and w h i c h w a s by then severely 
undermining its own position, developments in government policy 
relating to Aborigines were working in the opposite direction. By 
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the t i m e of the 1981 r e v i e w , t h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s w e r e a m o n g the 
last remnants of a highly patronal welfare authority approach of 
the p a s t . 
By 1982, La Grange c o m m u n i t y had already taken another step 
a w a y from that past. The project officer recently employed by the 
A b o r i g i n a l C o u n c i l w a s the f i r s t not to be a l a y m i s s i o n a r y . 
Although on his o w n admission a church m a n , after his arrival the 
p r o j e c t o f f i c e r had q u i c k l y b e c o m e d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h the 
c h u r c h ' s r o l e at La G r a n g e . In 1 9 8 2 he w a s b u s i l y e x t e n d i n g the 
role of the project officer and, to a lesser extent, that of the 
A b o r i g i n a l c o u n c i l . He had e s t a b l i s h e d a s e p a r a t e p o s t b a g for 
the c o m m u n i t y c o u n c i l and w a s e n c o u r a g i n g p e n s i o n e r s and 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s to d i r e c t t h e i r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y c h e q u e s t h e r e 
r a t h e r than to the m i s s i o n b a g . His w i f e w o u l d c a s h the c h e q u e s 
and help with the administration - filling in forms, answering 
letters etc. The able bodied social security recipients could, if 
t h e y w i s h e d , a l s o c o m e and 'do a b i t of w o r k ' for the p r o j e c t 
officer/council rather than for the mission as they had done in 
the p a s t . U n d e r t h i s n e w a r r a n g e m e n t , the p r o j e c t o f f i c e r 
i n s i s t e d , t h e r e w a s of c o u r s e no c o m p u l s i o n to w o r k for s o c i a l 
security payments. But with this 'volunteer' labour, the project 
o f f i c e r had b u i l t h i m s e l f a h o u s e and had p l a n s to b u i l d a 
council office, a c o m m u n i t y centre and perhaps even a store. All 
were to be outside the established mission compound. The project 
o f f i c e r w a s a l s o i n the p r o c e s s of r e v i t a l i s i n g the c o m m u n i t y 
p a s t o r a l p r o p e r t y a d j a c e n t to the m i s s i o n . C l e a r l y the a r e a of 
c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m i s s i o n a d m i n i s t r a t o r and the p r o j e c t 
o f f i c e r w a s e x p a n d i n g r a p i d l y . The r e v i e w ' s d i a g r a m m a t i c 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of ' d e c i s i o n m a k i n g ' s t r u c t u r e s a f f e c t i n g the 
c o m m u n i t y a l r e a d y n e e d e d r e d r a w i n g . The project officer needed 
elevating a little, perhaps even to the same level as the mission 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r , and a n e w l i n e n e e d e d to be a d d e d b e t w e e n the 
p r o j e c t o f f i c e r and the DSS. I n d e e d if the p r o j e c t o f f i c e r w a s 
successful in his bid to become the social security intermediary, 
he could soon find himself with influence over a larger part of 
the c o m m u n i t y e c o n o m y than the mission administrator. H o w e v e r , 
t h e r e w e r e c o n d i t i o n s to be e n d u r e d as w e l l as b e n e f i t s to be 
enjoyed for those in the c o m m u n i t y who chose to align themselves 
with the project officer. They had, on the project officer's say 
so, to r e f r a i n f r o m the d a i l y f o u r o ' c l o c k s w i l l ; the f o u r c a n s 
of b e e r a l l o w e d the A b o r i g i n e s b y the m i s s i o n . O t h e r w i s e the 
p r o j e c t o f f i c e r w o u l d l e a v e , or so he c l a i m e d . I n s t e a d , in the 
project officer's payment arrangements, there was a 'voluntary' 
levy on social security payments to go towards the purchase of a 
t e l e v i s i o n r e c e i v e r for the c o m m u n i t y . The A b o r i g i n e s at La 
Grange were ambivalent and divided: between the beer and the TV, 
b e t w e e n the m i s s i o n w o r k and the ' v o l u n t e e r ' c o u n c i l w o r k , 
between the old missionary and the new project officer. How long 
w o u l d this p r o j e c t o f f i c e r s t a y ? C o u l d he be r e l i e d u p o n to do 
the right thing by his Aboriginal clientele? The local DSS office 
in Broome looked on w i t h bemused concern. The Aboriginal Liaison 
Officer visited every two weeks, but could do little to alleviate 
the struggle that was occurring over control of social security 
s e r v i c e i n t e r m e d i a t i o n in the c o m m u n i t y ; e x c e p t p e r h a p s to 
p r o v i d e an o c c a s i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e c h a n n e l of a c c e s s to s o c i a l 
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security resources and t h e r e b y g u a r d a g a i n s t the m o s t b l a t a n t 
imposition of personal priorities and conditions by the two white 
intermediaries against the individual Aborigines' wills. 
The situation at La Grange and the other K i m b e r l e y m i s s i o n s 
covered by the 1981 review clearly represents only m i n i m a l change 
from the old patronal order. However, even domination by one or 
other of competing white patrons can offer Aborigines new room to 
m a n o u e v r e . C o m p e t i t o r s can p o t e n t i a l l y be p l a y e d off a g a i n s t 
e a c h o t h e r and f o r c e d to b e c o m e l e s s d o m i n a n t in the s e r v i c e 
e x c h a n g e s t h e y c o n t r o l and f a c i l i t a t e . H e r e t h e n l i e the 
beginnings of change, the beginnings of the pluralisation if not 
yet m u c h A b o r i g i n a l i s a t i o n of the n o n - g o v e r n m e n t w e l f a r e 
s t r u c t u r e in the K i m b e r l e y m i s s i o n s . The c a r t o o n s r e p r o d u c e d 
b e l o w s u g g e s t that c o m p e t i t i o n for the A b o r i g i n a l s e r v i c e 
intermediation position in the Kimberley is likely to become m u c h 
more intense in years to come. They are from a 1981 newsletter of 
t h e K i m b e r l e y L a n d C o u n c i l , o n e of t h e n e w A b o r i g i n a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s in the K i m b e r l e y , and m a k e no s e c r e t of that 
o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s c o n t e m p t for the m i s s i o n s ( F i g u r e 5). T h e y also 
m a k e c l e a r that o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s a p p r e c i a t i o n of the f a c t that 
c o n t r o l o v e r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y p a y m e n t s is c e n t r a l to t h e 
maintenance of the mission regimes. 
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Figure 5 
Cartoons from the Kimberley Land Council Newsletter, March 1981 
Of Lwes^ Yv ^ 
roouLo amio^ ipe piNfrfJC/Ao 
MiSr/ovJ .... 
V/s 6irr /r (AOOH wat: — 
rJetDT fi tje^ ^F... t /yf/H^i.. ^er 
fe^^ . 06>iT ^f^r -m BKc^ i6 o^r wet. 
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Finally in this catalogue of examples, I turn my attention 
to Qld, which deserves separate attention because it is the one 
State where a n old~style State government Aboriginal welfare 
authority has remained in existence. Until 1984, the authority 
was known as the Department of Aboriginal and Islander 
Advancement. At that time, in an attempt to throw off the image 
of being an old style Aboriginal welfare authority, it became 
known as the Department of Community Services. 
Over the last decade, DAIA has generally been far less 
concerned than the DAA to withdraw from Aboriginal communities 
and far less enamoured with the idea of handing over the control 
of local affairs to Aboriginal councils. Although it has 
permitted the establishment of elected Aboriginal councils, DAIA 
has, in the 'assimilationist' pre-1972 style, maintained close 
supervision and ultimate control over Aborigines on 'reserves'. 
It has engaged in an undeclared war with the DAA for Aboriginal 
support. Although DAA appears to have won the allegiance of 
Aborigines not living on DAIA reserves, the loyalty of those 
still on reserves is far more ambiguous. In many instances they 
remain securely within the DAIA fold. One might anticipate in 
such a situation of Commonwealth/State departmental antagonism, 
that another Commonwealth government department, such as the 
DSS, would be clearly aligned with the DAA. However, inter-
departmental and Commonwealth/State politics were never so 
simple. Due to its own complacency about existing arrangements, 
the DSS has continued to service its Aboriginal clientele on the 
Qld Aboriginal reserves by sending cheques and correspondence via 
DAIA offices. Hence, as late as 1978, in trying to account for 
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the fact that the Qld Premier and his Minister for Aboriginal and 
Islander Advancement continued to receive w a r m w e l c o m e s in m a n y 
of the Aboriginal and Islander r e s e r v e c o m m u n i t i e s d e s p i t e the 
f a c t t h a t t h e i r p o l i c i e s a p p e a r e d to b e r e l i c s o f t h e 
'assimilationist' past, Rowley was led to comment: 
The A b o r i g i n e s m u s t s a f e g u a r d c l a i m s to t h e i r h o m e s ; the 
Islanders to the services from Queensland; and both to social 
service benefits for which the State Government seems ready 
enough to take their thanks. The public relations m e n and the 
reporters who report these events (ie ministerial visits W S ) 
to the people are occasional visitors. Of the undercurrents 
we m a y get a hint from what the non-reserve Aborigines say of 
those remaining on reserves.(Rowley 1978: 138) 
In the T o r r e s S t r a i t I s l a n d s , the m e t h o d of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
payment has until recently been even more extraordinarily closely 
tied into DAIA administration. The DAIA office on Thursday Island 
has, for m a n y years, submitted a group eligibility schedule and 
recieved a bulk cheque for all social security recipients on all 
the other islands. On receipt of the bulk cheque, the amounts due 
to i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e b e e n r a d i o e d t h r o u g h to the i s l a n d s w h e r e 
they have been credited to individuals' accounts in the stores on 
e a c h i s l a n d . T h e s e s t o r e s h a v e b e e n run b y an o f f s h o o t of the 
DAIA, the Island Industries Board. DSS has long been complacent 
about its involvement in this DAIA administered non-cash e c o n o m y 
in the outer islands of Torres Strait. However, in 1983, the DSS 
office in Cairns w i t h d r e w its support for this arrangement and 
a t t e m p t e d to s e r v i c e t h e s e p e o p l e t h r o u g h i n t e r m e d i a r i e s 
occupying the DAA-funded council clerks positions on each island. 
What w i l l come of this in the future is as yet unclear. It is not 
the f i r s t t i m e that the DSS has m a d e s o m e m o v e s to f r e e i t s e l f 
from the total dependence on the DAIA in its service delivery to 
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Aborigines on Qld reserves. Past efforts have met with little 
success, but this time the Cairns office of the DSS has outposted 
an Aboriginal Liaison Officer permanently on Thursday Island. 
What is clear, is that the arena of intermediation between the 
DSS and its Islander clientele in this area is neither so stable 
nor so easily monopolised as it once was. 
Discussion 
As the above examples make clear, competition for the 
intermediary roles that do still exist between the DSS and its 
Aboriginal clientele has been intense and volatile in recent 
years. Part of the reason for this has been that the non-
government Aboriginal welfare sector has expanded so rapidly 
since DAA began to encourage and fund Aboriginal community 
organisations. The leaders and employees of the new Aboriginal 
organisations have all been keen to develop a role for themselves 
in servicing the Aboriginal poor, and hence in ensuring their own 
and their organisation's future survival as important 
participants in Aboriginal welfare. Social security resources 
have been a major target of those competing for prominence in 
this arena precisely because they now account for such a large 
proportion of the resources available to Aborigines. 
The degree to which this recent pluralisation of the non-
government Aboriginal welfare sector has resulted in significant 
changes in patterns of Aboriginal welfare intermediation has, as 
the above examples also make clear, varied considerably from 
place to place. In some instances, the arena of intermediation 
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has not only been pluralised, it has also to a large extent been 
Aboriglnalised. This has also been encouraged by the DAA and the 
n e w policy a p p r o a c h to A b o r i g i n a l affairs since the W h i t l a m 
years. For a l i m i t e d n u m b e r of A b o r i g i n e s w i l l i n g to i n v o l v e 
t h e m s e l v e s in the larger s o c i e t y ' s p r o c e s s e s of r e s o u r c e 
a l l o c a t i o n , this has m e a n t n e w o p p o r t u n i t i e s to take on m o r e 
prominent and independent roles and to themselves move beyond the 
status of the w e l f a r e - d e p e n d e n t poor. In their n e w roles as 
elected representatives or employees of Aboriginal organisations, 
these Aborigines have become autonomous political actors in their 
own right. No longer are they restricted to being the subverters 
or disciples of a d o m i n a n t white patron, as in the w e l f a r e 
a u t h o r i t y days and before. They are t h e m s e l v e s n o w often the 
intermediaries between poor Aborigines and the larger society. In 
fact, in the age of self-determination and self-management, being 
Aboriginal has itself become a significant resource legitimising 
participation in the arena of Aboriginal welfare intermediation. 
Aboriginal leaders and e m p l o y e e s of n o n - g o v e r n m e n t w e l f a r e 
organisations are themselves seen as prima facie evidence that 
the policy of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n is w o r k i n g , that A b o r i g i n a l 
c o m m u n i t i e s are indeed running their o w n affairs. So in recent 
years, newly emerging Aboriginal leaders have enjoyed something 
of a strategic advantage over whites involved in the non-
government Aboriginal welfare arena. 
This does not, h o w e v e r , m e a n that old n o n - g o v e r n m e n t 
Aboriginal welfare organisations have been unable to survive or, 
for that matter, that white people no longer play any role in the 
non-government Aboriginal welfare sector. Even the most strongly 
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Aboriginal-controlled of the new organisations still usually have 
white employees; though in these instances they now are clearly 
e m p l o y e e s s u b o r d i n a t e to A b o r i g i n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . In other 
instances, however, white employees remain quite dominant, even 
de facto leaders. Indeed as we have seen above, there are some 
instances in m o r e r e m o t e areas where old style white m i s s i o n 
regimes are only now begining to be affected by competition for 
the s e r v i c e i n t e r m e d i a t i o n position and where A b o r i g i n a l 
i n v o l v e m e n t in this arena is still highly restricted. Old 
organisations and established white intermediaries have survived, 
but increasingly only if they are willing to compete with newly 
emerging Aboriginal organisations and leaders, and only if they 
can d e m o n s t r a t e some conversion to the new policy doctrine of 
Aboriginal control. Conversion n e c e s s a r i l y brings w i t h it n e w 
room for m a n o e u v r e a m o n g the A b o r i g i n a l clientele and new 
opportunities for a more restricted n u m b e r of Aborigines to 
t h e m s e l v e s b e c o m e i n v o l v e d in the a r e n a of w e l f a r e 
intermediation. 
What is clear, despite the variation in degrees of c h a n g e , 
is that intermediaries, whether Aboriginal or white, no longer 
enjoy the absolute dominance and monopolistic control over poor 
A b o r i g i n e s ' access to social security resources that they once 
did. They are forced to compete with others and are overseen by a 
much stronger DSS presence. They are then forced to be brokers of 
welfare state a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , paying some heed to the legal 
b u r e a u c r a t i c rules of service allocation and only introducing 
their own priorities and values into the service exchanges they 
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m e d i a t e to a m o r e l i m i t e d degree. The c o m m i t t e d structure of 
important resources relevant to this area of public resource 
allocation does appear to have been significantly transformed. 
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PART III 
PLAYING BY THE RULES 
Introduction 
So far in the account, I have focused fairly broadly on the 
changing roles and resources of the various participants involved 
in the allocation of social security services to Aborigines. I 
have observed the expansion of the resources committed to this 
task by the DSS in recent years and the major changes in the non-
government Aboriginal welfare sector. The result of these changes 
has been a greater degree of penetration between the DSS and its 
Aboriginal clientele and a concurrent lessening of intermediary 
influence over the flow of social security payments to Aboriginal 
clients. All this has expanded, in the particular empirical 
context, on one of the general points about welfare 
administration introduced in chapters 1 and 2; that politics 
inevitably exists in this adminstrative setting because of the 
resource constraints within which participants seek information, 
develop strategies and make decisions. The shape of that politics 
depends on the resources that are available to the various 
participants and the roles they play. As these resources have 
changed over time, so too have the strategic patterns of 
interaction. However, there is more to the politics which has 
surounded the allocation of social security payments to 
Aborigines in recent years than just the broad scale changes in 
the configuration of participants, roles and resources. I have, 
thus far, had relatively little to say about the more fine 
grained causes of contention in the processes of social security 
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service a l l o c a t i o n ; the i n d e t e r m i n a c y of the rules and the 
c o m p l e x i t y of the cases to w h i c h they m u s t be applied. It is to 
the d e v e l o p m e n t of this theme in the context of the DSS and its 
Aboriginal clientele that I turn in Part III. 
The DSS, as I observed in chapter 2, is dominated by a large 
body of rules, laid down in both legislation and in departmental 
m a n u a l s and c i r c u l a r s . T h e s e r u l e s are to be a p p l i e d to 
i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e a l l o c a t i o n c a s e s . M o s t a p p l i c a t i o n s 
necessarily occur at the regional office level by rank and file 
assessing staff. But, as suggested in the early chapters, not all 
rule applications are straightforward or uncontentious. Issues of 
indeterminacy constantly arise w i t h i n the DSS over appropriate 
interpretations of rules in particular c i r c u m s t a n c e s . P o w e r 
w i t h i n the organisation is, in such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , largely a 
question of whose interpretations and applications of the rules 
will prevail. Formally, power is h i e r a r c h i c a l l y organised w i t h 
u l t i m a t e authority residing in the Director General and the 
l e g i s l a t i o n . But w h e n r u l e s are u n c l e a r or i n t e r n a l l y 
contradictory, or when they appear to some within the Department 
to be inconsistent or inappropriate in their a p p l i c a t i o n , the 
question of which interpretation is to prevail may not follow so 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y either from the legislation or from the DSS's 
hierarchical structure. In the application of the social security 
system to Aborigines in recent years, there have been a number of 
rule i n t e r p r e t a t i o n issues w h i c h have continued to reappear as 
sources of uncertainty and conflict. Some have been settled only 
to reappear in another guise later on. S o m e , on the other h a n d , 
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have defied any settlement at all. Different interpretations of 
the rules have, in these instances, been the source of constant 
disputes both within the DSS and between the DSS and extra-
departmental actors interested in this area of welfare 
administration. The game is always played by the rules. The 
legislation itself is sacrosanct. But what the legislation should 
be interpreted as meaning when applied to particular cases has 
been the subject of much debate. So conflict over the allocation 
of public resources, politics as 1 have used the term, has 
continued even at this most fine grained level of administrative 
activity. 
The chapters of this part are organised thematically around 
different types of issues in the interpretation of social 
security rules as they relate to Aborigines. The first focuses on 
largely procedural issues, the second on issues relating to 
Aboriginal family structures. The third chapter is concerned with 
rule interpretations surrounding the question of Aboriginal 
eligibility for UB. The last of the four chapters turns to the 
tension which has arisen in the Aboriginal context in recent 
years between the allocation of social security resources on a 
group basis or on an individual/family unit basis. The 
distinctions made between these various types of rule 
interpretation issues are only rough. As I proceed, it will 
become evident that in the real world of day to day social 
security administration the different debates that have arisen 
have often been inextricably interwoven. The discussion in each 
of the chapters of matters pertaining in different ways to the 
payment of unemployment benefits to Aborigines should serve as a 
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reminder of that f a c t . However, there i s some point in separating 
the d i f f e r e n t s t r a n d s , i f o n l y to c l a r i f y a n a l y t i c a l l y the 
d i v e r s i t y of ways in which the rules governing serv ice a l l o c a t i o n 
in the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y system are i n d e t e r m i n a t e and do s t i l l 
l e a v e open to debate impor tant q u e s t i o n s about who w i l l be 
a l located what, publ ic resources when and how. 
Be fore I proceed to the d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n , a c a u t i o n a r y 
n o t e i s i n o r d e r . D i s p u t e s o v e r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y r u l e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the kind i d e n t i f i e d here are not j u s t 
r e s t r i c t e d to the A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t e l e . S i m i l a r i s s u e s a r i s e 
repeatedly in re la t i on to many others among the s o c i a l secur i ty 
c l i e n t e l e ( s e e eg Sanders 1985). Over t ime , and p a r t i c u l a r l y i f 
the soc ia l and economic circumstances of a part of the c l i e n t e l e 
are c h a n g i n g r a p i d l y , r u l e s may r e q u i r e t h o r o u g h - g o i n g 
r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o l i t i c s o f r u l e 
interpretat ion surrounding the DSS's Aboriginal c l i e n t e l e i s , in 
pr inc ip le , then no d i f f e r e n t from that which ar ises in r e la t i on 
to other c l i e n t s . I would, however, go so far as to suggest that 
the a p p l i c a t i o n o f s o c i a l s e c u r i t y r u l e s t o A b o r i g i n a l 
circumstances in the wake of the l e g i s l a t i v e changes of the la te 
50s, has l ed to a more h i g h l y c o n t e n t i o u s p o l i t i c s of r u l e 
in terpretat ion , adaptation and use than that which has pertained 
in A u s t r a l i a n s o c i a l s e c u r i t y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n more g e n e r a l l y 
during these years. 
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Chapter _7 
If Procedures Fail,,.. 
In a government department like the DSS which is dominated 
by rules and legal bureaucratic norms, equality of treatment 
under the rules is generally taken to require standard procedures 
applied to all applicants in a given service category without 
exception. What this commitment to procedural justice does not so 
often acknowledge is that even the most simple and apparently 
innocuous administrative procedures enshrine a host of 
assumptions about the circumstances and capabilities of both the 
administrators and the clients. Where those asssumptions are 
unwarranted, standard procedures are likely to break down. Such 
has often been the case in relations between the DSS and its 
Aboriginal clientele. The atypical nature of Aboriginal 
circumstances has combined with the rigidities of DSS procedures 
to produce many complications and inadequacies. Some of these 
procedural problems have been able to be overcome, or at least 
ameliorated, by simple developments of standard DSS processing 
systems. Others have been lessened by the DSS's greater 
penetration to its Aboriginal clientele in recent years. Others 
still have remained more intractable and have led to pressure 
being brought to bear from both within and outside the DSS, 
either for the simplification of standard procedures or 
alternatively for the establishment of exceptional, more 
appropriate procedures to deal with Aboriginal cases. However, a 
strong DSS commitment to standardised procedures as an embodiment 
of legal bureaucratic norms militates against such pressures. So 
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in t h e s e m o r e i n t r a c t a b l e i n s t a n c e s of p r o c e d u r a l b r e a k d o w n , 
d e b a t e h a s o f t e n a r i s e n o v e r t h e i n a d e q u a c y of e x i s t i n g 
procedures when applied to A b o r i g i n e s and o v e r the p o s s i b i l i t y 
and justifiability of developing non-standard procedures for this 
c l i e n t g r o u p . In t h i s c h a p t e r I w i l l e x a m i n e a n u m b e r of 
i n s t a n c e s of p r o c e d u r a l b r e a k d o w n b e t w e e n the DSS and its 
A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t e l e , and the p r o c e s s e s of d e b a t e and d e c i s i o n 
making which have ensued. 
Mobility, Child Custody and Naming 
P r o c e d u r a l b r e a k d o w n s do not c o m e in s i n g l e d i s c r e t e 
i n s t a n c e s . If a n y t h i n g , in f a c t , t h e y tend to be the c o m p o u n d 
result of a number of complicating factors acting together. So I 
will begin m y discussion with a case which highlights a number of 
the p r o c e d u r a l p r o b l e m s e n c o u n t e r e d by the DSS's A b o r i g i n a l 
clientele over the last twenty years. 
The case i n v o l v e s an A b o r i g i n a l w o m a n l i v i n g in a r e m o t e 
c o m m u n i t y in n o r t h e r n A u s t r a l i a . In t r a d i t i o n a l f a s h i o n , the 
w o m a n had been married to a man much older than herself. She had 
b e e n r e c e n t l y w i d o w e d . In the D S S r e g i o n a l o f f i c e , her f a m i l y 
a l l o w a n c e f i l e sat i n a c t i v e w i t h a f i n a l n o t e , ' t e r m i n a t e d , 
whereabouts unknown'. As is the practice in the area, after the 
h u s b a n d ' s d e a t h the w o m a n had a b a n d o n e d that part of her n a m e 
w h i c h i d e n t i f i e d h i m and had m o v e d a w a y f r o m the p l a c e of h i s 
d e a t h . H e r three c h i l d r e n w e r e sent to v a r i o u s f r i e n d s and 
relatives some hundreds of kilometres apart while the w o m a n did 
her g r i e v i n g . One of the t e m p o r a r y c u s t o d i a n s s u c c e s s f u l l y 
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applied for family allowance, a feat of some note since doing so 
would have required the applicant to indicate to the DSS the 
previous, now taboo, name of the child's mother. The process was 
made easier because the Aboriginal Liaison Officer in the region 
knew what had happened in this case and where the extra child had 
come from. The other two children had however moved acros a state 
boundary and, as far as the regional DSS office was concerned, 
had just disappeared for the while. Twelve months after the date 
of termination on the mother's file the same ALO, on his regular 
rounds of the Aboriginal communities in the region, found the 
widow settling back into another community. She had assembled her 
three children and wanted to reapply for family allowance. The 
ALO did not need to ask her old name; he knew it. On return to 
the office, the new name was placed on the file and, with 
approximately two child years of family allowance missed by 
whoever had custody of the children in the meantime, the payment 
was recommenced. 
The case combines a number of elements which have often 
contributed to breakdowns in relations between Aborigines and the 
social security system over the last decade or so. The first of 
these is mobility across regional and state boundaries of social 
security administration. The second is frequent changes in child 
care and custody arrangements. The third is complications arising 
from Aboriginal naming practices. 
For administration organised on a regional and state office 
basis, regular mobility of the clientele across office boundaries 
can be a source of considerable problems. Clients may suddenly 
disappear from a region or equally suddenly just arrive out of 
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the blue. While liaison with departmental offices in other areas 
may sort out many such cases, there will often be those where the 
information supplied by the client will be inadequate to identify 
a previous case e l s e w h e r e . In an o r g a n i s a t i o n like the DSS, 
concern may then emerge both about whether applicants are being 
paid in two places at once and, to a lesser extent, whether they 
m a y be m i s s i n g out altogether. P r o b l e m s of this sort have long 
affected the DSS in relations with its Aboriginal clientele. They 
have h o w e v e r , been l e s s e n e d in r e c e n t y e a r s t h r o u g h t h e 
computerisation of departmental records. Though individual case 
files are still held and dealt with regionally, payment records 
are now available on a state wide basis updated daily. However, 
p r o b l e m s of this sort do still arise. A b o r i g i n a l m o b i l i t y in 
particular parts of Australia has, in some instances, been almost 
perversely at odds w i t h DSS boundaries. The m o s t w i d e l y 
recognised case has been in central A u s t r a l i a , w h e r e the 
homelands of the Pitjantjatjara people extend from the NT into 
W A and SA. Parts of the Pit j ant j at j ara h o m e l a n d s were for m a n y 
years serviced from regional offices in different DSS state 
administrations. So concerns about mobility causing overpayment 
and underpayment were substantial. So substantial, in fact, that 
in the l a t e 1 9 7 0 s the D S S , a l o n g w i t h a n u m b e r of o t h e r 
Commonwealth government departments, changed its regional office 
boundaries in order that the Alice Springs office would service 
all the Pitjantjatjara homelands including those parts of them in 
W A and SA. 
The second procedural issue w h i c h c o m p l i c a t e s the above 
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e x a m p l e of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y to an A b o r i g i n a l 
c l i e n t is c h a n g i n g child c u s t o d y and care a r r a n g m e n t s . T h o u g h 
there is nothing in the social security legislation which forbids 
changes in child custody arrangements, the DSS's administrative 
p r o c e d u r e s are not p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l suited to c o p i n g w i t h 
frequent changes. Files appear under the names of the custodians 
to w h o m the a l l o w a n c e s , p e n s i o n s or b e n e f i t s are paid; not the 
n a m e s of the c h i l d r e n on w h o s e a c c o u n t s f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e s are 
paid and pensions and benefits are increased. Hence, when a child 
passes from the care of one p e r s o n to a n o t h e r , a p p l i c a n t s for 
payments are asked to specify the name of the person from whose 
care the child has c o m e . The DSS then uses this i n f o r m a t i o n to 
t e r m i n a t e or a d j u s t the p r e v i o u s custodian's s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
p a y m e n t s . H o w e v e r , if the i n f o r m a t i o n s u p p l i e d by a p p l i c a n t s 
regarding previous custodians does not tally w i t h d e p a r t m e n t a l 
records, uncertainty immediately arises over whether payments on 
a child's behalf w e r e b e i n g m a d e at all to s o m e other c u s t o d i a n 
or, if they were, whether they will be adjusted accordingly. The 
everpresent concerns for underpayment and overpayment among those 
i n v o l v e d in social s e c u r i t y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n once a g a i n b e c o m e 
activated. Aboriginal cases of precisely this nature in W A in the 
1970s led to the idea of using the DSS's new computer capacity to 
develop a listing of departmental payments by children on whose 
behalf payments were being claimed. This complemented the file 
listings by custodian and greatly increased the DSS's ability to 
cope with frequent changes of child custody arrangements and the 
o f t e n i n a d e q u a t e i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g p r e v i o u s c u s t o d i a n s 
s u p p l i e d by a p p l i c a n t s . This f a c i l i t y has n o t , h o w e v e r , been 
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developed everywhere within the DSS. Even where it has, it tends 
mainly to identify possibilities of overpayment that might not 
otherwise have been detected and does little for the underpayment 
aspect of the problems arising from frequent changes of child 
custody arrangments. These latter have been partly ameliorated by 
the DSS's greater presence among its Aboriginal clientele in 
recent years, and in particular, as the above example suggests, 
by Aboriginal public contact staff's knowledge of the Aboriginal 
clientele. Generally, however, frequent changes in child custody 
arrangements still cause complications for DSS's dealings with 
its Aboriginal clientele; as evidenced by the fact that this 
problem area was explicitly identified no less than 34 times by 
regional office managers in the recent Aboriginal access survey. 
The third factor which contributed to service breakdown in 
the above example was Aboriginal naming practices. The 
complications which arise in this area have a number of other 
aspects besides the occasional changing of names after the death 
of a near relative. Contemporary Aboriginal naming practices 
often combine elements of traditional naming systems with 
elements reflecting the processes of the white settlement and 
domination. A person who has lived and worked on a particular 
pastoral station for an extended period may be known to many, 
particularly non-Aborigines, by the name of the station or the 
type of work; hence Bill Beetaloo after Beetaloo station, and the 
many Aboriginal Johnny Stockmans in pastoral areas. To others, 
particularly Aborigines, the same person may be known by another 
name altogether, or at least by one which includes some reference 
to t r a d i t i o n a l A b o r i g i n a l skin n a m e s . In 1979, an A b o r i g i n a l 
o f f i c e r w h o had w o r k e d in the A l i c e S p r i n g s o f f i c e of the DSS 
discussed the problems which could arise out these hybrid naming 
practices by citing the hypothetical example of Mary Napangardi 
Brown. She could appear in DSS records, he suggested, under that 
name or alternatively as Mary Napangardi, Mary Brown or M Mary. 
If the A b o r i g i n a l skin n a m e a p p e a r e d , it m i g h t also be spelt 
Napangati or Nabangadi. Since Mary might, in fact, be illiterate, 
w h i c h of these n a m e s she does a p p e a r as in a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l 
s e c u r i t y r e c o r d , could d i f f e r d e p e n d i n g on w h o she had r e l i e d 
upon to h e l p her fill out a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l s e c u r i t y f o r m . If 
at d i f f e r e n t t i m e s she has relied upon d i f f e r e n t l i t e r a t e 
intermediaries who have known her in different contexts, the name 
and spelling could well differ. In such a case the rank and file 
o f f i c e r s of the DSS w o u l d be faced w i t h the task of w o r k i n g out 
w h e t h e r the a p p l i c a n t is in fact the s a m e p e r s o n as one 
i d e n t i f i e d e l s e w h e r e . Insuch c i r c u m s t a n c e s the p o t e n t i a l for 
administrative breakdown is e x t e n s i v e . C l i e n t s y m p a t h i s e r s are 
again quick to recognise the possibility of wrongful termination 
or omission of payment, while control oriented DSS bureaucrats 
will be equally certain to suspect fraud, misrepresentation and 
duplication of payment. In this instance the problems have proved 
less amenable to the general procedural alleviation achieved in 
r e l a t i o n to m o b i l t y and child c u s t o d y c h a n g e s . H o w e v e r , an 
a w a r e n e s s of the p r o b l e m w i t h i n the DSS and an i n c r e a s i n g 
f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t e l e t h r o u g h t h e 
D e p a r t m e n t ' s A b o r i g i n a l p u b l i c contact staff have helped lessen 
the breakdowns that Aboriginal naming practices do cause. 
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Unemployment Benefit Procedures 
Benefits, as I noted in chapter 2, provide a less secure and 
shorter term form of income support than pensions. They are, as a 
consequence, subject to more stringent and frequent review 
procedures. UB review procedures, which are the most stringent of 
all, are best described as a two weekly positive stimulus review 
system. Every two weeks applicants must lodge a form with the DSS 
giving details of how much money they have earned in the past two 
weeks and what efforts thay have made to find a job. Only after 
the assessment of this completed 'SU19B income statement' will 
the DSS then initiate UB payment for the previous two weeks. 
Prior to 1981, the UB procedures were even more demanding as they 
also involved another Commonwealth government department. At that 
time, all UB applicants had to be registered for employment 
vacancies with the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES). The CES 
acted as the DSS's agent in administering the two weekly 'work 
test'; i.e. determining whether an applicant was 'willing and 
available to undertake suitable work'. The DSS would only grant 
or continue eligibility for UB on receipt of the CES's advice to 
this effect. 
In the late 1960s, with the introduction of award wages for 
Aborigines in the pastoral industry, a small number of Aborigines 
living and working on pastoral stations in northern and central 
Australia started applying for UB in the off-work season. CES and 
DSS officers in these regions had trouble applying the standard 
benefits processing procedures to these new applicants. CES 
officers did not have the resources to effectively register these 
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people for employment vacancies, nor to monitor their efforts to 
find work if they had. The DSS, for its part, found it difficult 
to maintain the two weekly circulation of income statements. This 
problem was partly due to DSS's weak presence in the remote areas 
and partly to poor communications, particularly postal services. 
But it also had a lot to do with the Aboriginal clientele's 
illiteracy and inexperience of the social security system. 
The response of the Darwin offices of the CES and the DSS, 
which at that time served the whole of the NT, was to develop an 
alternative procedure of their own. Known at first as 'ABSDCWN', 
or Aboriginal stand down procedure, its name was soon changed to 
'PASDOWN', standing for pastoral stand down. This avoided any 
suggestion of discriminatory practice that could attach to having 
a procedure which applied only to Aborigines; although clearly 
even after the name change this was in fact the intention. Under 
PASDOWI>j, pastoral station owners and managers submitted a form 
stating the date on which particular employees ceased work, 
whether they intended to rehire these claimants when work was 
once again available and whether the claimants were presently 
residing on the pastoral station. This one form, completed by the 
employer, which could cover a period of up to eight weeks and in 
exceptional circumstances even longer, was accepted both by the 
DSS as an application for UB and by the CES as proof that an 
applicant fulfilled the work test. On an employee's return to 
work, the employer was once again required to submit a form 
stating the date of resumption. 
This alternative procedure obviated the need for direct 
dealings between the DSS/CES and the increasing number of 
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Abor ig ina l app l i cants f o r UB from the NT pastora l industry . From 
the point of v iew of rank and f i l e admin is t ra tors in Darwin, i t 
was an e f f e c t i v e i f l e g a l l y quest ionable l o c a l adaptation of the 
standard procedures. I t coped, g iven a v a i l a b l e resources , with a 
weak d e p a r t m e n t a l p r e s e n c e , p o o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and an 
inexper ienced and o f t e n i l l i t e r a t e new c l i e n t e l e . In the s t y l e of 
the 60s and b e f o r e , i t depended heav i ly on the es tab l i shed white 
pastoral patrons and paid l i t t l e i f any regard to the p o t e n t i a l 
consequences of p lac ing such power in the i r hands. 
By the mid 1970s, e l i g i b i l i t y f o r UB in the NT had expanded 
to i n c l u d e A b o r i g i n e s l i v i n g in remote c o m m u n i t i e s o t h e r than 
those involved in the pastora l industry . Again, outs ide the major 
towns, the standard procedures were d i f f i c u l t to apply. Again the 
CES d id not have the r e s o u r c e s to 'work t e s t ' a l l a p p l i c a n t s 
e i t h e r i n i t i a l l y or f o r the r e g u l a r r e v i e w s , and the DSS had 
t r o u b l e m a i n t a i n i n g the two w e e k l y f l o w o f income s t a t e m e n t 
r e v i e w f o r m s . But t h i s expanding A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t e l e was no 
longer so neat ly attached to p a r t i c u l a r employers. So a procedure 
which r e l i e d e n t i r e l y on w h i t e e m p l o y e r s was no l o n g e r so 
f e a s i b l e . Nor , i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e new p o l i c y o f s e l f -
determinat ion in Abor ig inal a f f a i r s , was t o t a l r e l i a n c e on white 
in termed iar i es quite so r e a d i l y acceptab le to a l l concerned. The 
CES and DSS o f f i c e r s i n t h e NT d e v e l o p e d a n o t h e r s e t o f 
p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h came to be known as t h e 'UBNT' s y s t e m . 
A p p l i c a t i o n s f o r UB r e c e i v e d by the CES f rom c l i e n t s l i v i n g 
outs ide the major NT towns, were forwarded immediately to the DSS 
w i t h the n o t a t i o n 'work t e s t p e n d i n g ' . As l o n g as the a p p l i c a n t 
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had some history of employment in the last twelve months or so, 
the DSS w o u l d p r o c e e d to a s s e s s the case a n d , if the o t h e r 
conditions were m e t , grant eligibility for UB while awaiting the 
r e s u l t s of a n y w o r k test the CES m i g h t l a t e r a d m i n i s t e r . For 
those w h o had no r e c e n t w o r k h i s t o r y , on the o t h e r h a n d , the 
procedural concession was not forthcoming. They just had to wait 
u n t i l the C E S did s a t i s f y i t s e l f that they w e r e a v a i l a b l e and 
w i l l i n g to w o r k . G i v e n the CES's l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s and the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of A b o r i g i n a l a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r w o r k w h i c h 
p r e v a i l e d in the CES at the t i m e (to w h i c h I w i l l r e t u r n in a 
c h a p t e r 9), the w a i t for these p e o p l e w a s o f t e n l e n g t h y and 
fruitless. 
t 
For the e l i g i b l e , p r o c e d u r e s w e r e f u r t h e r a d a p t e d w h e n it 
came to the processes of maintaining UB eligibility. As a first 
s t e p , the DSS a t t e m p t e d to s y n c h r o n i s e p a y m e n t s in r e m o t e 
Aboriginal communities with mail services by adopting a c o m m o n , 
r a t h e r t h a n s t a g g e r e d , UB p a y d a y . A l l b e n e f i c i a r i e s in 
p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t i e s had their r e v i e w cycle a d j u s t e d to the 
s a m e day. F u r t h e r , a l t h o u g h p a y m e n t r e m a i n e d t w o w e e k l y , the 
s t a n d a r d SU19B i n c o m e s t a t e m e n t r e v i e w f o r m w a s a b a n d o n e d in 
favour of a simplified four weekly form, the SU19T. As one final 
concession, applicants were given two weeks grace after the due 
date for the r e t u r n of these s i m p l i f i e d f o u r - w e e k l y i n c o m e 
statements. From the standard two weekly time-critical positive 
stimulus review, the UBNT procedures were effectively modified to 
provide four weekly review, with a degree of continuous payment. 
In departmental terms, these were major concessions to a remote 
area c l i e n t e l e w h i c h t h o u g h not e x p l i c i t l y d e f i n e d in t e r m s of 
193 
race, was in fact as good as entirely Aboriginal. 
Ever since the introduction of 'PASDOWN' in the late 60s, 
DSS central office has been worried by the existence of these 
non-standard UB procedures in the NT. It was a matter of some 
minor relief within the central office when, in 1981, changes to 
the standard UB procedures rendered one aspect of the UBNT system 
less exceptional. W i t h the g r o w t h of u n e m p l o y m e n t during the 
1970s, the burden on the CES of doing UB 'work tests' for the DSS 
had become intolerable and was increasingly interfering with the 
CES's operation as an employment agency. In 1981, procedures were 
changed so that the CES would only be selectively involved in 
'work testing' UB applicants at DSS request. The p r i m a r y burden 
of determining whether an applicant was willing and available to 
undertake suitable work w o u l d , henceforth, fall on the DSS 
officers themselves. This a m o u n t e d , per force of changing 
circumstances and in the absence of a massive increase in the 
resources devoted to running the CES, to the introduction of an 
initial assessment procedure for UB of the sort w h i c h had 
operated in the remote areas of the NT for some time. H o w e v e r , 
other aspects of the UBNT procedures remained exceptional and DSS 
central office had b e c o m e more uneasy about the possible 
illegality of the system and about the potential adverse reaction 
if it became widely known that, despite its c o m m i t m e n t to the 
virtues of universal procedures, the DSS was in fact applying 
exceptional procedures to Aboriginal applicants in remote areas 
of the NT. The change of general arrangements with the CES in 
1981 and the gradual computerisation of the DSS's benefits 
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p r o c e s s i n g s y s t e m d u r i n g t h e e a r l y 80s , p r o v i d e d a s t i m u l u s f o r 
r e v i e w i n g t h e s e e x c e p t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s . 
S i n c e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e UBNT p r o c e d u r e s i n t h e m i d 
70s , t h e DSS had g r e a t l y expanded i t s r e g i o n a l o f f i c e p r e s e n c e i n 
t h e NT and t h e A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t e l e had become c o n s i d e r a b l y more 
e x p e r i e n c e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e f l o w o f p a p e r w o r k t h a t 
e l i g i b i l i t y f o r UB r e q u i r e d . Some of t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e UBNT 
p r o c e d u r e s had been l e s s e n e d and c e n t r a l o f f i c e was keen t o s e e 
t h a t t h e y b e s t a n d a r d i s e d , i f a t a l l p o s s i b l e . The NT 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e DSS, w h i c h had t h e t a s k o f i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n , d i d n o t e n t i r e l y s h a r e 
c e n t r a l o f f i c e c o n c e r n s a b o u t t h e e x c e p t i o n a l n a t u r e of t h e 
p r o c e d u r e s . H o w e v e r , i t h a d b e c o m e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e 
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e amount of r e s o u r c e s t h a t t h e p r o c e s s i n g of t h e s e 
r e m o t e a r e a c a s e s was c o n s u m i n g now t h a t s t a n d a r d b e n e f i t s 
paymen t s had been c o m p u t e r i s e d . The UBNT s y s t e m r e m a i n e d manua l 
and hence t i m e consuming . But t h e r i g o r s of a two w e e k l y p o s i t i v e 
s t i m u l u s r e v i e w s y s t e m s t i l l p r e s e n t e d some p r o b l e m s i n t h e 
r e m o t e a r e a s and t h e p r o s p e c t of s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n was n o t g r e e t e d 
e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y by A b o r i g i n a l c o m m u n i t i e s w h i c h had n o t l o n g 
l e a r n e d t o c o p e w i t h t h e m o r e l e n i e n t , f o u r w e e k l y , n o n t i m e -
c r i t i c a l UBNT p r o c e d u r e s . The UBNT s y s t e m s u r v i v e d and r e m a i n s i n 
o p e r a t i o n t o t h i s day . 
A c r o s s t h e NT b o r d e r i n t h e r e m o t e p a r t s of Q l d , WA a n d SA 
many of t h e s a m e p r o b l e m s w i t h UB p r o c e d u r e s h a v e a r i s e n . I n 
t h e s e s t a t e s , t h e DSS h a s n e v e r so o v e r t l y f l o u t e d t h e two w e e k l y 
p o s i t i v e s t i m u l u s p r i n c i p l e of UB p r o c e d u r e s . I t h a s i n s t e a d 
c o n t i n u e d t o r e l y h e a v i l y on l i t e r a t e e x t r a - d e p a r t m e n t a l 
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intermediaries to help make the standard procedures work. Until 
very recently, the DSS in W A had largely avoided these problems 
of UB procedures by continuing to use group eligibility schedules 
for Aboriginal clients in remote communities. The 'bulk payment' 
UB cheques which sustained the Catholic missions of the Kimberley 
into the early 1980s, to which I referred in part II, were cases 
in point. But increasingly in W A too, UB payments for Aborigines 
in r e m o t e a r e a s have been i n d i v i d u a l i s e d and m u c h the s a m e 
p r o c e d u r a l p r o b l e m s h a v e been e n c o u n t e r e d as in the NT. The W A 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the DSS e x p e r i m e n t e d at one t i m e w i t h a 
s i m p l i f i e d i n c o m e s t a t e m e n t f o r m , m u c h like the SU19T. It has 
also a t t e m p t e d to a c c o m m o d a t e p r o b l e m s a r i s i n g from the t w o 
w e e k l y f r e q u e n c y of the UB r e v i e w p r o c e d u r e s by r e l a x i n g its 
approach to the late lodgement of income statements. Rather than 
terminating the eligibility of those who lodged their forms late, 
the W A a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l l o w e d r e i n s t a t e m e n t and b a c k p a y for 
periods up to several weeks where the lateness of lodgement was 
j u s t i f i e d . This l a t t e r a c c o m m o d a t i o n w a s o f t e n less than 
s a t i s f a c t o r y f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of the A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t s 
c o n c e r n e d , since it r e s u l t e d in an e r r a t i c f l o w of i n c o m e as 
p a y m e n t s w e r e first cut off and later r e i n s t a t e d w i t h b a c k p a y . 
F r o m the point of v i e w of the W A a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the DSS, 
h o w e v e r , this w a s a m a j o r p r o c e d u r a l c o n c e s s i o n w h i c h a l r e a d y 
s t r a i n e d the D e p a r t m e n t ' s c o m m i t m e n t to s t a n d a r d u n i v e r s a l 
procedures and for which the Aboriginal clientele should be more 
than grateful. 
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Documentary Evidence and Proof of Identification 
The particular complications for Aborigines which arise out 
of UB procedures are largely restricted to the remote areas where 
high levels of illiteracy and administrative inexperience among 
the clientele combine with other adminstrative factors, such as 
the infrequency of mail services, to make the maintenance of such 
f r e q u e n t and t i m e - c r i t i c a l p r o c e d u r e s p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t . 
H o w e v e r , there are other e x a m p l e s of p r o c e d u r a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s 
which appear to effect Aborigines in the metropolitan centres of 
s o u t h e r n A u s t r a l i a as m u c h as those in the r e m o t e areas of the 
north and centre. The provision of certain types of documentary 
evidence by DSS clients provides an example. 
In order to guard against fraud and misrepresentation, DSS 
procedures require all applicants for social security payments to 
produce s o m e d o c u m e n t a r y evidence at v a r i o u s points in the 
assessment process. Age pension applicants must produce proof of 
age, family allowance applicants proof of a child's birth, and so 
on. Applicants for payments who have not effectively identified 
themselves through the production of any such document relating 
to the substantive aspects of eligibility, are also required to 
produce 'proof of identification' as well as demonstrating that 
they satisfy other eligibility criteria. 
In the early 80s, DSS instructions to rank and file officers 
p r e s c r i b e d that, in the first i n s t a n c e , c l a i m a n t s for b e n e f i t s 
could e s t a b l i s h their i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by producing any one of a 
list of documents ranging from birth and marriage certificates, 
passports, naturalization certificates and tax assessment notices 
through to school reports, housing authority rent cards, credit 
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c a r d s and a 'reference on o f f i c i a l paper'. The i n s t r u c t i o n 
explicitly excluded drivers licences and bankbooks, which had in 
earlier times been included but which had come to be regarded by 
the DSS as unreliable. The instruction did, however, suggest that 
as a last resort these m a y be acceptable in conjunction with some 
other document such as a warrant or summons. This more open ended 
part of the instruction concluded with the directive: 
as the a l t e r n a t i v e s of w h a t is a c c e p t a b l e v a r y f r o m o f f i c e to 
o f f i c e , a l w a y s c h e c k w i t h the s u p e r v i s o r w h e n the d o c u m e n t s 
presented by the claimant as proof of identity do not fall under 
the above categories. 
These g e n e r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s for the presentation of documentary 
evidence of proof of identification have at times been a source 
of d i f f i c u l t y for A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t s and for the r a n k and file 
DSS officials who have had to deal with them. Hence the fact that 
'proof of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ' p r o b l e m s were mentioned so frequently 
by regional managers in their responses to the Aboriginal access 
s u r v e y d i s c u s s e d in c h a p t e r 5. There have h o w e v e r , b e e n those 
within the DSS who have found various ways around the problem. 
In the NT in the e a r l y d a y s , the DSS's a p p r o a c h to this 
problem was to seek confirmation of a client's personal details 
from the Aboriginal Population Records section of the DAA, which 
had inherited the records of the old NT Welfare Branch, Similar 
'third p a r t y ' a r r a n g e m e n t s w e r e also d e v e l o p e d in the o t h e r 
states and worked well where Aborigines had remained close to 
the place in w h i c h they w e r e born or had g r o w n up. If h o s p i t a l , 
welfare authority or mission records in an area were reasonably 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e , the DSS could u s u a l l y s a t i s f y i t s e l f of an 
a p p l i c a n t ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h o u t h a v i n g to r e q u i r e t h e 
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Aboriginal clients themselves to produce documentary evidence. 
Where, however, Aborigines had moved further away from the 
managed welfare institutions of the past, consultation of another 
organisation's records was not always a possible alternative. In 
such circumstances, the onus of providing documentary evidence 
would fall back on the individual Aboriginal client. Some 
Aborigines possess none of the documents accepted by the DSS as 
proof of identification. So the procedure has presented an 
apparently unresolvable conundrum for both client and rank and 
file official, even if all the other relevant criteria for a 
benefit have been met. 
One common solution to this problem in recent years has been 
for Aboriginal clients to obtain letters from the new non-
government Aboriginal welfare organisations, such as legal 
services and medical services with whom they have had other 
dealings. These letters usually state that the person has been 
known to that organisation for some time as the person they claim 
to be. This has generally been accepted by rank and file DSS 
officials as a 'reference on official paper', and hence as 
acceptable proof of identification. In some regions assessing 
officers have also come to accept pro forma declarations by the 
DSS's own Aboriginal public contact staff stating that the 
particular Aboriginal applicant has been known to them for some 
time. However, even this fairly liberal application of the DSS's 
proof of identification rules at the street level of the 
Department has not been able to overcome all the problems of the 
documentary evidence requirements. There are people, particularly 
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recent arrivals in an area, who are not well known and for whom 
ALOs or non-government welfare organisations may be reluctant to 
provide such references. 
There are other circumtances also in which the documentary 
proof required by the DSS is more substantial than proof of 
identification and where even liberal interpretations of the 
standard rules appear not to help. For example, among the many 
Aborigines now reaching pensionable age, there are many who do 
not appear in State birth records. So documentary proof of age 
can be quite literally an impossibility. Because of these sorts 
of cases, the DSS has made the more overt procedural concession 
that in the case of Aboriginal clients, assessing officers may 
accept statutory declarations made by the clients and by others 
who claim to have had long association with them as adequate 
documentary evidence. This more overt procedural concession, 
which has not been extended to the social security clientele more 
generally, has however created a subsequent politics of its own. 
In 1982, the Redfern regional office of the DSS combined 
forces with a number of non-government welfare organisations in 
its area to prepare a joint submission to the Minister for Social 
Security on the DSS's proof of identification procedures. The 
office and the related non-government welfare organisations were 
experiencing considerable difficulties with the current list of 
acceptable proof of identification documents in their dealings 
not only with the substantial Aboriginal clientele in the area, 
but also with the inner city down and outers. One of the non-
government welfare agencies in the area claimed to have had 
contact with 503 cases of people requiring proof of 
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identification in the previous twelve m o n t h s . Even this, the 
s u b m i s s i o n c l a i m e d , did not reflect the 'true level of need', 
since it was known in the community that this agency would only 
p r o v i d e s t a t u t o r y d e c l a r a t i o n s and that these were only 
acceptable to the DSS for Aboriginal clients. Not surprisingly, 
206 of the 503 p e o p l e r e q u i r i n g p r o o f of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
assistance from the agency in the last twelve m o n t h s had been 
Aborigines. For the local agencies and the Redfern office, the 
problem of the moment was those other non-Aboriginal cases for 
whom statutory declarations were not acceptable. Their submission 
to the Minister for Social Security proposed the expansion of the 
list of acceptable proof of identity documents into a hierarchy 
which would allow a combination of lesser documents such as rent 
receipts, electricity bills, bank books and driver's licences. 
The submission also suggested the extension to all clients as a 
last resort of the statutory declaration concession then made 
only to Aborigines. 
In the event, nothing i m m e d i a t e came of the Redfern 
s u b m i s s i o n , except that the r e g i o n a l o f f i c e m a n a g e r w a s 
reprimanded from within the Department for collaborating a little 
too closely with the outside agencies in an overt piece of 
ministerial lobbying. However, this and similar episodes in which 
various people had expressed reservations about the efficacy of 
the proof of identification procedures had, by 1984, led the 
central office of the Department to undertake a general review of 
the procedures. At the end of that year new a r r a n g e m e n t s were 
being piloted that could potentially go some w a y towards 
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lessening the difficulties that were being experienced in Redfern 
and elsewhere. The new procedures provided for a greatly expanded 
list of documents and the requirement that applicants produce any 
three that contribute in different ways to establishing their 
identification. They did not, however, extend the statutory 
declaration facility beyond the Aboriginal clientele. 
Managing Procedural Complications: Exceptions and Resources 
Standard procedures have, in general, proved to be a source 
of considerable problems between the DSS and its Aboriginal 
clientele. Designed primarily for a more literate, experienced 
and urbanised white clientele, the procedures have often proved 
innappropriate and at times even unworkable when applied to 
Aborigines, particularly those in more remote areas. Procedures 
can, of course, be made to work more adequately if enough 
resources are committed to making them do so. In this regard, it 
is worth linking the discussion of procedural complications back 
to my earlier sketch of the changing configuration of the roles 
and resources of those involved in delivering social security 
services to the Aborigines. The expanding commitment of DSS 
resources to the servicing of its Aboriginal clientele has gone 
some way to alleviating many procedural complications. Aboriginal 
public contact staff, in particular, appear to have played a 
vital role in recent years because of their knowledge of the 
Aboriginal clientele at the regional office level. The point is 
not that complications and breakdowns do not still occur since 
the appointment of special purpose Aboriginal staff at the 
regional office level of the DSS, but rather that the 
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Department's greater presence among the Aboriginal clientele has 
given both it and its Aboriginal clients a capacity to manage 
their encounters which previously they did not have. Similarly, a 
greater awareness of the procedural problems that do arise in 
relations between Aborigines and the social security system in 
recent years has led the DSS to make some significant 
modifications to its administrative arrangements; such as the 
redrawing of regional boundaries and the development of child 
listings mentioned above. These types of developments have not, 
however, been able to adequately meet all the procedural problems 
that have arisen. In a more limited number of instances, as the 
complications and inadequacies of applying standard procedures to 
Aborigines have emerged, debate has developed in the 
administrative setting focusing on the issue of how procedures 
might be made more appropriate. One central question in such 
circumstances has been whether, or to what degree, the DSS's 
commitment to standardised procedures for all applicants, can be 
sacrificed in the name of exceptional Aboriginal need. Or, to put 
the matter the other way round, when can exceptional procedures 
for Aborigines be justified and how can they be best presented as 
not contravening departmental commitment to universality? 
'PASDOWN' was clearly preferable to 'ABSDOWN' in that it did not 
specifically identify the target group of these procedures as 
Aborigines, even though this was in fact the case. The more overt 
t 
concession of allowing statutory declarations as documentary 
evidence for Aboriginal clients has, in converse vein, created at 
least one episode in which the disability of some non-Aboriginal 
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clients was claimed to be equally significant and in need of 
similarly lenient procedural treatment. Procedural exceptions are 
not easy either to instigate or to maintain in an administrative 
setting as steeped in the virtues of standardised procedures as 
the DSS. But in a number of instances special exceptional 
procedures have been developed and applied in response to the 
problems encountered by the DSS in servicing its Aboriginal 
clientele. They are then an important element in the developing 
relations between the DSS and its Aboriginal clientele and need 
to be recognised as such. 
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Chapter ^ 
Complications vlth Family Income Units 
In March 1979, the International Social Security Association 
held a meeting in Canberra on the theme 'changing family patterns 
and social security protection'. The paper prepared for that 
meeting within the Development Division of the Australian DSS and 
delivered by the Director General as the keynote address, 
reflected frankly and extensively on contemporary difficulties in 
the definition and application of family income units employed by 
the social security system. It is, the paper argued: 
a commonplace to speak of the family as 'the basic social 
unit of society' or the like, as though families were 
tangible objects like bricks, and a society the sum of its 
constituent families. In reality, families cannot exist apart 
from the other social relationships in which their members 
are engaged, and there is no theoretical ground for regarding 
the unit consisting of a child and whoever is immediately 
responsible for its care as more basic than the household of 
individuals related by blood or marriage, or, further, as 
more basic than the kinship group residing in a number of 
households. 
Social security policy can neither escape nor solve the 
definitional problem. Unless each man , woman and child is to 
be treated as a separate entity people have to be classified 
into groups regarded as having an internal structure but 
engaging jointly in transactions with the outside world. Any 
principle of classification must be more or less arbitrary, 
and can hardly avoid more or less arbitrary assumptions not 
only as to how people do behave but how they should behave. 
(Jordan 1980:32) 
The Development Division's paper went on to identify a number of 
historical and contemporary instances in which rules for the 
public allocation of income in Australia used definitions of 
family units both larger and smaller than 'the version of the 
conjugal household' presently the focus of the social security 
system. It also identified a number of instances in which the 
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social security system seemed to be making unwarranted 
assumptions about the contemporary reality of families in 
Australian society and, therefore, to be encountering 
difficulties in the application of established family income unit 
definitions to particular types of cases. In particular, it noted 
that : 
Changes in the economic activity of women and greater 
diversity in relationships between men and women make certain 
of the assumptions implicit in the social security income 
unit more questionable than they might once have been. 
It continued: 
The vision seems to be of the woman at home cleaning, cooking 
and minding the children while her man is out earning a 
living for them all. For example, the Australian Class B 
widows pension, payable to widows without dependent children 
as early as 45 years of age on grounds of former dependency 
and domestic responsibility, may come to be seen as anomalous 
in a community where women without children increasingly 
expect to work. It could also be seen as anomalous that a 
woman who has been working and may have been economically 
independent is deemed to be fully supported by her husband 
when she is out of work. (Jordan 1980:33) 
More generally, it can be pointed out that there is an 
assumption implicit in many aspects of the social security system 
that the family unit, as defined by the rules, always shares 
available income internally (Edwards 1983). In the case of 
pensions, although eligibility is determined and payment made 
separately for husbands and wives, the income of an applicant's 
spouse is always relevant to the assessment of his or her own 
rate of payment. Hence, a married person without an income of 
their own who meets all the other eligibility criteria for a 
particular type of pension may be assessed as ineligible on the 
basis of an income test applied to half their spouse's income; 
the assumption being that the spouse shares that income with the 
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applicant. In the case of unemployment or sickness benefit, 
assumptions about income sharing are apparent not only in the way 
in which income tests are applied, but also the way in which 
eligibility itself is assessed and payment is made. In the 
benefits system, it is the individual unemployed or sick income 
unit head who is eligible for and receives the payment. The 
applicant's wife, or in a very few cases husband, is treated 
merely as a dependent with no eligibility of her own, but on 
account of whose dependency the rate of benefit paid to the 
applicant is increased. Here, the additional assumption is made 
that the applicant will share his benefit income with the 
dependent spouse and also with any dependent children on whose 
account part of the benefit is paid. The reality of contemporary 
financial arrangements within families is, of course, not so 
simple and this is a source of problems for the operation of the 
social security system (Edwards 1981). 
Another problem area identified in the 1979 Development 
Division paper was the system's treatment of couples living 
together as husband and wife on a 'bona fide domestic basis', 
though not legally married. For most purposes of the Social 
Security Act, such couples are treated in the same way as those 
who are legally married. The intention, the paper noted: 
is that unmarried couples should be no better and no worse 
off than legally married couples, which is reasonable in 
principle but in practice can take social security 
administration into unchartered areas of changing attitudes 
and life-styles with little guidance from the larger body of 
civil law... 
Application of the principle of equal treatment is 
comparatively straight forward at one end of the continuum, 
say to a couple who have lived together for many years and 
have raised children. It becomes more difficult with recent 
and ambiguous unions, where obligations may be assumed and 
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imposed which in fact have neither been expected nor entered 
into by the parties. (Jordan 1980:33) 
The problem of the 'cohabitation rule', as it is commonly known, 
can arise in relation to every pension and benefit category, 
since marital status is always a relevant consideration in the 
assessment of eligibility and rates of payment. It is, however, 
most contentious in relation to eligibility for widows pension 
and single parent's benefit, where the recipient's single status 
is the major element of the eligibility criteria (Mossman 1977). 
Departmental practices in this area are a subject of constant 
scrutiny and debate, with suggestions for reform ranging from the 
modification of departmental guidelines for field officers 
investigating such cases to the wholesale replacement of the 
family by the individual as the basic eligibility unit of the 
social security system (Mossman and Sackville 1977, Jordan 1981a, 
Edwards 1983). Such is the contentiousness of this particular 
issue. 
Complications and ongoing debates of the sort outlined above 
are an inevitable consequence of the artificial and arbitrary way 
in which the social security system divides its clientele into 
family income units and life-cycle stages and of the diverse and 
changing nature of the social reality of family structures to 
which those divisions are applied. Not only does the system 
impose income unit definitions on clients which may not be fully 
in accord with the way in which they see themselves, it also 
demands that as family circumstances change over time, instants 
be identified at which family units can be officially 
reclassified by the DSS. Verification of applicants' claims about 
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the formation and dissolution of family units involves DSS rank 
and file officers in information gathering of an investigative 
nature. When claims are substantiated by legal certificates of 
birth, marriage, divorce, death, etc., information gathering is 
relatively straight forward. But where marital and family unions 
are of a de facto nature, and particularly if changes are 
frequent, investigation can become intrusive and rank and file 
judgements contestable. In this regard, I would hypothesize that 
the further applicants deviate from the standard family 
circumstances envisaged, at least implicitly, in the rules of the 
social security system, the more likely they are to encounter 
difficulties as they attempt at various points in their lives to 
gain access to the income services of the social security system. 
For those who pass neatly from childhood dependency to legally 
sanctioned, long term, stable, income-sharing conjugal monogamy, 
access to social security payments when needed can be a 
relatively straightforward experience. For those whose conjugal 
unions are less stable, less long term, less monogamous, involve 
less income sharing or are not legally sanctioned, access will 
inevitably be more difficult. Difficulties encountered with the 
application of family income unit definitions at an individual 
case level will also be reflected in more generalised debate and 
conflict over the appropriateness of DSS rules and practices, 
both within the Department and between it and those outside with 
some interest in welfare administration. 
Against this background of the general contestability of the 
family income unit definitions used in the social security system 
and given the atypical position Aborigines occupy in Australian 
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s o c i e t y , w e m i g h t anticipate that the application of social 
security income units to Aboriginal families would be a source of 
significant difficulty and ongoing debate. This has indeed been 
the case, as we shall see in the rest of this chapter. One recent 
contribution to such debate commented that: 
The difficulties Aborigines face... are c o m p o u n d e d in the 
case of social security p a y m e n t s , less for the lack of 
i n f o r m a t i o n available to t h e m , than for the differing 
a s s u m p t i o n s about the functions of the nuclear f a m i l y , in 
particular, which underlie the structure of benefits. (Coombs 
et al 1983:302) 
Coombs and his co-authors went on to identify a n u m b e r of 
p r o b l e m s that have arisen over application of the rules of the 
social security system to Aborigines because of 'structural 
differences' b e t w e e n the 'Aboriginal f a m i l y ' and the 'nuclear 
f a m i l y of wider Australia'. A n u m b e r of these p r o b l e m s fall 
within the ambit of what I have here referred to as family income 
unit c o m p l i c a t i o n s . The first two I w i l l discuss are those 
explicitly mentioned above which are also frequently contested in 
relation to the social security clientele more generally; namely 
income sharing and cohabitation. The great bulk of this chapter 
is, h o w e v e r , devoted to the exposition of a f a m i l y i n c o m e unit 
issue w h i c h has arisen almost exclusively in relation to 
Aborigines; the recognition or non-recognition of polygamy and 
tribal m a r r i a g e . Debates over how the DSS should treat these 
Aboriginal f a m i l y practices have been particularly intractable 
and at times quite arcane. For that reason the account is rather 
long and detailed. It is, h o w e v e r , a good e x a m p l e of h o w 
intricate the politics of rule interpretation can b e c o m e when 
atypical and unanticipated client circumstances are encountered. 
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Income Sharing and Cohabitation 
In the late 1970s, the W A a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the DSS was 
faced w i t h the problem of A b o r i g i n a l m e n in the north of the 
state who, while on UB during the off-work season in the pastoral 
industry, were returning to areas of tribal significance for the 
conduct of c e r e m o n i e s . Apart from the men's m o b i l i t y and 
remoteness which itself caused problems for negotiating the two 
weekly UB procedures and also the basic question of eligibility 
for UB during such ceremonies, there was also the problem of the 
extended separation of the m e n from their w i v e s . In these W A 
cases, during the ceremonies some wives were not receiving any of 
the UB paid to their husbands, not even the part paid on account 
of the men having dependent wives or children. Some of the wives 
applied to the regional office of the DSS for income support. But 
t h e y w e r e i n e l i g i b l e for s u p p o r t u n d e r a n y of the DSS's 
mainstream income service categories. Those whose husbands were 
receiving UB, had been provided for in that payment. Those whose 
husbands were not, for one reason or another, w e r e in no better 
position. They were not single parents and they were not 
themselves regarded as eligible for UB. 
Other instances of Aboriginal women not receiving any of the 
UB paid to their husbands have been c o m m o n in recent years, and 
not all could be excused by the understandable complications of 
physical separation. Some instances have been the result of 
husbands regarding the UB paid to them as theirs to dispose of as 
they w i s h e d . In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , considerable pressure has 
built up among Aboriginal women, and among those more knowlegable 
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and experienced in the ways of the social security system who act 
as their i n t e r m e d i a r i e s and a d v o c a t e s , to have the system of 
benefit payment changed in order to take account of this lack of 
income sharing. In 1980, Bell and Ditton reported that: 
Women had clear suggestions as to how some of the differences 
between the family structures of whites and Aborigines could 
be accomodated. They argued that support money should be paid 
to the person responsible for the care of the child or 
d e p e n d a n t s , not to the person defined to be such by the n e w 
law. Thus the portion of UB which was for children, should go 
to the person in w h o s e care they were and w i v e s should be 
paid their share directly. (Bell and Ditton 1980:95). 
They then went on to discuss the response to these demands that 
the DSS had already made: split payment of benefit cheques. The 
DSS had gone some w a y to a c c o m o d a t i n g the women's d e m a n d s by 
invoking section 123 of the Act. This provided that a benefit, or 
p a r t t h e r e o f , c o u l d be p a i d to s o m e o n e o t h e r t h a n the 
b e n e f i c i a r y . It was i r o n i c a l l y e n o u g h , the same section of the 
Act as had been invoked in earlier days to pay A b o r i g i n e s ' 
benefits to their white mission and welfare authority custodians. 
Now it was to be used to pay a portion of a man's UB d i r e c t l y to 
his wife. The option of split cheques for beneficiaries and their 
wives was, in 1980, still rather limited in its application. Bell 
and D i t t o n k n e w of o n l y one c a s e in w h i c h it w a s b e i n g 
successfully used in the Alice Springs region. One of the 
problems with the arrangement was that within the DSS it required 
m a n u a l production of p a y m e n t cheques w h i c h w o u l d o t h e r w i s e be 
liandled by computer. This made it a source of extra work for rank 
and file officials, and hence something they avoided if possible. 
Another reason for the lack of use of the facility derived from 
the Department's policy of not providing split cheques w i t h o u t 
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the b e n e f i c i a r y ' s c o n s e n t . H u s b a n d s c o u l d , at t i m e s , r e f u s e 
consent. In time the first of these problems has been overcome by 
the incorporation of split cheque options into the computerised 
s y s t e m s u s e d for b e n e f i t s p a y m e n t . The s e c o n d p r o b l e m h a s , to 
some degree, also been alleviated in relation to the Aboriginal 
c l i e n t e l e as the use and k n o w l e d g e of split c h e q u e s a m o n g 
A b o r i g i n e s has g r o w n . As s o m e A b o r i g i n a l w o m e n h a v e a s s e r t e d 
their r i g h t s to part of their h u s b a n d s ' b e n e f i t i n c o m e , o t h e r s 
h a v e found out a b o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y and h a v e b e e n a b l e to 
convince their husbands to do likewise. 
F r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of the w o m e n it s e r v e s , the s p l i t 
c h e q u e o p t i o n is s t i l l a l e s s than o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n to the 
p r o b l e m of g a i n i n g s o m e a c c e s s to i n c o m e s e r v i c e s . T h e y s t i l l 
d e p e n d on their h u s b a n d s ' m a i n t a i n i n g e l i g i b i l i t y for b e n e f i t , 
since t h e y t h e m s e l v e s are not e l i g i b l e in their o w n r i g h t . So 
a d v o c a c y for c h a n g e p e r s i s t s (see for e x a m p l e G a l e ed 1983). In 
their recent contribution. Coombs et al have argued strongly for 
r e f o r m in this a r e a . T h e i r a r g u m e n t proceeds from observations 
a b o u t the n a t u r e of w o m e n ' s t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e in A b o r i g i n a l 
society to an implicit suggestion that Aboriginal w o m e n should 
themselves be considered eligible for UB: 
H a r d s h i p r e s u l t i n g f r o m u n e m p l o y m e n t is e v e n m o r e m a r k e d 
a m o n g A b o r i g i n a l w o m e n , b e c a u s e of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l 
e x p e c t a t i o n that w o m e n w i l l p r o v i d e f o o d , c l o t h i n g and 
p r i m a r y c a r e , for c h i l d r e n and f a m i l y . And yet it is 
notoriously difficult for w o m e n to establish eligibility for 
u n e m p l o y m e n t benefits....This d i f f i c u l t y w o u l d be e a s e d b y 
the r e c o g n i t i o n of the p l a c e of A b o r i g i n a l w o m e n as 'bread 
providers' in their community. (Coombs et al 1983: 311-12). 
Such an application of the UB eligibility criteria to Aborigines 
w o u l d , of c o u r s e , be m a r k e d l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the g e n e r a l 'male 
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h e a d / w o r k e r / b r e a d w i n n e r ' i n t e r p r e t r a t i o n w h i c h p r e s e n t l y 
predominates in the social security system. It is, at present, a 
r e f o r m w h i c h the DSS is not w i l l i n g to entertain either in 
relation to Aborigines or the population as a whole. 
The option of split cheques also fails to provide any 
solution to a number of other cases of inadequate income sharing 
in Aboriginal families which have come to the DSS's attention in 
recent years. These are cases in which one of the partners to the 
m a r r i a g e works w h i l e the other, usually the w i f e , presents 
herself to the local office of the DSS as an applicant w i t h no 
i n c o m e . Since the DSS is not m a k i n g any benefit or pension 
payment to the family, it is not in any position to induce income 
sharing by the use of split p a y m e n t s . Since, on the other hand, 
the DSS takes into account the i n c o m e of an applicant's spouse 
in any assessment for benefit or pension, these wives are unikely 
to be eligible for any social security p a y m e n t in their o w n 
right. So w o m e n m a y be left to survive on the f a m i l y a l l o w a n c e 
income they receive on account of having children in their care. 
In such cases, the DSS has not been able to offer a g e n e r a l i s e d 
solution to the women's p r o b l e m , such as the split cheque 
arrangement for benefits. There are however some other manoeuvres 
available to participants. The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e politics of 
managing this particular type of problem has focussed more on the 
interpretation and application of that other highly contested 
rule at the heart of social security income unit complications; 
the cohabitation rule. 
W h e r e applicants for social security p a y m e n t are not 
receiving i n c o m e from a spouse, s y m p a t h e t i c rank and file 
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officials may choose in certain circumstances to disregard the 
spouses's existence for social security purposes. Particular DSS 
offices and officers within them have, at times, gained 
reputations of being sympathetic fixers of such cases. For these 
officers, disregarding spouses is all the easier and more 
justifiable if the separation is physical as well as financial; 
as it often is for example in cases in which Aboriginal women and 
their children live in one location while men move around picking 
up work wherever they can. Such assistance with presentation of 
the facts may also be forthcoming from those outside the 
Department. One white intermediary to whom I spoke claimed 
considerable success in maintaining the flow of SPB to her 
clientele of Aboriginal women. Her secret was to keep copies of 
all correspondence to and from the DSS for each women, so that 
the information regarding their single marital status which she 
provided to the local DSS office over time was always consistent. 
The local DSS seemed happy enough not to inquire any further. So 
with the help of those both within and outside the DSS willing to 
interpret the facts liberally. Aboriginal women have in some 
instances been able to qualify for SPB or widows' pensions, and 
so overcome the problems of inadequate income sharing. The males 
with whom they may associate at times become defined for social 
security purposes as peripatetic male visitors. Given the 
marginal position of many Aborigines in the labour market, to 
which I will return in the next chapter, this is often both a 
more convenient and a more realistic definition of the situation 
for all concerned. 
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Talk of this sort of manoeuvre i s , of course , wont to set 
t h o s e who take a more p u r i t a n i c a l a p p r o a c h to w e l f a r e 
administration on edge. For some, this is the dreaded spectre of 
c l i e n t s consc iously f i t t i n g themselves into categories, and of 
sympathisers both within and outside the DSS assisting them to do 
so. To the control-oriented aspect of DSS t h i n k i n g , this can be 
seen as bordering on fraudulent m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . A more 
balanced approach, however , would r e f l e c t the Development 
Division's discussion of the arbitrary and arti f icial nature of 
DSS's own family income unit definitions with which I began this 
chapter. It would recognise that f a m i l y structures are not set 
rigidly like bricks in mortar, but can and do inevitably interact 
w ith and develop in response to a d m i n i s t r a t i v e systems of 
a l l o c a t i o n w h i c h c l a s s i f y them in var ious a r b i t r a r y and 
a r t i f i c i a l ways. This is no less true of Abor ig ina l f a m i l y 
structures than of the f a m i l y structures of the DSS c l i e n t e l e 
more general ly . It i s not then s u r p r i s i n g to see a degree of 
manoeuvre around the facts of a case , or to see r e d e f i n i t i o n of 
Aboriginal family units occurring in response to experiences of 
public allocation of income and other services. This is no more 
than the other side of the ongoing processes whereby soc ia l 
security rules are continually reinterpreted to take account of 
u n a n t i c i p a t e d cont ingencies in c l ient c ircumstances . Without 
elements of each, the social security system would in a l l 
p r o b a b i l i t y grind to a halt under the i n t r a c t a b l e burden of 
family groups who while treated by the DSS as a unit, fail to be 
so in any meaningful sense of the term. 
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Polygamy and Tribal Marriage 
It did not take long after the l e g i s l a t i v e changes of 1959 
for a n u m b e r of q u e s t i o n s to arise over the exact status of 
A b o r i g i n a l tribal m a r r i a g e for the purposes of social security 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . In m o s t A b o r i g i n a l t r i b e s , m a r r i a g e had 
traditionally often been polygamous; or more precisely polygynous 
since it was the males who over time acquired multiple spouses. 
In some areas of north and central Australia in the early 1960s, 
a degree of polygyny persisted. The DSS quickly developed the 
view that this aspect of tribal marriage was inconsistent with 
the Social Security Act. In January 1961, a section entitled 
'Natives w i t h m o r e than one w^ife' was incorporated into the 
'Instructions - Pensions and Other Benefits' m a n u a l then in use 
in the Department. It read: 
The f o l l o w i n g should be adopted as a w o r k i n g basis where a 
native has more than one wife -
(a) w h e r e a p e r m a n e n t l y incapacitated native pensioner has 
more than one wife, the woman who has lived longest with him 
(the first w i f e ) w i l l be treated as the only wife for the 
purposes of wife's and child's allowance. 
(b) the wife who has lived longest w i t h the husband w i l l be 
the only wife treated, on his death, as his widow for widow's 
pension purposes. 
(c) additional pension for children after the first w i l l be 
paid...only in respect of children of whom the first wife is 
the mother. (Section 3/B/7) 
Although this instruction said nothing about the treatment of any 
subsequent wives, the implication appears to have been that for 
pension purposes they and their children were to be treated as a 
separate f a m i l y i n c o m e unit. This w a s , in fact, spelt out m o r e 
e x p l i c i t l y in a circular instruction of D e c e m b e r 1963. But 
despite the relative clarity of the approach set out in the 
m a n u a l and subsequent c i r c u l a r , these were to be far from the 
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last w o r d s on the DSS's t r e a t m e n t of A b o r i g i n a l p o l y g y n y and 
tribal marriage. 
The 1965 W A Case 
In 1965, the W A office of the DSS in Perth submitted a case 
to the Department's central office for determination. It involved 
an A b o r i g i n a l m a n living at a m i s s i o n in the north of the state 
who w a s receiving age pension. His first w i f e , not herself yet 
being of pensionable age, was receiving a wife's pension. His 
second m u c h younger w i f e , who had one child, was receiving an 
invalid pension. Since the promulgation of the 1961 instruction 
laying down the DSS's approach to Aboriginal polygyny, a number 
of minor changes had been made to the rules governing payment of 
pensions. In 1963, an amendement to the legislation provided for 
a two tiered structure of 'married' and 'standard' rate pensions. 
Previously, all pensions had been paid at the same rate. However, 
the new married rate was $1 per week less than the standard rate 
and applied to all pensioners whose spouses were also in reciept 
of a social security payment. The standard rate applied to single 
pensioners and those married pensioners whose spouses were not in 
receipt of a social security payment. In 1965, these provisions 
w e r e further a m e n d e d to provide for the p a y m e n t of the larger 
standard rate to pensioners whose w i v e s were receiving wife's 
pension. Also in 1965, a guardian's allowance of $4 per week was 
introduced to provide additional i n c o m e for single p e n s i o n e r s 
w i t h d e p e n d e n t children under sixtee n. Under the i n s t r u c t i o n s 
regarding Aboriginal polygyny and in view of the 1965 amendements 
to the Act, it appeared that in the W A case the husband's age 
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pension should be i ncreased from the married to the standard 
rate, from $11 to $12 per week, and that the second wife's 
invalid pension, which had already been paid at the larger 
standard rate since 1963, should now be augmented by the new 
guardian's allowance. 
The assessing officer dealing with the case was, for 
whatever reason, either uncertain or uneasy about increasing the 
two rates of payment and referred the case to senior benefits 
entitlement officers within the WA administration. The Assistant 
Director of the DSS in WA argued strongly that since under 'white 
man's law' the man was living in a de facto relationship with his 
second wife, both should only receive the married rate of pension 
and the woman should not receive the guardian's allowance. In 
effect, he wanted to recognise the existence of the relationship 
between the pensioner and his second wife for the purposes of 
reducing their rates of pension by $1 and $5 per week 
respectively. The Director of the WA office of the DSS commented, 
in turn, that the Assistant Director's argument had some merit, 
but noted that under the existing instructions relating to 
Aboriginal polygyny it would seem the two pensions should in fact 
be increased. The WA administration referred the case to the 
Department's central office. Here, the first officer to examine 
the case agreed with the WA Assistant Director's line of 
argument. He believed that the case was an 'anomaly' and that the 
rates of payment should not be increased. However, he foresaw a 
potential problem in that recognising the second wife's 
relationship with the man for the purposes of reducing their 
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current rates of pension payment might, in future, make it 
difficult not to recognise two widows. In order to 'comply with 
the intention of the legislation' as this officer interpreted it, 
and in order 'to avoid complications resulting from recognising 
more than one wife', the officer suggested that the Department 
invoke section 28 (1) of the Act which provided for the payment 
of pension at a rate 'reasonable and sufficient' to the 
circumstances. His suggestion was that, while not in fact 
recognising the second wife, the Department reduce her and the 
husband's pensions to rates equivalent to the married rate 
without guardian's allowance, as if the polygynous marriage were 
recognised. The case was then examined by the Central Office's 
Assistant Director (Benefits), at which point the drift of 
proceedings changed dramatically. He re-affirmed the principle of 
non-recognition of second wives as spelt out in earlier 
instructions and argued strongly that the Department should apply 
this approach consistently in all aspects of assessment. With 
this the Assistant Director General (Policy and Benefits) agreed. 
So despite the misgivings and arguments of those subordinates who 
had examined the case, the two pensions were increased. 
Why the Debate? 
Ihe importance of this early episode lies not so much in the 
outcome of these particular intra-departmental deliberations as 
in the fact that they occurred at all. The reference of this case 
to more and more senior officers in the state and central office 
appears to have been quite unnecessary. The instructions which 
did exist in the manual and in the 1963 circular laid down a 
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clear approach to Aboriginal polygyny. Though they did not, and 
could not reasonably be expected to cover the subject of changes 
in the rates of pension payable subsequent to the 1965 
amendements, they did lay down a clear principle of non-
recognition of second wives which could be relatively simply 
extended to cover this particular contingency. But the case was 
raised and arguments for not increasing the rates of payment of 
the two pensions were strongly put, even at very senior levels of 
the Department. This in itself demands explanation. 
The raising of the case by the original assessing officer 
might reasonably be put down to genuine confusion and 
uncertainty. Working in an office which at that time serviced the 
whole of WA, cases of this nature would have arisen only 
infrequently, if at all, in the working lives of most rank and 
file assessors. The 1961 addition to the manual of instructions 
was not explicit about the treatment of second and subsequent 
wives, and the 1963 circular instructions which had been more so, 
would, for most rank and file officers not confronting the 
particular problem with any frequency, have already begun to fade 
into departmental history. The more senior officers of the DSS 
who considered the case were all clearly well aware of both 
instructions on the matter of Aboriginal polygyny. Yet none below 
the Assistant Director (Benefits) in central office was willing 
to reinforce and extend the logic of those instructions when 
applied to this particular case. The ambivalence of these 
officers to increase the rate of pension paid to these two 
Aborigines was, in itself, an interesting comment on the 
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attitudes to the payment of social security benefits to 
Aborigines which persisted at that time. There were within the 
DSS, officers with strong feelings about the inappropriateness of 
such payments, who were willing, as in this case, to develop 
arguments as to why such payments, or at least increases in the 
rate of payment, should not be made. 
Episodes of this nature have in many ways become the 
hallmark of the ongoing debate over the DSS's treatment of 
Aboriginal polygyny and tribal marriage. The non-recognition of 
second wives for social security purposes has a host of 
consequences both in qualifying and disqualifying Aborigines in 
polygynous unions for various social security payments at 
different rates. Whenever these consequences have seemed 
inappropriate to those assessing or otherwise involved in cases 
involving a polygynous union, the issue of the recognition of 
second wives has been raised anew. In the above example, a number 
of DSS officers were inclined to recognise the second wife's 
relationship with her husband for the purposes of reducing the 
rate of pension paid to them both. But the traffic of debate has 
not been all one way. In other instances, officers and other 
interested participants have pushed for the recognition of the 
relationship for the purposes of extending eligibility. The next 
episode in the polygyny debate was such an instance. 
The 1966 WA Case 
In 1966, the WA administration of the DSS referred another 
case to central office involving an invalid pensioner whose first 
wife had recently died. The question now arose as to the status 
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of the second wife. At that time, the legislation provided that 
v.ife's pension was payable to all legally married wives but only 
to de facto wives in relationships of three years standing. The 
case quickly came to the attention of the central office's 
Assistant Director (Benefits) who the year before had argued 
strongly for maintaining the consistency of the approach of not 
recognising second wives for any social security purposes. In 
this case, he again argued strongly for what he saw to be a 
consistent approach. Since prior to the first wife's death, the 
second wife had been treated as the head of a separate income 
unit, it would he argued be inconsistent to pay her a wife's 
pension until the Department's recognition of the de facto 
relationship between herself and her husband was of three years 
standing; i.e. three years after the death of the first wife. 
However, on this occasion, the Assistant Director General (Policy 
and Benefits) disagreed. He preferred 'to accept the number two 
wife as becoming the wife for pension purposes immediately on the 
death of the number one wife' and felt that this would 'not 
conflict with departmental policy, otherwise'. 
There was a degree of legitimate confusion and uncertainty 
in this 1966 case which had not existed in the 1965 one. Though 
the Assistant Director (Benefits) no doubt saw the decision as 
detracting from the consistency of the Department's approach, the 
Assistant Director General's interpretation could also claim 
consistency given certain provisos. Provided that Aboriginal 
tribal marriage was accorded the status of legally sanctioned 
rather than de facto marriage for pension purposes and that, on 
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the death of a first wife, the relationship between an Aboriginal 
pensioner and his second wife was also accorded legal status, the 
Assistant Director General's decision would be entirely 
consistent with the non-recognition of second wives. Whether, in 
fact, this was the line of the Assistant Director General's 
thinking is unclear from the case, since he offered no reason for 
his preference other than the general statement of its not 
conflicting with departmental policy. However, some indication 
that this may, at least implicitly, have been his reasoning is 
suggested by a central office initiative a couple of months after 
this case. 
The Recognition of the First Tribal Marriage as Legal Marriage 
In December 1966, the central office of the DSS approached 
the state offices of the Department in Brisbane, Adelaide and 
Perth requesting them to report on the precise status accorded to 
the first wife of an Aboriginal tribal marriage for pension 
purposes. The issue was essentially the same as that raised in 
the WA case two months earlier, though without the additional 
complications arising from polygyny and succession to the 
position of first wife. If first wives of Aboriginal tribal 
unions were regarded as legally married rather than as de facto 
dependent females, a number of minor eligibility advantages would 
follow. As mentioned above, de facto dependent females were not 
at that time eligible for wife's pension unless their bona fide 
domestic relationship with the man was of three years standing. 
In the event of a husband's death, a de facto dependent female 
was not eligible for widow's pension unless she had lived with 
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the man for three years immediately prior to his death. Nor were 
de facto wives eligible for widow's pension as deserted wives or 
as wives of men who had been imprisoned for more than six months, 
no matter how longstanding their relationship. In all these 
circumstances, legally married wives were so eligible. 
The purpose of the central office request to the state 
offices was, in the first instance, to gather information about 
the practices which had developed in the various states in the 
absence of any explicit central office instruction on the matter. 
The replies revealed considerable diversity of practice. 
The SA administration reported that it had followed the 
practice of treating Aboriginal first wives who had become widows 
as if they had been legally married and indicated that, although a 
case had not yet arisen, the same principle would be applied to 
deserted first wives of tribal unions. In justifying this 
approach, the Director of the SA administration commented: 
Experience has shown that only a small percentage of 
aborigines are legally married. The majority of full-blooded 
aborigines are tribally married only. In the circumstances it 
is generally necessary to recognise a tribal marriage and 
place an aboriginal woman in the same position as a woman 
legally married. 
The WA administration, by contrast, had treated tribal marriage 
as de facto marriage and had, as a consequence, in the previous 
few years rejected several claims for widow's pensions from 
deserted Aboriginal wives. It supported this approach by arguing 
that an Aboriginal claimant 'should not be placed in a better 
position than any other claimant who is not legally married'. 
Interestingly then, both the SA and WA offices had alluded to 
administrative principles of equal treatment for those in equal 
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circumstances, in order to justify their diametrically opposite 
practices. The difference was simply a matter of who was chosen 
for the purposes of the argument as the reference group with whom 
tribally married Aboriginal women were to be equated; legally 
married white women or white women in de facto domestic 
relationships. 
The WA administration offered a number of other arguments in 
support of its approach. One simply pointed to the diversity of 
Aboriginal tribal marriage practices across the state and 
particularly their 'elastic' nature in 'more sophisticated 
areas'. Another related this diversity of Aboriginal practice to 
the weakness of the DSS's ability to gather and verify the 
information needed to assess claims about the marital 
circumstances of Aboriginal applicants. In classic control 
oriented DSS thinking, the fear was of fraud and wrongful over-
expenditure. The WA office's report to central office commented: 
It has long been the policy of the Native Welfare Department 
in Western Australia to obtain Social Service benefits for as 
many natives as possible and in many cases over the years 
enquiries by this Department have raised grave doubts about 
the accuracy of supposed 'facts' submitted by some field 
officers in support of claims. The same applies to some 
missions, pastoral stations and other authorities. 
In my opinion this department should determine eligibility of 
a tribally married woman whose husband is deceased on the 
basis applied to a dependent female. It is usually simple to 
verify a white claimant's marriage but to obtain reliable 
evidence of a tribal marriage could be a different matter. 
There would always be the risk of unscrupulous persons 
falsely claiming to the Department of Native Welfare, and so 
to us, that a native women was tribally married to a deceased 
native. The woman could be totally illiterate and unable to 
speak for herself. 
In response to these reports of divergent practices and 
opinion from SA and WA, the central office of the DSS chose to do 
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nothing. However, the matter arose again during 1967 in a form 
which could not so easily be put aside. The Qld administration of 
the DSS submitted a case to central office involving an 
Aboriginal woman who was claiming widow's pension as a deserted 
wife. This was precisely the sort of case that the central office 
had enquired of in Dece mber 1966. If the woman's former marriage 
was granted the status of a legally sanctioned union, she would 
be eligible for the pension. If, however, she was treated as 
having been a de facto dependent female before desertion, she 
would be ineligible. The Assistant Director General (Policy and 
Benefits) now took the opportunity to develop a general approach 
to the problem. Drawing on the WA and SA reports as well as this 
Qld case, he argued that the tribal marriage of a first wife 
should be treated for pension purposes as if it were a legal 
marriage. In answering the WA administration's arguments to the 
contrary, he commented: 
It has been suggested that by accepting a tribal marriage we 
place Aboriginal women in a better position than white de 
facto wives. This does not necessarily follow. It presupposes 
that a tribal marriage is not a marriage. In the view of 
white society this may be so but in the view of Aboriginal 
society a tribal marriage has just as much meaning and 
importance as a Church or Registry Office marriage for a 
white person. Tribal marriages are subject to quite 
complicated social rules, custom and traditions of kinship 
and to the Aborigines have a deep spiritual religious 
significance. As opposed to this a de facto union between a 
white couple is one in which, by hypothesis, marriage has no 
part. 
In October 1967, the central office of the DSS issued a circular 
instruction entitled 'Tribal Marriage between Aborigines'. It 
began: 
For the purposes of the provisions of the Social Services 
Act, the decision has been taken that a tribal marriage 
entered into according to recognised tribal practice between 
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Aboriginals should be accorded the same status as a marriage 
registered according to law. 
To clarify the matter, the instruction went on to list a number 
of decisions which either 'flowed from this' or had been 'taken 
on other occasions': 
(a) Where an Aboriginal pensioner has more than one wife, the 
woman who has lived longest with him (the first wife) will be 
treated as the only wife for pension and allowance purposes. 
Any second wife should be t reated as a single person; 
(b) On the death of the first wife of a man, a second wife 
(if any) becomes his first wife without involving any 
question of a waiting period; 
(c) Only the first wife of a man who dies should be regarded 
as his widow; 
(d) A first wife may, if the desertion by her husband be 
satisfactorily proved, qualify for pension as a deserted 
wife; 
(e) Child's allowance and additional pension for children 
should be paid only in respect of children of whom the first 
wife is the mother except that payment may be made for 
children of a previous first wife if other conditions are 
fulfilled. 
Though the instruction in its bald form may have been 
misinterpreted as granting all tribal Aboriginal marriage a 
status equivalent to marriage registered at law, this expansion 
made it clear that the established approach of not recognising 
second and subsequent wives of polygynous marriages was to be 
maintained. Decisions a, c and e clearly derived from the 1961 
and 1963 instructions on Aboriginal polygyny, while b referred to 
the circumstances of the 1966 WA case and d referred to the 
circumstances of the case which had just arisen in Qld. By 1967 
then, the DSS was maintaining its early approach to the non-
recognition of second and subsequent wives and had clarified the 
precise status given to first wives of Aboriginal tribal 
marriages for the purposes of the Social Security Act. 
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Policy versus Practice: the 1971 WA Case 
The extent to which this 1967 clarification of the status of 
first wives as legal wives was translated into changed practices 
in WA is highly debatable. A case arose at Docker River on the 
NT/WA border in 1971 in which an Aboriginal applicant for widows 
pension was assessed as ineligible by the Perth office of the DSS 
on the grounds that she had not lived continuously with her 
husband in a bona fide domestic relationship for the three years 
immediately prior to his death. On reapplying to the Darwin 
office of the DSS, the woman was granted a widows pension; her 
former tribal marrriage being accorded the status of marriage 
registered at law and, hence the rules not requiring her to have 
lived with the man for any specified period prior to his death in 
order to qualify. In seeking to confirm this decision to grant 
eligibility, the Darwin Regional Manager of the DSS raised the 
matter of the treatment of Aboriginal tribal marriage with more 
senior officers in the DSS's SA administration. He was under the 
impression that the 1967 instruction to treat Aboriginal first 
wives of tribal marriages as if they were legally marrried was 
still in force, despite the fact that no reference to the 
treatment of tribal marriage as legal marriage had since been 
incorporated into the general manual of instructions for pensions 
examiners. Was this impression correct? If so, why had the Perth 
office assessed the widow under the conditions of eligibility 
applying to de facto dependent females? The answer received from 
the SA state headquarters of the DSS in Adelaide was that the 
policy as enunciated in the 1967 instruction did stand and that 
the Darwin assessment was correct. The Perth office, it 
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suggested, had either been in error or had some reason for 
judging this particular case not to be a tribal marriage. 
Clearly there was more to getting the WA administration to treat 
first wives of Aborig inal tribal marriages as if they were 
legally married than simply sending out a circular instruction 
stating that this was now departmental policy. 
The Office of Aboriginal Affairs and the Push for DSS to 
Recognise Aboriginal Polygamy 
The next episode in the polygamy and tribal marriage debate 
began in 1969 when the Commonwealth government's new Office of 
Aboriginal Affairs(OAA) became aware of the fact that the DSS was 
only paying widows' pensions to the first widows of polygynous 
tribal marriages. The Office put the matter to its Minister, who 
happened also to be the Minister for Social Security, and 
recommended that he consider changing the established approach. 
The OAA's submission to the minister alluded skilfully to the 
provisions of the Social Security Act and to administrative 
principles of universality. It argued: 
There is nothing preventing the payment of Widows' Pensions 
to more than one woman on the decease of one man. It 
therefore seems something very like discrimination to 
maintain special administrative procedures limiting the 
eligibility of Aboriginal widows. 
The submission went on to further support the case for change by 
arguing first that it would not cost much because the number of 
widows of polygynous marriages was relatively small and the 
number who would not remarry even smaller, and second that it 
would ensure that Aboriginal women 'were not left without 
adequate support on the death of a husband'. The Minister 
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referred the OAA's submission to the DSS indicating that he was 
inclined to agree with the proposed change. 
In reply the Director General of the DSS admitted that there 
was no specific provision in the Social Security Act to prevent 
the payment of widows' pensions to more than one widow on the 
death of one man. But, quoting himself in a previous minute, he 
then changed the argument from one about precise legislative 
provisions to one about general legislative intent. 
Polygamous marriages are not recognised in that we do not pay 
wife's allowance (ie pension WS) to the several wives of an 
Aboriginal at the same time. Neither would we pay widows' 
pensions simultaneously to all of the wives of an Aboriginal 
who died. I do not believe that in framing the present 
legislation it was ever contemplated that we should. 
Of the OAA's other arguments, he regarded the first concerning 
cost as 'irrelevant to the policy issue' and the second 
concerning Aboriginal women being left without adequate support 
as not substantiated by any evidence of the 'relative poverty' of 
these women within Aboriginal tribes: 
I understand that some of the tribal customs that co-exist 
with the custom of tribal marriages, could require sharing 
within the tribe of pension support, notwithstanding that by 
our law the pension is wholly the property of, and is paid 
to, the 'first' wife. 
Having thus put the case for maintaining the established 
practice, the Director General deferred to the Minister by noting 
that if he did not agree, they would have 'to be more certain of 
the reasons for, and likely results of, paying two or more widows 
pensions on the death of one man before considering any change'. 
To meet the possibility of the Minister not being entirely 
convinced by this response, the Director General of the DSS set 
in train another intra-departmental information gathering 
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exercise. The SA administration was asked to inquire into and 
report on the extent of polygjmy among the Aboriginal clientele 
of SA and the NT and to consider the likely consequences of 
extending the payment of widows' pensions to all tribal wives of 
deceased Aborigines. The reports submitted to DSS central office 
by the SA Director and the NT Regional Manager in Darwin were 
solidly against the proposed extension of eligibility for widows 
pension, even though they recognised that in the NT at least 
polygyny was still widespread and that cases did arise in which 
Aboriginal widows were being disqualified from pension because 
they had been second wives. Seven such cases had in fact arisen 
in the NT in the previous year. The arguments adduced in support 
of not extending eligibility were many and varied. But they did 
have a familiar ring. One argument, in much the same vein as the 
Director General's reply to the Minister quoted above, proceeded 
from premises about tribal culture and the adequacy of the 
existing support arrangements. The SA Director noted that: 
From our rather limited experience with this type of case, 
and after assessing the information we have been able to 
obtain, it would seem that the tribal customs generally cater 
quite effectively for the continued maintenance of second and 
third wives of deceased Aborigines and that there is no real 
need for them to be granted a widow's pension. 
Another was reminiscent of one of the WA administration's 1966 
arguments against according the status of legal marriage to 
Aboriginal tribal marriage. It focused on the inadequacy of the 
DSS's investigative resources and its consequent inability to 
verify the claims of Aboriginal applicants living in complex 
family circumstances, particularly in remote areas. Again it was 
the SA Director who developed the argument most fully when 
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referring to the 'communication problem' and the 'difficulties of 
ascertaining the true situation' of Aboriginal applicants living 
on pastoral stations: 
Managers at many of these stations already complain about 
the administrative work they are now called upon to perform 
by Government Departments on behalf of Aborigines, and the 
increased complexity of the additional information we could 
require would undoubtedly result in the supply of inadequate 
details in many cases. To be effectively administered, 
therefore, such a proposal would, in my opinion, have to be 
accompanied by an extensive travelling service by our own 
staff. 
A third argument foresaw the extension of the logic of 
recognising multiple widows to recognition of multiple wives 
during the husband's presence. The Darwin Regional Manager 
believed that: 
Polygyny would certainly be a happy state if it brought with 
it plural wive's allowance and additional pension for 
children. 
But this, in his view and that of an NT Welfare Branch officer of 
twenty one years experience, 'could well be detrimental to the 
Aborigines' welfare in the broad picture'. 
A fourth argument, which the Darwin Regional Manager also 
developed, combined elements of each of these strands. Having 
noted that polygyny was still prevalent among the NT's 
Aborigines, he went on to comment that so too was the practice 
whereby the wives of a deceased man passed to his brothers. This 
he referred to as 'inheritance', 'the tribal old-age insurance 
scheme' which itself provided for Aboriginal widows. If multiple 
widows' pensions were available, the tribal custom of inheritance 
could, he believed, be undesirably undermined. Alternatively, he 
added, it could go underground, creating a problem for the DSS 
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with its limited investigative capacity: 
officially inheritance could disappear, but in reality it 
would still exist. 
Because of the high incidence of inheritance... it would be 
necessary to ascertain if and when these occurred in each 
case. If we recognise second and third widows (and beyond) as 
qualified for widow's pension, it follows we must also 
recognise their disqualification in circumstances approaching 
our remarriage. In a situation where no written contract in 
law exists, obtaining these facts could present considerable 
difficulties. 
The Darwin Regional Manager highlighted the weakness of his own 
argument here by acknowledging that the problems of 'recognising 
remarriage' could, in principle, already exist in relation to 
first wives. In practice, he claimed, this was not a problem 
because mission and Welfare Branch 'superintendents' in the NT 
seemed to 'exercise their discretion wisely': 
If it is apparent that a young widow will immediately pass to 
a brother, then he (the Superintendent WS) will not advise 
the woman to claim pension. In an instance where a brother 
takes over a woman and her children on sufferance because of 
tribal demands, and she is only nominally part of his "camp", 
the Superintendent may, in his judgement, advise the woman to 
claim. 
This glowing account of 'finely balanced justice-in-the-field', 
as the Darwin Regional Manager referred to it, was strangely at 
odds with the SA Director's misgivings about the reliability of 
information about Aboriginal clients supplied by pastoral 
stations and also with the WA administration's earlier account of 
its lack of confidence in the information supplied to it by 
officers of the WA Department of Native Affairs and 'some 
missions, pastoral stations and other authorities'. 
There was then a certain glibness in these arguments about 
the supposed inadequacy of the DSS's investigative resources for 
the task of assessing second wives cases, and about the supposed 
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adequacy of support recieved by second widows under existing 
'tribal' arrangements. One could imagine similar arguments having 
been adduced at an earlier stage to defend the ineligibility of 
Aborigines for social security payments more generally. Also, 
first widows were curiously exempted from the very arguments 
which so compellingly suggested not extending eligibility to 
second and subsequent widows. In the event, the DSS's armoury of 
diverse arguments was enough to quash pressure from the fledgling 
OAA for the extension of eligibility for widow's pension, despite 
the fact that the latter's approach had rather skilfully and 
simply invoked the provisions of the Act and the administrative 
principle of equal treatment for those in equal circumstances. So 
it appears in this instance at least, that the way politics is 
played in an administrative setting, the overall rigour of an 
argument is sometimes not as important as the accumulation of a 
number of vaguely related points which defend existing practice 
by foretelling the possible pitfalls of change. 
The Lull and then the Storm 
In the wake of this attempt by the OAA to get the DSS to 
change its policy of not recognising second widows of Aboriginal 
tribal marriages, the DSS's treatment of Aboriginal polygyny 
tended to lapse from the agenda of departmental debate. 
Individual cases continued to arise in the north of Australia at 
the regional office level, but it would not be until the early 
80s that they would once again give rise to more general debate 
over the DSS's approach. 
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In 1979, a number of cases involving second wives of 
Aboriginal applicants for UB were referred from the new Kununurra 
regional office of the DSS in the north of WA to state 
headquarters in Perth, and then to central office in Canberra. 
These brought to central office attention the fact that the 
existing instructions on polygyny referred only to pensions and 
had nothing explicit to say about the treatment of second wives 
in appli cations for unemployment or sickness benefit. The cases 
stimulated a round of correspondence between central office and 
the various state administrations of the DSS in an attempt to 
clarify whether the treatment of second wives as separate income 
units had also been applied in benefits assessment. The replies 
from the relevant states reported that it had and, since central 
office regarded this as the correct approach, no further action 
was taken. 
Also in 1979, the new NT administration of the DSS brought 
to central office attention a number of 'anomalies' in the 
'assessment of eligibility when Aboriginal polygynous marriages 
are involved'. The 1978 review of DSS operations in the NT, which 
had laid the groundwork for the establishment of the new 
Territory level administration of the DSS, had raised these 
anomalies to the attention of senior officers. Most related to 
the new category of supporting parent's benefit (SPB), introduced 
in 1973 as supporting mothers benefit and extended to include 
single parents of both sexes in 1977. In the absence of any 
heightened departmental conciousness of the problems associated 
with polygyny at the time of the introduction of this new 
benefit, and in the absence of subsequent cases referred to 
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central office raising specific eligibility problems, general 
instructions to indicate how second wives of polygynous 
Aboriginal marriages were to be treated if they applied for SPB 
were never produced within the DSS. Following the logic of the 
60s, one might have guessed that the treatment of second wives as 
separate income units would be extended to the new benefit, and 
that they would, so long as they had dependent children, be 
eligible for SPB. However in this instance, senior Benefits 
Division staff in central office had departed from the logic of 
not recognising second and subsequent wives and had instead 
reasoned that these women were living in a bona fide domestic 
relationship with a man, and were not therefore eligible for SPB. 
Though no instruction to this effect appears ever to have been 
produced, there is no doubt that this was the endorsed 
departmental approach, at least as understood by senior central 
office benefits policy and entitlements personnel. 
The 1978 review of DSS operations in the NT revealed that 
the understanding of this matter among rank and file assessors in 
the Department's regional offices was somewhat more equivocal. 
The only major entry on Aboriginal polygyny in the manual of 
instructions for pensions assessors in use in the Department in 
the late 70s was section 29.12, which read: 
Where an Aboriginal has more than one wife and he dies or 
deserts them, a widow's pension is to be granted to the first 
wife and supporting parent's benefit will be granted to each 
of the other wives, provided they are eligible in other 
respects. 
While this made clear the treatment of second wives after a 
husband's death, it would need a furtive rank and file 
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imagination to deduce from it the central office judgement that 
second wives were ineligible for SPB during their husbands' 
presence. The possibility of rank and file confusion was 
redoubled by section 15.501, the only other section of the 
pension manual which by the late 70s made any reference to 
polygyny. It suggested that departmental policy had changed from 
the time of the 1967 instruction, if not in favour of recognising 
the second wives themselves, at least in favour of recognising 
their children for the purposes of child's allowance and 
additional pension. It read: 
...additional pension will be paid for all children in his 
custody, care and control or for those children supported by 
the claimant provided he (and no one else) is responsible for 
their upkeep. This will apply irrespective of which wife is 
the mother. 
With such incomplete and inconsistent instructions in the manual, 
it was not surprising that the 1978 review of DSS operations in 
the NT revealed some diversity of practice at the regional office 
level. My own impressions, from field work undertaken in the 
early 80s, were also of diversity of practice at the regional 
office level. While most regional office staff at that time acted 
in accordance with the policy as understood by central office, 
some did at times act otherwise, either because of confusion or 
concious dissent. Some officers were just unclear about the 
matter and, extending the logic of non-recognition in section 
29.12, paid SPB to second wives. Other regional office staff who 
were fully aware of the Department's approach, but disagreed with 
its inconsistencies, were not averse to their own form of playing 
by the rules. They could, for example, choose to overlook the 
existence of a husband and present the facts of a case in a way 
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which would ensure eligibility for SPB or some other benefit. As 
the NT Director put it in terms more acceptable to departmental 
norms: 
In a number of cases the relationship between husband and 
second or subsequent wives has been considered sufficiently 
tenuous to enable the second or subsequent wife to be granted 
either the Supporting Parents Benefit or Unemployment 
Benefits. 
Aboriginal clients and their extra-departmental intermediaries 
had also learnt that presenting to the DSS as a second wife was a 
recipe for d i s a s t r o u s access experiences. So some, 
understandably, were not averse to presenting the facts of their 
case in ways which avoided these complications. 
By the late 70s then, the DSS's approach to polygyny had 
retreated from the consistent non-recognition of second and 
subsequent wives. Not only did it recognise a second wife's 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with her husband for the p u r p o s e s of 
disqualification from SPB, it also recognised the children of 
such a relationship for the purposes of qualification for child's 
allowance and additional pension. 
The NT Director's concern in 1979 was to precipitate some 
review of these inconsistencies that had crept into the 
Department's approach to polygyny during the 1970s and which 
underlay the regional office confusion, dissent and 
dissatisfaction on this matter which the 1978 review of DSS 
operations in the NT had revealed. In his submission to central 
office on the matter, the NT Director referred poignantly to the 
inconsistency of disqualifying Aboriginal second wives from SPB 
on the basis of recognising a relationship which was not 
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recognised for other social security assessment purposes. Once in 
DSS central office, the NT Director's submission began to re-open 
the debate about the Department's treatment of Aboriginal 
polygamy in a way that had not been seen since the pressure from 
OAA back in 1970. 
One benefits policy officer who examined the NT submission 
commented that: 
there seems to be fair reason to pay the supporting parent's 
benefit whilst the unrecognised defacto relationship is in 
force simply because it is not recognised. 
This officer then went on to discuss a case which had arisen in 
Qld in 1978 in which a non-Aboriginal woman lived with her sister 
and brother-in-law. Both women had a number of children by the 
man and the unmarried sister was in receipt of supporting 
parent's benefit for herself and her children. The DSS had judged 
that while the supporting parent's beneficiary's sister was 
married to the father, the beneficiary could not herself be 
considered to be in a bona fide de facto domestic relationship 
with the man. So SPB could be paid. 
Reference to this non-Aboriginal case was to become a 
catalyst which fundamentally changed the debate about Aboriginal 
polygyny and the social security system. For the first time. 
Aboriginal polygyny was being discussed in relation to other 
forms of polygyny encountered by the DSS among its clientele more 
generally. Following the decision in the Qld case, there was 
clearly an argument to be made that Aboriginal second wives 
should be treated in like fashion. But the Qld case was itself a 
source of uncertainty. The Qld Director of the DSS had had 
misgivings about the approach and had pointed out that there was 
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no law against a man having two 'wives', so long as he did not go 
through a m a r r i a g e c e r e m o n y w i t h m o r e than one. In these 
circumstances, and since the NT administration's submission had 
been a g e n e r a l one w h i c h did not require a specific case 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , the issueof A b o r i g i n a l polygyny was easiest 
avoided. The NT s u b m i s s i o n disappeared into the i n t e r s t i c e s of 
c e n t r a l office debate. But that d i s a p p e a r a n c e was to be short 
lived. 
The 1980 Alice Springs Appeal Case 
Late in 1980, the Alice Springs regional office of the DSS 
received the first appeal against an adverse d e p a r t m e n t a l 
decision on e l i g i b i l i t y for SPB from the second and subsequent 
wives of an Aboriginal marriage. The case involved an Aboriginal 
m a n who had a close association with the Central Australian 
Aboriginal Legal Aid Service, which had become keen on contesting 
the DSS's approach to Aboriginal polygyny. The m a n had three 
wives, two of whom applied for SPB late in 1980. Both claims were 
rejected. Both wives lodged appeals, one claiming to be the man's 
second w i f e , the other his third. The basis of both appeals was 
that the husband's wage of around $200 per week was insufficient 
to support his three w i v e s and five children. In the i n t e r i m , 
while awaiting the outcome of the appeal, one of the wives with a 
ten month old baby applied for and recieved special benefit. 
In an a t t e m p t to clarify d e p a r t m e n t a l policy for the 
purposes of the a p p e a l , the Director of the DSS in the NT 
approached central office with the case. He quoted the 1978 non-
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Aboriginal case in Qld and pointed out, as others before him, 
that if the decision made in that case was correct, there were 
grounds for paying supporting parent's benefit to second and 
subsequent Aboriginal wives even though they were residing with 
their husband. The NT Director's own preference was to agree with 
the Qld Director's earlier line that there was no legal bar to a 
man having two 'wives' for the purposes of the Social Security 
Act, though he did not go so far as to say that the decision in 
the 1978 Qld case was incorrect. His suggestion in the present 
case was that the two women be granted special benefit. 
Unlike the 1979 submission from the NT administration, this 
submission could not simply disappear into the 'too hard' basket 
in the interstices of central office debate. Two cases needed to 
be determined. So an answer had to be given. 
The first officer to consider the case in central office 
was a benefits entitlements examiner. He adopted a stance in 
favour of thorough going non-recognition of second wives, and 
hence against the endorsed central office approach which 
disqualified Aboriginal second wives from SPB. He argued that the 
terms husband and wife, as used in the Social Security Act, did 
not envisage a man living with more than one wife. Consistent 
with and referring to the 1978 Qld case he then argued that the 
two Alice Springs women should not be treated as having a husband 
for the purposes of the Act, and should therefore be eligible for 
SPB. The reasoning was reminiscent of the 1960s and was simple 
enough. 
This benefits entitlement officer did, however, point to 
another problem. Two different declarations on the file ordered 
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the man's three wives oppositely. One of them placing as first 
wife, the appellant who was claiming to be his third wife. The 
explanation for this was rather complex and raised another point 
of complicaton in DSS practices. In 1979, a project officer in 
the DSS central office Aboriginal unit and former ALO in the 
Alice Springs region prepared a report on the problems of 
polygynous marriages in that region. In it he noted the tendency 
for men to nominate as their first wife for pension purposes the 
woman with whom they presently associated most closely; rather 
than, as the DSS prescribed, the woman with whom they had lived 
the longest. This appears to have been the basis of confusion in 
the 1980 Alice Springs case. The appellant who claimed to be the 
man's third wife had, in fact lived with the man longer than the 
other two women, but was presently the least closely associated 
with him. The Assistant Director (Entitlements) who next examined 
the case, confirmed these facts and argued that this appellant 
was ineligible for SPB because she was, as far as the DSS was 
concerned, the man's first wife. The previous officer had not 
gone this far in his reasoning because there was, in fact, a 
fourth woman who had lived with the man prior to all the other 
three and who, even though she was not presently living with the 
man, could possibly still be regarded as his first wife for 
social security purposes. The Assistant Director disposed of this 
possibility by noting that this fourth women was 'not now 
regarded as a wife'. This cleared the way for his own 
interpretation of the facts which nominated one of the appellants 
as the first wife and hence as automatically ineligible for SPB, 
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irrespective of the outcome of the present debate. 
As to the other appellant, the Assistant Director 
(Entitlements) did not agree that the case was like the 1978 Qld 
one. In that case it had been argued that the man could not 
possibly be at once a legal husband and a de facto husband to two 
women. As one legal officer within the Department who had been 
consulted on the 1978 case commented: 
To my mind de jure recognition of a relationship where both 
parties recognize and discharge the common obligations of the 
married state must mean, by definition, that there is nothing 
other than the de jure relationship. There cannot be a co-
existing 'de facto relationship' in that type of situation. 
The Assistant Director (Entitlements) distinguished the present 
case from the Qld case on the grounds that in the present one a 
man was living with several de facto wives but no legal wife. In 
these circumstances, he argued, the DSS could recognise more than 
one 'wife', and could therefore effectively disqualify more than 
one woman from eligibility for SPB. What the Assistant Director 
(Entitlements) failed to point out, when developing this fine 
categorical distinction, was that Aboriginal tribal marriage of 
first wives had been accorded the status of legal marriage by the 
DSS as long ago as 1967. This, of course, totally undermined the 
subtle distinction between the cases that he was attempting to 
draw. There was, however, some implicit suggestion that the 
Assistant Director was aware of this problem in his reasoning. He 
did, for reasons known only to himself, include a paragraph in 
his memorandum on the case indicating that the NT administration 
had advised that the man at the centre of the case was an 'urban 
aboriginal... well known to the Department'. He continued: 
Previously for an aboriginal to take more than one wife he 
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was usually a tribal elder of high standing within the tribe. 
It is not unusual at present for young men who are part 
aboriginal and reside permanently in urban areas to take more 
than one wife. 
The implication seemed to be that this man's polygynous marriage 
was 'urban' rather than 'tribal', and so did not come under the 
DSS's established policy of granting the status of legal marriage 
to the first 'tribal' wife. The reasoning was not explicitly 
drawn out at this time. At a later date, however, as we shall 
see, it did become quite clear that this was the Assistant 
Director's intention. 
The Director (Entitlements) who next examined the Alice 
Springs case took a slightly different line again. He believed 
that both the appellants were living on a bone fide domestic 
basis with the husband and therefore were not eligible for SPB. 
He distinguished this case from the 1978 Qld case not on the 
basis of the relationships being all de facto in the former and 
one legal and one de facto in the latter, but on the basis of the 
applicants being members of different societies/communities. The 
current appellants, he claimed, 'belong to a society that accepts 
polygamy'. The Qld woman, on the other hand, 'lives in a 
community where polygamy is not accepted as a form of marriage'. 
He continued: 
It is understood that in societies that accept polygamy a man 
may have as many wives as he can afford. In this particular 
case it seems that..(the man) .. has as many wives as he can 
afford and it is wrong for this Department to provide pocket 
money for his wives and thus encourage him to have more wives 
than he can afford. In addition there seems no doubt that he 
was supporting his wives and there was no need for special 
benefit to be paid. 
This convenient bit of social analysis was reminiscent of those 
arguments adduced ten years earlier which justified not extending 
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eligibility for widows pension by pointing to the adequacy and 
desirability of supporting existing 'tribal' arrangements for the 
support of second and subsequent widows. In the present context, 
the Director's argument from premises about the fundamentally 
different nature of Aboriginal society, was ironically at odds 
with the Assistant Director's argument about the 'urban', and by 
implication 'non-tribal', nature of this man's polygyny. On the 
basis of his argument, the Director recomended not only the 
confirmation of the ineligibility for SPB, but also the 
cancellation of the special benefit granted to one of the 
appellants; the one whose baby had, at the time of the appeal, 
been ten months old but was, by this stage, closer to one year 
and ten months old. The Assistant Director General (Policy and 
Eligibility) agreed with both the Director's recommendations and 
instructed the NT administration accordingly. However, he did so 
in a way which neither clarified the reasons for this particular 
decision nor discussed the apparent inconsistency of the 
Department's approach to SPB for Aboriginal second wives which 
the original submission had raised. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission's Criticism of the DSS 
Approach 
At the time this Alice Springs appeal case was proceeding, 
another significant development for the polygyny debate within 
the DSS was also beginning to take shape. Since 1977, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission(ALRC) had been inquiring into 
the recognition of Aboriginal customary law. In 1981, the 
Commission approached the DSS asking for clarification of its 
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approach in this area of its administration. In reply, the DSS 
noted that the eligibility criteria for social security benefits 
were identical for all members of the community, but went on to 
explain that 'specific guidelines' did exist 'for assessing 
benefits for tribal Aboriginals in relation to polygamous 
marriages'. The DSS submission to the ALRC then explained and 
defended the Department's approach of not recognising second 
wives and widows for pension or benefit purposes. It ommitted to 
mention, however, the practice of disqualifying second wives of 
polygynous Aboriginal marriages from eligibility for SPB or, for 
that matter, the unrest developing within some sections of the 
Department because of what some saw as inconsistency in the DSS's 
approach. 
In late 1981, when the Commisioner who had recently taken 
charge of the ALRC's Aboriginal customary law reference visited 
the NT, he was made well aware of misgivings on the issue of 
polygyny within the NT branch of the DSS. With this prompting, 
the Commissioner began to inquire more critically into the DSS's 
treatment of Aboriginal polygamy. The DSS central office was 
forced to defend its approach more fully. A subsequent submission 
to the Commission began as follows: 
The Social Services Act does not define what is a marriage. 
It is apparent that the Act is formulated on the basis that 
by law and custom people have only one husband or one wife at 
any one time. In these circumstances, it has been necessary 
to make policy decisions as to the treatment of Aboriginals 
who have engaged in tribal marriages according to their 
custom. (Quoted in ALRC 1982:38) 
In mid 1982, the ALRC devoted a considerable part of one 
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research paper to the DSS's treatment of Aboriginal polygyny. The 
paper presented a major critique of the DSS's established 
approach. It characterised the 'legal basis' of that approach as: 
an appeal to unexpressed inference from the Act, that 'the 
legislature would have envisaged that each man would have 
only one wife'. (ALRC 1982:40) 
The Commision's approach was to begin with the specific 
provisions of the Act, and to cast doubt on the imputed 
legislative intent. Because of the expansive definitions of 
wives, widows and dependent females used in the Act, the 
Commission argued that it was 'by no means clear' that the 
legislature had envisaged that there would be only one wife. It 
developed the hypothetical case of a male pensioner who had 
deserted a legal wife and lived with a de facto wife. Both, it 
seemed, could be considered his wife for the purposes of the 
Social Security Act. The first would be eligible for widow's 
pension as a deserted wife, the second for wife's pension. On his 
death, given certain provisos about the age of the women and the 
length of the de facto relationship, both would be eligible for 
widows pension. In deference to the Department and the 
uncertainty of such interpretations of the Act, the Commission 
stopped short of finding 'legal fault' with the DSS's 
'implementation' of the Social Security Act. The Commission did, 
however, go so far as to say that it was 'by no means clear' that 
the Department's approach to polygynous tribal marriage would be 
sustained if challenged in a court of law (ALRC 1982: 41). 
The Commission's report went on to criticise the DSS's 
approach on a number of other counts. Most important among these 
were the inconsistency and repugnancy of recognising second wives 
248 
for the purposes of disqualification from SPB while not 
recognising them for the purpose of qualifyong for other social 
security payments. Following the Aboriginal project officer's 
1979 report, the ALRC also criticised the arbitrariness of the 
DSS's approach of choosing the wife who had lived with a man 
longest as his first wife for social security purposes. It also 
disputed the adequacy of a number of other arguments offered by 
the DSS both in defense of its present practices (such as that 
second wives are accommodated in other income support categories 
such as unemployment benefit and special benefit) and against the 
recognition of polygyny (such as that income tests would be hard 
to apply and that large payments would be aggregated). In 
reference to this last, the DSS had proffered the hypothetical 
example of an unemployment beneficiary with three wives each of 
whom had three children. He would, at 1982 rates, have been 
eligible for a benefit of $312.20 a week; 'significantly in 
excess of present average weekly earnings', the Department noted. 
The Commission's reply was to comment, 'somewhat facetiously', 
that this group of thirteen was 'hardly an average weekly family' 
(ALRC 1982: 44-45). 
The ALRC's preferred approach was to recognise Aboriginal 
polygyny for all social security purposes. Part of its critique 
had been to suggest that the recognition of polygyny may already 
be in accord with the provisions of the Social Security Act, as 
it presently exists. But the Commission wanted to go further than 
just having the DSS change its interpretation of the Act to 
accommodate polygyny. It wanted to positively recognise 
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Aboriginal tribal marriage and polygyny in the Social Security 
Act. Given that the Commission's terms of reference related 
specifically to the recognition of customary law and the 
likelihood that its interpretation of the existing Social 
Security Act as already being able to accommodate polygyny more 
generally would be disputed, this line of attack was not 
surprising. What was of interest was the way in which the 
Commission constructed the supporting argument. The Commission 
had noted and applauded the DSS's policy of according the status 
of legal marriage to the tribal marriages of Aboriginal first 
wives. It went on to argue that it was desirable to formally 
incorporate such recognition into the Social Security Act. 
Skilfully invoking universalistic principles of equal treatment 
and an appeal to consistency of approach, the Commission then 
argued that such legislative recognition should extend to 
subsequent wives of polygynous tribal marriages as well: 
if tribal marriage is to be recognised as marriage for any 
purposes under the Social Service Act 1947 (Cwlth) it should 
be recognised for all purposes. Anything less would be 
arbitrary and unfair.... 
One characteristic of tribal marriage is potential polygyny, 
which exists in a small but still significant minority of 
cases. Recognising tribal marriage involves recognising this 
possibility. (ALRC 1982:43-44) 
Reactions within the DSS 
Within the DSS, responses to the ALRC's interest in the 
polygyny issue varied markedly. Within a few weeks of the 
Commissioner's visit in late 1981, the NT administration of the 
DSS had taken the opportunity to present two more cases to 
central office for determination. Both could easily have been 
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determined within the NT using existing i n s t r u c t i o n s . H o w e v e r , 
the NT a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the 
Department's e n d o r s e d a p p r o a c h and w a n t e d to t a k e e v e r y 
o p p o r t u n i t y to c h a l l e n g e it. Its tone of a r g u m e n t in these two 
cases was considerably less deferential than in the earlier 1980 
case. 
The first case involved a w o m a n in her late t w e n t i e s w i t h 
three children. As the second wife of an age pensioner she w a s 
applying for special benefit, his older first wife already being 
in receipt of a wife's pension. The NT a d m i n i s t r a t i o n used this 
r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e case to bludgeon the central office with the 
inconsistencies of the DSS's established approach- The submission 
to central office began with a short 'discussion' of the w a y in 
which Aboriginal men could aquire multiple wives; the death of a 
b r o t h e r , or teenage girls being attached to an old man's 
household to bear children or to be 'settled down' and taught by 
the older w i v e s . This brief bit of social analysis concluded by 
confronting the Department's established practice of assigning 
p r i o r i t y to A b o r i g i n a l tribal wives according to the length of 
their cohabitation with the husband: 
The t e r m s n u m b e r one, n u m b e r two w i f e , etc., are not t e r m s 
used in a tribal situation. They have been brought into use 
as a convenient m e a n s of b u r e a u c r a t i c d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . 
A1 t h o u g h the r o l e s of e a c h w i f e m a y d i f f e r , e.g. 
h o u s e k e e p i n g , child b e a r i n g , their relative i m p o r t a n c e is 
equal. 
Having criticised the Department's approach on this count, the 
s u b m i s s i o n turned to the l e g i s l a t i v e definition of wife in the 
Act. It pointed out that this young woman applicant appeared to 
fall within that definition, and hence should be eligible for a 
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wife's pension. To 'strengthen this view', and no doubt to add 
insult to the central office's injury, the NT's submission then 
referred to the 1980 case in which the two Alice Springs 'wives' 
were assessed as ineligible for SPB. Central office had not long 
since finished expressing its opinions on this case, and to have 
it thrown back at it in the following manner, was unceremonious 
to say the least: 
The Assistant Director-General (Policy and Eligibility) 
confirmed that decision when he determined that both women 
could not meet the requirements of Section 83 AAA( 1) of the 
Act. (ie that they could not be regarded as married women 
living apart from their husband nor as not living with a man 
on a bona fide domestic basis WS) 
It would therefore appear that there is nothing to preclude 
payment of wife's pensions to subsequent wives of tribal 
marriage despite current policy as outlined in instruction 
15.501 of the pensions manual of instructions. Similarly, it 
would appear that subsequent wives are eligible for widow's 
pensions rather than supporting parent's benefit if the 
husband dies, deserts them or is jailed for more than six 
months. This is also at variance with the current policy (see 
instruction 29.12), 
The submission then recommended that both women be paid wife's 
pension and requested that central office provide 'urgent advice 
as to the correct action'. 
Once in central office, the case climbed much the same 
Benefits Division ladder as its 1980 Alice Springs predecessor. 
The Examiner (Entitlements) who in the 1980 case had argued for 
thoroughgoing monogamy and the payment of SPB, here pushed for 
the payment of wives pension to both women. In so doing, he 
showed himself to be committed to consistency of approach rather 
than monogamy per se. Having lost the 1980 round of the argument 
to his superiors, he now used that case to argue that if two 
wives had been recognised then for the purposes of 
disqualification from SPB, two wives should also be recognised 
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now for the purposes of qualification for wife's pension. He 
added : 
As a matter of priority the whole issue of the effect of 
tribal customs on the eligiblity of Aboriginals for pensions 
and benefits should be investigated and appraised. Amendment 
to and expansion of the pension manual is urgently called 
for. 
The Director (Entitlements) who next examined the case, agreed 
with his subordinate on two counts; first, that it did seem that 
strictly speaking, wife's pension could be paid and second, that 
the whole question of payment to Aboriginal second wives was 
indeed in need of urgent review. However, he disagreed on the 
immediate action to be taken in this case: 
It is the policy at present to pay wife's pension to only one 
wife. In this situation it is suggested that special benefit 
with additional benefit for three children be paid.... until 
the whole question of payment to wives in polygamous marriage 
has been thoroughly examined. 
The Assistant Director-General (Policy and Eligibility) who again 
was the final referee of the case showed himself to be a much 
more staunch defender of the existing departmental approach. In 
his reply to the NT administration, he pointed to the 'policy' of 
considering such second wives for unemployment benefit or special 
benefit in their own right, and suggested that the woman in 
question should be considered for either of these. He also 
defended the Department's established policy using the now 
familiar argument from general legislative intent: 
The Act is silent upon the treatment of cases where there is 
more than one wife, doubtlessly because the Australian social 
security system is based upon underlying social customs and 
law which permit only one wife. In these circumstances the 
legislators would have envisaged that each man being so 
restricted, only one wife's pension or only one widow's 
pension would be payable in respect of his marriage partner. 
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The point was elaborated in a more fully argued minute which 
accompanied the reply to the NT Director: 
While this may place the question of appropriate treatment of 
Aboriginal tribal marriages in some doubt, there is no strong 
case to specify in the law that pensions may be paid for each 
wife of a pensioner or beneficiary in order to cater for the 
needs of a minority group in the community, regardless of how 
important that minority may be. It would be difficult to 
confine such provisions to 'tribal' situations and not extend 
similar treatment to others in the community who may, for 
instance, concurrently live with de jure and de facto wives. 
In this regard, it is clearly the intention of the Act to 
confine the provision of income support to those in the 
community who are unable to provide for themselves (or who 
are not expected to provide for themselves) and the spouse of 
such persons. If a breadwinner has imposed exceptional 
responsibilities upon himself by undertaking the support of 
2 or more wives, there is no reason for the community to 
automatically accept that responsibility on his behalf. 
This elaboration combined the argument from general legislative 
intent with one deriving from principles of universality. The 
'minority group', as the Assistant Director-General saw it, just 
had to put up with equality of treatment under universalistic 
eligibility criteria. The weakness of his argument lay in its 
ommissions. Although the Assistant Director-General was probably 
alluding to the 1978 non-Aboriginal Qld case when referring to 
the possibility of having to 'extend similar treatment' to those 
in the community concurrently living with de jure and de facto 
wives, he seems to have been confused about the significance of 
that case for his argument. In it, by paying SPB to the second 
women, the DSS had done exactly what the Assistant Director-
General was now suggesting they should not do; namely provide 
income support to a family in which a man had taken upon himself 
the 'exceptional responsibility' of two wives. This, however, 
seemed lost from view. The 1978 non-Aboriginal Qld case was 
fading into departmental history and its implications for the 
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debate over the treatment of Aboriginal polygyny were begining to 
be confused. 
The NT administration's stance in this case in early 1982 
suggested that it, like the ALRC, was now in favour of the DSS 
recognising Aboriginal polygyny. When the ALRC's research report 
was published in mid 82, the Director of the DSS in the NT wrote 
to the Commission supporting its suggestion that tribal marriage, 
including its polygynous aspects, be recognised in the social 
security legislation. What the NT branch of the DSS was a little 
less clear on, however, was that such recognition would not be a 
panacea for all the DSS's problems in this area. In its research 
report, the ALRC foresaw that multiple spouses of working 
husbands (or wives) would all be disqualified from pensions and 
benefits, as presently all the wives are disqualified from SPB. 
Clearly, if Aboriginal polygyny was recognised, there would still 
be areas of uncertainty in the application of the rules to these 
types of cases. The ALRC was inclined to the view that these 
could be accommodated by the development of policies about the 
application of income tests to multiple-spouse income units. 
The second case which the NT administration referred to the 
central office during 1982, raised exactly this sort of problem. 
However, the way in which the NT administration approached the 
case showed it to be less rigorous in its thinking about the 
recognition of polygyny than the ALRC. The case involved the 
second wife of an unemployment beneficiary who had herself 
recently commenced work. The question which the NT administration 
wanted answered related to whether the second wife's income 
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should now be taken into account in calculating the husband's UB. 
Referring to the definitions of 'dependent female' and 'married 
person' in those sections of the Act relating to unemployment 
benefits, and having established thereby that both women should 
be regarded as the man's spouses, it appeared correct to the NT 
administration to take into account the woman's income. This was 
a repetition of the ALRC's argument for the recognition of 
polygyny proceeding from the expansive definitions of these terms 
that already existed in specific provisions of the Act. The 
thorough-going pro-recognition approach would then have been to 
ask for some clarification on how such an income test might be 
applied. This the NT administration failed to do, lapsing instead 
into the view that the second wife's income should not be taken 
into account. This view provided few problems for DSS central 
office, since it was consistent with the established approach of 
treating second wives as separate income units. The case was 
returned to the NT with central office merely confirming the NT's 
recommended course of action. Exactly why the NT administration 
lapsed into this inconsistent approach in this case is not clear. 
In may have been a genuine lapse of reasoning, reflecting the 
fact that the NT administration had not, as the ALRC had, 
anticipated the problems that would remain for social security 
administration even if Aboriginal polygyny was recognised. 
The important general point that arises out of these two 
1982 cases is that in response to the ALRC's interest in the 
matter, the NT administration of the DSS had become a much more 
forceful critic of the inconsistencies of the Department's 
approach; despite the one case in which it displayed the 
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inconsistency of its own thinking. In a general minute on the 
'policy on tribal marriage' put to the 1982 conference of DSS 
senior assistant directors, the NT administration used the 1980 
case and the two 1982 cases to argue as follows: 
The definition of 'wife' is similar in all parts of the Act 
and it is considered that the Department must be consistent 
in its decisions. That is second or subsequent wives are 
'wives' for all parts of the Act or they are not.... 
The view of the Northern Territory Administration is that 
these women qualify as wives under the Act and thus should be 
eligible for wifes pension, additional benefit, etc. 
The DSS central office's reaction to the ALRC's interest had, on 
the other hand, been quite different. Having defended the 
Department's established approach in its original submission and 
in the face of the Commission's more critical investigation, the 
central office Benefits Division in particular was less than 
pleased to be presented with a major critique of its approach and 
supporting arguments. The Benefits Division was not ready to do a 
major about face on the issue. Its response to the Commission's 
research report picked up a number of minor, and in the 
circumstances almost pedantic, points; such as the fact that some 
of the legislative terminology used by the Commission had 
recently been changed. While points of detail are important in a 
game which is played so much by the rules, here they served only 
to obfuscate the thorough-going nature of the ALRC's critique. 
The one substantial point that the Benefits Division of 
central office did raise related to the geographical extent of 
the recognition of tribal marriage. The reply to the Commission 
conmiented : 
has the Law Reform Commission given any consideration to or 
made any recommendations on where the recognition of 
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Aboriginal customary law would apply. For example would such 
r e c o g n i t i o n be extended to all A b o r i g i n a l s or would it be 
limited to say for example Aboriginals still living according 
to tribal laws and customs in remote Aboriginal communities. 
The idea lurking behind this c o m m e n t had g r o w n from the 1980 
Alice Springs case in which the Benefits Division had alluded to 
the 'urban' nature of the man's polygyny. You w i l l recall that 
s o m e s e n i o r B e n e f i t s D i v i s i o n s t a f f in c e n t r a l o f f i c e 
distinguished this case from the 1978 non-Aboriginal Qld one by 
referring to the fact that there were only de facto wives in the 
Alice Springs case, but a legal and a de facto wife in the Qld 
case. I c o m m e n t e d at that point in m y account that this m a d e no 
sense in the light of the Department's e s t a b l i s h e d policy of 
treating first w i v e s of Aboriginal tribal unions as if l e g a l l y 
m a r r i e d . I w e n t on to quote a p a r a g r a p h of the m i n u t e in w h i c h 
the u r b a n / t r i b a l distinction was developed and to suggest that 
the officer concerned may be developing the distinction in order 
to deny this m a r r i a g e its tribal, and hence legal, status for 
social security purposes. In this 1982 debate with the ALRC, the 
Benefits Division officer w h o , as Assistant D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l 
(Policy and Eligibility) had been the highest referee of the 1980 
case, now made clear the connection between the earlier case and 
the current c o m m e n t on the ALRC's report. In the p r o c e s s , he 
verified m y earlier suggestion about the reasoning in the 1980 
case. He commented: 
does it (the ALRC W S ) recognise a traditional m a r r i a g e can 
exist in centres like Darwin or Alice Springs or Katherine, 
particularly where the person concerned has adopted many non-
t r a d i t i o n a l aspects into his life style. This is relevant 
in that one of the case studies quoted by the LRC was 
critical of the Department's not treating the marriage as a 
traditional one but it made no reference in its report to the 
fact that the m a r r i a g e was outside tribal areas and the 
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person was living a non-tribal life-style. 
If the LRC recognises this distinction, it may wish to 
comment on how any change in law might be drafted to reflect 
it and to recognise difficulties in determining to whom the 
provisions apply. 
In pursuing this particular line of response, the central office 
Benefits Division was displaying its ingenuity in developing 
arguments which provided support for established practices by 
forecasting the problems that would flow from proposed changes. 
Though the arguments were different in detail, the process itself 
was reminiscent of the way in which the DSS had succesfully 
shrugged off the OAA's pressure to extend eligibility for widow's 
pension in 1970. In this instance, however, the argument was 
peculiarly anachronistic and the ALRC's criticism was not to be 
disposed of so perfunctorily. 
Drawing categorical distinctions between different types of 
Aborigines for the purposes of public allocation of services is 
reminiscent of Aboriginal welfare policy of the s-i-x-t4es-and 
before. Since the introduction of the policy of self-
determination into Aboriginal affairs, distinctions of this sort 
have been shunned in favour of Aboriginal self-identification. In 
developing the tribal/urban argument in the early 80s then, the 
Benefits Division showed itself to be peculiarly out of touch 
with and insensitive to developments in the politics of 
Aboriginal affairs policy. The ALRC showed no such insensitivity. 
In reply to the DSS it reduced the problem to a simple matter of 
evidence: 
So far as the appplication of our proposals with respect to 
marriage is concerned, we would not envisage territorial 
restrictions, because these would be virtually impossible to 
define. A traditionally married person may visit Canberra or 
Sydney....What we are saying is that some persons by virtue 
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of their adherence to Aboriginal tradition and by virtue of 
the marriage in accordance with that tradition ought to be 
regarded as married for various purposes under the general 
law. So what is necessary in each case is to show that 
adherence and that compliance. This becomes a matter of 
evidence, and we are told that it causes relatively little 
problem in practice. 
Beyond calling forth this newly developed argument, the ALRC 
report had the effect of setting in motion once again a general 
debate on the Department's treatment of polygjmy within the DSS 
central office. As had been previously the case when confronted 
with the overall inconsistencies of the Department's approach, 
the Benefits Division of central office showed itself to be 
unwilling to resolve the matter in any way other than as it had 
already done so. The debate bogged down and in January 1984, a 
departmental working party was established to deal with the 
matter. The working party decided to do nothing until the ALRC 
had produced a final report. This approach was a perfect foil for 
the ALRC which, fearing that a once and for all report on the 
recognition of Aboriginal customary law might be quickly lost 
from the political agenda of reform, had opted instead to pursue 
its customary law reference through interim research and 
discussion papers. The ALRC's hope was that it might induce 
reform along the way. In this instance, however, the lack of 
authority of the interim research papers has been used by the 
Benefits Division of the DSS to justify inaction. 
Discussion. 
In the process of recounting the history of the treatment 
Aboriginal polygyny and tribal marriage in the social security 
system, I have made a number of points in passing about the way 
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in which the debate has proceeded. Having arrived at the present, 
there are a n u m b e r of m o r e general o b s e r v a t i o n s about this 
particular example of politics in an administrative setting which 
need to be made. 
First, it is interesting to note the way in which individual 
cases and the low level a d m i n i s t r a t i v e processes of service 
d e l i v e r y have c o n t i n u o u s l y interacted with higher level m o r e 
generalised processes of departmental decision making and debate. 
At a l m o s t every turn, it has been specific cases w h i c h have 
precipitated the general debate and provided its points of focus. 
In the early days of the issue, such cases p r o m p t e d useful 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the DSS's g e n e r a l approach. It was the cases 
r e f e r r e d to DSS c e n t r a l o f f i c e f r o m the W A and Qld 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s in 1966 and 1967 r e s p e c t i v e l y that led to 
clarification of the policy of treating first wives of Aboriginal 
tribal marriages as if their marriages were legally sanctioned. 
After the i n t r o d u c t i o n of SPB in the mid 70s, and w i t h it the 
development of a major inconsistency in the DSS's approach, the 
relationship between individual cases and general debate changed 
rather dramatically. While individual cases still provided the 
catalyst and the focus for debate, general clarification ceased 
to be a significant outcome. In each instance where the NT branch 
of the DSS, in p a r t i c u l a r , has offered cases in the hope of 
c h a l l e n g i n g these i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s , the Benefits Division in 
central office has determined the cases by simply restating the 
existing instructions and approach, and without reference to the 
broader issues of inconsistency raised. In so doing the Benefits 
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Division has been able to maintain the established departmental 
approach while deferring any process of more conclusive debate 
which might conceivably resolve the issue in some alternative, 
less inconsistent, way. The ALRC, with its more general legal 
approach and its position of extra-departmental authority, has as 
yet been similarly unsuccessful in precipitating any move away 
from the established approach. 
The second point to note about the polygyny and tribal 
marriage debate has to do with the way in which argument has 
entered into the policy processes. In the course of recounting 
the history of the issue, I have identified and characterised a 
number of types of arguments. There have been times when the 
argument has proceeded from premises about specific legislative 
provisions or alternatively about general legislative intent. 
Other arguments have proceeded from administrative principles of 
universality or consistency, or even at time from premises about 
the nature of Aboriginal society and its relationship with the 
encompassing white society. At points in the account, I have also 
identified more minor arguments involving, for example, 
assertions about the weakness of the DSS's investigative 
resources to cope with proposed changes or about the possible 
costs of those changes. It may be useful, therefore, to consider 
the overall arrangement of at least the major arguments used in 
the debate. 
Argument from the specific legislative provisions of the 
Social Security Act has been primarily the province of those 
pushing for the recognition of polygyny. Most have pointed out 
that Aboriginal second wives do appear to come within the various 
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definitions of wives, widows and dependent females and that 
nothing in the Act precludes the recognition of multiple numbers 
of such women in relation to any one man. The OAA used the 
argument in 1969-70 in its attempt to get eligibility for widows 
pension extended to second and subsequent Aboriginal widows. More 
recently, the ALRC and the NT administration of the DSS have 
further refined this sort of argument in their attempts to get 
the Department to recognise Aboriginal polygyny for all social 
security purposes. Against it has been arrayed the argument from 
general legislative intent: that the legislators envisaged that 
each man would have only one wife at any one time. Elaborated in 
different ways, this has always been the DSS's main defence 
against those pushing for the recognition of polygyny. It was 
used against the OAA in 1969-70 and has been similarly used 
against the ALRC and the NT branch of the Department in the 
1980s. 
Other arguments have not been so simply deployed among the 
protagonists. The argument for consistency of approach across the 
whole range of social security payments was, in the early days of 
the issue, largely the province of those defending the DSS's non-
recognition of second wives against those who wanted to recognise 
these wives for one purpose or another. Hence it was the 
consistency argument that put an end to the 1965 attempts within 
the WA administration of the DSS to recognise a second wife's 
relationship with her husband in order to reduce the rate of 
pension paid to each of them. The consistency argument was also 
prominent among the Darwin Regional Manager's reasons for not 
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acceding to the OAA's d e m a n d s for the extension of e l i g i b i l i t y 
for w i d o w s ' pensions to second w i v e s . After the m i d - 7 0 s , w h e n 
through regarding Aboriginal second wives as ineligible for SPB 
the DSS introduced a degree of i n c o n s i s t e n c y into its o w n 
a p p r o a c h , the a r g u m e n t from c o n s i s t e n c y of a p p r o a c h b e c a m e 
rather d i f f e r e n t l y deployed. It b e c a m e a m a j o r part of the 
armoury of those pushing for major change in the DSS's practices; 
either through the recognition of polygyny or through consistent 
non-recognition of second wives, and hence the extension to them 
of eligibility for SPB. 
A r g u m e n t s from principles of u n i v e r s a l i t y have been even 
m o r e e q u i v o c a l l y deployed. The reason for this is that the 
notion of equal treatment for those in equal circumstances leaves 
much to be specified. I noted earlier, the way in which both the 
SA and W A a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s of the DSS used this principle on 
opposite sides of the 1966-67 debate over whether the marriages 
of A b o r i g i n a l first w i v e s should be treated as de jure or de 
facto. Much the same type of deployment emerged in 1980 when the 
two appellant wives in the Alice Springs case were being compared 
with the wives in the 1978 non-Aboriginal Qld case. For those who 
saw the two situations as 'equal', the 1978 case was a strong 
precedent for paying the Aboriginal w o m e n SPB, and hence for 
overturning the established d e p a r t m e n t a l approach. Those who 
chose to defend the Department's approach argued, on the other 
hand, that the two cases did not represent 'equal circumstances'. 
More recently still, arguments from the principle of universality 
have been deployed on both sides of the A L R C - s p o n s o r e d debate 
over the g e n e r a l recognition of A b o r i g i n a l polygyny for all 
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social security purposes. While the Assistant Director-General 
(Policy and Eligibility) has been arguing that the DSS cannot 
recognise Aboriginal polygyny because it would then be difficult 
not to extend eligibility to others in the community living with 
two wives, the ALRC has been arguing that the DSS must recognise 
polygyny in order to treat Aboriginal first and second wives 
equally. Arguments from the principle of universality depend 
crucially on which among the diverse client circumstances 
protagonists deem to be equal and which to be different. The 
principle itself is not at dispute in administrative politics. 
What is, however, is where precisely categorical distinctions are 
to be drawn and when, as a consequence, circumstances are to be 
deemed equal or unequal. 
The final type of argument that deserves attention is unlike 
the others in that it is peculiar to the particular brand of 
administrative politics which has developed in recent years 
around questions about the inclusion or exclusion of Aborigines 
from the programs of mainstream government departments like the 
DSS. These are arguments which proceed from premises about the 
nature of Aboriginal society to conclusions about the 
applicability of the particular department's rules and service 
categories to the potential Aboriginal clientele. In the early 
stages of the polygyny debate, they were used by the DSS to 
defend itself against the OAA's pressures for extending 
eligibility for widows' pensions. Multiple widows pensions would, 
it was contended, undermine 'tribal' social support mechanisms. 
Likewise, it was supposed that the 'communal' nature of 
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Aboriginal culture meant that Aboriginal second widows who 
received no pension were being adequately catered for in the 
tribal 'sharing' of resources. More recently, one central office 
Benefits Division officer argued that the difference between the 
1980 Alice Springs case and the 1978 non-Aboriginal Qld case, was 
that the two 'wives' in the latter case lived in a 'community' 
which did not recognise polygyny, while those in the former 
lived in a 'society' which did. On this basis the white second 
wife was to be paid SPB while the Aboriginal women were not. In 
polygynous societies, the argument went, men have 'as many wives 
as they can afford', and so to pay SPB would be to undermine the 
basis of the society by encouraging men to have more wives than 
they could otherwise afford. More recently still, this type of 
argument has been used to attack the DSS's established approach, 
as for example when the NT Director of the DSS used some simple 
social analysis about the way in which Aboriginal men acquire 
second wives to attack the Department's approach to numbering 
Aboriginal wives. 
The truth or otherwise of these assertions about Aboriginal 
society is not important in this present context. What is, 
however, is the way in which the arguments have been used in the 
processes of administrative politics. Arguments of this type 
depend for their force on asserting the existance of fundamental 
differences between Aboriginal customs of social support and the 
family income support assumptions implicit in the contemporary 
Australian social security system. Difference there are. This no-
one would deny. But whether Aboriginal polygyny needs to be cast 
as any more fundamentally at odds with the assumptions of the 
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social security system than other family income unit 
complications which clients encounter in their dealings with the 
DSS, is a question which has seldom been asked. The casting of 
the issue as one of 'Aboriginal tribal marriage' has, of course, 
encouraged fundamentalist conceptualisation of the problem. 
However, there have been points in the debate when similarities 
have been made apparent between the problems which arise in this 
small number of cases among Aborigines in the more remote areas 
of Australia and other family income unit problems encountered 
among the larger DSS clientele. The reference to the 1978 non-
Aboriginal Qld case in the Aboriginal polygyny debate is a case 
in point. So is the argument, used by those pushing for the 
recognition of Aboriginal polygyny, that the Act as it stands is 
not necessarily at odds with polygyny anyway. The discussion at 
the begining of this chapter of the profound family income unit 
problems encountered by the DSS in its dealings with clients more 
generally, also suggests that the problems encountered with 
Aboriginal polygyny are not themselves so fundamentally 
different. 
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Chapter 
The Complications of Aboriginal Economic Marginalisation: 
DB or Not DB? That is the Question. 
Among Australian government services, UB is poised uneasily 
between being a 'welfare' and a 'workforce' program. Of all the 
social security system's income service categories, UB is the one 
subject to the most stringent eligibility conditions and the most 
frequent review procedures. This is because all the other 
categories provide income support to applicants who, on account 
of their age, incapacity, child rearing responsibilities or, in 
the case of widow's pension, former dependence on a male spouse, 
are regarded as either temporarily or permanently outside the 
workforce. UB, on the other hand, provides income support to 
people who are considered part of the workforce but who, for one 
reason or another, are presently unable to obtain work. The 
administration of UB is wracked by a tension between, on the one 
hand, preventing hardship and, on the other, preserving the 
workforce; it must not be a 'soft option' (Painter 1980: 267). In 
the language of micro-economists, UB is a 'work disincentive', 
particularly since the 'effective marginal tax rate' on the 
changeover from UB to employment is high (Edwards 1983:8-12, 
Whiteford 1981). Eligibility for UB depends not only on 
applicants being unemployed, but also on their passing the 'work 
test'; demonstrating that they are capable and willing to 
undertake suitable work and have taken reasonable steps to obtain 
such work. Some applicants fail the work test, and some 
beneficiaries become ineligible because they are no longer judged 
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to meet this condition (Jordan 1981b). They, for their 
misdemeanours, will probably be left with no social security 
income support at all. 
Government programs directed at those who are regarded as 
part of the workforce are primarily the province of the various 
Commonwealth and State industrial commissions and departments of 
employment, labour or industrial relations. The former, through 
their hearings and determinations, maintain Australia's system of 
award wages and conditions in accordance with which workers are 
to be employed. The latter provide inspectorates for the 
enforcement of award determinations and also provide a number of 
other employment-related services. The Commonwealth Department of 
Employment and Industrial Relations (DEIR), for example, through 
its Commonwealth Employment Service, provides a job advertising 
and placement service and an ever changing array of wage 
subsidies and allowances intended to encourage particular types 
of employment opportunities and vocational training. As discussed 
earlier, the CES is also involved in the work testing of 
applicants for UB. The role of the DSS and of its UB program is 
merely that of last resort in a vast array of workforce related 
programs. 
Much of the day-to-day politics surrounding UB arises 
because of its rather tenuous position between welfare and 
workforce. The distinctions implicit in the rules which govern 
its provision are much contested. Who precisely is considered 
part of the workforce? What evidence is taken as demonstrating a 
capability and willingness to undertake suitable work? Where 
exactly are the demarcation lines between UB and the other 
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Commonwealth and State government workforce and welfare programs? 
These questions provide the areas of indeterminacy which 
constitute the arena for ongoing politics surrounding the 
provision of UB. The form of the debate is, of course, alvjays in 
accordance with legal-bureaucratic norms. Like cases are to be 
treated in like fashion and the rules are to be applied 
consistently and in accordance with legislative intent. These 
principles are unproblematic in the administrative setting. What 
is, however, is how they relate to the cases at hand. What 
exactly is the legislative intent? What constitutes a consistent 
approach? And which cases are the like ones? 
In this chapter I examine the politics which has surrounded 
the issue of Aboriginal eligibility for UB over the last 25 
years. In comparison with the politics which has surrounded the 
application of social security rules to polygynous Aboriginal 
families, the debate over eligibility for UB has been far less 
intricate and arcane, and also a far more open and public affair. 
Politicians and others have often expressed views and taken 
stands in public forums, such as the parliament. The processes of 
argument have not been so entirely the preserve of DSS officials 
and other closely interested parties, though these actors have 
still been centrally involved. The central issues have remained 
basically constant and quite simple. Are Aborigines, particularly 
those in remote areas, unemployed just like other Australians or 
is their unemployment somehow different? Indeed, are they within 
the workforce at all, or are they beyond it and hence beyond the 
scope of UB? The prevailing judgements on these matters within 
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the DSS at any one time have been a source of constant dispute. 
Over time, these questions have been answered in markedly 
different ways in relation to Aborigines in various types of 
circumstances, and with the support of arguments comparing these 
groups of Aborigines to an equal variety of other potential UB 
applicants. 
In the early days the provisions were interpreted so that 
very few Aborigines obtained UB. As might be expected from the 
general analysis of the position of Aborigines in Australian 
society in chapter 3, the earliest challenges to Aboriginal 
exclusion from UB related to Aborigines in the southern more 
settled parts of the continent. So the chapter begins with a 
brief discussion of developments in these areas in the 1950s. 
However, most of the contention has surrounded the eligibility of 
Aborigines in more remote areas who have only more recently moved 
beyond the highly segregated and controlled Aboriginal welfare 
structures of the past. The greater part of the chapter, 
therefore, is concerned with events in the remote areas in more 
recent years. The challenge to Aboriginal ineligibility for UB in 
these areas began to build up in the 1960s, but did not really 
gain much ground until after the election of the Whitlam 
government late in 1972. During the rest of the 1970s the issue 
of Aboriginal eligibility for UB was highly contested, with 
participants pushing strongly in different directions. The 
outcome of this debate has been the gradual extension of 
Aboriginal eligibility for UB into even the most remote areas. 
However, the process has been complex and by no means 
unidirectional or conclusive. Even today the payment of UB to 
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Aborigines in the more remote areas remains a contentious issue. 
UB and Full Employment in the 1950s: 
Developments in the Settled Areas 
Under the welfare authority approach to Aboriginal affairs, 
Aborigines were excluded from the provisions of the mainstream 
workforce-related controls and services such as award wages, 
employment and training services and UB. The various state-level 
Aboriginal welfare authorities developed their own workforce-type 
programs for those subject to their supervision and control. The 
levels of reward under such programs were, of course, far below 
those pertaining in the mainstream workforce institutions of 
Australian society, and none included any equivalent to UB. 
By the 1950s, an increasing number of Aborigines in the more 
settled areas of Australia were moving beyond the segregated and 
closely managed reserve institutions of the Aboriginal welfare 
authorities. This brought with it the possibility of becoming 
involved in applications for UB when out of work, and hence of 
questions about their eligibility being contested. In general 
such debates were fairly infrequent and, by comparison with those 
that would arise later in relation to those in the more remote 
areas, not greatly contested. This was due in part to the fact 
that the 1950s was a period of relatively full employment in 
Australia. In terms of amounts of money paid out, UB was not a 
very large source of income or for that matter not even a very 
large element of the total social security system. The lack of 
contention was also due to the related fact that most Aborigines 
who were living permanently outside the welfare authority reserve 
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institutions were clearly regarded by the DSS as of sufficient 
'character, standard of intelligence and social development' to 
qualify for eligibility on the same grounds as other Australians 
in the workforce; which given the full employment of the time 
meant a fairly strict interpretation of the eligibility criteria 
and very few applicants for UB anyway. 
Contention did arise, as we saw in chapter 4, in relation to 
Aborigines in the settled areas who were moving back and forth 
between the old welfare authority reserves and the towns and 
cities of the larger society. Their eligibility for UB was more 
unclear because it was disputed within the DSS whether they were 
to be regarded as part of the general workforce or as part of a 
separate Aboriginal welfare system. The patterns of eligibility 
which did emerge were predictable enough. The more an individual 
Aborigine had lived and worked outside welfare authority 
reserves, the more likely he was to qualify for UB. Conversely, 
those who had spent less time outside reserves were more like to 
be knocked back; particularly if applying while living on a 
'managed 'reserve. Again, it should be emphasised that these were 
times of full employment and of strict interpretations of UB 
eligibility criteria. UB payments were not widespread and UB 
administration was not a highly contested or relevant aspect of 
government administration either for Aborigines or for Australian 
workers more generally. 
UB and the Move towards Award Wages in the 1960s: 
Seeds of Change in the Remote Areas 
In the House of Representatives in October 1958, the Labor 
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member for the seat of Kalgoorlie in outback WA argued that DSS 
officers should be stationed at two of the larger towns in his 
electorate. In putting his case, he pointed to the recent changes 
in Aboriginal entitlement under the Social Security Act and to 
the number of Aborigines in the Kalgoorlie electorate. He refined 
this argument by distinguishing between two types of Aborigines. 
First was the 'bush native' who 'does not want to work and sees 
no reason to work'. The member was not concerned with these 
Aborigines since he did not believe that they could be 'dealt 
with adequately under the unemployment benefit provisions' of the 
Social Security Act. He was however concerned with that other 
category of Aborigines, as he distinguished them; those who 'do 
work' and who 'are happy in employment' (CPD House of 
Representatives 10/10/68: 1885). He argued that this latter group 
were often being unjustly treated both while in employment, 
through the payment of under award wages, and while unemployed, 
through being judged ineligible for UB. It was in relation to 
these Aborigines that he saw the stationing of a DSS officer in 
the two towns as an important priority. 
In these distinctions and subsequent remarks, the member for 
Kalgoorlie neatly captured both the dominant approach and the 
emerging area of contention relating to Aboriginal eligibility 
for UB in the remote areas. His reference to 'bush natives' was 
in line with the BSS's established approach of regarding many of 
the Aborigines in these areas as totally outside the workforce 
and hence beyond the scope of UB. This approach had the support 
of most of the established Aboriginal welfare interests of the 
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1960s and, indeed, substantially reflected their past antipathy 
to having UB within the welfare structure. But this dominant 
approach was beginning to be challenged, and particularly in 
relation to Aborigines in these areas who had at some time been 
employed outside the welfare systems. 
In 1965, the journal of the Melbourne based Federal Council 
for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders 
(FCAATSI) included an article entitled 'Discrimination in the 
North West; Commonwealth Social Services Department Policy on 
Unemployment Benefit for Aborigines Assures Cheap Labour Pool'. 
The article was the result of an interchange between the WA 
administration of the DSS and a white advisor to an Aboriginal 
group involved in the pastoral industry in the north of WA. The 
white advisor had sought clarification from the WA administration 
of the DSS regarding the eligibility of Aborigines for UB, 
particularly in relation to pastoral work offered at under award 
rates of pay. The reply from the WA Director of the DSS indicated 
that Aborigines could apply for UB, but that if they were to be 
regarded as willing and available to undertake suitable work, 
they would have to be prepared to accept employment under the 
'local conditions' applying to 'native labour'. In remote areas 
like northern WA, this meant accepting work at under award rates 
of pay. The white advisor viewed this as a form of unjustified 
discrimination. Though no claims for UB were lodged with the DSS 
at the time, the advisor referred the matter to FCAATSI to be 
taken up with the Minister. In his reply the Minister for Social 
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Security reiterated the WA administration's position and added: 
My department is not responsible in any way for wages policy 
and its concern is to see that claims made under the Social 
Service Act are determined in accordance with the law 
expressed in that Act (quoted in Davey 1965:4). 
The advisor's challenge had been unsuccessful. Even FCAATSI's 
representations had been cursorily dismissed by the Minister with 
no more than an off hand reference to the Act and by his 
disavowing any responsibility for Aboriginal wages policy. 
Others, however, would not be so easily dismissed. 
At the time of this interchange in WA, in neighbouring NT 
the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
happened, by coincidence, to be engaged in hearing a claim by the 
North Australian Workers Union for the inclusion of Aborigines in 
the Cattle Station Industry (Northern Territory) Award (Rowley 
1971b: Chs 10,14,15, Stevens 1981: Ch 3). Previously the 
Commission had taken the view that it was appropriate to leave 
matters pertaining specifically to the conditions of Aboriginal 
employment to 'the specialised government departments' which 
dealt with Aboriginal welfare (see Rowley 1971: 311). In this 
hearing, the Commission reversed its former view. The claim for 
the inclusion of Aborigines in the award was heard and was 
successful. The judgement was, however, subject to the proviso 
that in order to give the industry time to adjust, the inclusion 
would not come into effect until December 1968. In the interim 
the Wards Employment Ordinance, the NT Welfare Branch's 
equivalent to an industrial award for Aborigines, would continue 
to apply. 
This three year inter-regnum in the regulation of Aboriginal 
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employment in the NT pastoral industry provided a number of more 
successful cases in which challenges were made to the 
disqualification of Aborigines from UB. In August 1966, a group 
of Aboriginal pastoral workers walked off Wave Hill station, 
south west of Katherine in the NT (Hardy 1968). They camped 
nearby at Dagaragu (Wattie Creek) and over thirty of them applied 
for UB. All were assessed as ineligible because of a report 
obtained by the DSS from their former employer which indicated 
that they had ceased work of their own accord and that employment 
was still open to them under the terms laid down in the Wards 
Employment Ordinance. Later in the year, a number of these 
Aboriginal stockmen moved with their families to Darwin, where 
some gained employment and others again applied for UB. This time 
the DSS assessed them as eligible for UB, judging that they had 
severed their connections with Wave Hill and were available for 
employment in Darwin. 
In the months following the Wave Hill incident, a number of 
other groups of Aboriginal pastoral workers in the NT also staged 
walk offs. Encouraged, by the Wave Hill workers' success in 
gaining UB, they also applied. By February 1967, the Darwin DSS 
had received 100 claims from Aboriginal stockmen in 10 different 
areas. In each walk off the stockmen complained of the non-
payment of wages and the inadequate provision of food and other 
items even to the levels specified in the NT Welfare Branch's 
Wards Employment Ordinance. The stockmen also stated that they 
would only work again if employed at full pastoral industry award 
rates or under prenegotiated contract arrangements. Most of these 
applicants for UB were successful; and, unlike the Wave Hill 
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workers, they did not have to move to Darwin in order to be so. 
In these subsequent walk offs, it was the breach of the more 
meagre conditions specified in the Ward's Employment Ordinance 
which provided the basis for eligibility. One officer of the 
Darwin DSS office recalling the events some years later wrote: 
It seemed fairly obvious that by insisting on these (award 
WS) conditions or contract work, the claimants... were 
placing limitations on their availability for employment and 
a recommendation was made to reject the claims. 
Further investigation showed that the conditions of 
employment, i.e. standards of accommodation etc., did not 
meet with the requirements of the Wards Employment Ordinance 
and consequently it would have been unfair to reject the 
claims on a technicality. 
It was approved that the 'walk o f f issue be treated as 
closed and payment of benefit authorised with the question of 
unemployment benefit in the future being based on the normal 
requirements of the Social Services Act (DSS 1978). 
In all these early walk offs, eligibility for UB was granted by 
the DSS only on the basis that the circumstances of these cases 
were exceptional. This was a victory for those directly involved, 
but not for Aboriginal eligibility for UB in the remote areas 
more generally. 
After the introduction of award wages to the NT pastoral 
industry in December 1968, Aboriginal participation in the 
industry began to involve shorter periods of employment at better 
rates of pay, but with substantial interspersed periods of 
unemployment. The flow of Aboriginal applicants from the pastoral 
industry changed from the sporadic outbursts of the walk offs to 
a steady seasonal trickle of workers who had been temporarily 
stood down. This combination of circumstances made it difficult 
for the DSS to argue that these applicants were either outside 
the workforce, had ceased work of their own accord or that they 
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were unwilling to take up suitable work that was available to 
them. The applicants slipped neatly past the barriers to 
Aboriginal eligibility for UB which had sufficed in the past. By 
1970, the number of such UB applicants from the pastoral industry 
was sufficient for the DSS and CES in the NT to introduce the 
special pastoral standown (PASDOWN) procedures discussed 
previously. These procedures could at one level be seen as having 
facilitated access to UB for illiterate and inexperienced 
Aboriginal applicants. But in the larger historical context, they 
can also be seen as having guarded against the spread of UB to 
Aborigines other than those who were strongly tied to individual 
pastoralists. Under PASDOWN, each white pastoralists had to vouch 
for the Aborigine's constant availability for work on the 
property. The Aborigines who were likely to meet these conditions 
were those who had strong personalised attachments to particular 
pastoralists and pastoral properties. Those more peripherally 
involved would be unlikely to qualify. 
Not all the early challenges to Aboriginal ineligibility for 
UB in the remote areas came from the pastoral industry. In mid 
1967, a number of claims for UB were received from the Aboriginal 
residents of St Teresa mission in central Australia. These 
Aborigines had recently become involved through the CES in a 
labour migration program in which they were sent to NSW to work 
as seasonal fruit pickers (Smee 1966). On their return to St 
Teresa at the end of the 1967 season, these Aboriginal residents 
were not re-enlisted in the mission's under award training/ 
employment programs. The mission had decided instead to help them 
apply for UB; a move which if successful would lessen the demands 
279 
on its own resources. All the applicants claimed to be unemployed 
and to be willing to move away from the mission again in order to 
take up further employment. The same Darwin DSS officer who 
recalled the 1966 w a l k offs recalled the d e l i b e r a t i o n s 
surrounding these applications as follows: 
On the face of that information their eligibility to receive 
unemployment benefit seemed established, however, before 
payment could be authorised some further points had to be 
cleared up. 
Welfare Branch paid Missions maintenance in respect of all 
children under sixteen years and in respect of pregnant women 
and nursing mothers. If we paid unemployment benefits under 
normal Social Services Act requirements, i.e. paid for 
claimants wife and children, and Welfare Branch continued 
their m a i n t e n a n c e payments, would not there be dual 
Commonwealth payments being made to some people.... 
It was finally decided that this Department would make 
payment to those claimants considered eligible, but that the 
Northern Territory Administration (ie the Welfare Branch WS) 
be advised of the commencing and terminating dates of the 
payments so they could adjust their maintenance payments (DSS 
1978). 
In 1970 following the lead of the mission at St Teresa, a couple 
of missions in the far north of WA approached the DSS regarding 
the possibility of their Aboriginal residents being eligible for 
UB. Since the Aborigines concerned had never worked outside the 
missions, the approaches were rejected by the DSS on the grounds 
that the Aborigines concerned were outside the workforce, and 
hence not 'unemployed' for the purposes of the Act. This was, of 
course, entirely consistent with the DSS's established approach. 
However, the fact that the approach had occurred indicated that 
some missions were coming to see UB as a potential source of 
additional funds with which to run their local communities, 
rather than as something that needed to be excluded from their 
communities at all cost. This more pragmatic mission approach to 
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UB was more prevalent in WA than elsewhere, since in that State 
the m i s s i o n s g e n e r a l l y received less funding from the State 
government's Aboriginal welfare authority. 
Despite the success of a few Aboriginal applicants for UB, 
particularly from the pastoral industry, and the growing interest 
in UB among some m i s s i o n s , the general approach to Abor ig ina l 
i n e l i g i b i l i t y for UB in remote areas remained l a r g e l y i n t a c t . 
This reflected the continuation of a broad agreement between the 
DSS, the CES and most of the e s t a b l i s h e d mission and wel fare 
a u t h o r i t y i n t e r e s t s in A b o r i g i n a l a f f a i r s , that UB was 
inapplicable to almost all Aborigines in these areas. The social 
security rule interpretation which supported this agreement had 
two aspects . F irst the DSS had decreed that Aborigines in the 
remote areas who had not worked were simply beyond the workforce 
and hence beyond the scope of UB. Second, in cooperation with the 
CES, the DSS continued to regard under award employment and 
training, both within and outside the welfare system, as suitable 
work which Aborigines could not refuse without being judged to 
have f a i l e d the work test . In the MT this l a t t e r aspect of the 
preva i l ing approach was re i terated as late as August 1968 in a 
CES circular instructing rank and f i le assessors that the 'work 
test ' for Aborigines was 'no d i f f e r e n t ' from that which applied 
to al l appl icants for UB. The c i rcular continued by noting that 
'work ' , in the case of Abor ig ines , was def ined as a job o f fered 
under any recognised industrial award i n c l u d i n g the NT Welfare 
Branch's Wards Employment Ordinance. 
There were, however, also some signs that this alliance of 
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welfare interests against Aboriginal eligibility for UB in remote 
areas was coming under strain from a different quarter; not 
because of any widespread disagreement between these interests 
about the inappropriateness of UB, but simply because of the 
increasing financial stringency of managing groups of Aborigines 
without any contribution from UB. These financial concerns were 
at the heart of the slightly less negative attitudes towards UB 
which were developing among the WA missions. But they also 
manifested themselves in other ways in other established 
Aboriginal welfare organisation. The financial situation which 
was developing around the NT Welfare Branch provides the most 
pertinent and clear illustration. 
With the inclusion of Aboriginal workers in the NT pastoral 
industry award in 1968, the NT Welfare Branch came under 
considerable pressure to similarly increase its rates of payments 
to Aborigines working more fully within the welfare system. As a 
result, in 1969 the Branch's existing cash-and-kind program for 
those who 'worked' at settlements and missions was replaced by a 
new cash-only training allowance scheme which raised the pay for 
adult male workers from $7.60 to between $25 and $30 per week, 
and for females from $4.60 to between $18 and $27 per week. These 
rates were subsequently raised further, though they remained well 
below the minimum mainstream award rates of pay determined by the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and only 
marginally above the rates of UB (See Table 7). In conjunction 
with other developments, these increases in the training 
allowance made it increasingly difficult for the Welfare Branch 
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and the m i s s i o n s in the NT to offer training positions to all 
A b o r i g i n e s of w o r k i n g age in their c o m m u n i t i e s , and so to 
maintain the exclusion of UB from the Aboriginal welfare system. 
Table 7 
Comparison of NT Welfare Branch Training Allowance Rates with DB 
Rates and with Weighted Average Minimum Weekly Wage Rates 
Training Allowance UB rate ($pw) Weighted Average 
Rate ($pw) Beneficiary + Minimum Weekly 
Dep Spouse Wage Rates ($pw) 
Year M F Extra for 
Dep Child 
M F 
1969 25-30 18-27 17 2.5 1st 
3.5 Subseq 
52 38 
1972 28-41 24-32 25 4.5 each 67 52 
1973 40-65 34-46 37.5 4.5 each 78 65 
S o u r c e s : N1 W e l f a r e B r a n c h A n n u a l R e p o r t s , D S S 1 9 8 3 a n d 
Commonwealth Government Year Books, Rates of Wage Statistics. See 
these latter for an explanation of the calculation of the 
weighted average weekly minimum rates of pay from Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission determinations. 
At D a g a r a g u , for e x a m p l e , after the W a v e Hill w a l k off of 
1966, the W e l f a r e Branch had established a s e t t l e m e n t and 
instituted a housing construction program to employ Aborigines at 
training rates. During 1972 another series of w a l k offs in the 
area caused a further influx of Aborigines to Dagaragu (Doolan 
1977). This later influx placed severe strains on the W e l f a r e 
Branch's budget for the new settlement and on its ability to 
offer 'jobs' on the housing project to all the Aborigines living 
there. Over 20 claims for UB were lodged with the CES/DSS and it 
seemed to the local rank and file officers of these departments 
that the claims would have to be granted. This prospect worried 
the W e l f a r e Branch and, after he had been i n f o r m e d of the 
p o s i t i o n , also the M i n i s t e r for Social Security. The W e l f a r e 
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p o s i t i o n , also the M i n i s t e r for Social Security. The W e l f a r e 
Branch was t h r o w n into a flurry of a c t i v i t y in an a t t e m p t to 
increase its training a l l o w a n c e a l l o c a t i o n for the Dagaragu 
housing project. The applicants for UB were then w o r k tested 
adversely and their c l a i m s rejected. The spread of UB to m o r e 
Aborigines in the remote areas had been once again averted, but 
at the cost of some considerable budgetary manouevring within the 
Welfare Branch. 
By 1972, budgeting for the ' e m p l o y m e n t ' of all 3,350 
Aborigines of working age in the NT's settlements and missions on 
the training allowance had become a major problem for the Welfare 
Branch. But the Branch remained adamant that Aborigines in these 
c o m m u n i t i e s should not receive UB. The Branch even began 
exploring the possibility of extending its o w n resources by 
tapping into the p r o g r a m s of other government departments. The 
DEIR was the p r i m e target through its E m p l o y m e n t and Training 
Scheme for Aborigines(ETSA). ETSA had been introduced in the 60s 
and provided a wage subsidy to e m p l o y e r s taking on A b o r i g i n a l 
workers. The Welfare Branch now had the bright id ea that it might 
be able to use the program to contribute to its o w n burgeoning 
wages bill. However, the Welfare Branch's approach was rejected 
by the DEIR as the guidelines for ETSA insisted that award wages 
had to be paid before eligibility for a subsidy could be 
considered. The Welfare Branch continued the training allowance 
s c h e m e under increasing budgetary p r e s s u r e , w h i l e refusing 
r e s o l u t e l y to a d m i t UB to the s e t t l e m e n t s and m i s s i o n s as had 
already happened to a limited extent at St Teresa. 
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The Whitlam Years: Labor's Loves Lost 
W i t h the election of the W h i t l a m Labor g o v e r n m e n t in 
D e c e m b e r 1972, Aboriginal affairs entered a period of rapid 
change. In relation to e m p l o y m e n t , u n e m p l o y m e n t and social 
security benefits, the Labor party's declared policy was that all 
Aborigines should be paid award wages when in e m p l o y m e n t and 
should otherwise be eligible for the full range of social 
security payments, including l)B. Though this sort of rhetoric was 
not entirely new in relation to social security p a y m e n t s , the 
W h i t l a m government soon showed that it did not regard the 
established patterns of commitment negotiated between the DSS and 
the established Aboriginal welfare interests over recent years as 
adequately reflecting this statement of principle. In April 1973, 
Cabinet specifically directed that Aborigines living on missions 
and settlements in remote areas would no longer be regarded as 
b e y o n d the s c o p e of UB. As a r e s u l t , s e c t i o n 14.201 w a s 
incorporated in the DSS's m a n u a l for u n e m p l o y m e n t and sickness 
benefit assessors instructing that: 
U n e m p l o y m e n t benefit is payable to Aboriginals living on 
settlements and missions provided they are capable of and 
willing to work and no such work is available on the 
settlement or mission, in other words, an Aboriginal is not 
required to leave the settlement or mission in order to 
qualify for unemployment benefit. 
The new g o v e r n m e n t also declared its intention to phase out 
programs which perpetuated Aboriginal under award employment. 
Prior to the W h i t l a m government's election in 1972, there 
had been little difference between the way in which the various 
state branches of the DSS had treated applications for UB from 
Aborigines in remote areas. H o w e v e r , reactions to the n e w 
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government's directions on this matter did differ markedly 
between the various states and the NT over the next few years. 
This partly reflected the new DAA's different relationship with 
the old welfare authorities and other established Aboriginal 
welfare interests in each of the states and the NT. For this 
reason, I will discuss developments in the NT, WA and QLD during 
the Whitlam years separately before returning to some more 
general points about the Whitlam government's push for an award 
wages and UB economy for all Aborigines. 
The NT 
The NT Welfare Branch, which since the change of government 
in Canberra had been subsumed in the new DAA, was most directly 
and swiftly affected by the Whitlam government's push towards 
award wages and UB. Two of its established programs were marked 
for immediate destruction because they contravened the policy 
principle. The first was the training allowance scheme, the 
second the Welfare Branch's program of 'maintenance payments' 
made to pastoralists and missionaries for Aborigines living in 
their care but not employed by them. In August 1973, the Minister 
for Aboriginal Affairs informed the Cabinet of his intention to 
establish an interdepartmental committee to oversee the 
termination of the training allowance scheme. In November Cabinet 
approved his proposal that the scheme be progressively phased out 
between December 1973 and May 1974 and also agreed that UB apply 
from December 1 973 to those who had recently been in regular 
receipt of Training Allowance but who could not be absorbed into 
award wage employment. The phasing out of the maintenance 
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payments scheme, on the other hand, was to be achieved simply by 
the peicemeal termination of payments to individual pastoralists 
and missions and by encouraging these people to assist the 
affected Aborigines to apply for UB or whatever other social 
security payment seemed appropriate. 
The Whitlam government's intention was that with the money 
saved from the abolition of these two programs and with the 
additional money allocated to Aboriginal affairs, the DAA would 
create a number of award wage public service positions for 
Aborigines in the NT's remote communities and would also provide 
funds for Aboriginal organisations and councils to undertake 
specific projects or to provide particular services. For those 
Aborigines in the remote communities who did not obtain award 
wage employment through one of these channels, there would be the 
normal array of social security payments, including UB. 
It did not take long for reactions to arise which called 
into question the new government's plans. One mission-sponsored 
Aboriginal fishing enterprise in Arnhemland which was notified 
that its training allowance funding would cease at the end of 
November 1973, immediately reacted by arguing that it would have 
to close down unless some alternative source of funding for wages 
could be found. The termination of funding was postponed while 
the interdepartmental committee set to work drawing up longer 
term plans for the phasing out of the scheme in all 31 NT mission 
and settlement communities in which it operated. In undertaking 
this process the committee itself soon became a source of 
reaction against the proposed changes. In March 1974, the 
committee estimated that with available funds DAA could create 
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about 1,000 a w a r d wage positions in the r e m o t e NT c o m m u n i t i e s . 
This would leave a little over 2,000 A b o r i g i n e s c u r r e n t l y in 
receipt of the training a l l o w a n c e w i t h o u t e m p l o y m e n t . The 
prospect of two thirds of all Aborigines of w o r k i n g age on the 
missions and settlements receiving UB was greeted with horror by 
a n u m b e r of officers on the i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t t e e . Some 
DAA, f o r m e r l y W e l f a r e Branch, officers who were p a r t i c u l a r l y 
perturbed began to develop a r g u m e n t s against the proposed 
changeover: that an award wage e c o n o m y would be disruptive of 
traditional life style; that the UB would all flow to the m e n 
leaving women who had been paid training allowance without their 
own income; and that the proposal was imposing priorities from 
above rather than letting them emerge from the Aborigines 
themselves as the new policy of self-determination inferred they 
should. 
These reactions were mild in comparison with some w h i c h 
developed in the larger NT c o m m u n i t y . In January 1974, while 
visiting the NT, the M i n i s t e r for Aboriginal Affairs was 
confronted by a group of people calling themselves 'Rights for 
Territorians' who wanted all social security benefits to be taken 
a w a y from Aborigines. Later he referred to this as 'the m o s t 
unpleasant event' on his trip to the NT and commented: 
I was left in no doubt as to their motives - a return to the 
good old days of cheap black labour (Cavanagh 1974: 28). 
In the early stages of the W h i t l a m g o v e r n m e n t , such 
c r i t i c i s m had to contend with a determined M i n i s t e r for 
Aboriginal Affairs and with senior officials who strongly 
supported the new government's ideas. The head of the new DAA who 
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chaired the interdepartmental committee, for example, was adamant 
that the 'political climate' dictated that all Aborigines should 
receive either award wages or UB. It was not long, however, 
before even the Minister's own Labor party colleagues began 
expressing reservations about the changes. In March 1974, in his 
capacity as chairman of the House of Representative Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, one backbench Labor 
parliamentarian wrote to the Minister expressing that Committee's 
concerns about the termination of the training allowance. The 
letter concluded as follows: 
The Committee's concern might best be expressed by saying 
that the new arrangements will not coincide with the 
introduction of a satisfactory alternative means of employing 
those unable to vjork for award wages. The result of the 
scheme will be to inject an additonal $llm of cash into the 
Northern Territory Aboriginal community with the full 
knowledge that a large portion of that amount will go to non-
workers. From what the committee has seen in the NT this 
would be a positive disincentive to work and we are 
apprehensive that in some areas the additional money will 
aggravate an already serious drinking problem. Furthermore, 
once the payment of unemployment benefits becomes wide spread 
it will then become difficult to introduce any meaningful and 
appropriate employment providing schemes. 
Whilst we have no ready made suggestions to make for 
remedying the shortcomings of the new proposals in their 
present form, except that the phasing out period might be 
extended indefinitely, we believe you should be aware that 
some significant problems are likely to flow from their 
introduction. 
A short time later the Minister for the Northern Territory also 
wrote to the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in similar terms. 
His letter began: 
I am aware that the Party platform for Aboriginal Affairs 
included provisions that award wages should be paid to 
Aboriginals and that they should enjoy the same Social 
Service benefits as apply to other Australians. Indeed 
Cabinet endorsed these aims when it decided to introduce 
award wages to replace the training allowance scheme. 
However, I have become increasingly aware in recent times of 
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the possible impact of that decision from a social welfare 
point of view and its future effect on the Territory as a 
whole. Whilst accepting the philosophy of equality, I regard 
it as a matter of utmost importance that implementation of 
the decision be handled with great sensitivity. 
He continued by arguing that 'full wage reward' should only occur 
when Aborigines met 'the same work criteria as apply in the wider 
community'. Noting that employment opportunities for Aborigines 
in the remote areas of the NT were limited to the provision of 
basic services and a few housing, forestry and cattle projects, 
he then went on to question the proposed approach to the payment 
of UB: 
I am not opposed to unemployment benefit being made available 
to Aboriginals on Reserves but I point to the fact that in 
our national economy, unemployment benefit is paid against 
the background of relatively full employment. In the case of 
Aboriginals on Reserves, it will be paid in circumstances of 
general unemployment. The effect of protracted payment of 
unemployment benefit in the latter circumstances could, I 
believe, only be to the detriment of the future well-being of 
Aboriginals. 
Implicit in these arguments was a movement back towards the ideas 
which had dominated this area of policy prior to the election of 
the Whitlam government. Here once again was the assertion that 
Aborigines in these areas were different from other unemployed 
Australians and should, as a consequence, be beyond the scope of 
UB. The difference was not now that these were 'bush natives' who 
simply did not want to work, but rather that these people, unlike 
other Australians, would be paid UB against a background of 
general unemployment in their local communities. Though no longer 
in crude racial terms, the intent of the distinction was still 
the same; to exclude Aborigines in the remote areas from 
eligibility for UB. 
The tenor of these criticisms of the Whitlam government's 
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proposals was , to a large extent , accepted w i th in the senior 
ranks of the DSS. In a departmental c i rcular of May 1973 
clarifying the new section 14.201, the Director General of Social 
Security emphasised that UB was 'not to be granted ' to any 
Aborigines who did not 'want to work'. In a b r i e f i n g note to the 
Minister for Social Security in June 1974, the Director General 
i n d i c a t e d that he s h a r e d the M i n i s t e r for the N o r t h e r n 
Territory ' s concern about the potential payment of UB to 
Aborigines whose employment prospects were 'not good'. In a 
similar vein, the First Assistant Director General of the DSS who 
was involved in the activities of the interdepartmental committee 
overseeing the termination of the training allowance scheme was 
drawn to comment in mid-1974 that: 
It was clear . . . that a number of Aborig inals are not ready 
for award wages and indeed a general disinclination to work 
was apparent. This being so,... it would seem that there will 
be no great influx of claims for unemployment benefits. 
What was taking shape within the DSS during 1974 was a concurrent 
reinterpretation both of the eligibility rules for UB and of the 
facts of Aboriginal applicants circumstances. The effect of this 
r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would be to continue to severely r e s t r i c t 
Aboriginal e l i g i b i l i t y for UB in the remote areas of the NT for 
some time to come. 
The part icular stumbling block to Aboriginal e l i g i b i l i t y 
which gained currency in the DSS at this time related to the 
equation of the term 'unemployed' with 'temporarily out of work'. 
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was not new. It had long been the bas is on 
which people who seldom worked were excluded from UB and referred 
to some other income support program, even though in one sense of 
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the word they were obviously 'unemployed'. Aborigines in remote 
areas who had never worked, even for under award wages or 
allowances, were just some of the many potential applicants 
disqualified from UB on these grounds. What was new in 1974, was 
the way in which this interpretation also now began to be applied 
to Aboriginal applicants who had worked under the training 
allowance scheme, wards employment ordinance or some other form 
of under award payment. These Aborigines, so the argument ran, 
also did not have a recent work history and so could not be 
regarded as temporarily out of work. This was a logical and 
historical sleight of hand of the highest order. Employment at 
under award conditions had long been accepted as work by the DSS 
for the purposes of applying the work test to Aborigines in these 
areas who had applied for UB in the past. They had been required 
by the DSS to accept such employment or else be judged unwilling 
or unavailable to take up suitable work. Now, that very same work 
was being disregarded by the DSS as constituting a work history. 
These finer logical and historical points were of little 
consequence within the DSS during 1974. It was also of little 
consequence that the new 'work history' interpretation appeared 
contrary to the intent expressed in the Cabinet decision of April 
1973, in the new section 14.201 of the unemployment and sickness 
benefit manual and, most explicitly, in the later Cabinet 
decision of November 1973 stating that Aborigines who had 
previously been in receipt of the training allowance and found 
themselves unemployed on its termination should be regarded as 
eligible for UB. However, much had transpired since these earlier 
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policy pronouncements by the new government, and they were now 
conveniently lost from view within the DSS. 
In the light of the wide spread criticism of the Whitlam 
government's stated objective of introducing an award wage and UB 
economy for all Aborigines, the development of this new 
interpretation of the UB eligibility criteria within the DSS was 
perhaps not surprising. But the DSS was not merely doing the 
bidding of others. It was in fact developing a single mindedness 
on the matter which would ensure the new interpretation against 
challenge for some time to come. One example will suffice to 
illustrate the point. In September 197A, the NT Director of the 
DAA directly questioned the 'work history' interpretation as it 
was being applied to Aborigines who had formerly come under the 
Welfare Branch's maintenance payments scheme. Having been assured 
by his DSS counterpart in Darwin that the interpretation was 
correct, he raised the matter with the DAA in Canberra. He wrote: 
As you know, we had anticipated that a majority of the 
maintained Aborigines would be eligible for social security 
benefits, particularly UB, when the maintenance scheme 
ceased. This has not proved to be the case. The works test is 
being applied in such a way that many (if not a majority) of 
claimants are deemed ineligible for benefits. If the claimant 
cannot produce a history of regular employment, or was not 
employed shortly before he made the claim, his claim is in 
most cases rejected. The nature of station work and its 
irregularity in Central Australia in particular means that 
only a comparatively small number of claims are successful. 
He went on to note that there were still only about 50 
unemployment beneficiaries on pastoral properties in the NT and 
cited the case of one pastoral property where maintenance 
payments had been cut off in August 1974. The DAA officer in the 
area had helped 25 people on the property apply for UB and now, 
over a month later, only two of those claims had been successful. 
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In t h i s and a number o f o t h e r c a s e s , i n the f a c e o f a l o c a l 
ou t c ry , the Darwin o f f i c e of the DM had cons idered i t necessary 
t o r e c o m m e n c e m a i n t e n a n c e p a y m e n t s u n t i l t h e m a t t e r o f 
e l i g i b i l i t y f o r UB had been c l a r i f i e d f u r t h e r . 
The r e s u l t of these communications between the Darwin and 
Canberra o f f i c e s o f the DAA, was the c o n v e n i n g o f a m e e t i n g on 
the m a t t e r b e t w e e n h i g h l e v e l o f f i c e r s o f the DAA, DSS and DEIR 
in Canberra. Again the DSS maintained that i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
the term ' u n e m p l o y e d ' was c o r r e c t and r e s o l u t e l y r e f u s e d t o be 
moved on t h e m a t t e r . T h i s DSS i n t r a n s i g e n c e o v e r t h e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the e l i g i b i l i t y c r i t e r i a f o r UB p r o v i d e d the 
p e r f e c t s c e n a r i o f o r the c o n s e r v a t i v e f o r c e s w i t h i n the DAA to 
push f o r the cont inuat ion of under award employment in the remote 
Abor ig inal communities. In the absence of a s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l of 
e l i g i b i l i t y f o r UB in these communities, i t became untenable f o r 
t h o s e w i t h i n the DAA who were s y m p a t h e t i c to the Whi t lam 
government's ideas to pursue the award wage goal with any v igour . 
To do so would have been to concentrate a l l the resources the DAA 
was d i r e c t i n g to t h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s in the hands o f the f e w who 
g a i n e d award wage e m p l o y m e n t , and t o have abandoned o t h e r s 
w i t h o u t any i n c o m e at a l l . This was c l e a r l y u n a c c e p t a b l e . The 
maintenance payments scheme was not f i n a l l y terminated u n t i l 1978 
and the t ra in ing a l lowance scheme, though terminated in 1974, was 
p a r t l y p e r p e t u a t e d by the e x p a n s i o n o f the DAA's S p e c i a l Works 
P r o j e c t s scheme to f i n a n c e p r o j e c t s p r o v i d i n g p a r t - t i m e 
employment to Abor ig ines in many of these remote communities. 
294 
WA 
In WA, reactions to the Whitlam government's push for an 
award wage and UB economy for all Aborigines were considerably 
different. As has been evident at a number of points already in 
the account, established Aboriginal welfare interests in WA had 
always been rather more receptive to the inflow of social 
security payments than their counterparts in the NT. When it came 
to the possibility of eligibility for UB, this greater 
receptiveness was evident once again. As mentioned earlier, two 
missions in the most remote areas of northern WA had already 
approached the DSS regarding the possibility of Aborigines in 
their communities recieving UB during 1970 and 1S71. Now that 
cabinet had directed that eligibility be extended, they and 
others were more than willing to try again. Unlike in the NT 
then, the WA administration of the DSS was faced during the 
Whitlam years with a number of established welfare patrons in the 
remote areas who were keen to obtain UB for residents in their 
communities. In these circumstances the WA administration of the 
DSS did not go out of its way to create obstacles to UB 
eligibility through adverse interpretations of facts and rules. 
Equally however, neither was the DSS actively advertising the 
availability of UB for those who did not learn of it by some 
other means; the Department's own lack of independent penetration 
to the Aboriginal clientele in these areas at that time saw to 
that. The DSS's approach in WA was passive rather than active, 
but certainly not obstructionist as in the NT. The initiative was 
left to the established welfare patrons. If they wanted UB in 
their communities they could help the Aborigines apply, if not 
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they could be reasonably well assured that the Aborigines would 
not successfuly gain access to it by direct contact with DSS 
officers. 
In a number of communities, the WA administration of the DSS 
managed the payment of UB that did occur by opting for a group 
warrantee system, as in the Kimberley mission communities 
discussed in chapter 6. All UB payments for particular 
communities were directed through one individual who was 
responsible for the distribution of payments and for the regular 
updating of details relating to eligibility. In many mission 
communities this 'warrantor' was a white missionary, and the 
effect of the arrangement was to place power over most of the 
questions relating to whether and how UB would be paid in their 
hands. This often led to a situation where Aborigines worked for 
the mission, and in return now received their unemployment 
benefit. Rather than challenging the existing structures of 
welfare patronage and under award employment in the remote 
Aboriginal communities of WA, the payment of UB in fact often 
reinforced them. 
QLD 
In Qld, the situation which developed was different again. 
During the Whitlam years, the Qld Aboriginal welfare authority, 
the DAIA, continued to pursue its established approach to 
Aboriginal affairs in competition with the new Commonwealth DAA. 
This led to the emergence of a considerably different situation 
in Aboriginal affairs in Qld than elsewhere. The Commonwealth 
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DAA, for example, was in no position to attack the Qld DAIA's 
under-award 'training wage', as it had done with the old Welfare 
Branch programs in the NT. So the pattern of commitments 
surrounding Aboriginal wages and UB in the Qld communities was 
not so overtly challenged by the Whitlam government as it had 
been in the NT. This also meant that the introduction of UB did 
not become a major focus for debate as in the NT. The situation 
which developed in Qld during the Whitlam years was rather more 
like that in some of the remote mission communities in WA. The 
DSS was neither publicising the possibility of UB eligibility for 
Aborigines in Qld reserve communities nor, as in the NT, actively 
opposing its expansion. Established local patrons could, if they 
wished, tap into the DSS's UB program. But equally it was not 
pushed upon them. As resources available from other sources were 
often insufficient to pay even the under award 'training wage' to 
all Aborigines of working age living in the reserve communities, 
many local patrons in Qld did slowly avail themselves of UB. 
Where they did, the DSS obliged by working through them for the 
purposes of service delivery; though without resorting to a group 
warrantee arrangement, as in WA. 
Discussion: The Continuation of Economic Marginality 
The general question that arises out of the situation which 
developed around the payment of UB to Aborigines in the remote 
areas of NT, Qld and WA during the Whitlam years, concerns why 
exactly the Whitlam government's intention to introduce an award 
wage and UB economy for all Aborigines floundered so desperately. 
At one level it would be easy to blame entrenched bureaucratic 
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interests in the DAA and the DSS. Certainly, in my account of 
events relating to the NT there are examples of officers within 
these departments resisting and arguing against a UB and award 
wages economy. However, to treat their resistance as the root 
cause of thwarted reform would be to overlook the fact that 
opposition to the Whitlam government's proposed changes developed 
in sections of the community not directly involved in the 
administration of Aboriginal welfare, including the Labor party 
itself. It would also be to overlook the fact that in WA and Qld, 
where some greater amounts of UB did begin to be paid, this 
contributed little to the development of anything resembling an 
award wage and UB economy in the remote Aboriginal communities in 
these states. 
There were, it seems, real and substantial difficulties in 
bringing the remote communities into these mainstream economic 
structures. The marginalisation of Aborigines within local low-
cost economies had been many years in the making. The welfare 
communities and the pastoral industry in northern and central 
Australia had been built on low wage and income structures and, 
to some extent, their viability in their established form 
depended on it. So when DAA officers or missionaries prophesied 
that fishing, foresty and other welfare authority and mission 
sponsored projects would be shut down, or when pastoralist 
claimed that they would no longer employ many Aborigines, they 
were not just calling the Whitlam government's bluff. The change 
from marginalised low cost local economies existing within the 
auspices of an Aboriginal welfare system to a mainstream award 
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wage and UB economy was going to render unviable many of the 
established projects in which Aborigines were employed. There 
would be Aborigines in these areas left unemployed. The 
transition to an award wage and UB economy was inevitably going 
to be a contentious and drawn out affair, whenever it occurred 
and whatever the political 'will' of the government in power. In 
many ways the Whitlam government can be seen as having made a 
bold start in its attempt to introduce a thorough going award 
wage and UB economy for all Aborigines. It made strong 
declarations about its intentions and relentlessly attacked the 
offending programs of the NT Welfare Branch. Arrayed against 
these actions there came, over time, to be an ample dose of 
reaction in the community at large, in parts of the Commonwealth 
administration and even in the Labor party itself; not all of 
which was merely the self serving arguments of entrenched 
interests. In such circumstances, the failure of the Whitlam 
government to realise its early intention should not be judged to 
harshly. The historical processes of Aboriginal economic 
marginalisation were not to be reversed simply by a couple of 
Cabinet declarations. 
The Fraser Years: Reaction or Progression? 
When the Fraser Liberal/National coalition government came 
to power in Canberra in December 1975, it was in an atmosphere 
far removed from the reformist zeal which had accompanied the 
Whitlam government's victory three years earlier. The Fraser 
government's zeal was a cost-cutting managerial one, and the 
administration of UB was to be one of its early targets. 
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During the latter half of the period of the Whitlam 
government, unemployment in Australia had risen to levels 
unprecedented since the depression of the 1930s (Sheehan and 
Strieker 1980, Gregory 1984). In January 1976, at the request of 
its new Minister, the DEIR issued revised guidelines intended to 
strengthen the CES's application of the work test to UB 
applicants (see Ferber 1980: 336). Among the provisions were 
instructions which indicated that those who placed themselves in 
a position where they were likely to remain unemployed would not 
be regarded as available for work, and hence would be ineligible 
for UB. Though not specifically directed at Aborigines living in 
remote areas, this particular aspect of the new guidelines caused 
some uncertainty about Aboriginal eligibility for UB among CES 
officers servicing the remote areas. Did the new instructions 
mean that Aborigines would be expected to move away from the 
remote communities in order to take up work elsewhere? Did they, 
therefore, overide section 14.201 of the unemployent and sickness 
benefit manual inserted in 1973. Interpretations differed to some 
extent between the various state and territory administrations of 
the DEIR. 
In the view of the NT Director of the DEIR in Darwin, the 
new instruction did not require any change in the approach to 
Aboriginal eligibility for UB in remote communities. In March 
1976, he issued a clarifying circular specifically reminding his 
CES rank and file assessing staff that the instructions 'relating 
to Aborigines living on communities' had not changed. 
In the Qld branch of the DEIR, the issue was not so quickly 
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or d e f i n i t e l y r e s o l v e d . In A p r i l 1 9 7 7 , f o r m e r P r i m e M i n i s t e r 
W h i t l a m t a b l e d a d o c u m e n t in the p a r l i a m e n t w h i c h had b e e n 
prepared in January of that year by an Assistant Director of the 
DEIR in Qld. It was addressed to all CES regional office managers 
in the s t a t e . It b e g a n b y n o t i n g the 1973 c h a n g e s r e l a t i n g to 
e l i g i l i t y for UB for A b o r i g i n e s l i v i n g on c h u r c h m i s s i o n s and 
government settlements and continued: 
This a r r a n g e m e n t had the e f f e c t in N o r t h Q u e e n s l a n d of 
inflating the applicant register with persons who cannot be 
w o r k t e s t e d , and are s i m p l y on i n d e f i n i t e u n e m p l o y m e n t 
benefit. 
To reduce this unproductive workload without jeopardising the 
claimant's right to benefit it is proposed that the following 
p r o c e d u r e s b e f o l l o w e d (CPD H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
21/4/77: 1110). 
The p r o p o s e d n e w p r o c e d u r e f o c u s s e d on the w o r d s 'Are you 
p r e p a r e d to w o r k in a n o t h e r l o c a l i t y ? ' , w h i c h had b e e n a d d e d to 
CES r e g i s t r a t i o n f o r m s in that s t a t e as a r e s u l t of the n e w 
government's revised guidelines for the work test. The circular 
instructed that if applicants living on missions and settlements 
w h e r e t h e r e w e r e no e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n s w e r e d this 
question in the negative, they should be regarded as unavailable 
for work and removed from the CES register. The circular went on 
to say that in such cases the DSS was then to be notified of this 
C E S j u d g e m e n t . It w a s , the c i r c u l a r n o t e d in c o n c l u s i o n , up to 
the DSS to d e t e r m i n e an a p p l i c a n t ' s e l i g i b i l i t y for UB in the 
l i g h t of s u c h a d v i c e . This r a t h e r f o r m a l i s t i c f i n a l p o i n t w a s 
p r e s u m a b l y i n t e n d e d to r e i n f o r c e the i m p r e s s i o n that this w a s 
m e r e l y a p r o c e d u r a l c h a n g e d e s i g n e d to 'reduce' the CES's 
'unproductive workload' without affecting Aboriginal eligibility 
for UB. For W h i t l a m , h o w e v e r , it w a s t a n t a m o u n t to i n s t r u c t i n g 
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that Aborigines on settlement and mission communities would not 
be eligible for UB unless they were willing to move elsewhere to 
work. As he saw it, this was a major substantive change which 
overturned the April 1973 Cabinet decision and section 14.201 of 
the unemployment and sickness benefit manual. 
Whitlam's view was by no means unreasonable. In contrast to 
the final sentence of the Qld memorandum which placed 
responsibility for assessment of eligibility for UB squarely on 
the DSS rank and file, the original revised guidelines of January 
1976 had instructed that DSS officers were to accept CES 
judgements regarding availability for work as definitive in the 
assessment of eligibility for UB. By emphasising the 'procedural' 
nature of the changes and that final responsibility for 
assessment lay with the DSS, the DEIR in Qld appeared to be 
attempting to distance itself from any exclusion of Aborigines 
from UB which might result. The Eraser government's response to 
Whitlam's accusations was to declare that there had been no 
changes in policy in this area and that the tabled document had, 
in fact, never been circulated to the CES office managers (CPD 
House of Representatives 21/4/77: 1117). Ihe episode was, 
superficially at least, a storm without substance. 
The Interdepartmental Working Party on Aboriginal Employment and 
the Emergance of the CDEP Program 
Whitlam's anger over the-circular-that-was-never-circulated 
did, however, have its roots in a substantial difference between 
his government and the new Eraser government in the area of 
Aboriginal employment and unemployment policy. In March 1976, the 
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Fraser government focussed its managerial zeal quite squarely on 
this area of policy by establishing an interdepartmental working 
party on Aboriginal employment. The working party comprised three 
members from the DAA and one each from DSS, DEIR and the 
Commonwealth Department of Education. It was to report to the 
relevant ministers by the end of July that year on terms of 
reference which were as follows: 
1. To examine Aboriginal attitudes towards gaining a 
livelihood. 
2. To examine the present state of Aboriginal unemployment 
levels and to ascertain the causes of such unemployment. 
3. To recommend measures for reducing the magnitude of 
Aboriginal unemployment, both in the short and the long term, 
with particular reference to: (a) the extent to which 
education, pre-employment and vocational training programs 
need to be varied to meet such needs; and (b) the extent to 
which schemes for promoting Aboriginal employment... need to 
be modified and/or new schemes initiated. 
4. To consider the impact of the payment of unemployment 
benefits to Aboriginals living as communities; the extent to 
which payment of these benefits has created unsatisfactory 
social problems within those communities; and to recommend 
ways by which these situations can be remedied, including 
recommendations as to any necessary changes. 
5. To examine the effect on Aboriginal employment of the 
payment of unemployment benefits to Aboriginals not living in 
communities where Aboriginals receive such benefits under 
less stringent conditions than those which apply to the 
general community; and to recommend any necessary changes to 
the prerequisites for entitlement for unemployment benefits 
to such Aboriginals. 
6. To consider and report on the most appropriate form of 
administration for the Government's programs of assistance to 
Aboriginal employment (IWP on Aboriginal Employment 1976 :v). 
The terms of reference suggested just how far the attitude of 
this new government differed from that of the previous one. Talk 
was no longer of Aborigines being unjustly excluded from award 
wages and UB, but of those 'not living in communities' actually 
receiving UB under 'less stringent conditions' than the rest of 
the community. In the case of those 'living in communities', talk 
was now of the payment of UB creating 'unsatisfactory social 
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problems'. This was a far cry from the heady reformism of the 
early Whitlam days. 
In its report, the working party attempted to dampen some of 
the anti-UB sentiments evident in its terms of reference. Of term 
of reference 5 it had nothing to say but the following: 
Ihe Working Party could find no evidence to suggest that 
Aboriginals not living in communities are currently receiving 
unemployment benefits under less stringent conditions than 
those which apply to the community in general (IW P on 
Aboriginal Employment 1976:33). 
In relation to term of reference 4, the members of the working 
party were more expansive. They were 'aware' of the 'frequent 
expressions of disquiet from anthropoligists, socioligists and 
welfare workers' about the payment of UB to Aborigines 'living in 
communities'. The report even went so far as to list some of the 
'adverse effects' which others had attributed to UB: hazardous to 
mental health because of reward without effort; of detriment to 
children's health because it encourages alcohol consumption 
rather than purchase of food; breaks down tribal authority 
structures by giving 'buying power' to those who would not 
traditionally enjoy independence; gets shared around as the 
cheques come in so that some men are drunk most of the time; 
causes drunken brawls; makes mothers despondent and turn to 
drink; has an adverse effect on the attitude of Aboriginal men to 
work (IWP on Aboriginal Employment 1976:30). At the conclusion of 
this litany of purported adverse effects, the working party 
cautioned that UB is 'only a contributing factor'. Elsewhere in 
the report, the working party also noted that: 
In considering the question of the impact of the payment of 
unemployment benefit on Aboriginal communities it must be 
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kept in mind that not all the income available within a 
community is derived from unemployment benefit. In many 
instances the community's income is made up of wages and 
other social security payments... in addition to unemployment 
benefit (IWP on Aboriginal Employment 1976:29). 
The working party's report went on to discuss one particular 
proposal relating to 'Aboriginals living in a traditional way in 
communities'; that instead of these Aborigines receiving 
individual UB payments, the money be directed to community 
councils to fund work projects in their communities (IWP on 
Aboriginal Employment 1976: 31). Though not referred to in the 
terms of reference, this idea was clearly under consideration by 
the new government. It was no doubt attractive to its cost-
cutting mentality. But the working party was strongly against 
such a proposal. It argued that the proposal would leave the DSS 
open to charges of discrimination against Aborigines unless all 
individual beneficiaries in the communities concerned approved 
the arrangement. It also argued that employment funded by 
unemployment benefit would disqualify the beneficiaries from 
further eligibility for UB. The working party's preferred 
solution was to seek an expansion of Commonwealth government 
expenditure on Aborigines in a number of employment related 
areas: an extra $3.5M for formal training programs, $6M for on 
the job training, $5M for the creation of long term employment 
opportunities through the encouragement of Aboriginal enterprises 
and and extra $25M for the creation of short term employment 
opportunities through the DAA's Special Works Projects scheme. 
The working party believed that if these initiatives were 
undertaken there would be 'useful' employment opportunities for 
Aborigines in all areas against which a 'realistic application of 
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the work test' could be made (IWP on Aboriginal Employment 1976: 
31). There would then be no need to entertain ideas of using UB 
to fund community work projects in the more remote communities. 
These recommendations for major increases in expenditure 
were, of course, quite out of step with the Fraser government's 
cost-cutting mood. The working party, not unaware of this, was 
often tempted to play on that mood in putting its case. It 
argued, for example, that its suggestions for expanded training 
and employment funding for Aborigines should be seen against the 
background of significant savings in UB expenditure and 
increased taxation revenue. The 'net cost' of the initiatives to 
the government would therefore be much less than the projected 
$39.5M. This was an interesting ploy. The working party was 
attempting to appear seduced by the Fraser government's cost-
cutting managerialism, while at the same time trying to resist 
the suggestion of UB-funded work projects. The ploy was to little 
avail. 
During the months following the submission of this report to 
the ministers, former prime minister Whitlam repeatedly 
questioned the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs regarding its 
fate. From the Minister's answers and his other statements to the 
parliament on the matter, it quickly became apparent that the 
proposal to convert UB into work projects payments in remote 
communities was to be pursued, despite the continued opposition 
of the DSS and, to a lesser extent, the DEIR (CPD House of 
Representatives 5/10/ 76: 1497, 18/11/76: 2844, 7/12/76: 3370, 
16/3/77: 248). In May 1977, when the Minister for Aboriginal 
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Affairs launched the government's new 'national employment 
strategy for Aboriginals' arising out of the working party's 
report, a UB-alternative works project proposal figured 
prominently. 
Having outlined the general extent of Aboriginal 
unemployment, the Minister launched immediately into a 
description of 'initiatives to assist those Aboriginals who live 
in remote or separate communities who do not form part of the 
open labour market' (CPD House of Representatives 26/5/77: 1921). 
He then reinterpreted the working party's rather cautious words 
about the purported 'adverse effects' of UB and credited its 
members with having revealed the 'serious social problems' caused 
by UB in these communities. He continued: 
The initiatives to be undertaken in these communities consist 
of community development employment projects, or CDEPs as 
they will be known, which will provide work for all 
Aboriginals in a particular community who wish to work. 
Finance for the CDEPs will be provided to individual 
Aboriginal councils to enable the council to pay for work 
performed by individual community members, preferably on a 
co-operative, part-time or contractual basis. The total 
moneys available to a community would be determined in 
consultation between the community and departmental officers. 
In determining the amounts available, the entitlements of 
individual community members tb unemployment benefit would be 
taken into account (CPD House of Representatives 26/5/77: 
1921). 
In the face of continued resistance from the DSS, the proposal 
had been changed from being a UB-funded community works project 
to one better described as a UB-al ternat ive. The DAA was to run 
the program providing funds from its own budget rather than the 
DSS's. The direct link with UB had disappeared, except to the 
extent that in determining the level of funding the DAA was to 
take into account the amount of UB for which community members 
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would otherwise be eligible. This it was to do, in conjunction 
with the DEIR, not the DSS. The scheme was already underway in 
one NT community and was to be implemented in another dozen 
communities on a pilot basis before further expansion. 
The 'national employment strategy for Aboriginals' also 
provided for 'initiatives to be undertaken in respect of 
Aboriginals who live in, or wish to move to, urban and rural 
areas where they will have access to the established open labour 
market' (CPD House of Representatives 26/5/77: 1923). These 
resembled the working party's suggestions for all Aborigines in 
that they covered the range of formal training, on the job 
training and employment creation. However, apart from increased 
staffing for the Aboriginal employment and training section of 
the DEIR, improvements were to be achieved within existing 
levels of expenditure. In short, while lauding the working 
party's report and using it to launch and to justify the new-
national employment strategy for Aboriginals, the Minister and 
his colleagues had neither been convinced of the need for the 
considerable expansion of expenditure which the working party had 
recommended nor of the arguments against a UB-alternative works 
project scheme for Aboriginal communities in the remote areas. 
The account thus far, would appear to suggest that the years 
of the Eraser government were unequivocally ones of reaction back 
towards the sorts of ideas which had dominated thinking about 
Aboriginal eligibility for UB prior to the Whitlam government's 
attempts to introduce a thorough-going award wage and UB economy 
for all Aborigines. But judgment of the Eraser government's 
influence in this area of policy are not so simply made. Whereas 
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the critics of the CDEP scheme saw it as simply a return to the 
practice of sanctioning under award wages, its supporters 
portrayed it as a highly progressive program which provided 
greater opportunity for self-determination and self-management in 
relation to community employment matters among those Aborigines 
in remote areas who were still effectively outside the general 
labour market. There is much more to be said about these 
competing claims regarding the reactionary or progressive nature 
of the CDEP program, and I will return to that subject in the 
next chapter. However, there are also other counts on which the 
reactionary or progressive nature of the Fraser years in this 
area of policy is unclear, and it is to these that I want to pay 
a little more attention here. 
The Expansion of Aboriginal Eligibility for UB in NT and WA 
Despite the anti-UB rhetoric which accompanied the Fraser 
Government's ascent to power and the moves the new government 
made to clamp down on UB administration, it w^as in fact during 
the Fraser years that the greatest expansion in the payment of UB 
to Aborigines in the remote areas occurred. The reasons for this 
had more to do with changing economic circumstances than with the 
intentions or prede1ictions of the Fraser government. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that actual levels of Aboriginal 
eligibility for UB in these areas did expand rapidly. 
During the late 1970s as unemployment grew in the Australian 
community generally, it became increasingly difficult to argue 
that Aborigines in the remote areas were in any categorically 
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d i f f e r e n t l a b o u r m a r k e t s i t u a t i o n to o t h e r u n e m p l o y e d 
Austral ians. It therefore also became increasingly diff icult to 
susta in the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the rules which had t i l l then 
excluded most Aborigines in these areas from el igibi l ity for UB. 
The growth in unemployment g e n e r a l l y in A u s t r a l i a provided 
critics of the established interpretations with ample opportunity 
to redefine the relevant comparisons in ways more favourable to 
the extension of el igibil ity to these Aborigines. For example, as 
early as 1976, in response to a suggestion that Aborigines in the 
remote areas be put to work instead of receiving UB, one former 
Labor m i n i s t e r for Abor ig inal a f f a i r s r h e t o r i c a l l y asked h is 
parliamentary colleagues what Aborigines in these areas might be 
put to work doing. As he saw it the prospects for creating 
employment opportunities were severely limited. He continued: 
What else are they going to do but draw unemployment 
b e n e f i t s ? . . . In this respect they are no d i f f e r e n t from the 
1 7 0 , 0 0 0 other people in A u s t r a l i a drawing unemployment 
benefits (CPD House of Representatives 5 / 1 0 / 7 6 : 1488). 
Over the next few years, as the numbers of Australians unemployed 
grew to exceed 500,000, comparisons of this sort became more and 
more compelling and the exclusion of Aborigines in the remote 
areas from UB harder and harder to sustain . This general change 
mani fested i t s e l f in a number of successful challenges to the 
specific interpretations of the UB eligibility criteria which had 
excluded Aborigines in the past. 
In Apri l 1977 , it was reported in the Canberra press that 
Aborigines in central Australia were being denied UB because of a 
strict application of the work test (Canberra Times 5 /4 /77 ) . This 
was a reference to the DSS in the NT requir ing Aboriginal 
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a p p l i c a n t s to produce evidence of a 'work h i s t o r y ' . Though in 
1974 this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the term 'unemployed' in the UB 
e l i g i b i l i t y c r i t e r i a had received the support of most officers 
w i t h i n the DSS, by 1977 it was i n c r e a s i n g l y under attack . The 
press report i t s e l f was l a r g e l y due to in format ion supplied by 
i n t e r e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s in central A u s t r a l i a , both w i t h i n and 
outside the DSS, who f e l t that this a p p l i c a t i o n of the rules to 
Aborigines was discriminatory and unjustified. It was estimated 
in the press report that there were 3 , 0 0 0 A b o r i g i n a l males of 
working age in central Australia and that less than one sixth of 
these were receiving UB. At Papunya, 260 kilometres north-west of 
Alice Springs, six men were in receipt of UB while an estimated 
300 others were out of work. There was, the press report also 
c la imed , talk of an enrolment drive among those who were 
d i s s a t i s f i e d with this state of a f f a i r s . But, unless the DSS's 
interpretation of the el igibil ity criteria for UB changed, most 
who could be assisted to apply would still be judged ineligible. 
Challenged publicly in this way, the DSS initiated a review 
of the s i t u a t i o n at Papunya and of the 'work h i story ' condition 
as it was being applied to Aborigines in remote areas of the NT 
more general ly . The work history condit ion f e l l e a s i l y to the 
pressure for reinterpretation. The Senior Assistant Director of 
the SA a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the DSS who conducted the rev iew , 
concluded in his report that: 
The Act does not carry any requirement of a previous work 
history and claims cannot be disallowed on that basis. 
In future , each claim for UB would have to be assessed 'on its 
m e r i t s ' , without regard to work h istory . In case this might be 
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construed as an admission of large scale past underpayment, the 
Senior Assistant Director's report went on to note that, during a 
visit to Papunya by CES and DAA officers the week after the press 
r e p o r t , n o t a s i n g l e i n q u i r y had b e e n m a d e to t h e m a b o u t UB 
eligibility by any of the allegedly hundreds of unemployed. The 
report then predicted that as the people at Papunya became aware 
that a work history was no longer required for eligibility, the 
n u m b e r of UB r e c i p i e n t s in that c o m m u n i t y w o u l d p r o b a b l y o n l y 
r i s e to 20 or 30. The r e a s o n for t h i s , he e x p l a i n e d , w a s that 
P a p u n y a w a s p r e s e n t l y l o s i n g p o p u l a t i o n to n e w l y e s t a b l i s h e d 
'outstations'. He a r g u e d that the d e p a r t m e n t w o u l d 'probably 
disallow' claims for UB from outstation residents on the ground 
that they were 'unavailable or unwilling to work'. 
While the Papunya incident in 1977 led to the demise of the 
'work history' condition and with it a considerable expansion in 
the p o t e n t i a l for UB p a y m e n t s a m o n g A b o r i g i n e s in the l a r g e r 
more established remote communities, it also created a new focus 
for the o n g o i n g d e b a t e over A b o r i g i n a l e l i g i b i l i t y for UB; the 
o u t s t a t i o n i s s u e . The D S S w a s n o t , in f a c t , as s i n g l e m i n d e d as 
the SA S e n i o r A s s i s t a n t D i r e c t o r had s u g g e s t e d in r e g a r d i n g 
A b o r i g i n e s l i v i n g on o u t s t a t i o n s as i n e l i g i b l e for UB. The n e w 
f o c u s of d e b a t e r e l a t e d to w h e t h e r the DSS s h o u l d r e g a r d all 
Aborigines on outstations automatically as having made themselves 
unavailable for work. Those who thought the Department should do 
so, looked to the revised guidelines of January 1976 and the new 
s e c t i o n 14.104 of the U n e m p l o y m e n t and Sickness Benefit manual 
relating to applicants who had placed themselves in a position in 
w h i c h t h e y w e r e l i k e l y to r e m a i n u n e m p l o y e d . The SA S e n i o r 
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Ass istant D irector , for one, f e l t that the DSS would be quite 
justified in placing all outstation residents in this category. 
However, there were others who raised the question of the 
e l i g i b i l i t y of long time res idents of o u t s t a t i o n s . Surely they 
could not be so regarded? O f f i c e r s of the DSS sympathetic to 
these applicants suggested that they came under the 1973 section 
14.201 of the manual stating that Aborigines were not required to 
leave the settlements where they l ived in order to q u a l i f y for 
UB. This controversy was resolved , in the f i r s t instance at 
l e a s t , by placing a foot f i r m l y in both camps. In mid-1978, the 
First Ass istant Director General in charge of the Benef its 
Division in DSS central office issued a circular instructing that 
if an applicant 'normally lives and works' at the outstation, he 
may be e l i g i b l e for UB. The c i rcular also indicated that i f an 
applicant: 
moves to a locat ion where , in the opinion of the CES, there 
are l i t t l e or no employment opportunit ies for him, he i s 
considered not to have satisfied the work test. 
This f ine d i s t i n c t i o n between res idents who normally l ive and 
work at an outstat ion and new a r r i v a l s who have moved to 
locations of low employment opportunity was a recipe for further 
controversy. 
In 1978, the review of DSS operations in the NT revealed 
that the application of this central office instruction relating 
to e l i g i b i l i t y for UB on outstations differed markedly between 
the two DSS regional o f f i c e s then operating in the NT, and in 
relation to different communities. There were, the review team 
c a l c u l a t e d , j u s t over 1 0 0 u n e m p l o y m e n t b e n e f i c i a r i e s on 
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outstations in the NT at the time, almost all of whom lived in 
the area covered by the Alice Springs regional office. The 
Papunya outstations, over which the fuss had arisen in the first 
place, accounted for no less than half the total. Differences of 
this magnitude could certainly not be explained merely in terms 
of a more substantial development of outstations in the central 
Australian region. The Review also reported uncertainty in 
relation to particular types of cases. If, for example, an 
Aboriginal in receipt of UB moved from a settlement to an 
outstation, was this to be regarded as the applicant making 
himself unavailable for work when the prospects of employment on 
many settlements may have been no better than at the outstation? 
Similarly, how long need a newly arrived outstation resident stay 
in order to pass from the category of one who has moved to a 
locality where they are likely to remain unemployed to the 
category of 'normal' outstation resident? There was also 
uncertainty as to which of the many small Aboriginal communities 
in the remote areas were to be regarded as outstations. In the 
figures for their report, the NT review team had tentatively 
included one pastoral community which had been established as the 
result of one of the walk offs of the late 60s. But many thought 
of these communities slightly differently to the outstations 
which had blossomed in the 70s. Uncertainty and difference of 
opinion abounded. 
The NT review team's line was to push for a reinterpretation 
of the rules which would extend UB eligibility to most outstation 
residents of working age, regardless of whether or not they were 
new arrivals. They argued that: 
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movement to an outstation should normally be regarded as 
movement to a homeland and not viewed, in relation to the 
work test, as a move to a new location where the person 
places himself in a situation where he will remain, or is 
likely to remain unemployed. Only when a person has actually 
terminated employment to move to an outstation should he be 
considered not to satisfy the works test on this basis (DSS 
1978: 39). 
Though this argument for extending UB eligibility in outstations 
was not immediately sanctioned at the highest levels of the DSS, 
it was clearly becoming the dominant opinion within the NT' branch 
and among the Department's Aboriginal employees. During 1979, the 
Director of the new NT administration of the DSS also became 
convinced of the view that Aborigines who had 'gone home to their 
country' should not be penalised in the receipt of DSS services, 
and on a number of occasions he put this view to central office. 
In DSS central office, some were still inclined to maintain the 
line that Aborigines who moved to outstations were placing 
themselves in a position where they were likely to remain 
unemployed. In July 1979, for example, the Deputy Director 
General commented that the payment of UB to Aborigines living on 
outstations could: 
lead to complaints that they were being more favourably 
treated than non-Aborigines who, for various reasons, wish to 
adopt what might be termed an alternative life-style and 
establish self-supporting co-operatives in areas where there 
is little prospect of obtaining other employment. 
He even went so far as to directly compare Aboriginal outstation 
residents with the white alternative life-style new settlers at 
Nimbin in northern NSW. However, the Director General was 
unimpressed with this reasoning and commented, in reply, that it 
was not 'applicable' to Aborigines 'living in their natural 
locations'. The Director General, like the NT Director and 
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o t h e r s , was coming i n c r e a s i n g l y to argue f o r the ' t o homeland' 
ra ther than the 'away from work' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of A b o r i g i n a l 
movement to outstat ions and f o r the expansion of e l i g i b i l i t y f o r 
UB which i t implied. 
Arrayed against this changing c l imate of opinion within the 
DSS was an i n c r e a s i n g l y h o s t i l e DAA. The argument of the NT 
Branch o f the DAA was that o u t s t a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d a ' f o r m a l 
c h o i c e ' by A b o r i g i n e s to move towards an ' a l t e r n a t i v e s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t l i f e - s t y l e ' and that the payment of UB in such 
communities was a ' s o c i a l l y d isrupt ive proposi t ion ' which would 
d e s t r o y t h e i r ' e c o n o m i c b a l a n c e ' . The v i r u l e n c e o f t h i s 
opposit ion to UB needs to be understood in re la t i on to the strong 
attachment to the CDEP scheme which had developed within the DAA 
by t h i s t ime. DAA o f f i c e r s were keen f o r the CDEP scheme to 
expand as a UB a l ternat ive and c l e a r l y saw the further spread of 
e l i g i b i l i t y f o r UB as c o n t r a r y to t h i s g o a l . In response to 
c r i t i c i s m of the NT branch of the DAA, the DSS's new NT Director 
ins i s ted that i t was not within his power to 'withhold payment of 
b e n e f i t to e l i g i b l e c l i e n t s ' . The DAA was not at that t ime in a 
pos i t ions to expand the CDEP scheme, so e l i g i b i l i t y f o r UB spread 
to the outstat ions despite i t s opposit ion. 
The DEIR also had reservations about the DSS's more generous 
a t t i t u d e t o A b o r i g i n e s on o u t s t a t i o n s . I n i t i a l l y t h i s 
Department's o f f i c e r s were simply perplexed as to how, with their 
l imi ted resources, they could apply the work test in communities 
which were even more remote than the l a r g e r e s t a b l i s h e d 
s e t t l e m e n t s and in which there were even fewer employment 
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opportunities. The response of most DEIR rank and file officers 
in the past had been to d isregard outstat ion res idents as 
automatically failing the work test . But that was i n c r e a s i n g l y 
unacceptable to the climate of opinion developing within the DSS, 
and so became a focus for departmental conflict. The response of 
one Aboriginal DSS employee was to suggest that the DSS by-pass 
the DEIR officers and allow its own ALO's to apply the work test 
to applicants in these communities directly. More senior officers 
of the DSS did not countenance such u n i l a t e r a l act ion , but they 
did i n c r e a s i n g l y i n s i s t that the DSS was going to s t i c k to its 
more liberal interpretation of Aboriginal el igibil ity for UB on 
outstations despite DEIR work test recommendations. 
In the WA branch of the DSS, the debate about UB eligibil ity 
for outstat ion res idents was also s p i l l i n g over into one about 
el igibil ity during absence on ceremonies. In the north of WA in 
recent years , a number of cases had ar isen in which Aboriginal 
men had travelled to extremely remote tribal areas during the off 
work season in order to conduct ceremonies. At f irst , during such 
absences , the appl icants were regarded as making themselves 
unavailable for work and hence ineligible for UB. But there were 
those w i t h i n the DSS more sympathetic to these appl icants who 
felt that such 'traditional' activity should not be so regarded, 
particularly as its timing had been adjusted to fit in with the 
l i m i t e d employment opportunit ies that were a v a i l a b l e in the 
region. These o f f i c e r s invoked the comparison with other 
u n e m p l o y e d A u s t r a l i a n s who were being allowed to reta in 
el igibil ity for UB while going on annual holiday. This argument 
was i n c r e a s i n g l y accepted in the DSS during 1979, and thereby 
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lead to some further expansion in Aboriginal el igibil ity for UB 
in remote areas. 
The Struggle for Award Wages on the Queensland Reserves During 
the Fraser Years 
In Qld, Aborigines on reserves were still trying to escape 
an old style ' t r a i n i n g wage' regime run by the Qld state 
g o v e r n m e n t DAIA at the same t i m e as those in NT and WA 
outstat ions were being granted e l i g i b i l i t y for UB. In 1979 an 
Aborig inal worker from the Yarrabah reserve community, near 
Cairns in north Qld, lodged a claim in the Qld I n d u s t r i a l 
Commission for the difference between the award wage applying to 
his job and the training wage being paid to him by the DAIA. The 
case led to a judgement rul ing that the Qld government did not 
have a legal basis for paying under award wages to Aborigines 
working in reserve communities . The Commission instructed the 
DAIA to adjust i ts rate of pay accordingly . The DAIA, i ts 
M i n i s t e r and the Premier of Qld all r e s i s t e d , c laiming that i f 
award wages were to be paid about half the Aborigines then 
employed in reserve communities would become unemployed. The Qld 
government saw this as an excellent opportunity to demand that 
the Commonwealth DAA should contribute an extra $7M to the 
DAIA's budget in order to meet the extra wage b i l l . This it 
argued was preferable to seeing 850 Aborigines in these 
communities unemployed and receiving a similar amount from the 
Commonwealth in the form of UB. The Fraser government was 
unimpressed by the Qld government's argument and was adamant that 
it would not pick up the DAIA's extra wages b i l l . But the Qld 
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government remained equally adamant that without such additional 
funding, it would not countenance raising D M A wages to award 
levels. The Yarrabah worker's victory in the Industrial 
Commission had become mere illusion. What had been given in the 
courts had been denied by the Qld government. DATA training wages 
would, and still do, remain. 
These events in Qld in 1979 were reminiscent of the 
manoeuvring which had gone on in the NT during the Whitlam years 
because of the push towards award wages. The reaction of 
established Qld State government interests and the invocation of 
the spectre of UB epidemic had both been seen before. The Fraser 
government, though not assertive in defending the Aborigines' 
right to award wages, was equally not supportive of the Qld 
government's anti award wages line and did not place any 
obstacles in the way of Qld Aborigines applying for UB. 
Discussion: The New Economic Marginality 
Despite its early railings against the adverse effects of UB 
payments to Aborigines in remote areas and despite its creation 
of the CDEP scheme in 1977, the Fraser government had, by the 
early 1980s, presided over an expansion of UB eligibility for 
these Aborigines which would have more befitted the stated 
objectives of the Whitlam government. Adverse interpretations of 
UB eligibility criteria had gradually been broken down until even 
those Aborigines living in the most remote areas were being 
regarded as eligibile for UB. This did not, however, signal the 
achievement of a thorough going award wage and UB economy for all 
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Aborigines. The CDEP scheme, for one, was still in operation and 
much supported by the DAA. The Qld DATA still ran a 'training 
wage' system for Aborigines on its reserve settlements. In other 
places too, the reality of local wages still fell well short of 
the award wage ideal. The sorts of arrangements that had 
typically developed provided an extended eligiblity for UB in 
conjunction with a wage structure which in many instances still 
reflected the marginal economic nature of many of the activities 
in which Aborigines were involved. In short, through devices such 
as contract work, peice work or part-time employment, rates of 
pay were often still under the award. The new eligibility for UB 
served at times even to subsidise these marginal economic 
activities. One admittedly extreme example will serve to 
illustrate the point. 
The example concerns one of the Aboriginal communities 
established in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as a result of 
the walk offs which were then plaguing the NT cattle industry. By 
the 1980s, this community of 200 Aborigines had established 
itself on an excision of land from the larger white-run pastoral 
property and was operating its own pastoral company. At the 
begining of 1981 the company was not in a particularly healthy 
financial state. The new Aboriginal manager of the company 
engaged a number of young men in the community to do fencing and 
stock work on the understanding that once the muster had been 
completed later in the year, the workers would be back paid from 
the receipts. Come the end of the mustering season, however, 
receipts were only adequate to cover other costs which had been 
incurred and the workers received no back pay at all. The workers 
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then e n r o l l e d for UB d u r i n g the o f f - s e a s o n . In 1 9 8 2 , c o m e the 
t i m e for m u s t e r i n g , this g r o u p of w o r k e r s o n c e a g a i n b e g a n to 
'help o u t ' w i th the c a t t l e w o r k . But this t i m e t h e y r e t a i n e d 
their UB rather than trusting the manager to find them some back 
pay. The l o c a l o f f i c e of the DSS w a s a w a r e of the s i t u a t i o n and 
j u d g e d it to be w i t h i n the r u l e s . The s t o c k m e n r e a s o n a b l y 
e x p e c t e d n o t to be p a i d , so w e r e in a s e n s e m e r e l y u n d e r t a k i n g 
' v o l u n t a r y w o r k ' w h i l e u n e m p l o y e d . This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
f a c t s and e l i g i b i l i t y c r i t e r i a b y the l o c a l DSS w a s n o t , of 
course, without its precedents. The DSS had long realised that a 
number of W A missions were extracting a little 'voluntary work' 
from their A b o r i g i n e s in r e t u r n for the UB w h i c h t h e y r e c e i v e d 
through the missionary as warrantor. The DSS in W A had generally 
j u d g e d this to c o m e w i t h i n the r u l e s in m u c h the s a m e w a y as 
other unemployed Australians might work voluntarily for a church 
c h a r i t y w h i l e r e c e i v i n g UB. In the p r e s e n t e x a m p l e it w a s an 
e m e r g i n g A b o r i g i n a l l e a d e r , r a t h e r than an e s t a b l i s h e d w h i t e 
m i s s i o n a r y , w h o w a s b u i l d i n g his r e g i m e on this sort of 
arrangement. I say building his regime because, even though his 
workers were not being paid wages, there were benefits which they 
did e n j o y . T h e y had a c c e s s to the c a t t l e c o m p a n y v e h i c l e s and 
f o o d s t o r e , b e n e f i t s of s o m e v a l u e i n a p o o r A b o r i g i n a l 
community. Because of this, the benefit for the manager were not 
o n l y a u n p a i d w o r k f o r c e , but also a band of f o l l o w e r s on w h i c h 
to build local political as well as economic leadership. All this 
depended crucially on the local DSS's interpretation of the facts 
and r u l e s s u r r o u n d i n g e l i g i b i l i t y for UB. In this c o m m u n i t y in 
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1982, UB had become not so much an income support mechanism for 
those who could not find work as the means of support for a 
highly marginal economic enterprise. 
These sorts of arrangements are now common in remote 
Aboriginal communities. In many ways they reflect the 
continuation of an economic marginality which was created within 
the formal confines of a separate legal structure of Aboriginal 
welfare, but which is now developing within the structure of 
Australia's mainstream welfare and workforce institutions. That 
economic marginality is now taking on new forms, but only slowly 
moving towards a thorough going award wage and UB economy. One 
such new form has emerged in the changing role of UB. There was a 
time when it was excluded from these marginal economies, even 
though the legislative barrier to Aboriginal eligibility had been 
removed. Now, however, UB has become a major source of resources 
for Aborigines in remote areas, and even for some who during 
their waking hours undertake a little 'voluntary work'. Such are 
the reversals possible in politics in an administrative setting. 
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Chapter 10 
CDEP and UB Group Payment Schemes: Group versus Family Unit 
Service Allocation 
In 1965, the DSS contemplated legal proceedings against a 
pastoralist in the north of WA who was suspected of misusing 
pension money flowing to him on behalf of Aborigines. Under the 
letter of agreement with the DSS signed by such intermediaries at 
the time, the pastoralist was supposed to hand over the 'pocket 
money' portion of Aboriginal pensions, while applying the rest to 
the pensioners' maintenance. This particular pastoralist was 
asked by the DSS to account for the disbursment of the pension 
money he had received on behalf of a number of Aborigines. When 
he was unable to do so, the DSS contemplated legal action. 
However, advice from the Attorney-General's Department indicated 
that the DSS's letter of agreement with third parties regarding 
the disbursement of funds paid to them on behalf of Aboriginal 
pensioners could well be beyond the Department's powers under the 
Social Security Act. The Act provided that a pension or benefit 
could be paid 'on behalf of the pensioner or beneficiary to a 
'person institution or authority' approved by the Director-
General (sees 43 and 123). The advice from the Attorney-General's 
Department in 1965 suggested that because of the wording of these 
provisions, the pastoralist was the pensioners' agent, not the 
Department's, and therefore probably not legally accountable to 
the DSS for the disbursement of pension money. On this advice, 
DSS's thoughts of legal action against the pastoralist were put 
aside. 
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Though for the time this was an exceptional case which came 
to nothing, it did indicate that the DSS could become concerned 
to protect individual Aborigines' rights under the Social 
Security Act. In the 1960s of course, even if the DSS had been 
strongly committed to protecting these rights for Aborigines in 
remote areas, it would have had little chance of doing so. The 
Department's weak penetration to this portion of its clientele 
was certain assurance of that. However, during the 1970s, as 
DSS's conciousness of and penetration to its Aboriginal clientele 
slowly increased, expressions of concern for such rights became 
more frequent and the DSS's ability to act for their protection 
became more substantial. 
By the time the Fraser government initiated the 
establishment of the interdepartmental working party on 
Aboriginal employment in 1976, the DSS had developed some 
considerable commitment to the principle of direct individual 
payments for Aborigines. It had also developed a degree of 
wariness about old style arrangements for the payment of 
Aborigines' pensions and benefits to third parties. The DSS 
member of the working party offered considerable resistance to 
the idea of a UB-funded community works project scheme and 
insisted on including in the working party's report the argument 
that under such an arrangement the DSS would be open to charges 
of discrimination against Aborigines unless all individual 
beneficiaries in the communities concerned approved the 
arrangement. DSS was clearly not pleased with the prospect of 
opening itself anew to charges of denying Aborigines their 
individual rights under the Social Security Act by endorsing a 
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mandatory UB-funded community-based works project scheme. 
The DAA saw the works project proposal in a slightly 
different light. Since its inception in 1972, the DAA had pursued 
programs specifically intended to encourage Aboriginal group 
organisation through the direct funding of incorporated community 
groups. Many within the DAA were rather keen on the community 
emphasis of the works project proposal and, naturally enough, 
were not so concerned either for the DSS's reputation for non-
discriminatory administration or for individual Aborigines' 
rights under the Social Security Act. In fact there were some 
within the DAA who saw the DSS's highly individualised income 
support services as acting against their own programs intended to 
encourage Aboriginal community organisation. 
This difference of outlook between the DAA and the DSS 
reflected a broader tension over the question of whether 
individual family units or incorporated community groups were the 
appropriate recipients of income support services for Aborigines 
in remote areas. In the years leading up to 1976, the push for 
individual rights and direct social security payments for these 
Aborigines had made most of the running as the 'progressive' 
direction in which policy should be moving (see eg Tatz 1964). 
However, with the floating of this community works project idea, 
communitarian alternatives were making something of a comeback. 
Individual payments were portrayed as disorganising and also 
contrary to the purported communitarian nature of Aboriginal 
society. A works project scheme, on the other hand, could 
strengthen community self-management in matters relating to use 
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of the community workforce. Significantly, it was the DAA and 
DEIR officers from the working party, and not the DSS officer, 
who were given the task of developing the works project idea into 
a more definite proposal in the months following the submission 
of the working party's report to the ministers. 
Because of the DSS's continued resistance to the UB-funded 
community works project idea, when the CDEP did emerge in May 
1977, it was only loosely a UB alternative. It was funded and 
administered by the DAA with some slight administrative 
assistance from the DEIR and the DSS. The DSS was not so 
resistant to this arrangement, since it no longer regarded the 
scheme as leaving it open to the criticism of directly 
compromising Aboriginal rights under the Social Security Act. 
Nevertheless, the emergeance of the CDEP scheme in 1977 still 
provided new life for debate over the appropriateness of 
community based versus individual family unit income service 
programs for Aborigines in remote areas. No longer could the 
proponents of individualised payments so easily claim that theirs 
was the only 'progressive' alternative. 
CDEP: Early Problems, Criticisms and Defences 
Throughout its history, the CDEP scheme has been beset by 
problems and criticisms. On the first day of its operation at 
Barunga (previously known as Bamyili) in 1977, almost twice as 
many Aborigines turned up for work as had previously been on UB 
in the community. During the first six months of the project's 
operation, turn out continued to be higher than expected. At the 
end of 1977, under pressure from the Barunga council, the DAA 
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increased the allocation for the project to cover 80 people, as 
opposed to the initial 50. Even so, the Barunga council continued 
to overspend its CDEP budget and to ask for more. The DAA in 
Darwin soon became concerned that the Barunga CDEP was taking 
funds from its other programs, particularly the Special Works 
Projects scheme, and that Barunga was enjoying increasingly 
privileged access to DAA funds at the expense of other Aboriginal 
communities. 
Similar budgetary problems were to recur throughout the 
early years of the CDEP program and in relation to almost every 
community in uhich it was introduced. The numbers who wanted to 
obtain work under the program often outstripped the numbers for 
whom finance had been provided. Pressure on the DAA for budget 
expansions was unremitting. Because funding was notionally based 
on being a UB alternative, this pressure was often difficult to 
resist. But funds did not come from the open appropriation of the 
national welfare fund, as with UB and other social security 
payments. Rather, they came from DAA's own pre-determined budget 
allocation. This meant that, apart from one-off additional 
funding allocations, the program could only expand at the expense 
of other DAA expenditure. Increasingly DAA felt compelled to 
resist the pressure for expanded CDEP budgets in order that other 
programs and other Aboriginal communities not be deprived of 
money. But if funds were not supplied, there was always the 
possibility of community members of working age being left 
without income support at all, or of them applying for UB. 
Neither scenario reflected well on the operation of the CDEP 
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scheme. C lear ly there were fundamental problems in the budgetary 
a r r a n g e m e n t f o r the CDEP scheme and I w i l l have more t o say o f 
these l a t e r in the chapter . 
Not a l l the problems and c r i t i c i s m s which arose in r e l a t i o n 
t o the CDEP scheme in the e a r l y y e a r s r e l a t e d s i m p l y t o the 
weakness of the budgetary arrangement, and not a l l the pressures 
f o r budgetary expansion arose s imply out of higher than expected 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s i n the 11 A b o r i g i n a l c o m m u n i t i e s i n which 
CDEPs were introduced. Soon a f t e r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the scheme, 
the Labor o p p o s i t i o n spokesman and former Minister f o r Abor ig ina l 
A f f a i r s , Senator Cavanagh, pointed to the p o s s i b i l i t y of under-
award wages b e i n g paid under the scheme. The CDEP g u i d e l i n e s 
p r e s e n t e d to the p a r l i a m e n t by the M i n i s t e r f o r A b o r i g i n a l 
A f f a i r s in May 1977 had provided, i n t e r a l i a , that : 
14. Each community w i l l be e n c o u r a g e d to e s t a b l i s h i t s own 
method of remuneration f o r i t s members who p a r t i c i p a t e in the 
p r o j e c t provided t h a t : 
(a ) a l l unemployed community members e l i g i b l e to apply f o r 
unemployment b e n e f i t s w i l l be g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e ; 
( b ) e a c h p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o m m u n i t y member, p r o v i d e d he 
c o n t r i b u t e s the r e q u i r e d minimum hours or s a t i s f i e s o t h e r 
minimum c r i t e r i a d e t e r m i n e d by the communi ty , w i l l be 
g u a r a n t e e d a minimum income a p p r o x i m a t i n g h i s normal 
u n e m p l o y m e n t b e n e f i t e n t i t l e m e n t (CPD H o u s e o f 
Representat ives 2 6 / 5 / 7 7 : 1922). 
Cavanagh and o t h e r s now s u g g e s t e d that any d e c i s i o n by a 
community c o u n c i l to adopt an under-award remuneration s t ruc ture 
m i g h t be i n b r e a c h o f A u s t r a l i a n i n d u s t r i a l o r r a c e 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n l a w s , or even in b r e a c h o f United N a t i o n s and 
In ternat i ona l Labour Organisation conventions to which Austra l ia 
was a p a r t y (CPD Senate 8 / 9 / 7 7 : 708, 6 / 1 0 / 7 7 : 1151) . In r e p l y , 
the Min i s te r s f o r Abor ig ina l A f f a i r s and Soc ia l Securi ty c laimed 
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that advice from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Attorney-
General indicated that the scheme did not contravene the relevant 
international conventions because it had been entered into 
voluntarily by the Aboriginal communities concerned (CPD House of 
Representatives 6/10/77:1718). In relation to the possible 
contravention of Australia's own industrial and race 
discrimination laws, the Ministers' replies were conspicuously 
silent. In time, however, the DAA accommodated these other 
criticisms by adopting the position that CDEP participants were 
to be paid part-time pro-rata equivalents of award rates up to 
the level of their entitlement for UB. Whether this, in fact, 
occurred in the communities in which CDEP operated is highly 
questionable. But DAA's stance did something at least to quieten 
criticism. 
Cavanagh also suggested that the 'blanket decision' not to 
pay UB to Aborigines in particular communities contravened a 
recent high court case in which the DSS had been successfully 
challenged over a similar blanket practice of excluding all 
school leavers from UB during the annual vacation period, without 
specific legislative justification for doing so. The Minister for 
Social Security replied that: 
If individual Aborigines wish to avail themselves of 
unemployment benefits, they may do so by seeking work 
outside of these communities, but if they wish to be part of 
the schemes that have been introduced at the initiative of 
the Aboriginal communities they may do so (CPD Senate 
6 / 1 0 / 7 7 : 1 1 5 1 ) . 
In all these responses to Cavanagh's criticism, the major 
argument in defence of the CDEP scheme related to its voluntary 
nature and the fact that many Aboriginal community councils were 
329 
clearly expressing a desire to be included in the scheme. CDEP, 
as portrayed by its defenders, was an example Aboriginal self-
management 'at work' (see for another example of such defence 
Coombs 1977). These were important arguments which served to 
m a i n t a i n the CDEP scheme against Cavanagh's barrage of 
criticisms. They do, however, need to be seen in historical 
perspective. 
At the time when the CBEP scheme was first introduced. 
Aborigines in remote areas were still having considerable 
difficulty gaining access to UB. The 'work history' 
interpretation of the eligibility rules, which had been applied 
to Aboriginal applicants in the NT, was only then being 
challenged, so eligibility for UB was only just begining to 
expand. DSS's first Aboriginal public contact staff were also 
only just being appointed, so individual Aboriginal applicants 
still had to rely extremely heavily on extra-departmental 
intermediaries. Some of these intermediaries still disapproved of 
the Aborigines receiving UB, thus presenting another impediment 
to Aboriginal access. Even for those individual Aborigines in 
remote areas who had succesfully negotiated access to UB, the 
demanding review procedures were often still a source of 
dissatisfaction. In this historical context, expressions of 
preference for a work projects alternative to UB paid by DAA 
through community councils could have arisen for a number of 
different reasons. They may, for example, have reflected the 
continuing influence over Aboriginal community councils of 
particular advisors/intermediaries who were against UB. 
Alternatively, they may have reflected calculated decisions of 
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s e l f - i n t e r e s t on the part of r e l a t i v e l y a u t o n o m o u s c o m m u n i t y 
c o u n c i l s w h i c h quite f a i t h f u l l y r e p r e s e n t e d their A b o r i g i n a l 
constituents. Councillors and other community members may quite 
r e a s o n a b l y have a n t i c i p a t e d m o r e m o n e y and e a s i e r a c c e s s to it 
t h r o u g h this n e w DAA p r o g r a m than t h r o u g h the DSS's e x i s t i n g 
provision of UB, There was also the additional incentive that the 
C D E P g u i d e l i n e s p r o v i d e d for 'specific g r a n t s ' to be m a d e to 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n c i l s to p u r c h a s e 'materials and e q u i p m e n t 
r e q u i r e d for the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r p r o j e c t ' (CPD 
House of Representatives 26/5/77:1922). These grants were to be 
over and above the assessed level of UB-alternative entitlement 
in the community. Apart from these financial incentives, councils 
may also have perceived an advantage for their own positions of 
a u t h o r i t y in their c o m m u n i t i e s . M o n e y f l o w i n g through the 
councils would obviously be far more open to their influence than 
money flowing directly to individual DSS clients. 
All this puts the e x p r e s s e d p r e f e r e n c e of s o m e A b o r i g i n a l 
c o u n c i l s for CDEP and the d e f e n c e of it as a v o l u n t a r y self-
managing arrangement in greater perspective. The scheme was not 
as incontrovertibly progressive as its defenders portrayed it and 
its c r i t i c s w e r e not to be so e a s i l y put aside. The Labor 
opposition continued to argue that the scheme required Aborigines 
to work for their UB at under-award conditions and was therefore 
in b r e a c h of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (CPD House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
1 5 / 9 / 7 8 : 1563). Senator C a v a n a g h , in p a r t i c u l a r , w a s not to be 
satisfied by the Minister for Social Security's argument that the 
s c h e m e w a s e n t e r e d into v o l u n t a r i l y by c o m m u n i t y c o u n c i l s and 
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that individuals who did not want to participate could leave the 
communities and gain UB elsewhere. In April 1978, Cavanagh 
constructed a parliamentary question around the scenario of an 
unemployed individual in a community with a CDEP not being 
offered a job under the scheme. His question was whether such an 
individual would be eligible for UB. Clearly he was suggesting 
they should be. But the Minister for Social Security was not to 
be drawn. Her reply outlined the principles of the CDEP scheme 
noting that the 'community councils concerned would... arrange 
the employment and pay the Aborigines according to the work done 
by them' (CPD Senate 5/4/78 822). By restricting herself to this 
statement in principle about the mode of operation of the CDEP, 
the Minister avoided directly addressing the scenario which 
Cavanagh had constructed. But that scenario was by no means 
unrealistic, given the funding problems which had emerged around 
the CDEP from the very first day of its operation and given the 
fact that the DAA was increasingly less willing to accede to 
council demands for budgetary expansion. 
Within DSS central office, Cavanagh's scenario was in fact 
addressed more specifically. Within a week an instruction was 
circulated by the Assistant Director General (Benefits 
Administration) indicating that an applicant from a CDEP 
community who had not been offered work under the scheme should 
be granted UB if the eligibility criteria could be satisfied. 
Though this clearly represented a weakening of the original 
intent that CDEP be a thorough going UB-alternative, in the 
absence of specific legislative provisions disqualifying 
applicants in CDEP communities from UB, the DSS felt unable 
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formally to deny eligibility in the sorts of circumstances 
Cavanagh had sketched. The effect of this instruction on 
Aboriginal eligibility for UB in CDEP communities was, however, 
highly problematic. As late as 1980, senior DSS officers 
participating on an interdepartmental working party in Canberra 
admitted that although this was the Department's formal 
interpretation of the rules, the reality was that the DSS had 
been inclined to avoid making UB payments in CDEP community's 
whenever possible precisely because CDEP was still seen as a UB 
alternative. Even as late as 1982, the Darwin office of the DSS 
was, as one of its ALOs pointed out, still using a standard 
letter of rejection for applicants for UB from CDEP communities 
stating explicitly that they were not eligible while living in 
such a community. Senior officers in the DSS's NT administration 
were at that time unsuccessfully seeking clarification on the 
question of eligibility for UB in CDEP communities from central 
office. These officers clearly were not aware of the 1978 
instruction which had arisen from Cavanagh's questioning and 
central office was equally clearly unwilling to repeat it. 
All this takes me a little too far ahead in the CDEP story. 
But it does raise an important issue about the problematic nature 
of the relationship between debates and clarification of rule 
interpretations going on at senior levels of the administration 
at one point in time and their effect on actual operations of 
programs at the street level over longer periods. For this 
reason, before 1 continue the discussion of the early problems 
and criticisms which surrounded the CDEP scheme at a general 
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level, it may be useful to illustrate just how the CDEP scheme 
was working out on the ground at the community and regional 
office level. Events surrounding the original Barunga CDEP can 
serve once again as the example. 
The Barunga CDEP: An Example 
Worried by the continual overspending which had occurred in 
the Barunga CDEP during the first six months of its operation, 
the DAA's Darwin office suggested removing the 'accounting 
oversight' of the scheme away from the Barunga council to the 
newly formed Yulngu association in nearby Katherine. Yulngu's 
principle employee at the time happened, quite fortuitously, to 
be the former DAA officer who had participated in the 1976 
interdepartmental working party on Aboriginal employment and had 
subsequently been involved in the development of the CDEP 
proposal. The Darwin DAA's suggestion regarding accounting 
arrangements was strongly resisted by the Barunga council, which 
in December 1977 put its case strongly to a review team of two 
Katherine-based officers of the DAA and DEIR. In their report, 
the review team sided with the community council, echoing the 
council president's criticisms of DAA's attempts to 'interfere' 
in the running of the project and discounting the Darwin DAA's 
concerns that the expanding CDEP was taking money from its other 
programs. They commented: 
The Review team is alarmed that DAA suggests that no Special 
Works Projects are available to other communities because of 
the CDEP at Bamyili (Barunga WS). The team believes that 
active measures have been made to impede the progress of CDEP 
at Bamyili and that Special Works Projects submissions made 
by other communities have been budgetted for by deducting the 
Special Works Projects cost from CDEP allocated to Bamyili. 
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The DAA in Darwin was less than impressed with such partisan 
reporting and in June 1978 organised another review of the 
Barunga CDEP. This time the review team included another more 
senior Katherine-based DAA officer who was a little less inclined 
to adopt the Barunga council's point of view. The report was, as 
a consequence, rather more informative in its factual detail and 
rather less concerned with criticising the DAA. It began as 
follows: 
The Bamyili project has been in operation now for some 
fourteen months and there is no doubt that it has a general 
community acceptance as an unemployment relief scheme. It is 
necessary to point out though that there are a number of 
residents who would prefer not to work in order to attract 
unemployment relief. These nevertherless partake of the 
scheme. 
The June 1978 Barunga review provided further evidence relating 
to the possibility of tension between individuals and the 
Aboriginal council over CDEP and UB. It reported that there were 
9 Aborigines living at Barunga who were receiving UB. Council, it 
appeared, had refused to give them work on the CDEP on the 
grounds that they were 'foreigners' in the community. This was 
not an approach of which the DAA approved, but equally it was not 
one which the DAA could do much about without further budgetary 
expansion of the Barunga CDEP. ? 
All this pointed to an important dimension of the CDEP 
scheme which the rhetoric of voluntarism and self-management 
employed by its defenders often overlooked. It was the Aboriginal 
councils, not individuals, who were asking for CDEP. So it was at 
the council level that one could talk of CDEP as an exercise in 
self-management. What this implied for individual Aborigines in 
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the communities had, till episodes like this, seldom been 
considered by the scheme's defenders. Clearly, the Barunga 
example suggested that increased self-management for the council 
could lead to increased power for the council over individual 
community members; indeed even over who were considered to be 
community members for CDEP purposes. 
The review of the Barunga CDEP in June 1978 also revealed a 
number of other problems. 17 school leavers had not been 
incorporated into the program because funds had not been provided 
to cover them. They were presently without any income at all but 
might in time apply for UB at the nearby Katherine office of the 
DSS. The more senior DAA officer involved in the review also 
expressed concern about the problem of finding useful jobs for 
people to do under the scheme. In a minute to the Darwin office 
of his Department a month after the review, he commented that: 
Although the philosophies behind the CDEP Program and the old 
Training Allowance are different, the sort of works 
undertaken by workers at Bamyili under CDEP are the same as 
that of the Training Allowance. The work in the main is not 
meaningful and certainly not long term. I feel that unless 
councils operating the scheme can think of projects which are 
long term, meaningful and acceptable to the Community the 
main objective of the program will not be realised. It would 
not be in the interests of the community to have a training 
allowance mentality develop, something which I fear will 
occur if the present approach continues. 
The review team also suggested that DAA 'rationalise' the 
relationship between the CDEP and another program under which DAA 
funds flowed to the Bamyili council; the Town Maintenance and 
Public Utilities (TMPU) program. The review team argued that TMPU 
funding had, in the past, 'reflected employment creation 
objectives' which could now reasonably be transferred to the 
CDEP. This, of course, would mean an expansion of the Barunga 
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CDEP, but an overall cut in the combined CDEP and TMPU funding 
directed to the community by the DAA. For this reason the 
proposal met with considerable support in the Darwin office of 
the DAA, which, as I have indicated, had already expressed some 
concern at the favoured budgetary position being achieved by 
Barunga. The recommendation gave rise to a specific proposal to 
transfer 13 positions out of the TMPU and into the CDEP. The 
proposal was resisted strongly by the Barunga council on behalf 
of its TMPU employees who stood to be downgraded. But the DAA 
insisted and by the end of 1978, the transfer had been effected. 
This was not to be the end of the matter. In June 1979, another 
review of the Barunga CDEP revealed that although funding had 
remained constant, the actual number of people employed under 
CDEP had dropped dramatically. In the pay period immediately 
prior to the review, only 26 people had been employed, 14 of whom 
had worked 60-70 hours in the two week period. The review team 
explained the situation which had developed as follows: 
The transfer of TMPU reliable workers to CDEP presented the 
opportunity to sack those CDEP workers whose job efficiency 
reliability and work attitudes left much to be desired and 
this subsequently occurred. However, TMPU workers transferred 
to CDEP were used to working more or less an 8 hour day with 
a corresponding award wage level and were not inclined to opt 
for less, so thus evolved the present situation whereby a 
lesser number of workers are employed who work more hours 
with a corresponding increased wage level. 
The Council,it appeared, had applied CDEP money to the TMPU 
workers on a basis similar to that under which they had 
previously been working under the TMPU program. The other 
supposed recipients of CDEP had been left without income support 
altogether, or to do battle with a DSS which was still confused 
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over w h e t h e r to pay UB to a p p l i c a n t s f r o m C D E P c o m m u n i t i e s or 
not. The saga of the B a r u n g a CDEP has c o n t i n u e d in s i m i l a r v e i n 
to the present day. 
CDEP: Fundamental Contradictions 
Similar stories to the Barunga one could be told in relation 
to almost all 11 communities in which CDEP had been introduced 
d u r i n g 1977 and 1978. The r e a s o n for this, I w o u l d a r g u e , w a s 
that from the v e r y start the p r o b l e m s of the s c h e m e had been a 
d i r e c t c o n s e q u e n c e of the i n a d e q u a c i e s and t e n s i o n s in its 
conception and in the guidelines which governed its operation. It 
had at once a t t e m p t e d to be an i n c o m e s e c u r i t y p r o g r a m , a 
c o m m u n i t y w o r k s / j o b c r e a t i o n p r o g r a m a n d an e x e r c i s e in 
Aboriginal community council self-management. 
Because of its notional link with UB entitlement, CDEP began 
its life with some aspects of an income security program. These 
w e r e r e f l e c t e d in parts a) and b) of g u i d e l i n e 14 quoted a b o v e . 
B u t the m e t h o d of f u n d i n g a d o p t e d for the s c h e m e w a s 
fundamentally incompatible with a thorough going income security 
o b j e c t i v e . N u m b e r s of u n e m p l o y e d w e r e c a l c u l a t e d o n l y 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y and those i n c l u d e d in the n u m b e r s for a p r o j e c t 
were not individually identified. The level of funding for each 
project was determined s i m p l y by m u l t i p l y i n g this a p p r o x i m a t e 
number of unemployed by a notional average amount for which a UB 
a p p l i c a n t m i g h t be e l i g i b l e . The r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n C D E P 
funding and UB entitlement was rough and ready, even before the 
D A A b e c a m e c o n c e r n e d to halt CDEP's b u d g e t a r y e x p a n s i o n . This 
m e a n t that the s c h e m e w a s u n l i k e l y to p r o v i d e a f a i r l y p r e c i s e 
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alternative to UB, as guideline 14 b) suggested it should, even 
without the many other complications that in practice arose. 
Because of the community works and employment creation 
aspect of its conception, the CDEP was also open to the host of 
issues that typically surround these sorts of programs. There is 
always the concern that such programs may be used to substitute 
created employment positions for existing jobs and, on the other 
hand, that they do not become simply punitive make-work measures 
without some community benefit (Scherer 1984). There are also the 
characteristic demands that participants in these programs 
receive award wages, or at least part-time equivalents, and that 
the schemes not be used to deny participants their underlying 
entitlement to UB. In an attempt to avoid these sorts of 
criticisms, the guidelines had provided that the CDEP was only to 
apply to communities with 'high unemployment and inadequate job 
opportunities' and to communities which had 'specifically 
requested ' it. But even so, this did not stop precisely these 
sorts of criticisms being levelled at the CDEP. 
The third aspect of CDEP related to its claims to be 
encouraging Aboriginal self-management. This was enshrined in the 
'objective' which stated that the program was intended to 
'maximise the capacity of Aboriginal communities to determine the 
use of their workforce', and in the references in the 
'guidelines' to the 'community' having a significant role to play 
in determining 'type of employment' and 'method of remuneration'. 
Aswe have seen, the self-management theme qickly became the 
central defense of CDEP against its critics. 
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This concatenation of program objectives was a certain 
recipe for conflict and criticism. The income maintenance 
objectives could be used by councils to legitimate overspending 
and to push for increased funding when rates of participation 
exceeded those budgeted for. They could also be used by councils 
or individuals to demand payment irrespective of work done. The 
community employment aspects of the scheme, on the other hand, 
could be used by the DAA to lessen the budgetary load on its 
other programs or to require councils to demand work performance 
as a condition of payment. They could also be used by councils to 
threaten exclusion of recalcitrant workers, ignoring in the 
process the program's income maintenance objectives. The self-
management aspects of the scheme could be used by the 
participating councils and their advisors to legitimate just 
about anything they chose to do. They could exclude unwanted 
workers, pay under award wages, even pay some workers a higher 
rate than others and/or allow some workers to work longer hours 
than others. Councils could assert their right to determine what 
sort of activity constituted work and to resist DAA's moves to 
exercise greater oversight of the scheme's operation at the 
community level. As the Barunga example suggests, all these 
possibilities and more did in fact occur within the first couple 
of years of the CDEP scheme's operation. 
1978-79: Continuing Demands for CDEP and UB Group Payment Schemes 
Despite, or perhaps because of its problems, the CDEP scheme 
was still much in demand. During 1978 and 1979, the DAA received 
numerous requests for CDEPs from Aboriginal councils, but was 
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reluctant to enter into new projects without additional funding. 
At the end of 1979, an additional $5.5M per annum was made 
available to the DAA for the expansion of the scheme and projects 
were initiated in another 7 communities. This by no means met all 
of the requests, nor did it address the problems with CDEP which 
had already emerged in the operation of the first 11 projects. 
Because they were unable to obtain CDEPs, a number of the 
Aboriginal community councils which were requesting them began to 
devise alternative CDEP-type arrangements based on UB. One 
example was at Milingimbi in Arnhemland in the NT. Until 1978, 
the council at Milingimbi had, under the influence of the Uniting 
Church mission, maintained a strong anti-UB policy in the 
community. During that year however, a number of individuals 
defied the council and applied for UB. Initially the council and 
its Uniting Church advisors obstructed the inflow of UB. But 
later a compromise was struck whereby UB would be allowed if 
applicants were involved in volunteer council work. The 
Milingimbi council called the arrangement a CDEP and clearly 
looked to the real CDEP scheme to justify the way in which UB was 
being directed through council and paid in return for work. 
Meanwhile the council continued to request a real CDEP scheme 
from the DAA. With the expansion of the CDEP scheme in late 1979, 
Milingimbi was one of the 7 communities to be newly included. 
The Willowra community, in central Australia, was another 
which sought a CDEP soon after the introduction of the scheme. As 
CDEP funding was not forthcoming, in 1978 the Willowra council in 
conjunction with the local DAA officer approached the DSS in 
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Alice Springs asking for a single bulk cheque directing all UB 
payments in the community to one central person. The DSS informed 
Willowra that bulk UB cheques were not available in the NT. The 
council reworked its request into one in which all individual 
social security pension and benefit cheques would be paid through 
one central council-approved individual. The new proposal also 
included an informal tax on incoming payments at a rate of 20 per 
cent. The community fund so created was to be used to encourage 
individuals to take on voluntary work in return for a small bonus 
and to meet community expenses such as running the powerhouse and 
vehicles and the costs incurred in organising ceremonies. A 
similar informal taxing arrangement had been in operation at 
Willowra in 1977, but had broken down because of the non-
compliance of an increasing number of community members. A large 
part of the Willowra council's reason for wanting a group payment 
was precisely that it might improve community compliance with any 
informal taxing regime designed to create a pool of community 
funds. Early in 1979, the Willowra council sought DSS support for 
its revised proposal. The Darwin Director of the DSS was 
generally supportive, though he did see a number of minor 
'shortcomings'. In May 1979, he referred the proposal to DSS 
central office for its consideration and in doing so commented 
that the DSS could: 
partially meet the desires of the community by enabling 
willing pensioners and beneficiaries to complete SA33 
authority forms making their cheques payable to a central 
person. To ensure that such authorisation was authentic I 
would insist on a Departmental officer being present at the 
signing of the forms to verify their authenticity. 
He also insisted on any such scheme being subject to regular 
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reviews in order that the willingness of the participating 
individuals continue to be ascertained. The reply from central 
office was brief and to the point. Under no circumstance was the 
DSS to give support to the extension of UB group payment schemes 
at the present time, particularly ones involving Aborigines 
undertaking voluntary 'work' in return for UB or any part 
thereof. This 'policy' was clearcut. The Willowra proposal would 
have to be rejected and the Milingimbi arrangement and others 
like it were not to be supported. 
To explain the adamant tenor of this DSS central office 
response, it is necessary to fill in some of the contemporary 
developments surrounding the UB bulk warrantee scheme which had 
been operating in some remote Aboriginal communities in WA since 
the Whitlam years. As discussed previously, in its early years 
this arrangement often served to reinforce existing local 
structures of welfare patronage by channeling UB funds through 
established mission authorities. As time went on, the arrangement 
also came to be used by newly emerging Aboriginal community 
organisations to create pools of funds for community expenditure. 
By the late 1970s, there were 11 Aboriginal communities in the 
north of WA using the UB bulk warrantee arrangement. Four were 
unequivocally old style mission communities in which the 
warrantor was a white missionary and the UB was paid through the 
mission to Aborigines in return for work. The others seven 
communities had undergone varying degress of change, some to the 
extent of having a local Aboriginal leader as the warrantor. 
Understandably, the WA bulk warrantee arrangement for UB was 
viewed ambivalently by the DAA in relation to its attempts to 
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encourage greater Aboriginal community organisation and greater 
Aboriginal involvement in community decision making. On the one 
hand it provided a useful source of recurrent funds which gave 
emerging communities some additional ability to organise 
resources on a loose community basis. This DAA viewed as a 
welcome supplement to the limited funds it could provide to the 
new community councils. On the other hand, the bulk warrantee 
arrangement also provided some Aboriginal welfare organisations 
which DAA viewed as recalcitrant, such as the four missions, with 
additional ability to shun DAA money and resist its urgings for 
change. 
In 1977, the DAA sensed the prospect of extending its 
influence over these WA mission communities by replacing the UB 
bulk warrantee arrangement with the new CDEP scheme. DAA began to 
lobby DSS over the inadequacies of the WA bulk warrantee 
arrangement and to push for its abolition in favour of CDEP. DSS 
was reasonably receptive to the argument that the Aborigines 
involved in these arrangements who worked for their UB were 'not 
really unemployed'. It was also reasonably receptive to evidence 
that the arrangement was being misused by some warrantors who, 
for example, continued to receive UB for particular beneficiaries 
even when the beneficiaries were absent from the community for 
extended periods. Some Aborigines in the communities involved in 
the arrangement were also begining to criticise it. All of this 
was made perfectly clear to the new Director General of Social 
Security, Lanigan, in mid 1978 when he visited the north of WA. 
His response was to place an immediate and total ban not just on 
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the expansion of the WA bulk warrantee arrangement for UB, but 
on all UB group payment arrangements to Aboriginal communities, 
particularly those in which there was any suggestion of 
beneficiaries working in order to receive UB. The whole question 
of these arrangements was to be comprehensively reviewed by the 
DSS. 
The DAA's opposition to the WA bulk warrantee arrangement in 
1977 depended, in part at least, on the prospect of replacing the 
arrangement with the new CDEP alternative. However, by mid 1978 
CDEP was experiencing considerable difficulties in the 
communities in which it had been introduced and the DAA was in no 
position to expand it. Ironically then, at precisely the time 
when the constriction of the CDEP scheme was generating secondary 
demands for UB group payment schemes, the DSS, at DAA urging, had 
placed a ban on the expansion of the one established arrangement 
of this type that it had in the past allowed. For those 
Aboriginal communities which wanted a CDEP but could not get one, 
there was now no formally sanctioned DSS UB group payment scheme 
to which they could turn as an alternative even in WA. More 
informal arrangements of a group payment nature, like the Yulgnu 
association's one discussed in an earlier chapter, did of course 
continue to exist. 
Reactions within the DSS to the range of more and less 
formalised UB group payment arrangements operating in remote 
Aboriginal communities at the end of the 1970s were extremely 
varied. Few in the Department were as seized by the need for 
reform of these arrangements as the new Director General had been 
after his trip to the north of WA in mid 1978. Some officers were 
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however expressing similar concerns. For example, late in 1978 
one ALO in the Darwin DSS office questioned the propriety of an 
arrangement which had recently developed in Nguiu community on 
Bathurst Island, whereby UB recipients were required to work for 
the council in return for their benefit. A more senior officer of 
the DSS's NT administration visited the community with the ALO 
soon after in order to review the arrangement. In his report he 
commented as follows: 
People asked would they have to work to receive the UB. We 
advised that this was not the case... The group was almost 
completely ignorant (and in some instances sadly misinformed) 
about their entitlement to UB and their rights to insist on 
receiving their individual cheques if they wished. 
In a minute to the SA Director, the NT Regional Director of the 
DSS had commented more ambivalently only a few months earlier 
that: 
It is particularly difficult to really assess whether this 
Department should press to have individuals receive their 
individual entitlement, or whether they should allow the 
Aboriginal Councils to exercise their influence for their 
corporate good. 
Others within the DSS were more positively supportive of group 
payment arrangements and less concerned about individual 
Aborigines' rights to receive payment directly and without having 
to undertake voluntary work. The WA Director of the DSS, for 
example, clearly regarded the Director General's ban on the 
extension of the bulk warrantee arrangement as an unnecessary and 
constricting inconvenience. Early in 1979 he wrote to the 
Director General as follows: 
The purpose of this report is to convey that the commonly 
held view is that group payment is available to Aborginal 
communities and that there are continuing pressures for its 
extension. To date, we have managed to contain these 
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pressures, but it is not possible to say that allegations of 
discriminatory treatment between Aboriginal communities will 
not sometime be voiced. 
This inherent danger needs to be clearly perceived so that 
the review of the legality and implications of the 
group method of payment proceeds with alacrity. There is, of 
course, a great deal more to the whole matter than just the 
legality of the payment arrangements. The very legality of 
the basis of grant of unemployment benefit could well be open 
to question. 1 have previously expressed the opinion and I 
hold to it that only by the extension of the CDEP scheme will 
we ever approach a situation where the work test and the 
eligibility test of Section 107(c) can be realistically 
applied in Aboriginal communities. 
The second paragraph of this report was presumably intended to 
provide some justification for allowing the persistence of group 
payment arrangements in which individual Aborigines worked in 
return for their UB. The WA Director's argument seemed to be that 
since Aborigines in these remote communities did not really meet 
the eligibility criteria for UB anyway, it did not really matter 
that their individual rights to it were infringed in this more 
minor way. The WA Director's comments also illustrated the way in 
which the debate over group versus family unit service allocation 
which had arisen out of CDEP could re-enliven the even more long 
standing and contentious debate over whether Aborigines in remote 
areas were eligibile for UB at all. Even though, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, this debate had largely been resolved in favour 
of UB eligibility for these Aborigines by the end of the 1970s, 
there were still those within the senior ranks of the DSS 
prepared to argue against this interpretation of the eligibility 
criteria. For these officers, including one Deputy Director 
General, concerns about individual Aborigines' rights to UB in 
remote areas seemed peculiarly misplaced. This Deputy Director 
General, like the WA Director, saw it as more important that the 
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DSS lend its support to initiatives which created work 
opportunities in these areas, such as the CDEP scheme. For him, 
the WA bulk warrantee arrangement under which Aborigines were 
often being required to engage in a little voluntary work in 
return for UB had a few 'technical' problems, but was heading in 
the right direction. Ideally it would be better replaced by CDEP, 
but in the meantime he saw nothing fundamentally wrong with it. 
Given the reasons for the Director General's 1978 ban, it 
was unlikely that the DSS's review would be over enthusiastic 
about the WA bulk warrantee arrangement or other group payment 
schemes. The review argued that UB bulk payments could only be 
entertained as a short term arrangement applying to smaller 
Aboriginal communities in remote areas and that in the longer 
term individual or even split UB payments for husbands and wives 
would necessarily become the norm. Reflecting the diversity of 
opinion within the DSS, however, the review did not totally 
foreclose the bulk payment option. Nor did it suggest terminating 
any of the existing bulk payment arrangements. In short, the DSS 
review allowed the status quo to persist without moving 
decisively one way or the other on the general question of UB 
bulk payments. This, of course, left the DAA to cope with the 
demands generated by the CDEP scheme on its own. 
1980-81: A Time for Interdepartmental Review 
Within the DAA, problems surrounding the operation of the 
CDEP scheme were rapidly taking on the dimensions of a major 
crisis. By early 1980 some participating Aboriginal councils were 
presenting demands for budgetary expansion in the form of bills 
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for the retrospective UB entitlement which they claimed was 
rightly theirs. The DAA viewed the implications of this manoeuvre 
as potentially so disastrous that it decided to institute a 
freeze on CDEP funding pending a review of the scheme. This, of 
course, only exacerbated the problems of the CDEP. How could it 
possibly be a thorough-going alternative to UB if funds were 
frozen? Under questioning in the parliament in March 1980, the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs even stated publicly what had 
been quietly admitted within DSS central office since Senator 
Cavanagh's questioning in May 1978; that if work was not 
available to a person in a community with a CDEP, they would be 
entitled to UB if the normal eligibility criteria were met (CPD 
Senate 26/3/80: 1019, also House of Representatives 14/5/81: 
2500). The income security aspects of the CDEP were being 
thoroughly compromised. The DAA was no longer ensuring funding to 
a level equivalent to UB entitlement and its Minister was 
inviting those in these communities not employed in CDEPs to 
apply for UB. DSS central office, as mentioned previously, was 
still reluctant to make clear its position on UB eligibility in 
CDEP communities. Confusion and diversity of practice reigned. 
The DAA's review of CDEP admitted that the scheme was in a 
'shambles'. Among the problems the review identified were the 
'somewhat incompatible objectives of job creation and income 
support': 
Grants have been made available on the condition that a given 
level of work activity is achieved and DAA has, on one 
occasion, threatened to cease funding CDEP schemes unless 
work performance improved. 
The administration of the Program has thus largely 
disregarded the income support principle inherent in the 
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guidelines. 
In relation to the job creation objective which had predominated, 
DAA acknowledged the validity of a number of further criticisms. 
It admitted that displacement of pre-CDEP award wage positions by 
CDEP positions had occurred in some communities and that funding 
levels had become so low that some participants were being forced 
to work for less than the UB for which they might otherwise be 
eligible. In relation to the self-managment objective, the 
mainstay of CDEP's defense against its critics, the DAA admitted 
that while in some communities the scheme had led to greater 
Aboriginal involvement in local decision making, in others CDEP 
remained firmly under the control of 'entrenched' non-Aboriginal 
administrators. Like the WA bulk warrantee arrangement for UB, 
the CDEP scheme appeared in some communities to be supporting the 
position of emerging Aboriginal leaders and in others to be 
bolstering the old style authority of established white welfare 
patrons. But despite the DAA's acknowledgement of these major 
shortcomings, there was never any suggestion that the CDEP scheme 
should be abandoned in favour of UB. The DAA review noted that: 
Communities don't want 'sit down money' and evidence suggests 
that more people are working and achieving than pre-CDEP. As 
a matter of policy we must prefer a non-UB solution. 
That solution, as DAA saw it, was to somehow transfer the 
budgetary burden of the CDEP scheme onto the national welfare 
fund. In this way, the scheme, or something like it, could be 
automatically funded to the extent of a community's entitlement 
to UB or some other social security payment. This, of course, was 
not within DAA's power to achieve on its own. It would require 
the cooperation of a number of other Commonwealth government 
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departments, most notably the DSS. In mid 1980 therefore, the DAA 
and the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs initiated the formation 
of an interdepartmental working party on 'Income Maintenance in 
Remote Aboriginal Communities'. 
The new working party was a large and flexible group with 
representatives from a number of Commonwealth government 
departments. At its core were representatives from DAA, DSS, DEIR 
and the Departments of Finance and Prime Minister and Cabinet. It 
was chaired by the DAA and settled on terms of reference which 
were as follows: 
1) Examine and assess the likely opportunity for income 
producing work and availability of other income in remote 
Aboriginal communities. 
2) Examine and assess the appropriateness of the present 
structure and level of income security payments to 
Aboriginals living in remote Aboriginal communities, with 
particular reference to: (a) traditional social structure and 
behaviour relating to the distribution of income and the work 
ethic; (b) whether there are imbalances and inequities in 
income distribution within and between communities; (c) the 
effectiveness of the administration of such payments; and (d) 
the effects of pilot CDEP and bulk UB schemes. 
3) Develop long term options for meeting income security 
needs in these areas. 
The working group is to make its recommendations in the light 
of Aboriginal views on the above matters. 
The working party proceeded by the preparation and discussion of 
a number of background papers. These established the various 
departments' understandings of and attitudes to the many impasses 
that had arisen in the operation of CDEP and UB in remote 
Aboriginal communities, and the relationship between the two 
programs. This led in turn to the canvassing of options for 
possible future directions in income security for the remote 
communities. Options ranged from merely maintaining the CDEP 
scheme and UB bulk warrantee arrangements in the communities in 
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which they had been established, through the expansion of job 
creation programs such as DAA's Special Works Projects scheme, 
to the 'major policy innovation' of a 'global vote' for remote 
Aboriginal communities in lieu of all Commonwealth government 
funding. The working party's 'preferred option' was less radical 
than this last, but still potentially a major innovation. It 
suggested using the special benefit, rather than the UB, 
provisions of the Social Security Act to pay income support to 
Aborigines in remote communities. 
As with most of the interdepartmental working party's 
business, the initiative in suggesting this option and developing 
it into a more definite proposal lay with the DAA. What DAA 
envisaged was in fact a modification of the CDEP scheme and, to a 
lesser extent, the UB bulk warrantee arrangment, with special 
benefit taking over the income/wages portion of these schemes. As 
with CDEP, DAA would provide supplementary funds for capital and 
other requirements associated with the 'community development' 
projects to be undertaken by participating councils using the 
labour of beneficiaries. One advantage of this proposal, from 
DAA's point of view, was that a large portion of its bourgeoning 
CDEP budget would be transferred to the national welfare fund. 
But more importantly for the future, DAA saw the advantage that 
the funding arrangement would have the flexibility to respond to 
actual levels of demand for participation in the scheme, whatever 
these turned out to be. 
DSS's reactions to the proposal were cautious, but not 
entirely negative. DSS recognised the problems of the CDEP's past 
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funding arrangement and acknowledged the great advantage of 
funding flexibility inherent in this proposal. The other great 
advantage that some within the DSS saw was in moving away from UB 
to special benefit as the major source of income maintenance for 
Aborigines of working age in remote communities. Those within the 
DSS who, like the WA Director and the Deputy Director General, 
still maintained that Aborigines in these areas did not really 
satisfy the eligibility criteria for UB were enthusiastic on this 
count. As they saw it, the proposal would restore the 'integrity' 
of UB which had been compromised in recent years by rather too 
liberal interpretations of the rules as applied to these 
Aborigines. One disadvantage that the DSS pointed to fairly early 
in the discussion of the proposal was the possibility that the 
special benefit could be seen by recipients as a pension for 
life, eligiblity for which seemed to assume that those included 
were all indefinitely unemployable. Another was that the scheme 
could lead to accusations of 'preferential treatment' for 
Aborigines and requests for the extension of special benefits in 
lieu of UB, to other groups in the general community. 
The Director General of the DSS, Lanigan, who was not 
participating directly in the interdepartmental working party, 
pointed to some further considerations. First he insisted that: 
while communities be encouraged to recognise the advantage of 
aggregating the special benefits of their constituent 
members, the right of individuals to receive the special 
benefit direct be retained. 
In so doing, he was reiterating the individual rights theme which 
had slowly become more forceful within the DSS in recent years in 
the debates over the treatment of the Aboriginal clientele and 
353 
had played a significant part in his own decision to ban the 
extension of UB group payment schemes in mid 1978. Second he 
noted that under the social security legislation, special benefit 
could not be paid to applicants eligible for some other benefit 
or pension. Since in recent years, DSS had slowly come to 
interpret the rules in such a way that Aborigines in remote 
communities were eligible for UB, short of further 
reinterpretation which reversed this trend and declared past 
eligibility improper, there seemed no way that special benefit 
could be paid rather than UB. Lanigan suggested, as a 
consequence, that any group payment scheme to be considered would 
have to be based on UB rather than special benefit. 
DSS reservations about the DAA's proposal were, for the most 
part, reflected fairly faithfully in various passages of the 
working party's final report to the Ministers. In the preamble, a 
statement arguing that the 'increasing availability' of UB to 
'individuals' had been seen by 'many Aboriginal community 
leaders, parliamentarians, administrators and academics as a 
major cause, or potential cause of disruption', was juxtaposed 
with one noting that on the other hand, other Aborigines were 
becoming aware of their individual entitlements to UB and were 
'expressing their demands to be treated equally with non-
Aboriginals'. The one exception to the incorporation of DSS's 
reservations related to Director General Lanigan's objection that 
the Department's could not pay special benefit to people eligible 
for UB. DSS representatives on the working party had clearly not 
taken this point to heart, and the report reflected this. The 
preamble to the report suggested that Aborigines in remote areas 
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were presently being treated as 'a special case for the payment 
of UB'. The implication to be drawn followed the Deputy Director 
General's preferred line of argument, not the Director General's; 
ie that these Aborigines were not strictly eligible for UB, so 
paying special benefit would present no great difficulties. The 
final 'Summary and Recommendations' in the report to the 
Ministers were an ironic reflection on Lanigan's influence on the 
working party. On the one hand they brought this disregard of his 
argument relating to eligiblity for UB to its full bloom, while 
on the other they included a clause on the need to protect 
individual Aborigines' rights which was clearly derived from the 
Director General's own comments on this point. They read as 
follows: 
Noting that sections 124-128 of the Social Services Act 
provide a discretion for the Director General to grant and 
pay a special benefit to persons in need of income support 
who do not qualify for other income support measures... the 
working party recommends 
a) that the Director General give consideration to the 
payment of special benefit... to those Aboriginals residing 
in remote areas who are unable to satisfy the eligibility 
criteria (s.l07) for unemployment benefit. 
b) that the transition from existing arrangements be 
negotiated with each community by the Department of Social 
Security and Aboriginal Affairs with priority being given to 
those communities at present operating a CDEP or receiving 
UB payments in bulk; and that 
c) while communities be encouraged to recognise the advantage 
of aggregating the special benefits of the constituent 
members, the right of individuals to receive special benefit 
be retained. 
The DSS representatives on the working party had clearly 
indicated their willingness to entertain the necessary 
reinterpretation of rules and circumstances to enable Aborigines 
in remote areas to receive special benefit instead of UB. 
Prospects for the success of the working party's proposal 
355 
were affected at the time by a number of key ministerial and 
senior administrative personnel changes. First and foremost, at 
the end of 1980 during the time of the working party's 
deliberations, Senator Chaney moved from being Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs to Minister for Social Security. With him, he 
brought a considerable commitment to the idea of reinvigorating 
something like the CDEP through social security funds, but 
preferably not UB. Second, early in 1981 after the completion of 
the working party's report but before its discussion by the 
Ministers for Aboriginal Affairs and Social Security, Director 
General Lanigan retired from the DSS. This meant that his pro UB 
and anti special benefit argument was unlikely to surface again; 
particularly since the Deputy Director General who took over as 
acting Director General was the one who maintained that 
Aborigines in remote areas did not strictly meet the eligibility 
criteria for UB even though DSS was currently paying many of 
them. The acting Director General was clearly an enthusiast for 
the special benefits idea. The third personnel change of 
importance, though this was a little in the future, was that the 
new Director General of Social Security appointed later in 1981 
was Chaney's former department head in Aboriginal Affairs. He, 
like Chaney, brought with him some ongoing commitment to 
reinvigorating something like the CDEP scheme. 
When Chaney, as the new Minister for Social Security, and 
his acting Director General met with the new Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs, Baume, and his departmental head in March 
1981 to discuss the working party's report, the meeting was 
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extremely optimistic about the possibility of bringing the 
special benefit proposal to fruition. The DSS was to begin 
developing guidelines on eligibility criteria, review procedures 
payment mechanisms and arrangements for transition to the new 
scheme. Soon after the meeting, the Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs wrote to Chaney endorsing the report's recommendations 
and asking, in a particularly forthright manner, that DSS arrange 
to pay future instalments of the 'income maintenance component' 
of existing CDEPs to the participating councils in the form of 
special benefit. But as DSS saw it, things were not quite that 
far advanced. The acting Director General advised his Minister 
that : 
Having regard to the terms of Senator Baume's letter there 
may be some misunderstanding about the general conditions of 
eligibility for payment of special benefits. These benefits 
may be granted at the sole discretion of the Director General 
to Individuals who meet certain conditions as laid down in 
section 124 of the Social Service Act. Claims must be 
determined on an individual basis and participation in a CDEP 
scheme could in no way be considered as a prequisite for the 
payment of special benefit to people living in remote 
Aboriginal communities. 
Though the acting Direct General hastened to add that the DSS did 
agree with the general proposition that special benefit was the 
appropriate form of payment, the changeover was clearly not going 
to be a simple matter of DSS paying DAA's CDEP bills, as the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs' letter seemed to suggest. The 
agreement that had been achieved in the interdepartmental working 
party's recommendations was only on the broadest outlines of a 
possible arrangement between the DSS and the DAA. Before the 
special benefits actually started to be paid, there were many 
further details to be worked out. 
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In A p r i l 1981, the DSS put t o g e t h e r a s m a l l team o f s e n i o r 
c e n t r a l o f f i c e p e r s o n n e l and the WA and NT D i r e c t o r s o f the 
Department t o d e v e l o p t h e w o r k i n g p a r t y ' s p r o p o s a l m o r e 
p r e c i s e l y . By June these o f f i c e r s had f l e shed out a scheme which 
provided f o r a c o l l e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s p e c i a l b e n e f i t payments 
and an a c c o m p a n y i n g g roup r e v i e w s c h e d u l e to be s en t to one 
c e n t r a l p o i n t in a p a r t i c i p a t i n g community each f o r t n i g h t . The 
i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f b e n e f i c i a r i e s and the amounts f o r 
which they were e l i g i b l e on bo th the cheques and the r e v i e w 
schedule was intended c l e a r l y to maintain the i n d i v i d u a l bas i s o f 
e l i g i b i l i t y and pro te c t i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . The cent ra l payment, 
on the other hand, was intended to f a c i l i t a t e any a u t h o r i t a t i v e 
a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r d i s b u r s e m e n t and use o f the f u n d s made by a 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g community as a w h o l e . On t h i s p o i n t the DSS team 
noted that : 
D e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e s e s c h e d u l e d 
payments w i l l be made i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a g r e e m e n t s 
p r e v i o u s l y reached between the community and the ind iv idua l 
r e c i p i e n t s . T h i s w i l l n o t g e n e r a l l y be a m a t t e r f o r 
involvement of the Department of Soc ia l Secur i ty apart from 
our p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the c o n s u l t a t i v e p r o c e s s tha t w i l l 
n e c e s s a r i l y occur in the f i r s t i n s t a n c e . 
More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the team added: 
I t s h o u l d be made p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s no 
o b l i g a t i o n , i n t e n t i o n or requirement that the person work to 
r e c e i v e b e n e f i t . S p e c i a l b e n e f i t i s an income s e c u r i t y 
programme and not a wages component of a j o b c r e a t i o n scheme. 
In r e c o g n i t i o n o f A b o r i g i n a l l a w and t r i b a l c u s t o m , 
c o m m u n i t i e s may make t h e i r own r u l e s f o r members o f t h e i r 
c o m m u n i t i e s . These r u l e s c o u l d g i v e r i s e t o a community 
e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s would a s s i s t t o w a r d s the 
development, general good and we l fa re of the community. This 
i s no t a m a t t e r in which the Department would n o r m a l l y be 
i n v o l v e d . 
Though the i n d i v i d u a l i s m of the proposed scheme and i t s emphasis 
on the b e n e f i c i a r i e s ' r i g h t not to have t o work t o r e c e i v e the 
358 
payment made it somewhat less than a straight replacement for the 
CDEP, the DAA generally accepted the DSS's proposal. It achieved 
the central objective of shifting the CDEP budget to the national 
welfare fund and provided some facilities for community pooling 
of payments and for the involvement of beneficiaries in community 
development projects. In July 1981 the Minister for Social 
Security sought the Prime Minister's permission to pursue the 
proposal further and in September the DSS began to draft a 
Cabinet submission on the scheme. 
All appeared to be going well until the matter was referred 
to the Department of Finance for its approval for submission to 
Cabinet. Back at the time of drafting the interdepartmental 
working party report in late 1980, the Department of Finance 
representative had baulked at the prospect of paying out large 
sums of money under the special benefit provisions of the Social 
Security Act. On the working party's estimate, if the scheme was 
introduced in all 340 remote Aboriginal communities recognised by 
the DAA, it would provide income support for in the order of 
15,000 beneficiaries and cost approximately $52M per annum. The 
Department of Finance's objection to meeting a bill of this 
magnitude through the provisions for special benefit had been 
glossed over in the working party and in subsequent negotiations 
between DSS and DAA. Now, however, the agreement achieved by the 
working party was exposed for the rather 'paper-thin' consensus 
that it was. This, as others have argued, is fairly typical of 
Canberra's interdepartmental committees (Painter and Carey 1979: 
Ch5). The Department of Finance refused now to even contemplate 
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the idea of allowing such a large and open-ended use of special 
benefit in an exercise which it rather cynically saw as the DAA 
trying to tap into the national welfare fund in order to expand 
the Aboriginal Affairs budget. Again as others have argued, this 
was typical behaviour for the Department of Finance on an intra-
departmental committee in maintaining its role as keeper of the 
purse (Weller and Cutt 1976). Experienced senior bureaucrats 
could perhaps have been expected to have realised the deep rooted 
nature of Finance's concern for controlling expenditure and 
addressed it more thoroughly at an earlier stage. But they did 
not. The Cabinet submission foundered and the proposal retreated 
into another round of inter-departmental negotiations which 
proved fruitless. In February 1982, in response to a question 
about the future development of CDEP, the Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs commented that: 
Various options have been under consideration for some time 
as to how we might reconsider the scheme, how we might look 
at its future. VJ e are trying to find some option that is 
acceptable to all departments involved. They are my own 
department, the Department of Social Security, the Department 
of Finance and a whole lot of other departments. These 
discussions are continuing at both permanent head and 
ministerial level. (CPD Senate 16/2/82:12, see also Senate 
24/11/81:2446, House of Representatives 13/10/81:1963, 
15/10/81:2169, 27/10/81:2555) 
By that time however, despites the Minister's hopes, the proposal 
had all but died in the interstices of interdepartmental debate. 
Three years of reviews had apparently come to nought. The DSS's 
WA UB bulk warrantee scheme remained intact but not to be 
encouraged, as too did the DAA's CDEP, with all its inherent 
problems. Neither the separate departmental nor the 
interdepartmental reviews had been able to resolve the host of 
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problems surrounding the CDEP and social security group payment 
schemes. 
Developments Since 1982 
T h o u g h the i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l w o r k i n g party on i n c o m e 
m a i n t e n a n c e in r e m o t e A b o r i g i n a l c o m m u n i t i e s had o s t e n s i b l y 
failed in its aim of achieving comprehensive reform of the CDEP 
and UE b u l k w a r r a n t e e s c h e m e s , the r e v i e w e x e r c i s e w a s not 
without its consequences. Through DSS involvement in the working 
p a r t y , g r o u p p a y m e n t s c h e m e s had enjoyed s o m e t h i n g of a 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n w i t h i n the D e p a r t m e n t f r o m their nadir in 1978 
w h e n e x p a n s i o n of t h e m had been b a n n e d . The DSS's 1981 s p e c i a l 
b e n e f i t p r o p o s a l , t h o u g h c a u t i o u s about the p r o t e c t i o n of 
individual rights, was far from hostile to the idea of community 
p o o l i n g of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y p a y m e n t s . I n d e e d , the p r o p o s a l 
provided authoritative sanction for a d e l i v e r y m e c h a n i s m w h i c h 
could, potentially at least, support a high degree of centralised 
community organisation of payments. 
Though the special benefit's scheme itself came to nothing, 
there was no reason why the group payment aspect of the proposal 
could not be a p p l i e d to UB; as D i r e c t o r General Lanigan had 
s u g g e s t e d w o u l d have to be the case w h e n he c o n s i d e r e d the 
w o r k i n g party's p r o p o s a l s late in 1980. By M a r c h 1982, w i t h the 
prospects of the special benefit scheme rapidly waning, DSS did 
in fact m o v e in p r e c i s e l y this d i r e c t i o n . The n e w D i r e c t o r 
General gave instructions for the W A bulk warrantee arangements 
to be reformed along the lines suggested in the special benefit 
proposal. In future, the system of a single bulk UB cheque was to 
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be replaced by a collection of individual cheques and a group 
review schedule identifying individual beneficiaries sent to a 
central community point. In fact, in a number of the WA bulk 
warrantee communities, in the face of pressures from 
participating Aborigines, UB payments had already changed over to 
systems involving this or even greater degrees of individualised 
service allocation. Now, DSS was providing some formal sanction 
for these changes and also a restructured general arrangement 
which It believed could facilitate group organisation, while also 
adequately protecting individual rights. The other important 
aspect of the development was that the reformed community payment 
scheme was once again opened for expansion to other remote 
Aboriginal communities, and not only in WA. However, ironically 
enough, the response to the long awaited opening up of the DSS's 
group payment facility was rather limited. By 1985 outside WA, 
only one NT community, Willowra, had taken up the scheme. Within 
WA a couple of new communities had been added to those already on 
group payment arrangements, but a greater number had also dropped 
off in favour of individualised payments. The reasons for this 
apparently unenthusiastic response are themselves worth further 
consideration. 
First, as I shall discuss further in a moment, by 1983 the 
CDEP scheme was itself once again expanding. Second, although the 
DSS had established the operational procedures for community 
payment, it did not actively promote the new scheme. It relied to 
a large extent on Aboriginal communities seeking it out. Even 
taking these factors into account, the rate of take up of the 
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community payment scheme does still seem low. The explanation, I 
suggest, does not lie in accusing protagonists for group payments 
of overstating levels of demand. Rather, as earlier with demands 
for CDEP, it lies in placing the demands for group payment in 
their proper historical perspective. By 1983, when the DSS had 
finally reformed its UB bulk warrantee arrangement into the new 
community payment scheme, the situation in Aboriginal communities 
had moved on somewhat from the mid 70s. Eligibility for UB on an 
individual basis had spread significantly in many communities and 
had come, like eligibility for individualised pensions and family 
allowances before it, to be largely accepted. Where opposition to 
individual UB persisted, in the absence of opportunities for CDEP 
/ 
or formal DSS community payments, some communities had worked out 
informal pooling arrangements of their own. Though these did not 
enjoy the formal sanction of the DSS, they were up and running. 
So as long as individual non-compliance did not become a major 
problem, those running these informal arrangements in communities 
may have seen little need to change them in favour of the formal 
community payment scheme. Ironically then, while the reform of 
the DSS's community payment scheme had been slowly taking shape, 
the demand for UB group payments had, to some extent, been 
reduced. 
As for the CDEP, with the prospects of the special benefit 
proposal fading, DAA and its Minister began once again to think 
about expanding the CDEP in its existing form. DAA, for its part, 
was less worried than it had been about the possibility of 
budgetary explosions. With the freeze on CDEP budgets during 
1980/81, the Department had shown that it could resist demands 
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for ever increasing CDEP allocations. The expectation among 
participating councils was no longer that CDEP would be a 
budgetary free-for-all. Again, from DAA's point of view, the 
scheme had other potential advantages in an economic climate 
which was increasingly one of spending restraint and one in 
which, in response to rising levels of unemployment, job creation 
schemes more generally were enjoying something of a renaissance. 
Available money could be spread thinner and further through CDEP 
than through programs which supported full time award wage 
employment. There was also the possibility in these times of 
increasing unemployment that, using the argument that CDEP was a 
UB alternative, the DAA might be able to make some extra 
budgetary claims of its own. For all these reasons, the CDEP 
scheme was enjoying a return to favour within the DAA during 
1982. 
Late in 1982, the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs 
initiated the formation of yet another interdepartmental 
committee to review the CDEP. The exercise was largely one of 
rehabilitating the scheme after the mauling it had suffered at 
the hands of the previous interdepartmental working party when 
the prospects of the special benefit proposal had appeared 
brighter. The other participants in this latest interdepartmental 
review, the DEIR, DSS and Departments of Finance and Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, were all willing to support the DAA's 
proposal to expand the scheme. They had little reason to raise 
any objection since CDEP, unlike special benefit, was the DAA's 
own established program to do with as it wished. The 
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rehabilitation process was surprisingly straight forward. The 
scheme which two years previously had been frozen, was now 
resurrected as DAA's great hope for Aboriginal self-management in 
remote areas. The review did suggest some budgetary rearrangement 
so that the CDEP scheme's allocation would be determined outside 
the DAA's general allocation. It continued: 
Individual council allocations would be advised early in the 
financial year and communities would be expected to live 
within that allocation unless there were substantial changes 
to the number of eligible people within the community. In 
these circumstances DAA could assist by switching funds 
between communities to even out population movement. 
Unless there was a substantial net addition to the total 
eligible population of eligible CDEP communities, the total 
allocation would not be increased during the financial year. 
Expansion of funding to further new CDEP communities, apart 
from those allowed for in the Budget, would not be considered 
during the course of the financial year. 
Clearly, although DAA intended expanding the CDEP scheme, it was 
not going to let its funding arrangements get out of hand as they 
had done in the late 70s. With this single proviso, CDEP was on 
the way back-
Even the election of a new Labor government in March 1983 
did little to detract from the CDEP's rehabilitation. The Kawke 
Labor government did not reinvigorate the Whitlam government's 
concern for achieving a thorough going award wage and UB economy 
for all Aborigines. Its concerns were rather more like those of 
its Liberal/National party coalition predecessor: cost cutting 
managerial ones. In a political and economic climate where 
employment creation, rather than defense of employment 
conditions, was seen as the priority, CDEP was not particularly 
offensive even to a Labor government. In fact, it has been the 
Kawke Labor government which presided over CDEP's most 
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spectacular expansion. By 1984/85 CDEP had been expanded to cover 
32 communities and to an annual budget of $23M, as compared to 18 
communities and a $7M annual budget at the time of the freeze. In 
so doing, the scheme had moved from accounting for 4.5 to 10 per 
cent of DAA's annual expenditure. 
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PART IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
I began this work by stating that it was about Australian 
government social security policy towards Aborigines, and by 
outlining the shift from the exclusion of Aborigines from the 
social security legislation in the early part of this century to 
their gradual legislative inclusion between 1941 and 1966. I went 
on in chapter 1 to clarify my conceptual approach to the notion 
of policy. I indicated my agreement with Ueclo, Schaffer and 
others who have recently argued that, to be of any analytic 
value, policy has to be defined in terms of commitments and 
courses of governmental action over time, rather than as 
something which can be identified in single statements, 
documents, actions or decisions. The consequence of this 
conceptual approach was that, to say anything of analytic value 
about social security policy towards Aborigines, I needed to 
investigate the patterns of commitment which have existed between 
the DSS and its Aboriginal clientele and how they have developed 
over recent years. Ihe policy had to be observed and analysed as 
it emerged from the strategic interactions of the many 
participants who have been involved in this area of governmental 
activity, both within the formal apparatus of the state and 
outside it. 
Following Heclo, I noted the danger in this approach of 
lapsing into an unanalysed realism, of providing an endless 
account of the strategic interaction of participants without 
adequately analysing the changing courses of governmental 
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commitment and action. In an attempt to guard against this 
possibility, I structured my approach to the case by building on 
recent work by Schaffer and others. Ihe approach was to start at 
the bottom of government administration with the routine daily 
encounters between the rank and file (street level) officials who 
allocate public services and the applicants/clients who receive 
them. I identified the potential for politics, in the sense of 
indeterminacy and contention over the allocation of important 
public resources, which existed even at this level of 
governmental activity. I analysed this level of politics in terms 
of the possibility of manoeuvre within only partially determined 
rule-bound queueing structures for service allocation. I then 
returned my attention to the more usual focus of policy studies, 
to the larger opportunities for choice in the allocation of 
public resources which occur higher up the hierarchies of 
government administration. At this higher level, politics takes 
the form of strategic manoeuvre about queueing structures, rather 
than within them. Over time resources can be redeployed, rules 
can be reinterpreted and participants can take on rather 
different positions in the networks of strategic interaction. The 
stakes of politics at this higher level are larger than at the 
street level, the time scale is longer and the central 
participants are senior rather than rank and file bureaucrats. 
But the processes of deliberation and decision making at the two 
levels are essentially and continually connected. 
Having outlined this 'bottom up' approach to the study of 
policy which grounds the large 'extraordinary' moments of public 
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choice in the 'ordinary' routine choices of service allocation, I 
returned in the rest of part I to provide background material on 
the context of the particular governmental commitments to be 
investigated in this study. Given my conceptual approach to the 
study of policy, any substantial fine grained analysis of social 
security policy towards Aborigines would need to be built on a 
broad scale appreciation of existing patterns of governmental 
activity in both the social security and Aboriginal affairs 
policy arenas. So chapter 2 was concerned to examine the 
structure and operation of the Australian social security system 
in general and to provide some idea of the broader context of 
Australian welfare administration. Chapter 3, on the other hand, 
provided information on the position of Aborigines in Australian 
society and on general governmental approaches to Aborigines, 
both as they existed back in the 1940s and 1950s and as they have 
developed since. 
Parts II and III of the work have been concerned primarily 
to present an historical account of relevant strategic 
interactions between Aborigines, the DSS and other interested 
participants. I have focusssed on events at different levels of 
generality and specificity and on a number of different aspects 
of the relations between the social security system and its new 
Aboriginal clientele. Each part and each chapter within it has 
contributed in a different way to an overall appreciation of 
developing relations between the DSS and Aborigines. They rightly 
give the impression that there has been continual activity and 
debate on a large number of aspects of these relations extending 
from the 1940s to the present. Disputes over matters such as how 
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the Aboriginal clientele should be serviced and how rules should 
be interpreted when applied to Aborigines in a variety of 
circumstances have been continual. Nany of the chapters have 
already provided some subst antial analysis of various aspects of 
these disputes, interspersed with the more historical narrative. 
In these concluding remarks, however, I want to return more 
explicitly to consider the maintenance and transformation of 
relevant patterns of commitment in this area of governmental 
activity; to policy maintenance and transformation as 
analytically understood. 
The major conclusion that needs to be drawn from the body of 
this study is that there has indeed been a considerable 
transformation of the patterns of commitment existing between 
Aborigines and the Australian social security system over the 
last 25 to AO years. This transformation has not, however, 
proceeded in any direct or simple way either from the changes to 
the Social Security Act made in the 1940s and 1950s or from any 
other singular ministerial decision. Rather it has involved a 
continual accumulation of decisions made at a number of different 
locations within the governmental apparatus and on a wide variety 
of matters relevant to relations between the DSS and its new 
Aboriginal clientele. In retrospect, the legislative amendments 
of 1959, which were presented by the then Minister for Social 
Security as 'an occasion of great historic importance', do not in 
fact stand out as singularly important at all. The period of 
greatest change appears to have come much later, and particularly 
after the election of the Ivhitlam government late in 1972. 
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If w e w e r e to try to i d e n t i f y d e c i s i o n s of s i n g u l a r 
importance, we might want to point to the Ivhitlam government's 
1973 Cabinet directive that all Aborigines be incorporated into a 
t h o r o u g h - g o i n g a w a r d w a g e and UB e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e . But then 
a g a i n , as w e s a w in c h a p t e r 9, the d e l i b e r a t i o n s and d e c i s i o n s 
w h i c h a c t u a l l y led to the g r e a t e s t e x p a n s i o n of A b o r i g i n a l 
e l i g i b i l i t y for UB in r e m o t e a r e a s did not o c c u r u n t i l the l a t e 
1970s under the Fraser government. Similarly, as chapter 9 also 
m a d e clear, even today many Aborigines in the remote areas do not 
p a r t i c i p a t e in a n y t h i n g like an a w a r d w a g e and UB e c o n o m y . 
Another decision which we might want to identify as of singular 
i m p o r t a n c e , is the M i n i s t e r f o r S o c i a l S e c u r i t y ' s 1 9 7 7 
announcement of the establishment an Aboriginal unit within the 
DSS's c e n t r a l o f f i c e and a s p e c i a l p u r p o s e A b o r i g i n a l s t a f f i n g 
p r o g r a m in the D e p a r t m e n t ' s state and r e g i o n a l o f f i c e s . But 
a g a i n , as we saw in c h a p t e r 5, s o m e A b o r i g i n a l p u b l i c c o n t a c t 
s t a f f i n g w i t h i n the D S S d a t e d b a c k to 1 975 a n d , in the r e m o t e 
a r e a s at l e a s t , this i n i t i a t i v e d e p e n d e d c r u c i a l l y on the 
e x p a n d e d r e g i o n a l o f f i c e n e t w o r k w h i c h the DSS had b e g u n to 
d e v e l o p d u r i n g the \vhitlam y e a r s . On the o t h e r hand it w a s not 
u n t i l the e a r l y 1980s that the DSS's e m p l o y m e n t of A b o r i g i n a l 
public contact staff and its c o m m i t m e n t to other special purpose 
p r o g r a m i n i t i a t i v e s f o r A b o r i g i n e s a c t u a l l y b e c a m e w e l l 
e s t a b l i s h e d . In s h o r t t h e n , for e v e r y l e g i s l a t i v e , c a b i n e t or 
m i n i s t e r i a l d e c i s i o n w h i c h w e m i g h t w a n t to i d e n t i f y as of 
s i n g u l a r i m p o r t a n c e in c h a n g i n g the p a t t e r n s of c o m m i t m e n t 
existing between the social security system and Aborigines, there 
are m a n y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s w h i c h need to be added a b o u t h o w the 
3 7 1 
decision emerged from the existing setting, how declared 
intentions did in fact affect exisiting commitments and how both 
the intentions and the commitments themselves either did or did 
not become modified by subsequent developments. So rather than 
being the result of singular isolated decisions, the 
transformation of social security policy towards Aborigines has 
been the result of continual deliberation and decision making on 
a wide range of related matters. 
Though the transformation of social security policy towards 
Aborigines has been both gradual and on a number of different 
fronts, it has by no means been haphazard or without direction. 
Some consistent trends are readily apparent. In part II of this 
work I attempted to analyse recent changes in the roles and 
resources of participants involved in this area of governmental 
activity in terms of a shift in the nature of Aboriginal access 
structures. 
In the 1960s and before. Aborigines were legally and 
institutionally set apart from other Australians as the subjects 
of special purpose welfare systems administered by state-level 
Aboriginal welfare authorities and their delegates. Those placed 
in charge of Aborigines in these systems enjoyed a monopoly over 
the control of Aboriginal access to the resources of the larger 
society and so became their patrons. They had the power to 
control and manage groups of Aborigines as they saw fit with 
little oversight or competition from others and with a high 
degree of personal autonomy and discretion. With the legislative 
inclusion of Aborigines in the social security system in the 
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1940s and 1950s, these new types of payments f o r Abor ig ines were 
l a r g e l y fed i n t o the e x i s t i n g we l l e s t a b l i s h e d system of w e l f a r e 
p a t r o n a g e . They were u s u a l l y made d i r e c t t o t h o s e i n c h a r g e o f 
A b o r i g i n e s and in such a way as t o r e i n f o r c e , r a t h e r than 
u n d e r m i n e , t h e i r p o s i t i o n o f m o n o p o l y c o n t r o l o v e r A b o r i g i n a l 
a c c e s s . In t i m e , h o w e v e r , t h i s p a t t e r n o f commitment t o the 
s e r v i c i n g of Abor ig ines with s o c i a l s e c u r i t y payments began to be 
chal lenged. I'he growth of Commonwealth government involvement in 
A b o r i g i n a l a f f a i r s a f t e r t h e 1967 r e f e r e n d u m , and m o r e 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the e l e c t i o n of the Whitlam Labor government 
in 1 972, was the s o u r c e o f a m a j o r s h i f t in g o v e r n m e n t a l 
a p p r o a c h e s to A b o r i g i n e s . The s t a t e - l e v e l A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e 
a u t h o r i t i e s were taken o v e r , e x c e p t in Qld, and r e p l a c e d by a 
Commonwealth government depar tment i n t e n t on e n c o u r a g i n g 
Abor ig ina l community organ isat i on and s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The new 
DAA's a p p r o a c h l e d t o a p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f n o n - g o v e r n m e n t 
Abor ig ina l o rgan i sa t i ons run, to greater and l e s s e r degrees , by 
A b o r i g i n e s t h e m s e l v e s . A b o r i g i n e s as w e l l as w h i t e s began to 
compete f o r the intermediary p o s i t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e between the 
DSS and i t s Abor ig inal c l i e n t e l e . Competit ion f o r i n f l u e n c e over 
t h i s growing stream o f resources became intense and the a b i l i t y 
of any one extra-departmental intermediary to c o n t r o l the s o c i a l 
s e c u r i t y p a y m e n t s f l o w i n g t o g r o u p s o f A b o r i g i n e s as 
comprehensively as in the past became lessened . At the same time 
as t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t and as ano ther a s p e c t o f the Commonwealth 
government's new approach to Abor ig ines , mainstream departments 
o f government l i k e the DSS were b e i n g e n c o u r a g e d to pay more 
a t t e n t i o n to the A b o r i g i n a l p o r t i o n o f t h e i r c l i e n t e l e . This 
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gradually led to an inc reased DSS awareness of Aborigines and to 
specific DSS commitments such as the appointment of Aboriginal 
staff and the promotion of small ancillary programs within the 
DSS intended to facilitate Aboriginal access to departmental 
services. The net result of these changes has been to bring the 
DSS much closer to its Aboriginal clientele and so also to 
undermine the established highly patronal Aboriginal welfare 
structure of the 1960s and before. An access structure which was 
highly monopolistic and personalised has become considerably more 
pluralistic, open and competitive, but also more rule bound. 
Aborigines are in a far better position to avail themselves of 
the opportunities for resources presented by the DSS. They are 
also, through the new Aboriginal presence within the DSS, in a 
far better position to have their demands for further change 
heard. The DSS, on the other hand, is in a far better position to 
ensure that its services reach Aborigines in ways consistent with 
its established body of rules. 
The fact that most of this change in Aboriginal access to 
social security payments has occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, 
and not during the 1960s and before, suggests that the 
legislative changes of the 1940s and 1950s were not of themselves 
a sufficient development to radically alter the pattern of 
effective Aboriginal exclusion from the social security system 
which then existed. Indeed, the 1960s provided many examples of 
the new social security payments for Aborigines being thoroughly 
incorporated into the exisiting structure of special purpose 
welfare patronage without any effective change. It was not until 
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the state-level special purpose welfare authority approach to 
Aboriginal affairs was itself directly challenged by greater 
Commonwealth involvement in this area of policy, that the 
potential for change inherent in Aboriginal inclusion in the 
social security system began to be realised. It was only then 
that the payment of social security money to Aborigines became a 
part of a larger change in Aboriginal access structures. To 
support this contention that changing patterns of Aboriginal 
access to social security payments have been part of larger 
changes in Aboriginal access structures in recent years, I look 
to other works which have attempted to analyse recent changes in 
the socio-economic and political circumstances of Aborigines in 
ways similar to those I have employed in this study in the 
context of the social security system. 
In his study of Aboriginal politics in the south western 
area of Australia around Perth, Howard portrayed recent 
t 
developments in Aboriginal politics as an expansion of the 
'inter-ethnic field', which have provided increased opportunities 
for Aboriginal involvement in 'leadership/broker age' roles. Of 
the increasing Commonwealth government involvement in Aboriginal 
affairs after the 1967 referendum and into the 1970s, he 
commented : 
One result was enlargement of the field. This meant that 
Aborigines were able to deal with and utilize a more 
heterogeneous non-Aboriginal component. It became possible to 
seek support and favours from both federal and state 
politicians and bureaucrats. There were also new power 
relations among Whites which potentially gave Aborigines more 
room for manoeuvring. In general, the political environment 
became somewhat less restrictive for those qualified by White 
standards to take an active part in the inter-ethnic field 
(Howard 1981: 96). 
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After returning to Perth in 1980, Howard commented further that a 
number of government departments had: 
i m p r o v e d t h e i r own a b i l i t i e s to p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s to 
A b o r i g i n e s in P e r t h . A b o r i g i n a l e m p l o y e e s of t h e s e 
departments are now better trained and they often play a 
larger role in day-to-day decision-making within departments 
(Howard 1981: 151-2). 
Later he commented : 
The changing s i tuat ion in Aboriginal a f f a i r s has a f fected 
individual Aboriginal leader/brokers in different ways. New 
opportunit ies have been created w i th in government for 
younger, better educated Aborigines who show promise and who 
are w i l l i n g to accept the bureaucratic rules of the game 
(Howard 1981: 154). 
In his account of the p o l i t i c s of service de l ivery in the small 
Aboriginal towns and outstations of the Katherine region of the 
Ml, Gerritsen provided a similar analysis relating to Aboriginal 
communities at the opposite end of the geographic spectrum. He 
c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d the i n c r e a s e d number of g o v e r n m e n t 
departments, both Commonwealth and NT, which had begun to take 
some interest in these communities. He also noted the increased 
opportunities for Aboriginal involvement in local leadership and 
intermediation roles, and was acutely aware of the expanded room 
for manoeuvre which this multiplicity of interested departments 
allowed these new Aboriginal leaders/brokers (Gerritsen 1982 a 
and b). Gerritsen referred to the Aborigines taking on these new 
opportunities for involvement in the sphere of intermediation as 
'dominant' and 'prominent' men. Though this terminology d i f f e r s 
from Howard's and my own, the analysis has many points in common 
and indicates a general transformation of Aboriginal/government 
relations along the lines I have identified in this study in the 
context of the social security system (see also Loveday 1983) . 
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Aboriginal access structures do appear to have become both more 
open and more pluralistic in recent years than they were in the 
1960s and before. There are now a far greater range of government 
departments offering service opportunities to Aborigines and a 
far greater range of non-government organisations and their 
leaders competing for positions of intermediary influence. The 
ability of any one individual to personally control Aboriginal 
access to the resource of the larger society has been 
considerably lessened, while the ability of various government 
departments to deliver specialised services in rule governed ways 
has been considerably increased. Changing patterns of access to 
social security payments have been an important and integral part 
of this more general transformation of Aboriginal access 
structures. 
Having emphasised the common analytic aspects of changes in 
the patterns of commitment existing between the social security 
system and its Aboriginal clientele in recent years, it is 
perhaps wise to reiterate a somewhat contrary theme of this work 
which has emphasised the need to distinguish at times between the 
circumstances of Aborigines in different locations. Although I am 
suggesting that patterns of Aboriginal access to social security 
payments have changed in similar ways all over Australia in 
recent years, 1 am by no means claiming that the changes have 
been uniform or constant across the geographical spread of 
Aboriginal communities. Following Rowley and others, I have 
maintained some distinction between the circumstances of 
Aborigines in the more settled and the more remote areas and have 
argued that changes in patterns of access to social security 
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payments have generally proceeded further and earlier in the more 
settled areas. It is for this reason that the debates of the 
1950s and 1960s often focused more on the settled regions while 
the debates of more recent years have related more strongly to 
Aborigines in remote areas. There has also been a need to 
distinguish between developments in the various states and 
territories of Australia. This last need has largely been the 
result of the peculiar federal dimension of developments in 
Aboriginal welfare in Australia in recent years. Because an 
approach dominated by the Commonwealth government has been 
slowly taking over from one focused almost exclusively at the 
state level of Australian government, developments have often 
been negotiated differently in different states. This has been so 
even in an area of government activity such as social security, 
which has long been a Commonw^ealth government preserve. The state 
branches of the CSS have faced different State government 
reactions to the new approach to Aboriginal welfare and have 
themselves often reacted in slightly different ways. Even so, the 
general point still stands that Aboriginal access to social 
security payments and the DSS's commitments to Aborigines have 
generally changed in similar directions throughout Australia. 
This is so even in Qld, where an old style state-level Aboriginal 
welfare authority has existed until very recently, and arguably 
still continues to do so. 
Whereas in part II of this work I was concerned to sketch 
the transformation of commitments between the social security 
system and Aborigines in broad outline and to identify the 
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general nature of that transformation, in part III I inquired 
more closely into particular aspects of relations between the DSS 
and Aborigines and into the details of the processes through 
which change had been occurring. In entitling part III 'Playing 
by the Rules', I have identified one central characteristic of 
these processes of change; their respect for the established 
legislative rules of the social security system. Change has 
occurred within these rules rather than by directly challenging 
them. It has proceeded through debates and decisions about rule 
interpretation and resource deployment rather than through 
wholesale challenges to the legislation. This is not to say that 
change has been merely about insubstantial details. In fact, the 
study has revealed just how much change can occur within a given 
body of legislative rules purely through different rule 
interpretations and different deployments of resources. Debate 
has been carried on in ways acceptable to its adm^inistrative 
setting, while treating the legislative provisions as given. But 
it has bee none the less a political struggle over the allocation 
of important public resources because of that. 
The impetus for changing established patterns of commitment 
between the DSS and its Aboriginal clientele has come from 
various interested participants who have at times been 
dissatisfied with particular aspects of existing arrangements. 
Sometimes governments have brought strong intentions to bear, 
such as when the Whitlam government declared its intention to 
close down the old NT Welfare Branch's under award emplojonent and 
training programs or when the Fraser government persisted with 
its idea of a UB-alternative works program for remote Aboriginal 
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c o m m u n i t i e s . More u s u a l l y , h o w e v e r , the s o u r c e o f c h a l l e n g e t o 
e x i s t i n g DSS commitments has been from p a r t i c i p a n t s more c l o s e l y 
and r o u t i n e l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r o c e s s e s o f w e l f a r e 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n : from other government agenc ies , from within the 
DSS i t s e l f or d i r e c t f rom the A b o r i g i n a l c l i e n t s and the n o n -
government we l fa re o r g a n i s a t i o n s ac t ing as t h e i r i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . 
Among other government agenc ies , the DAA and i t s predecessor 
the OAA stand out as those most c o n s i s t e n t l y involved in attempts 
to i n f l u e n c e the p a t t e r n s o f DSS commitment t o i t s A b o r i g i n a l 
c l i e n t e l e . I t was the OAA whi ch f i r s t c h a l l e n g e d the DSS's n o n -
r e c o g n i t i o n of Abor ig inal second wives back in 1970 and the DAA 
w h i c h , d u r i n g the Whit lam y e a r s , pushed h a r d e s t f o r the DSS t o 
employ A b o r i g i n a l f i e l d s t a f f t o more a d e q u a t e l y s e r v i c e i t s 
growing Abor ig inal c l i e n t e l e . It has a l so been the DAA which has 
in r e c e n t y e a r s been c o n s t a n t l y engaged in d e b a t e w i t h the DSS 
over the r e l a t i v e mer i t s o f i t s own community-based CDEP scheme 
and the DSS's p r o v i s i o n o f ind iv idua l UB f o r Abor ig ines in remote 
a r e a s . Other government a g e n c i e s which have t r i e d to i n f l u e n c e 
p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t s o f the DSS's a p p r o a c h to i t s A b o r i g i n a l 
c l i e n t e l e at var ious t imes inc lude the ALRC with i t s i n t e r e s t in 
the DSS's n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n o f A b o r i g i n a l p o l y g a m y , the CES w i t h 
i t s i n v o l v m e n t in the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the 'works t e s t ' to 
A b o r i g i n e s in r e m o t e a r e a s and, o f c o u r s e , in the days b e f o r e 
t h e i r d i s b a n d em e n t , t h e s t a t e - l e v e l A b o r i g i n a l w e l f a r e 
a u t h o r i t i e s . 
In recent years , cha l l enges to var ious aspects of the DSS's 
commitments to Abor ig ines have a l s o been generated within the DSS 
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itself. After the establishment of Aboriginal service staffing 
within the DSS in 1977, these new DSS staff took over from the 
DAA in b e c o m i n g the m a j o r protagonists pushing for further 
d e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t m e n t s to this type of e m p l o y m e n t and in 
raising specific issues of rule interpretation of relevance to 
Aborigines. The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a state-like NT branch of the 
DSS in 1979 has also provided a higher intra-departmental profile 
for Aboriginal issues. 
Of particular interest in this study has been the w a y in 
which individual cases and other developments at the street level 
of social security a d m i n i s t r a t i o n have often provided both the 
catalyst and the focus for higher level debates over rule 
interpretation and resource deployment issues. It was the 1966 W A 
case and the 1967 Qld case which precipitated debate about the 
precise treatment of Aboriginal woman by the BSS as either legal 
or de facto wives, and it was the 1980 Alice Springs appeal case 
which provided a focus for challenges to the DSS's recognition of 
Aboriginal second wives for the purposes of disqualification from 
SPB while for all other social security purposes they were not so 
recognised. In the debate over Aboriginal eligibility for UB in 
remote areas, it was the pastoral station walk offs in the NT in 
the m i d 1960s which provided the first successful challenge to 
general Aboriginal ineligibility in these areas and it was the 
Papunya incident of 1977 w h i c h directly challenged the 'work 
history' interpretation of the UB eligiblity criteria which had 
gained c u r r e n c y in the NT offices of the DSS since 1974. 
Similarly, it was the Redfern regional office's submission to the 
M i n i s t e r for Social S e c u r i t y on p r o o f of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
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difficulties which served to focus attention on the possiblity of 
extending the concessions already made to Aborigines in this 
a s p e c t of d e p a r t m e n t a l p r o c e d u r e s to o t h e r s among the 
Department's clientele. The point is not that these street level 
disputes have in any way logically preceded or displaced higher 
level policy debates over the appropriate application of social 
security rules and resources to Aborigines , but that they have 
often provided an immediate focus for those debates. Individual 
c a s e s need to be d e t e r m i n e d and when they i n v o l v e an 
indeterminate or contentious issue in rule i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or 
resource deployment, they make that issue that much more pressing 
on s e n i o r a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . W h e r e there i s no case to be 
determined, issues have often been more easily left unresolved. 
So the interaction between street level disputes and higher level 
policy debates has been complex and continuous, with neither 
having absolute precedence in setting the course of policy 
developments , but with street level d isputes often seving to 
focus more senior departmental deliberations on precise matters 
of concern. Even when senior DSS administrators have attempted to 
settle a particular rule interpretation or resource deployment 
issue one way or another, there has of course been nothing to 
stop d i s s a t i s f i e d part ic ipants re-raising the issue whenever 
another opportunity presented i t s e l f . I nd iv idual cases at the 
regional office level of administration have often presented one 
such opportunity. 
Because since the 1960s the debates over relations between 
Aborigines and the social security system have been conducted so 
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m u c h w i t h i n the existing body of legislative rules, there have 
been a n u m b e r of types of a r g u m e n t s w h i c h have recurred with 
characteristic regularity throughout the different disputes. For 
example, arguments can proceed from an exact and literal reading 
of specific provisions of the social security legislation. This 
strategy has long been a favourite of those pushing for the DSS 
to recognise that Aboriginal second wives do in fact come under 
the definitions of wife in the Social Security Act and should 
therefore be recognised for social security purposes. It was also 
the method of argument preferred by Director General Lanigan when 
he pointed out that the provisions of the legislation could not 
allow special benefit to be paid to those eligible for UB. 
Alternatively, arguments can proceed from claims about general 
legislative intent. In the polygamy and tribal marriage debate, 
the claim has often been made that the makers of the legislation 
never intended the provisions of the Social Security Act to cover 
polygamous unions. S i m i l a r l y in the UB eligibility debate the 
claim has often been that the legislators never intended that the 
UB provisions would cover circumstances of majority unemployment 
among the working age' population of a community. 
Perhaps m o s t c o m m o n of all has been resort to a third type 
of argument which proceeds from the principle of equal treatment 
under the rules for those in equal c i r c u m s t a n c e s . By comparing 
Aborigines in particular circumstances to others among the DSS's 
clientele and arguing that their circumstances are either similar 
or different, different protagonists have attempted to persuade 
the DSS to treat Aboriginal cases in particular ways within the 
rules. Over the years Aborigines in various c i r c u m s t a n c e s have 
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been c o n v e n i e n t l y compared to a v a s t a r r a y o f o t h e r s in the 
Austral ian community. Abor ig ina l wives have been compared with 
b o t h de f a c t o and de j u r e w h i t e w i v e s . A b o r i g i n a l s e c o n d w i v e s 
have been compared w i t h A b o r i g i n a l f i r s t w i v e s . A b o r i g i n a l 
unemployed in r e m o t e a r e a s have been compared w i t h w h i t e 
' a l t e r n a t i v e l i f e s t y l e r s ' r e g a r d e d by the DSS as undeserving of 
UB b e c a u s e o f the s e l f - c h o s e n n a t u r e o f t h e i r unemployment , or 
more commonly j u s t treated as i n e l i g i b l e f o r UB because judged to 
be in a fundamental ly d i f f e r e n t labour market p o s i t i o n to other 
unemployed A u s t r a l i a n s . On the o t h e r s i d e o f the UB d e b a t e , 
A b o r i g i n e s in r e m o t e a r e a s have i n c r e a s i n g l y been compared 
d i r e c t l y with the growing number of other Austral ian unemployed 
and r e g a r d e d as in an e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r l a b o u r m a r k e t 
s i t u a t i o n . The l i s t o f comparisons could be extended g r e a t l y , but 
would o n l y s e r v e t o r e i n f o r c e the c e n t r a l p o i n t o f d i s p u t e in 
th i s third type of argument; equal treatment under the ru les f o r 
t h o s e in e q u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s s t i l l l e a v e s open the i s s u e about 
what are in f a c t judged to be equal c ircumstances . 
More o c c a s i o n a l l y , p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e s e d e b a t e s over the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y ru les to Aborig ines have invoked 
other arguments concerning the c o n s i s t e n c y or i n c o n s i s t e n c y o f 
the DSS's approach to Abor ig inal cases across the range of s o c i a l 
s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e c a t e g o r i e s . They have a l s o invoked arguments 
proceeding from premises about the nature of Abor ig inal s o c i e t y 
to conc lus ions about the way in which p a r t i c u l a r aspects of the 
s o c i a l s e c u r i t y system should be appl ied to Abor ig inal c l i e n t s . 
The uses o f t h i s a r r a y o f arguments have been d i v e r s e and 
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t h e y h a v e o f t e n b e e n s e t o n e a g a i n s t a n o t h e r i n t h e c o u r s e of 
d i s p u t e s . They h a v e , i t s e e m s , b e e n an a c k n o w l e d g e d m e a n s f o r 
c o n d u c t i n g p o l i t i c s w i t h i n t h e b o u n d s o f t h e e x i s i t i n g 
l e g i s l a t i v e p r o v i s i o n s , f o r a r g u i n g a b o u t w h i c h A b o r i g i n e s s h o u l d 
g e t what s o c i a l s e c u r i t y r e s o u r c e s when and how w h i l e l e a v i n g t h e 
l e g i s l a t i o n i t s e l f i n t a c t . P a r t I I I of t h i s work h a s d e m o n s t r a t e d 
j u s t how much s c o p e f o r s u c h p o l i t i c s i n an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
s e t t i n g t h e r e can i n f a c t be , a l b e i t i n t h i s e x a m p l e i n a r a t h e r 
t r a n s i t i o n a r y p e r i o d and i n v o l v i n g o n l y a s m a l l and a t y p i c a l 
p o r t i o n of t h e s o c i a l s e c u r i t y s y s t e m ' s c l i e n t e l e . That p o l i t i c s 
i n an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s e t t i n g i n v o l v i n g A b o r i g i n e s and t h e s o c i a l 
s e c u r i t y s y s t e m w i l l c o n t i n u e f o r some t i m e t o c o m e , f o r 
a l t h o u g h much has changed i n r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e r e a r e s t i l l many 
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h i s a r e a o f g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i v i t y who a r e 
d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f t h e p r e s e n t p a t t e r n s o f 
c o m m i t m e n t . S o c i a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y t o w a r d s A b o r i g i n e s i s t o t h i s 
d a y s t i l l e m e r g i n g f r o m t h e s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s of t h o s e 
i n v o l v e d i n t h i s a r e a o f g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i v i t y . The v a r i o u s 
d e b a t e s a b o u t how e x a c t l y A b o r i g i n e s s h o u l d be i n c l u d e d i n t h e 
A u s t r a l i a n s o c i a l s e c u r i t y s y s t e m w h i c h I h a v e i d e n t i f i e d i n t h i s 
work , t hough s l o w l y s h i f t i n g t h e i r g r o u n d , w i l l c o n t i n u e f o r some 
t i m e t o c o m e . 
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ENDNOTES 
1)Naming. For the sake of convenience and clarity in the text, I 
have adopted the practice of refering to programs, payments, 
government departments, departmental offices, etc, by the same 
names throughout the account, rather than by the names by which 
they were known at the time. I have opted for the present name, 
though with some exceptions. 
The first exception is where I am quoting others, in which 
case 1 have respected their usage and provided clarification when 
necessary. The second is where I have judged that the change of 
name coincided with a s i g n i f i c a n t change of approach, in which 
case the retention of the h istorical name is of importance in 
indicating that fact. References to the state-level Aboriginal 
welfare authori ties follow this practice. In particular, the Qld 
Aboriginal welfare authority is referred to throughout as the 
Department of Aboriginal and Islander Advancement even though it 
has now become the Department of Community Services. As well as 
emphasising this organisation 's status as the last old-style 
special purpose state-level Aboriginal welfare authority , this 
usage also serves to d ist inguish it from the new Commonwealth 
Department of Community Services. The third exception relates to 
the t itles of senior o f f icers within the DSS. I have used 
Director General, Deputy Director General, Assistant Director 
General, Director, etc. These have recently been changed to be 
more in line with other Commonwealth government departments in 
which the department head is known as the Secretary. 
As regards the past names of benef its , departments, etc 
referred to frequently , some of the more important are as 
follows. Family allowances were previously known as child 
endowment and w i v e s ' p e n s i o n s as w i v e s ' a l l o w a n c e s . The 
Department of Social Security was previously known as the 
Department of Social Services. 
2) Throughout this work I have used the term 'Aborigines ' to 
refer to the particular portion of the Australian population with 
whom I am concerned. Historically usage and capitalisation have 
varied between terms such as 'aboriginal native', 'Aboriginal' or 
'Aborigine' . Present usage is split between Aboriginal and 
Aborigine, with a trend back to the former in recent years. I 
have opted for the l a t t e r , but have respected others usage in 
quoting them. The term is taken as including Torres Strait 
Islanders, though when events and practices relating specifically 
to these Islanders are being discussed , they are referred to 
directly. 
3) Much of the detail relating to events in recent years has been 
obtained from interviews with some of those involved and from 
inspection of relevant departmental f i l e s . As f i l e s are not 
generally available and as letters and memoranda can usually be 
found in numerous file locations, I have chosen when quoting from 
file not to provide specific references. I have instead attempted 
to establish the context of each quote in the narrative . I also 
provide below a list of files consulted. 
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DSS Central Office Files - Canberra. 
7 9 / 3 4 9 1 , 7 8 / 1 0 6 8 8 , 7 4 / 3 3 9 5 , A b o r i g i n a l E l i g i b i l i t y f o r 
Unemployment and Sickness Benefit. 
74/3187, Proposal to Pay Award Rates to Aborigines in the NT. 
80/591, Payment of Unemployment and Sickness Benefit in Remote 
Areas - Working Party Aspects. 
8 1 / 1 9 3 , 8 0 / 4 5 5 9 , 8 0 / 2 5 0 9 , Income Security in Remote Areas -
Working Party. 
83/1918, Income Security in Remote Areas. 
82/258, Social Implications of Payment of Unemployment Benefit in 
Remote Areas. 
81/4019, UB - Bulk Payment in WA - Proposal for Amendement. 
8 0 / 4 8 4 3 , A b o r i g i n a l Unit - S p l i t Payments in A b o r i g i n a l 
Communities. 
79/72, Polygamous Marriage - Eligibility of 'Wives' for Pensions 
and Benefits. 
8 2 / 9 0 8 0 , 8 1 / 1 4 9 6 , A b o r i g i n a l Customary Law - Recognition 
Discussion Paper - the Law Reform Commission. 
8 2 / 3 4 7 2 , Austral ian Law Reform Commission - Reference On 
Customary Law. 
82/2377, Aboriginal Unit NT. 
83/7392, Aboriginal Unit WA. 
80/569, Aboriginal Unit Qld. 
DSS NT Office - Darwin. 
80/62, 77/8 , Benefit Payments - Remote Areas. 
4 / 2 / 6 Tribal Marriages - Polygamous. 
DAA NT Office - Darwin. 
7 6 / 1 1 4 4 , Social Service Benef its for Aboriginals on Pastoral 
Properties in NT - Policy. 
76/1091, Social Service Benefits for Aboriginals on Settlements 
in NT - Policy. 
77/97 , DAA Functional Arrangments with DSS. 
3 8 7 
77/180, CDEP - Policy and Procedures. 
80/503, Income Maintenance in Remote Aboriginal Communities, 
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